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Abstract  
The objective of this study is to measure the level of the European Union’s (EU) 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) price support system (PSS) applied to producers in the 
EU-15 and in Turkey. The producer subsidy estimate (PSE) method has been used to 
determine protection levels for selected cereal products from the beginning of the application 
of the PSE method in 1986 to date. In addition, this study attempts to examine the empirical 
findings of the PSE in the light of CAP reforms and EU enlargements during the period 1986- 
2003.  
The expected contribution of this study is to determine which support instruments, 
such as countervailing levies or direct payments (based on limited or unlimited area) against 
export subsidies, voluntary or compulsory set-aside measures and price interventions, are 
more appropriate for the CAP in reducing destabilizing effects on trade with selected products 
between the EU and Turkey with respect to distribution effects (how income is distributed 
between different groups involved in the production operation process). 
 Does the current PSS of the CAP have positive effects on agricultural producers in 
Turkey as a non-member country?  
The major finding of this dissertation is the evaluation of benefits and costs of 
common agricultural policies of the EU on fair trade. The assessment of the PSE of the EU’s 
CAP will be used to determine the impact of current support measures of the CAP reforms on 
fair trade and consumer welfare, and how the CAP measures can be reformed for the 
improvement of producer gain in accordance with fair trade.     
 
Keywords: European Union, Price Support System, Common Agricultural Policy, 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent, Unfair Competition, Tariffs and Non Tariff Measures, Turkey. 
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SIS  State Institute for Statistics in Turkey 
TGB  Turkish Grain Board 
 TEU  Treaty of the European Union 
 TENs  Trans European Network 
 TL  Turkish Lira 
 TR  Turkey 
 UA  Unit of Account 
 UEF  Union of European Federalists 
 UN  United Nations 
 UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
 URAA  Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture  
 VAT  Value Added Tax 
 VER  Voluntary Export Restraint 
 VIL  Variable import levy 
 WEU  Western European Union 
 WTO  World Trade Organisation 
 YES  Youth for Europe Scheme      
 
 
 (Selected Abbreviations relevant to the EU) 
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 Introduction 
  
Throughout the world there is probably no single country that would not use protective 
measures in agriculture. However, there are some differences in the ways that the price 
support system is being implemented in various European countries. In the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) the price support system prevents producers’ losses through 
different support measures, such as, direct payments with set-aside measures, intervention 
prices, export subsidies, import quotas and production subsidies. 
 This study is aimed at bringing about a better understanding of the European Union‘s 
(EU) CAP price support system (PSS). The goal of this study is to assess the impact of the 
CAP measures in the light of the reform proposals during the period 1986-2003, and to 
determine the best possible measure which could be introduced into the CAP system in order 
to reduce the trade distortion effect between the EU-15 and Turkey (as a non member 
country). 
 In the EU’s CAP the removal of trade barriers occurred after the Single European Act, 
but the EU, the impact of the CAP’s PSS has had a negative impact on the liberalisation of 
trade. In the EU the aim of protection is to protect internal producers from lower cost 
production of the third world countries.  
In the Seattle World Trade Organisation (WTO) meetings, the negative reactions of 
less developed countries to a reduction of the support measures in agriculture applied by the 
developed countries climbed to the highest level ever and continued until the WTO meetings 
in Japan. However, support measures are not used only in developed countries, but also in the 
developing counties.  
The impact of the support measures are only considered in the EU’s CAP. But its 
effects on third world country producers are also questioned. In the EU the impact of the 
support measures are researched for the EU-12/15 and, outside the Union, Turkey is 
considered as a non-member country in order to estimate the effects of such measures on 
selected agricultural products (cereals) trade. The support measures are researched in order to 
determine their effects on the producer gain, and whether the customs union theory of Viner 
(trade creation/ distortion effects) has been affected. Which of these support measures could 
reduce the trade distortion on the free market? 
A free market leads to more efficient use of scarce resources which results in the 
maximization of global wealth and enables people to benefit economically. In such a market 
fair trade can be based on the comparative advantages theory, because the PSS may cause a 
substitution of efficient production of an exportable commodity in the third world by 
inefficient products of EU members.  
“Removal of barriers might be accompanied by a re-segmentation of national markets 
via anti-competitive behaviour (e.g. cartels, abuse of dominant position, state aids).”1 
Accordingly, competition policy is an essential tool for preventing such behaviour and for 
translating efficiency gains into lower prices and better quality for consumers. However, in 
the Union, reform proposals are used to maintain sufficient income for domestic producers, 
instead of replacing the existing system with more productive and competitive new 
regulations.  
 In the last decade the impact of globalisation has contributed to trade liberalisation. 
The development of communication and information technology has brought not only nations, 
but also producers closer in the marketing of their products for consumers. 
 The EU follows a process of integrating the European countries into a single market. 
However, the implementation of a certain number of measures has encountered problems 
                                                 
1European Commission: Panorama of EU Industry 97 volume1, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Brussels, 1997, p.31 
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(technical barriers and public procurement etc.). The implementation of the single market 
program (SMP) has contributed to globalisation of the economy and a substantial increase in 
the volume and effectiveness of the Community Structural Fund assistance. The 
implementation of the single market program and monetary union increased the attractiveness 
of trade and foreign investments (FDI) into the EU. The improvement of communication and 
information technology, the eastern enlargement of the EU and the reunification of Germany 
increased the impact of the EU in the world market. All these developments in the EU made 
an important contribution to the globalisation of the world market.    
The increasing trend towards liberal economics compels the CAP to reduce trade 
barriers in agriculture. Especially harsh criticisms of the CAP support measures come from 
the WTO, which comprises of 146 members and endeavours to liberalise trade in agriculture. 
 In 2004 the EU enlarged its number of member countries to 25 and some other 
applicant countries are on the waiting list. The economic power of the EU is evident, except 
in the CAP. This study will analyse the impact of the support measures of the CAP by 
bringing about a better understanding of these measures and will estimate the best possible 
measure – this being  the one that has the least trade distortion effect on the market. 
 A summary of chapters is given below:       
In the first chapter of the thesis the EU is briefly introduced and the theoretical 
foundations of free trade, the impact of the price regulation theory (cobweb theorem) and the 
importance of the theory of comparative advantage are examined within the perspective of 
other trade theories.   
 In the second chapter the EU’s CAP and the price support system are defined. The 
impact of the price support measures and the currently realised CAP reforms are analysed. 
The function of the CAP, its benefits and costs, and possible improvements of the CAP 
policies are researched.  
 In the third chapter the methodological background to the measurement of different 
levels of agricultural protection is described.  
The structure of the protection and application of tariff and non- tariff measures of the 
CAP is analysed. The impacts of tariff and non-tariff measures of the CAP are considered 
only for selected cereal products (common wheat, barley, maize, and other cereals) to 
estimate the impact of support measures by using the PSE (Producer Subsidy Estimate) 
method of the OECD. It is asked, which of these measures will best fit into the CAP in order 
to reduce unfair trade distortion on export and import of agricultural products? 
The fourth chapter attempts to examine the empirical findings in the light of the CAP 
reforms from 1986 to date. The impact of the CAP measures of the EU on economic 
parameters such as growth, employment, price, import and export are analysed.  
In the last chapter concluding remarks concern the necessary policy changes that must 
be undertaken, both in Turkey and in the CAP support system, and finally, the findings of this 
research on the impact of the price support system of the CAP are interpreted.  
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1. The European Union  
 
In the EU’s CAP the application of the price support system has reduced the welfare 
of consumers whilst producers gain has increased during the last decade. Nevertheless the EU 
is attractive. The number of member countries increased from 6 in 1957 to 25 in May 2004 
and there are some more eastern countries, which have applied to the Union for full-
membership.  
 
1.1 Theoretical Perspective of International Trade      
 
One of the most important reasons for free trade is the increasing impact of 
multinational firms on world politics and economics. In the past, international trade depended 
on international relations between politicians. In the last decade the increasing role of 
multinational firms reduced the role of national states in world economy and politics. The 
new world order is directly related to the theories of world politics.    
There have been three main approaches to world politics: “Realism on the power 
relations between states, liberalism on a much wider set of interactions between states and 
non states actors and world system theory on the patterns of the world economy.”2 Liberalism 
affects the world’s economy, social, cultural and also political events. Neo-liberal economics 
empowers and enriches big business, especially multinational firms. Governments' debt 
reduction policies shift income and wealth from wages to profits. Slashed food subsidies and 
welfare payments cut the floor from under the labour force. Monetary policies attack wages 
through high interest rates and high unemployment. Consequently, it is obvious that free trade 
is not bringing global welfare to the nations of the world.  
In the EU the notion of free trade has developed, and over time has gained in 
importance. In the Single European Act (SEA) 1986, all technical, fiscal and physical barriers 
were removed and all member countries confirmed the objective of the progressive realization 
of an economic and monetary union. In 1996 the SLIM Project (Simpler Legislation for the 
Internal Market) simplified the rules and reduced the difficulties of the single market. It 
simplified agricultural measures to ensure facilities for internal producers within the EU 
market.  
The removal of the trade barriers, the foundation of customs union (1968), single 
market (1993) and monetary union (2002) in the EU contributed to the liberalisation of trade. 
However, liberalisation of trade in the world was mostly observed in the industrial sector and 
not in agriculture. The EU’s CAP price support system, in particular, was reformed to reduce 
the negative effects on agricultural trade. However, insufficient reform proposals have made 
only a minor contribution to trade liberalisation in agriculture which affects most of the third 
world countries.  
The impact of the EU’s CAP price support system can be analysed in the light of 
international trade theories, which can be classified into four groups: "First, inter industry 
trade based on comparative advantages and specialization; second, inter industry trade based 
on factor endowments of a general or a sector-specific kind; third, intra industry trade; and 
fourth, strategic trade, which in itself is a special variety of the third classification"3 These 
theories are briefly classified and compared to each other to bring about a better 
understanding of the comparative advantages theory which still has considerable importance 
on fair trade.  
                                                 
2 Baylis and Smith: The Globalisation of world Politics, 1999, p.6  
3Klaus Gunter Deutsch: The politics of Freer Trade in Europe, 1999, p.70    
 16
The analyses of the impact of PSS on the market may contribute to a better 
understanding of the effects of the CAP support measures on trade liberalisation. In the last 
decade these measures had negative effects on the liberalisation of international trade. The 
CAP price support system in particular, is supposed to cause trade distortions in the 
international market. A consequence of the trade distortion effects is that some lower cost 
productions of exportable commodities in third world countries are replaced by the inefficient 
products of the European Union. Such resource allocation between third world countries and 
internal producers is not consistent with fair trade. Since free but fair trade is dependent on 
the comparative advantages theory (D. Ricardo), it is therefore necessary to verify whether or 
not the theory of  comparative advantages still has unquestioned importance for fair trade in 
agriculture relative to other international trade theories. 
This question can be either empirically or theoretically answered. The theoretical 
answer can be a conclusion in favour of the comparative advantages theory, for the reasons 
explained below. But the empirical answer can be found at the end of this study after the 
estimation of PSE for selected agricultural products.   
 Clarification is given below of the theoretical perspective, which is, that the 
comparative advantages theory is of major importance in defining free but fair trade, i.e. price 
support for the sustainability and equity of traders in order to decrease trade distortions. 
International trade can be explained by the comparative advantages theory (Ricardo). 
Firstly, this theory is based on free trade and perfect competition. Secondly, comparative costs 
are related to technological advantage because such an advantage also plays an important role 
in a country becoming a trade partner. And thirdly, this theory depends on the lower relative 
cost of advantage on trade which allows countries to compete freely in the market on their 
lower relative cost advantage as a trade partner. As stated by Gilpin “Most economists believe 
that the international community should concentrate its efforts on creating an open 
multilateral world economy rather than on making regional arrangements, because a world 
economy based on the principle of comparative advantages and national specialisation would 
not only produce superior economic benefits but an open and non-discriminatory economy 
would also reduce international economic friction and perhaps even promote peace.”4 This 
explanation is obviously of major importance in the argument that the comparative 
advantages theory supports free but fair trade.  
Due to the free but fair trade approach, international trade cannot be dependent on 
subsidies or other non- tariff measures which cause a trade distortion for countries with 
efficient production of exportable commodities. As was refined and elaborated later by John 
Stuart Mill, the comparative advantages theory, “served as an effective weapon against the 
lingering restrictions of mercantilism and as a strong support of the free trade movement, and 
later as a defence against resurgent protectionism.”5 The authors Ellsworth J. and Clark Leith 
stated also that the comparative advantages theory served admirably to advance the cause of 
free trade and that it was inadequate for other tasks. Indeed, the theory has made an important 
contribution to the defence of free trade, because free trade would be beneficial both for a 
single country and for the partner to increase the welfare of both nations.  
As has been noted by the OECD, there has been, on the one hand, increasing Inter 
Industry trade (IIT), in intra EU trade and in intra NAFTA trade,  between developed 
countries, and on the other hand, the Heckscher Ohline (H-O) model or Ricardo model of 
trade has been observed between developed and developing countries.  Since 1990 the 
increasing impact of globalisation and neo-liberalism has had considerable effects on the 
world trade. “But the endeavours in the WTO for further liberalisation not only meant the 
                                                 
4 Robert Gilpin: The Challenge of Global Capitalism, 2000, p.338 
5 P.T. Ellsworth J. Clark Leith: The International Economy (6th edition), 1984, p.59 
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international product trade, on the contrary it was the international capital movement and 
labour movement, as was first observed in Seattle, that frustrated the Minister Conference 29th  
November till 3rd December 1999.”6 An increasing trade capacity in multinational firms 
forced countries to support free movement of capital and labour. An increasing factor 
movement between countries would contribute to reducing the differences between 
production processes, which affected the production cost. Therefore in the last decade firms in 
developed countries moved to IIT and firms in less developed countries turned to the Ricardo 
model of trade. This is also supposed to be the H-O model of trade which is realised between 
developed and less developed countries.   
Summarized below are the limitations which other theories (H-O model, Intra industry 
trade and Strategic trade) have in adequately explaining how international trade increases fair 
trade:   
 
• The H-O Model: Heckscher- Ohlin theory focuses on international differences in 
factor endowment. Trade is explained by the relative abundance of factors and firms with 
highly abundant factors will export and countries with scarce factors on this product will 
import. Trade is dependent on inter industry trade and firms with more abundant factors will 
profit from trade.  
The H-O theory states that economy is assumed to produce two goods and uses two 
factors of production which are perfectly mobile between sectors. However, in this model 
comparative advantage is explained by the relative abundance of factors and not relative cost 
of production as was explained in Ricardo’s model and it goes back to the classical approach 
of Ricardo.  
International trade cannot be explained only on inter industry trade. World trade is 
comprised of intra and inter industry trade together. According to the H-O model trade is 
dependent on factor endowment; it implies that the relative abundance of factors is sufficient 
to become a trade partner. However, factor abundance is not sufficient to become a trade 
partner. Contrary to the H-O model trade is largely realized among developed countries which 
often have similar relative factor endowment.  
International trade cannot be explained by the relative abundance of factors as was 
found with the well- known Leontief paradox. 
Leontief (1953) found “that US exports were less capital intensive than US imports. 
This result is known as the Leontief paradox. It is the single biggest piece of evidence against 
the factor proportions theory.”7  
 
• Intra Industry Trade IIT is defined as the simultaneous export and import of 
commodities which are grouped in the same industry. IIT was originally introduced by 
Balassa 1966; However, IIT received increased attention from economists after the 
multipurpose index which was developed by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). Intra Industry Trade 
entails lower costs of factor and market adjustment and considers only similar product trade. 
IIT can be of two types:  
Horizontal: Similar qualities of products are traded 
Vertical: Different qualities of products are traded. 
Intra-industry trade may become beneficial for large-scale firms, because it allows 
them to take advantage of both the size of the market and the differentiation of products. As 
was also stated by Breuss, the new international trade has been based on the empirical critique 
of traditional trade theories. Firstly, “large amounts of world trade are realized between 
                                                 
6 Fritz Breuss: Reale Außenwirtschaft und Europeaeische Integration, 2003, p.156 (translated by author) 
7 Krugman and Obstfiled: International Economics, 1996, p.81 
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similar countries.”8 This means that similar products’ trade is realised between similar 
countries. Let us say exported electronic goods are traded between developed countries where 
capital is used in almost similar proportions and labour quality is at almost similar levels in 
the production of similar products; and secondly, “large amounts of world trade are realized 
with similar products.”9  
In the EU increasing IIT is supported by the developed member countries to increase 
the power of multinational companies in world trade. In such a product trade increasing 
competition in the same sector leads large companies to a dominant position and market 
structure tends towards oligopolistic competition which is inconsistent with free trade. 
Nevertheless, in IIT similar product trade creates pressure on firms to reduce product prices in 
order to compete in the market.  
 
• Strategic trade: “The model of strategic trade policy as proposed initially by Brandner 
and Spencer 1985 is without a doubt one of the most influential ideas in both recent trade 
theory and trade policy.”10 In the strategic trade market, based on imperfect competition, 
where the number of firms producing goods is lower, industries which are subsidized by the 
government are protected. Targeting one industry with a subsidy will draw away scarce 
resources from others so that strategic trade policy on behalf of one industry affects other 
industries in a negative way.  
Such unilateral protection of firms to increase their market share may increase firms’ 
dominant position in the markets which then turns to an oligopolistic market.  
The payments of subsidies, which are obtained from consumers to finance producers, 
reduce the welfare of consumers and tax payers, whilst industries, which are subsidized, 
increase their market share and achieve a dominant position in the market. Such subsidies 
may create an oligopolistic market. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Considerations of Price Support Systems  
 
In this study PSS plays a major role in the assessment of the PSS system. For this 
reason it is necessary to analyse the effects of the intervention price mechanism from a 
theoretical perspective where the impact of the PSS can be explained by the cobweb theorem.     
The Cobweb theory was named by Hungarian-born economist Nicholas Kaldor (1908-
1986). “The Cobweb theory stems from a simple dynamic model of cyclical demand, which 
involves time lag (between the response of production and change in price (most often seen in 
agricultural sector)”11 According to this theory it is assumed that the demand for a good is a 
decreasing function of its current price and its supply is an increasing function of last year’s 
price because of the time taken to plant and harvest crops. This happens because the price of 
agricultural products has mostly an elastic demand.  
The equilibrium price is realised where the supply and demand curves intersect each 
other. If any changes in the conditions of demand and/ or supply occur, then this will lead to 
changes in the equilibrium values of price and quantity. If demand, which is affected by the 
price changes, exceeds output in the first year, then the supply will be above the equilibrium 
level in the second year. If the demand curve is more elastic than the supply curve (absolute 
slope of supply curve is greater than demand curve), then demand (price) and supply tend to 
                                                 
8 Fritz Breuss: Reale Außenwirtschaft und Europeaeische Integration, 2003, p.109-110 (translated by author)  
9 Fritz Breuss: Reale Außenwirtschaft und Europeaeische Integration, 2003, p.109-110 (translated by author) 
10 Dirk Engelmann and Theo Norman: An Experimental Test of Strategic Trade Policy, WP, 2003, p.3        
11 N Kaldor “A classificatory note on the Determination of Equilibrium”, Review of Economic Studies, vol.1 
February 1934, p.122-136   
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approach the equilibrium position. This is a stable cobweb, as shown in Figure 1.1, the 
amount supplied in the first period is 0Q1, but the demand curve shows that the price is 0P1 in 
the first period (it is supposed that this is the price at which 0Q1 units of products is 
demanded). With this P1 price in the first period the supply curve shows the amount  supplied 
in the second period, which is shown with 0Q2 and with that amount of supply in the second 
period the demand curve shows that the price in the second period will fall below the 0P2 
level. This process continues until the equilibrium level.      
Therefore, if difference in price changes between first year product prices (P0P1) and 
second year product prices (P0P2) is increasingly decreased, then output and price tend to 
approach to the equilibrium position. This has also meant that the slope of the demand curve 
is smaller than the slope of the supply curve (Fig1.1). 
 
P2 P1          P0 P1             
Slope of demand curve =  -------- < ------ = Slope of supply curve 
Q1 Q2           Q1 Q2   
         
In the opposite case, if the supply curve is more elastic than the demand curve 
(absolute slope of supply curve is less than demand curve), then output and price tend to 
move further away from the equilibrium position. This is an unstable cobweb as shown in 
Figure 1.2. At price P0 supply is 0Q1, where demand is greater than supply in year1, leading 
price to P1; this gives a supply of 0Q2 in year 2 and the price P2.    
Therefore, the slope of the demand curve is expected to be greater than the slope of the 
supply curve, which means that price and output tend to move further from the equilibrium 
position (Fig1.2).       
P2 P1          P0 P1             
Slope of demand Curve =  -------- > ------ = Slope of supply curve 
Q1 Q2           Q1 Q2   
The case where supply and price have the same slope is shown in Figure 1.3.        
 P            p                                p    
P0                P1  
P2           P0                          p 
P1             P2  
 
      Q2       Q1       Q           0            Q1          Q2         Q                0         Q1          Q2          Q 
Figure1.1: Demand is price elastic      Figure 1.2: Supply is price elastic         Figure 1.3: Both have the same elasticity  
    (A Stable Cobweb)           (An Unstable Cobweb)  
Source: Sexton Robert: Microeconomics, 1995, p.282 (reproduced by the permission of author and publisher) 
 
According to Ezekiel (1938), who investigated the price dynamics in the Cobweb 
model, there is large price instability in agriculture because “the agricultural demand function 
is specific. It leads to permanent price risks for farmers and these risks are large enough to 
jeopardize agricultural growth and development. As a consequence large efficiency gain can 
be expected from a direct administration of agricultural price.”12   
                                                 
12 Agricultural trade liberalization in a world of uncertainty: discussion of the results of a world CGE model. 
Authors: J.M. Boussard, F. Gérard , M.G. Piketty, A.K Christensen, T. Voituriez. 
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The above conditions define the fluctuation in the market. In agriculture most of the 
products are perishable and price fluctuation is inevitable, but within the CAP System 
mentioned intervention purchase reduces such fluctuations in the market. 
Then, what will any intervention purchase bring into the market? Within the EU, 
target prices are secured by intervention prices. The intervention price is approximately 9% 
below the target price. 
In the figure below, the impact of intervention purchasing is shown: 
 
   P               P 
            
               Pi 
  P1                    
             P     
  P               
  Pi 
 
0 Q1            Qi  Q2        Q            0  Qi        Q1                     Q  
Figure 1.4: Intervention price is below Figure 1.5: Intervention price is above the  
market price (p)    market price (p)  
 
In Figure 1.4 the intervention price is below the equilibrium price (P). Suppose output 
(supply) 0Q1 is less than demand in year 1. It is expected that the insufficient supply (output) 
will increase the products price from Pi to P1. Increasing product price will increase the next 
term production (output) from Q1 to Q2.  However, the demand capacity at intervention price 
level is Qi. The difference between Qi and Q2 will be bought by the community agencies to 
prevent the price fluctuation in the market. This will also reduce the over production in the 
market. 
In Figure 1.5 the intervention price (Pi) is above the equilibrium price (P). Suppose 
that this higher intervention price will increase the output to the Q1 level but decrease the 
quantity demanded to Qi. The difference is the excess quantity supplied Q1-Qi at price Pi. This 
is called a surplus. The only way for the price Pi to continue is for the overproduction to be 
continuously bought up by the community agencies to prevent the intervention price level. 
However, higher intervention price will increase again in the next year’s production which 
causes overproduction. 
As can be seen, intervention buying will prevent fluctuations and contribute to an 
approach towards the stable equilibrium position. However, if the intervention price is above 
the market price (p) this will increase production and will not lead the market to the 
equilibrium position. Furthermore, overproduction and fluctuation in the market will not be 
prevented, although intervention purchase is implemented in order to prevent price fluctuation 
on the market and prevention of possible income loss to producers. 
Through this procedure price fluctuations as predicted by the Cobweb theory will be 
prevented. Hence it is necessary to ask: Did the intervention price mechanism of the EU’s 
CAP reduce the price fluctuation and only have a price regulation effect which is explained by 
the Cobweb theorem, or did it increase producer gain while consumer welfare was reduced? 
In fact intervention purchase and price have been applied by the EU’s CAP to prevent 
price fluctuation in the market. In the initial years of the CAP, incomes of the farmers were 
guaranteed by the intervention prices, which are 9% below the target price. The target price is 
usually higher than the world price in the EU and most expensive production costs (usually 
Duisburg region) are taken into consideration for the estimation of target prices. 
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However, application of the intervention price mechanism had some negative effects 
besides the price regulation effect. The impact of the intervention price mechanism is briefly 
given below. 
Positive effects of the intervention price mechanism:  
Prevents price fall below the intervention price within the CAP,  
Increases the producer gain,  
Secures reasonable income for internal producers, 
Increases the production capacity of internal producers, 
Increases the market capacity of internal producers.    
 
Negative effects of the intervention price mechanism: 
Prevents the access of  third world country products into the EU market, 
Reduces the production capacity of third world country producers, 
Causes an overproduction of internal producers, 
Product prices are increased artificially, 
Replaces some efficient third world country production with inefficient production of  
internal producers, 
Reduces the consumer surplus and welfare, 
Reduces the income of third world country producers, 
Reduces the market capacity of third world country producers which is inconsistent 
with fair trade and comparative advantages theory.  
 
The intervention price mechanism has both positive and reasonable negative effects. In 
this study, the application of the intervention price and some other measures such as export 
subsidies, set-aside and direct payments are strictly researched and analysed in the light of 
reform proposals of the EU’s CAP which have been realised in the last decade.  
Indeed, many reform packages have been applied to reduce the above mentioned 
effects of the intervention price, which might improve conditions for internal producers to 
become sufficient in production operation processes and to become more competitive on the 
market. 
The impact of reform proposals is analysed only for producers, because there is only 
transfer from consumer and tax payer to producers, but there is no transfer from producers to 
consumers.  
In this study the best possible PSS are researched and reform packages are questioned 
to determine: whether CAP reforms were applied to reduce negative effects of support 
measures or if they mostly contributed to maintaining the income of internal producers.  
 
1.3 The Perspectives of Protection  
 
In the following section perspectives of protection are briefly explained to give a 
better understanding of reasons for protection.  
 
1.3.1  The Reason for Protection 
 
In the last decade expected utility from the CAP reforms on reducing the market price 
support and demands of the WTO nations on liberalization of the world trade has not been 
achieved for every nation. Some of the people and nations became richer while other nations, 
especially in the third world, became poorer than ever before. According to UN Human 
Development report in 2000, at the end of 1990, 20% of the world’s richest population who 
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live in developed countries have 80% of the world’s products and 20% of the world’s poorest 
population have only 1% of the world’s products. 
It is obvious that the fear of nations of free trade is the reason for this poverty. On the 
one hand, the danger of free trade with low-wage countries in East Asia required higher 
barriers to restrict their exports into Europe. On the other hand, less developed countries, 
which depend on the agricultural sector, became poorer then ever because of these 
protections. Is it actually the solution to be an opponent of liberalisation or it is better to 
demand more cooperation to reduce income disparities? 
 
1.3.2 The Protection and the CAP  
 
In the CAP system, the reason for protection is obviously planned mostly to prevent 
the loss of internal producers. The higher cost of production and marketing difficulties 
increase producers’ surpluses and compel the CAP system to support producers with different 
measures. The application of the support can be divided in three sub-sections. These are:  
• Market price support: Market price support means a price intervention mechanism. 
This is used to prevent market price stability and to secure producers’ reasonable prices. This 
is done by intervention prices. Producers’ incomes are supported with intervention purchases, 
direct payments for set-aside measures and storage costs. Producers are supported with 
different payments, which increase the cost of the CAP budget.   
• Internal protection: Internal protection is given to protect producers from exporters 
outside the Union. This can be dependent on the ‘community preference’ principal, which 
implies products of community origin are bought in preference. There are different 
protections against third world country producers such as direct payments, common custom 
tariff (CCT), variable import levies, quotas, voluntary export restrain (VER). Direct income 
support, especially, which was introduced by the Mac Sharry reform has enhanced producer 
income in the last decade. However, finance of direct payments is costly for the CAP budget.    
• External protection: It comprises export subsidies, which are given to boost the export 
of internal producers and to reduce the surplus amount which causes a serious problem for 
producers within the CAP.  
In the last decade negative reactions of third world country producers against the CAP 
measures have been mostly concentrated on the export subsidies, which were directly 
reflected in the exported product prices. However, all these measures are directed at the 
protection of producer gain while consumer surplus unfortunately is reduced.  
 
The Maastricht treaty stipulates in article 130v that, in all political areas, the EU has to 
consider the goal of a sustainable economic and social development of developing nations. 
There must be a radical reform in the mutual agricultural policy between EU and non- 
member countries to reduce the trade distortion between countries. In the CAP, support 
measures not only prevent imports, but also destroy local markets through aggressive 
subsidies of food exports. It is stated that, “if the protection is adopted as a mean correcting 
domestic distortion not only will the result be that economic welfare will fall short of the 
maximum obtainable, but economic welfare may even be reduced below what it would be 
under a policy of free trade.”13 Therefore, it is important to estimate the impact of protection 
on the welfare of consumers and producers’ gain. It might be less distorting if bilateral trade 
agreements consider the nations welfare as a whole instead of producers’ gain which might 
reduce the welfare more than in cases where trade relations are based on comparative 
advantages.       
                                                 
13 Jagdish Bhagwati: International Trade, 1987, p.236 
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  Legal (explicit) protection; 
  The annual fixing of the intervention price determines the overall level of support for 
producers. The fixing of intervention prices (and, following them, threshold prices) influences 
the prices of products in the market and secures the prices and incomes of producers. 
 In the first half of the1980s, surplus and the financial burden which was imposed on 
the CAP budget, forced the Commission to introduce a new quota system. The policy for 
trading with third world countries imposes higher tariffs on imports into the Community. 
Furthermore, exports are controlled through use of licenses.  
  
  The implicit apparent protection;  
Imports are only allowed to cover internal production deficits and it is not permitted to 
compete in the internal market.  
 Domestic producers are granted export subsidies.  
The implicit support occurs when budget transfers or income support with the help of 
export subsidies do not directly affect consumers or market prices. Such support could consist 
of deficiency payments, input subsidies, infrastructure subsidies, etc. Some of such programs 
are commodity or group specific. Some are very general, such as agricultural research 
funding. Some subsidies that should be included in Producer Subsidy estimates (PSEs) may 
not appear explicitly in government budgets or accounts. Subsidies may be concessionary, 
such as tax concessions affording farmers some additional allowances that reduce their tax 
bills. The value of such concessions would not usually appear in a budget statement. Another 
example is concessionary energy (e.g. electricity) charges. Again, the value of these may not 
be explicit. Sometimes they will be estimated when, for example, the government has to pay 
compensation to the electricity company for charging less to farmers.  
 
1.3.3 Maintenance of Domestic Protection  
 
The mercantilist approach still has importance within the economy: “Selling is good, 
buying is a regrettable necessity. Buying at home is preferable to buying abroad, if price and 
quality are not egregiously scarified. Buying at home is thought to enhance the national 
welfare, - buying abroad some other country’s.”14 The motive for using protection is to 
promote certain social and economic objectives in economic and regional development in a 
country. This is also stated by three major principles of the CAP, one of which is the 
‘community preference’ principal. It implies that products of EU origin are bought in 
preference. This community preference principle later is also supported by the realisation of 
the SEA in 1986, which removed technical fiscal and physical barriers, and the Maastricht 
Agreement (1993), which secured monetary and economic integration within the EU. Hence 
the EU countries cooperate to increase their trade capacity between member countries and 
contribute to each other to increase the competition outside the Union against the third county 
producers.  
In the CAP system application of measures is directed by the Commission and not 
local governments; furthermore, some protective measures, such as market support, 
intervention purchase, direct income support, production and export subsidies are given by the 
Commission to increase the capability of internal producers. Import licences are also obtained 
by the Commission and not by the governments of member countries. Therefore, producers in 
member countries are dependent on Commission decisions and not governments, making it 
increasingly difficult to suggest that the members are in competition with each other.  
 
                                                 
14 Finger and Olechowsky: The Uruguay Round, 1988, p.22 
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1.3.4 Maintenance of Employment 
 
Protection of employment is needed when unemployment is high and subsequently the 
government raises the import restrictions to substitute local production with imports. By 
doing so, production of domestic goods will increase. Any increase in production capacity 
also contributes to increase employment.  
This is, however, very superficial and is questionable. Firstly, “it is not very effective 
in creating jobs, because an increase of application capacity requires the existence of a 
sufficient source of input and technological equipment. Secondly, protection may reduce 
employment if a protected industry is a source of inputs to other industries. Protection of 
imports will raise costs of inputs and reduce employment in the industry which uses protected 
materials. Thirdly, what starts as a temporary measure to ease the pain of adjustment to new 
foreign competition becomes a permanent measure that impedes adjustment and lowers the 
standard of living of those other than the direct beneficiaries of the import restriction in the 
long run.”15              
 
1.3.5 Protection of Balance of Payments 
 
 The balance of payments can be defined as a record of the economic transaction 
between one country and the rest of the world. A balance of payments deficit means excessive 
purchases of foreign goods and services or excessive investment overseas. A balance of 
payment surplus can occur when export of goods and services exceed import or excessive 
foreign investment. A reduction in interest rates or restrictive exchange control will correct 
the supply. The balance of payment deficit can be corrected by; imposing tariffs, import 
quotas, imposing exchange control or increasing interest rate to reduce overseas investors. 
Therefore, countries prefer to use support measures to reduce their balance of payments 
deficits. However, this can only be effective in the short run. In the long run, governments can 
correct the balance of payments deficit by reducing the demand in the economy for all 
products, or reducing inflation rates, or encouraging currency depreciation, which will 
increase the export amount, because domestic products become cheaper while imported 
products become more expensive.      
 
1.3.6 The Political Economy and Protection 
 
 Protection of the domestic market is required to support domestic production, but 
economic benefits of protection are always affected by political decisions. It is stated in the 
EFTA bulletin: “protectionist measures result from either political pressure at home or abroad 
or the self serving initiatives of politicians in promised rewards for past votes or with a regard 
to future election.”16 Actually, protection depends on the power balance between those in the 
country who demand protection, namely producers, and those who are hurt by the protective 
measures. In fact, by doing this, the welfare of the nations tends to diminish due to the 
protective measures having a negative effect on the nation as a whole, because most countries 
are not capable of being self-sufficient in producing commodities in all sectors. In this case 
international cooperation and trade is required to cover the demands of the nations as a whole 
by using the comparative advantages method.  
 In fact governments are also trapped on the one side by producers who have the power 
in their hand to force the politicians to fulfil their wishes and on the other side by consumers 
                                                 
15 Ellsworth and Leith: The International Economy, 1984, p195-196  -- 
16 Senti R.: New Protectionism in Foreign Trade, EFTA Bulletin 4/1985, p.16  
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who expect to maximize their utility with products which are offered by the producers with 
relative lower cost must be considered to secure the social welfare. This has meant that 
political decisions must consider both producer gain and consumer welfare to prevent welfare 
loss of consumers; something which was experimented on in the last decade with non- tariff 
measures in the CAP.  
 
1.3.7 Liberalism versus Protectionism 
 
The ideology of neo-liberalism is the worship of the "market". In the last decade an 
increasing trend of liberal economics has contributed to liberalisation of trade. However, it is 
observed that in the last decade protection of trade has also increased. On the one side liberal 
trade compels countries to reduce restrictions on trade and on the other side non-tariff trade 
barriers prevent the full implementation of the free trade approach. In fact, liberalisation of 
trade has mostly been achieved in the industrial sector, but in the agricultural sector the before 
mentioned non-tariff measures have steadily increased the trade distortion.  
The strategy of neo-liberal economics includes privatisation, reduced social 
expenditures, union busting, land enclosure, lower wages, higher profits, free trade, free 
capital mobility and the accelerated modification of nature.  
In the era of Reagan and Thatcher neo-liberals concentrated all their efforts on three 
fundamental points: “free trade in goods and services, free circulation of capital, freedom of 
investment”17 Until that time, governments had been interfering with the efficiency of the 
economy through protectionism, government subsidies, and government ownership. 
According to a set of policies, commonly called the ‘Washington Consensus’ and formulated 
by IMF, the World Bank and the US treasury, countries “focus on stabilization, liberalization, 
privatisation. It is based on a rejection of the state's activist role and the promotion of a 
minimalist, non-interventionist state.”18 The neoliberal economic approach consists of 
individualism and non-interventionist policies.     
According to the defenders of neo-liberalism, in the short term, there may be some 
problems such as rapid liberalization of financial and capital markets, adaptation of new 
technology and regulations for privatisation to reduce the role of the government in the 
economy, but in the long run, these problems are supposed to diminish if the adaptation of 
these measures are settled in the economic system.  
 
1.3.8 Social dimension of Protection  
 
The protests of 30 thousand people against to the WTO meetings in Seattle in 1999 
were not casual. Since 1990 the income gap between rich and poor people has steadily 
increased. Similar protests have been observed in Prague, Melbourne and in Geneva; although 
during the Seattle protests the demands of the labour unions in the USA contradicted the 
demands of less developed countries’ representatives. The demands of the labour unions in 
the USA concentrate on the quality of labour and environmental standards; this will increase 
the protection level of developed countries against that of third world countries’ exports. The 
results of these meetings compel the EU and other developed country producers to reduce the 
amount of protection on agricultural products. The application of environmental measures 
creates technical barriers to third world country producers. For the CAP, the application of 
technical barriers will increase the trade capacity in the market while external producers 
                                                 
17 Susan George: Twenty Years of Elite Economics and Emerging Opportunities for Structural Change 
Conference on Economic Sovereignty in a Globalizing World, 1999 
18 http://www.progressive.org, June 2000, interview with Josef Stiglitz 
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reduce their trade capacity in the market. In the world market, the application of these 
measures may only contribute to increasing the trade distortion against third world country 
producers.     
The abyss between rich and poor is deepening. In the UN Human Development report 
(2000) it was stated that there are three million people earning a living of less than 2 dollars 
per day.  According to this report, the properties of the 200 richest people in the world are 
more than the income of the 2.5 billion poorest people. Furthermore, the properties of the 
three richest people in the world (in the USA) are higher than the GNP of the 48 poorest 
countries. The income inequality in the world is illustrated in the figure below. The income 
inequality between poor and rich has risen during the period 1988 - 1993. The percentage of 
the poorest people who have a 10% share in the world income has reduced from 0.88% to 
0.64%, whilst the percentage of the richest 10% share in the world income has increased from 
48% to 52%. The Gini coefficient (a measure of inequality) has also increased within this 
period.     
Table1.1: Income Inequality in the World 
 
Inequality Values     1988  1993  % change 
 
Gini Coefficient, World                0.63   0.67  6.0 
Most poor 10%  share in the world income    0.88 %             0.64 %          -27.3 
Most rich 10 % share in the world income    48 %   52 %   8.3 
Source: Yuri Dikhanov and Michael Ward: Measuring the Distribution of Global Income, World Bank statistics 
considered, 1999 
 
It is important to note that the existence of an equitable social and economic system at 
international level is required. There are two important components necessary to secure this 
system. These are: equitable income distribution and an international law system. 
Increasing losses on the losing side reflect a reduction on the winning side eventually, 
because in economics there is a basic rule: reducing the income of people will reduce demand 
or consumption capacity and this will reduce the next term production and profit.  
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2.  The CAP of the European Union 
 
The shortage of agricultural products after the Second World War pushed member 
states to coordinate and collaborate their agricultural policies at national EU level. In the EU 
the Common agricultural policy (CAP) came into effect in 1962. In the CAP agricultural 
production was strongly stimulated by a price support system for the protection of the internal 
producers from third countries producers in order to increase the marketing possibilities of 
agricultural products, in addition to stabilizing agricultural product prices, thereby ensuring a 
fair standard of living for the agricultural producers of the six original members of the EU.  
There are three basic principles defined in 1962 that characterise the CAP, and 
consequently, the common organization of the market (COMs). These are: 
“- No barriers on intra community trade in farm products, 
- Preference for EC supplies in intra community agricultural trade, 
- Common financial responsibility for CAP policies.”1  
These basic principles of the CAP are briefly defined as, market unity, community 
preference and financial solidarity. The market unity has meant that all agricultural products 
within the Union are protected against lower prices of imported products and the community 
preference has meant “the products of community origin are bought in preference to 
imports.”2 The third principle of the CAP was defined as financial solidarity which was 
obtained by the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), founded on 
4 April 1962. The EEAGF consists of guarantee and guidance sections. The guarantee section 
was founded to finance CAP support measures and the guidance section to be the planning 
part of the CAP.      
Since the CAP was established and funded by the EAGGF, its initial mechanisms 
were harmonizing price support mechanism, controlling imports and agreeing institutional 
prices which have meant target price and intervention price. 
The EEC reached agreements on three important objectives for the CAP policies: 
“First, it eliminated national agricultural support systems. Second, it replaced the national 
systems with a Community-wide agricultural support system. And third, agricultural 
protection between EEC countries was eliminated.”3 CETs (Common External Tariffs) were 
put into effect to meet these objectives. This was the first step to protect internal producers 
from foreign competition (by non-members), while customs duties were abolished within the 
Union. For agriculture, instead of fixed tariffs the EEC adopted a system of variable import 
tariffs or levies (which persisted until 1995). It entailed setting Minimum Import Prices 
(MIPs) with variable import levies (VILs) equal to the difference between the MIP and the 
lowest c.i.f. (cost insurance freight) offered by importers at the Community borders.  
A part of the legislative and executive powers of the CAP was transferred to the Union 
Organs, as was done for other common policies. However, agriculture has required special 
treatment compared to other policies. The primary reason given is the very nature of 
agriculture. Only in the agricultural sector, do the weather conditions, crop and livestock 
diseases and many other factors, which often elude human control, affect the quantity and 
quality of the products. The diversity of member states, which is on the increase with each 
enlargement of the Union, creates more difficulties for the unification of their agricultural 
markets. This was the reason for providing further justification for an interventionist 
agricultural policy. Because of this, Member States are not able to make any unilateral 
decision which deals with agriculture. They have to accept and apply the decisions of the 
Union. "The common market therefore had not only to align structurally different agricultural 
                                                 
1Ritson and Harvey: The CAP and the world Economy, 1991, p.2  
2Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.435 
3David M.Wood and Birol Yesilada: The emerging European Union, 1996, p.151 
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systems, but also to iron out tenaciously held privileges resulting from the interplay of 
national political institutions.”4 These are given in the form of price guarantees, farm income 
aids, export subsidies and import restriction etc. However, different structural, social and 
economic developments affect the application of these measures in member countries, which 
reinforce the need for blending into one common agricultural policy. Since the CAP was 
founded, the mentioned difficulties have been reduced. In the common market organisation 
the agricultural policies of member countries are dependent on the CAP measures and 
application. 
In 1968 the Customs Union came into effect; this removed the custom duties between 
member countries while common external custom tariffs began to apply. The agricultural 
sector in the European Communities has an important role for the economies of the member 
countries. On the one hand, agriculture depends on variable conditions, such as, climate, 
rainfall, soil etc., and on the other hand, the permanent prosperity of this sector in the 
European Union depends on the policies which are going to be applied. The CAP policy in 
the EC has become more important for the agricultural sector than for others such as 
transport, trade, etc. 
The Rome Treaty, stabilization of the agricultural sector in the European Communities 
has been put into effect by article 39 (Common Agricultural Policy of the EC): 
“These objectives contained in Article 39 of the Rome Treaty are: 
1. To increase agricultural productivity, 
2. To ensure a fair standard of living for farmers, 
3. To stabilize markets,  
4. To ensure availability of supplies, 
5. To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices.”5 
 
However, application of these policies in the European Communities was not effective 
enough because of the diversity of agricultural conditions in the member states. Intervention 
of the member state governments in the agricultural sector caused many problems. 
Arable crops and reform of the CAP system were rather important subjects within the 
CAP agenda. From the beginning years of the EU-6 to date more than half of the utilized 
agricultural area (UAA) is arable land. In the EU-12 approximately 115,400 million hectares 
of fields were used as arable land and in 1996 it was increased to 135,260 million hectares (1 
hectares = 2.47 acres) after the fourth enlargement of the EU. However, the consequence of 
the compulsory set-aside measure within the CAP system reduced this amount to below 
130,809 ha in 2002.     
In 1957 after the formation of the EEC (EU), there were approximately 7 million 
farms of which the largest farms by size (about 70 ha) were in the UK and the smallest were 
in Greece (less than 5 ha) (see tables 2.1.2 and 2.21). The EU covers approximately 3.2 
million km2 and has currently approximately 376 million EU-15 plus 74 million CEEC’s 
inhabitants. The utilized area is 1,30 million km2 or 40% of the total surface area. The five 
largest countries- France, Spain, Germany, UK and Italy together possess 80% of all 
agricultural land in the EU-15. 
The amount of people who were employed in agriculture was approximately 9.5% of 
the total population in 1980s. But the share of employed people in agriculture was reduced to 
5% in 1996 (see Graph 2.1.2).  
 The cereals (wheat, barley, oats, and rye) are grown mostly in all member countries 
which covers approximately 28-30 percent of the total utilized areas. 47% of the CAP support 
measures are used to finance the cereals.      
                                                 
4Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.424 
5Agricultural policy, http://europa.eu.int/pol/agr/en/info.htm , August 1998. 
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Graphic 2.1.1: Market support by agricultural products in the CAP of the EU in 2000 
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As shown in the graph below the share of employed people was about 9.5% of total 
employment. The share of employed people in agriculture was reduced almost 50 % between 
1980 and 1996, and currently it is estimated at about 4 per cent of total employment. An 
important decrease has been observed in Italy, where about two thirds of agricultural 
employment has been reduced. In the UK the share of employed people in agriculture was 
2.4% in 1980.  However, a small decrease was also observed in 1996. 
 
Graphic 2.1.2: Share of employed people in agriculture 
 
Source: European Commission the Agricultural Situation in the EU 1998 Report, p. T/116  
 
The related period in the table given below is especially selected to show the impact of 
the set-aside measure which had considerable impact on the CAP after the MacSharry reforms 
in 1992. Within the CAP system the voluntary set-aside measure was first introduced in 1988, 
yet there was a very small decline in land use. However, the previous plan which was 
introduced by Mansholt in 1968 had a considerable effect, replacing small scale farming with 
large scale farming on arable land.  
The second phase of the set-aside measure which comprises a compulsory set-aside 
measure in the CAP system was first introduced by MacSharry in 1992. Besides the voluntary 
set-aside measure, the compulsory set- aside measure had contributed to reducing the land use 
in the CAP. Approximately 15 % of the arable land ceased to be used for farming. However, 
as shown in the tables below, farm numbers were declining as they grew in size. This also 
meant that 50 hectare and more utilized agricultural areas increased, whilst there was a 
decrease in small-scale farms between the period 1987 and 2000. Consequently, the utilized 
agricultural area in almost all member countries except the UK, Spain, France, Portugal and 
Germany was reduced (see tables below).  
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Table 2.1.1: Number and area of holdings (x1000) in EU -12/ 15 
                            Holdings  
                            X 1000 
Farm size class 
 (ha UAA) 
1987 1995 1997 2000 
0- 5  3,411 4,193.6 3,901.7 3,903.2 
5- 20 2,099 1,742.3 1,686.9 1,525.6 
20- 50 946 848.4 802.0 738.4 
 ≥50 473 585.7 598.5 603.4 
EU- 
12/ 
15 
Total EU 12 6,929 :: :: :: 
 Total EU 15 : 7,370.0 6,989.2 6,770.7 
Source: Europe EU Commission Agricultural statistics: The 2003 Agricultural Year – (Farm structure). And 
Eurostat: European Commission DG 6 for Agriculture FAO and UNSO and 1987 data from Baldwin and 
Wyplosz: The Economics of European Integration,  
 
In the table below, the decline in arable land use for cereals from 1990 to 1999 is 
given. During this period a decline in land use was observed in EU 12, whereas a small 
increase in land use was observed through to the end of the decade in EU 15. However, 
similar reductions in cereal production have not been observed. Although the set-aside 
measure was planned to reduce the production amount in the CAP, as indicated in the table 
below, neither the set-aside measure, aimed at cutting arable land use by approximately 15 % 
in member countries, nor the production amount was reduced in the last decade.               
 
Table 2.1.2: Use of Cereal Area and Production in the CAP of the EU between 1990- 2000 
(mn ha/ tons) 
                 Area             Production   Year 
EU-12 EU 15 EU-12 EU 15 
 m ha m ha m tonnes m tonnes 
1990 35.8 n/a 170.2 n/a 
1991 35.9 n/a 181.3 n/a 
1992 35.2 n/a 168.6 n/a 
1993 32.3 35.2 165.4 178.1 
1994 31.9 34.8 162.1 174.3 
1995 32.7 35.6 165.1 177.7 
1996 33.9 37.0 191.8 205.9 
1997 34.9 38.1 190.9 205.7 
1998 34.1 37.4 197.7 210.9 
1999 33.3 36.5 188.5 201.4 
Source: http://www.statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/evaluation/setaside/fullrep.pdf (original from Eurostat) 
 
In the table below arable UAA in the EU CAP is given. As in the table above for 
cereal products, a similar decline was also observed in all arable land use. However, the 
above-mentioned decline was observed only for small scale farming and not for large scale 
farming. In 1987 land use of less than 5 hectares declined from 8,915 to 7,008 and land use of 
5 to less than 20 ha fell from 21,353 in 1987 to 17,229 in 1997. Arable areas of less than 50 
hectares reduced from 29,505 in 1987 to 25,459 in 1997. However, arable land use of above 
50 ha increased from 22,101 ha in 1987 to 25,784 in 1997. And finally land use of 100 ha and 
more increased from 33,526 to 53,211 in a related period of time. 
After the fourth enlargement of the EU UAA land use continued to reduce, but as 
previously explained the mentioned decline was not observed for member countries such as 
Germany, Spain, France, and the UK, where large scale farming exists.  
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In the EU-12 UAA increased between 1987 and 1993.  In 1996 after the fourth 
enlargement of the EU UAA there was a slight decrease until 2004. (see table below)     
 
Table 2.2: Utilized agricultural area UAA by size classes of holdings (1000 hectare)  
 
Area 1987 1989/90 1993 1996 1997 2004 
Total EU 12 or 15 after 1995: 
 less than 5 ha 
8,915  8,157 7,384 : 7,008 : 
Total EU 12 or 15 after 1995:  
 From 5 to less than 20 ha 
21,353 18,607 17,024 : 17,229 : 
Total EU 12 or 15 after 1995:  
From20 to less than 50 ha 
29,505 27,129 24,799 : 25,459 : 
Total EU 12 or 15 after 1995:  
From 50 to less than 100 ha 
22,101 22,957 23,734 : 25,784 : 
Total EU 12 or 15 after 1995:  
1100 ha and more 
33,526 42,732 46,012 . 53,211 : 
Tot EUR 15 : : : 135, 260 134, 261 133, 293 
Total EUR 12 115,400 119,581 118,953 : : : 
Germany 11,842 17,048 17,022.1 17,335.0 17,335 17,048 
Spain 24,796 24,531 24,713.7 30,286.0 29,649 24,531 
France 28,058 28,186 28,107.2 30,215 30,168 28,186 
United Kingdom 16,751.1 16,498 16.382 16,149 15,858 16,499 
Source Eurostat: Agriculture statistical yearbook, 1997, p.127-128.  
1996 and 1997 data from Eurostat European Commission, DG for Agriculture FAO and UNSO table: Key EU 
agricultural statistics and UAA data for EU-15 between 1997- 2002 period from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/en354.htm , Europe EU Commission Agricultural 
statistics: The 2003 Agricultural Year-from table: basic statistics.  
1997 data from BMLF: Grüner Bericht 2000, Wien, 2001, p.231 and 2004 data from BMLF: Grüner Bericht 
2004, Table: Landwirtschaftliche Betriebe in der EU 
 
Farm sizes in member countries are illustrated in the graphic below. The average farm 
size in the EU is about 20 ha, the lowest sizes of farms of about 5 ha were found in Greece 
and the highest with 70 ha were found in the UK. However, farms of above 50 ha and more 
were observed only in the UK, After the MacSharry reform, farm sizes in member countries 
such as Germany, Spain, France, and Portugal steadily increased as shown in the table below. 
 
Graphic 2.2.1: The farm size in the EU countries  
 
Source: Eva Laczka and Peter Szabo:  Definitions of Farm in the Agricultural Statistics of Hungary and the EU.  
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In the graphic below, average farm size and number of farm sizes in the EU are 
compared with the US and Japan to bring about a better understanding of the EU farm 
structure on the world farm size scale. The farm size is, on average, considerably smaller than 
U.S. farms, but the number of these small farms in the EU is higher than in Japan and the US 
(see graphic below). 
 
Graphic 2.2.2: Average farm size 
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Source: Adopted from EU Commission, the Agricultural Situation in the European Union, 1998 Report, p. T/24. 
 
Finally in the graph below, the number of farms is also compared with the US and 
Japan. In the EU the number of farms is very high compared to the US and Japan. However, 
as illustrated in the table above, the average size is very low compared to the US.   
 
Graphic2.2.3: Number of farms 
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After a quick glance at arable land use, average farm size and number of farms and 
people employed in the CAP of the EU, a brief description of the CAP support system, the 
need for CAP support measures and their financial burden on the CAP budget can now be 
explained to bring about a better understanding of the CAP.  
The CAP was actually founded to support the agricultural producers and to increase 
the self-sufficiency of internal producers in the EU. However, application of the intervention 
price mechanism and some other measures, which were planned to protect the internal 
producers from third countries, had negative effects on product prices in and out of the Union. 
In particular, application of the price support system and some other protective measures, 
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especially import tariffs, had increased the imported product prices up to the EU level for 
protecting internal producers. 
When the EC first started, the original six member states of the Union were net 
importers of cereals and oilseeds and they were only just self-sufficient in livestock products. 
Through time application of the CAP reforms has negatively affected the production capacity 
of internal producers. In particular, the first reforms which were put into effect by the 
Mansholt plan increased the production capacity enormously and caused an over production 
in some products. In the following years application of the Uruguay round and MacSharry 
reforms changed and reduced such over production, but increased the incomes of internal 
producers. However, increasing transfers from consumers to producers has reduced the 
welfare of consumers whilst producer gain has increased. The impact of the CAP reforms is 
explained comprehensively in the coming chapter. 
 
The CAP Resources, 
In the CAP of the EU there are four types of resources to finance the Community 
budget.  These are: 
-Variable import levies in agriculture,  
-Custom duties, which are obtained from member countries, 
-VAT (value added tax). This was determined by the Luxembourg agreement in 1970 
and  
-The net contributor of the EU member countries based on their GDP (stated in the 
Delores package in 1987).  
In fact the above mentioned resources are mostly used to finance the European 
agricultural and guidance Fund (EAGGF), which covers two thirds of the CAP budget. 
Incomes of the EAGGF are obtained by “variable import levy, sugar tax which is in the 
common market system and payments of the milk producers, funds which are taken from the 
over quotas production, taxes taken from cereals.”6 
In the EAGGF approximately 90% of expenditure goes to finance the Guarantee 
section, which is used to finance; the price support system, export and production subsidies to 
producers, compensatory payments to cover the price difference between members, 
intervention purchase and storage costs.   
“The Guarantee Section's main purpose is to fund expenditure arising from the 
common organisation of the markets and agricultural prices, rural development measures 
accompanying market support and rural measures outside Objective 1 regions, expenditure on 
certain veterinary measures and information measures relating to the CAP; the Guidance 
Section funds other rural development expenditure not funded by the Guarantee Section, 
including the Leader Initiative.”7 
In short, the guarantee section finances the common market policies given to support 
producers for the implementation of common market organizations in agriculture. These can 
be divided into four categories: Market intervention, export refunds, agri-environmental 
measures and direct payments. The guidance section is the community’s structural funds. It 
constitutes the market policy and forms the structural policies such as investment aids, grant 
for farmers, compensatory payments in less favoured areas and training programmes. 
Approximately 10% of the EAGGF expenditure goes to finance structural policies of the 
guidance section.  
                                                 
6Ridvan Karluk: Avrupa Birliği ve Turkiye, 1996, p.217 
7Activities of the EU Summaries of Legislation: Regional policies Structural Policy Reform 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60013.htm,  
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The increasing CAP expenditure of the EU is given in the table below. The CAP 
expenditure increased rapidly from 2% in 1970 to 42%, 39% of which was given to finance 
the guarantee section and only 3% was used to finance the guidance section.   
 
Table 2.3: Rapid increase of the CAP expenditure is illustrated (in 100 mn/ ECU)  
 
 1970 1980 1990 1995 
Guarantee 2,0 11,2 29,2 39,1 
Guidance - 0,4 1,6 3,1 
EAGGF 2,0 11,6 30,8 42,2 
Total Budget 2,4 16,8 49,1 76,1 
1as percentage of 3 97 96 95 93 
3 as percentage of 1 88 70 63 56 
Source: Williem Molle: The Economics of European Integration, 1997, p.262   
 
In the CAP system structural changes have been concentrated within the guidance 
section of the EAGGF “on the objectives 5a (adaptation of farm structures) and 5b 
(development of rural areas), for which it is the only source of aid and, (development of 
regions whose development is lagging behind), where it operates jointly with other funds 
while taking special responsibility for aspects relating to rural development.”8 The EAGGF 
Guidance section is applied especially for objective 5 and also objective 1 (regions lagging 
behind in development) to provide aid. In table below, applications of these measures have 
been shown. 
According to Table 2.4, expenditure on Objective 1 increased from 1989 to 1993, 
expenditure on Objective 5a also increased, but to a lesser extent, except in 1993 because 
payments to producers for the first time of advance came in the form of a compensatory 
allowance. This increased the amount of expenditure on Objective 5b reflecting the emphasis 
which was put on rural development.    
 
Table 2.4: EAGGF Guidance section expenditure trend by objective. (ECU/ mn)  
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 2004 
(Euro/mn) 
Objective 1 862.13 1,081.16 1,440.83 1,634.68 1,599.22 127.543 
Objective 5a 516.20 743.81 631.25 701.33 923.88 : 
Objective 5b 26.86 44.00 260.15 475.80 508.64 2.721 
Transitional measures 56.80 56.70 75.93 63.00 61.65 8.411 
Total 1,461.99 1,925.68 2,408.16 2,874.81 3,093.40 182.458 
Source: The Agricultural Situation in the European Union 1994 report, 1995, p.125 and 2004 data from 
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/Verwiss/GSchneider/lehre/European%20Integration%20SoSe04/folien2004-
12.pdf ,  
  
The EAGGF guidance section gives finance measures for speeding up the adjustment 
of agricultural structures between the 1994-1999 programming periods. Below, objective 5a is 
briefly described to bring about a better understanding of these measures: 
“1. Market policy accompanies measures which help re-establish the balance between 
production and market capacity where the financing of such measures is not provided for 
under the EAGGF Guarantee section. 
                                                 
8Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.441 
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“2. Concrete measures to encourage the installation of young farmers of either sex, 
3. Measures to improve the efficiency of the structures of holdings especially 
investments aimed at reducing production costs, promoting quality, improving the living and 
working conditions and promoting the diversification of production”9  
There are also some other measures, such as, to support farm incomes and to maintain 
viable agricultural communities in less favoured areas, measures to improve the marketing 
and processing of agricultural and forestry products. These measures are good enough to 
improve the existing conditions. However; the process for reaching these goals was not 
described. 
Financial assistance by the EAGGF for the promotion of the rural development is also 
supported with the measures below (objective 1),  
“i-the commercial, diversification, re-orientation and adjustment of production 
potential, 
ii-the promotion quality labelling and investment for quality of local or regional 
agricultural and forestry products, 
iii-individual collective land or pasture improvement,”10 drainage systems 
improvement, encouragement for tourist and craft investment. Development and exploitation 
of woodlands and protection of the environment are the other measures related to rural 
development. 
Development of the rural area is concerned with objective 5b; where 9% of the 
population of the fifteen (now 25) member countries are located in these regions. Measures 
co-financed by the EAGGF concern, not only the production, but also processing and 
marketing of agricultural products, development of tourism and environmental protection.
 The EAGGF guarantee section secures the improving, processing and marketing 
conditions for agricultural products, environmental measures, early retirement etc. The 
EAGGF expenditure is shown in the table below. 
 
Table 2.5: EAGGF expenditure of the CAP before and after the MacSharry reform (ECU/mn)
         
  1989   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 
Guideline  28,624   30,630  32,511  35,039  36,657  36,465 
Expenditure Financed within the 
guideline 
 24,406   25,069  30,961  31,119  34,590  32,960 
Margin  4,218   5,561  1,550  3,920  2,067  3,505 
Total expenditure  25,871   26,454  31,784  31,950  34,590  32,960 
Source: European Commission: The Agricultural Situation in the European Union 1994 report, 1995, p.114
  
The guideline for 1994 was set at ECU 36,465 million; the initial budget for this 
financial year provided for appropriations amounting to that, not including the appropriations 
entered in respect to the monetary reserve (ECU 1 billion).   
On comparing the above measures, which are financed by the EAGGF guarantee 
section, to other recent reforms there are many similar measures which were adopted to 
improve the CAP policy. But each time it was seen that EU prices were not below those of the 
world market. Farmers have often had to be granted prices above world rates to encourage 
them to keep production at a level sufficient to guarantee internal demand in periods of world 
shortage. In the Union, the Commission sets up the guide (target) prices each year which are 
                                                 
9Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.442 
10Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.442 
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higher than the world prices. These higher product prices affect the effectiveness of the CAP 
policies. CAP overproduction and higher expenditure rates especially still have considerable 
importance. In the second half of the eighties when Spain and Portugal joined the EU CAP 
mentioned expenditures were higher in most of the less developed members relative to other 
developed members. For example, “in 1986 the average aid from the EAGGF to Germany 
was 19.7%, for France 24.6%; and for Greece, Portugal and Spain only 7.8% aid was given 
from this fund.”11 In 1998 CAP expenditures were mostly distributed to producers in Ireland, 
in France and in Spain. However, member countries such as Germany, UK and Italy, which 
are net contributors of the CAP budget, received less financial support from the CAP 
spending (see graphic below).  
 
Graphic 2.3: CAP spending per capita, 1998 (Euro/ mn)  
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Source: Adopted from the Economist, February 3, 2001, p. 51 
 
In the EU, countries are mostly supported through direct payments. The countries 
which become full members of the EU develop their trade capacity with the EU members, 
while reducing their trade capacity with non-member countries (trade creation effect). On the 
one hand, non-member countries lose their trade partners, and on the other, access for non-
member countries products into the EU market was restricted by high custom tariffs. In the 
CAP agricultural products are protected from third countries’ cheaper products. The PSS of 
the CAP secures the internal producers through different support measures such as 
intervention purchase, export and production subsidies, import levies, direct payments, 
voluntary export restrains (VER) and import and production quotas.  
The EU’s CAP comprises an area without internal borders in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. The reform proposals were 
planned to achieve a common market without internal barriers. There were three types of 
barriers in the Union which were removed by the SEA in 1987.  These are: physical, technical 
and fiscal barriers. “Physical barriers are defined as frontier controls, technical barriers as non 
tariff barriers, such as health and safety regulations, and fiscal barriers as differing taxes 
between member states.”12 The starting point of the CAP was to remove the frontier control in 
order to establish a common market between member countries, which was secured by the 
SEA in 1987, and improved with the Maastricht agreement in 1993. This was based on the 
liberal economic principal and contributed to liberalization of the trade within the Union by 
ensuring the economic and monetary integration of the EU. 
However, liberalization of the trade within the Union was not sufficient for the trade 
partners outside the EU. The demands of the GATT (WTO) on the CAP, for the liberalization 
                                                 
11Ridvan Karluk: European Union and Turkey, 1996, p.217 
12Ritson and Harvey: The CAP and the world Economy, 1991, p.166 
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of world trade and the negative impact of the price support system (PSS) of the CAP, 
compelled the EU Commission to reform CAP measures. But reform proposals, which would 
contribute to the liberalization of trade, were unfortunately planned to support producers with 
export subsidies, import levies or direct payments to enable them to maintain their production 
in the market, which increased producers gain whilst consumer welfare was reduced.                
 
2.1 The Functioning of the CAP 
 
For the CAP there are two aspects, the first one is “a price support mechanism, which 
attempts to create a unified market for agricultural produce throughout the community”13; and 
the second one “a structural policy, which attempts to influence such factors as the nature of 
the workforce, the size of farms, their efficiency, the methods they employ and the technology 
they use.”14 The structural part obviously plays an important role in the EU’s CAP. However, 
the price support system and, nowadays, income payments have been by far the most 
important and controversial aspect of the CAP.  
Main indicators of the CAP are shown in Table 2.6.1: The numbers for 1985 and 1998 
estimate that production and consumption in the EU has increased with varying yearly 
increases throughout the decade 1985-1998. Overall extra-EU exports of food, drink and 
tobacco usually exceed extra-EU imports. The trade balance has remained positive throughout 
the period 1985-1998.  
 
Table 2.6.1: Food, drink and tobacco, main indicators in current prices (ECU/ mn) 
 
 1985 1990 1993 1995 1998 
Apparent consumption 33,408.0 41,537.5 45,047.0 50,933.7 57,431.0 
Production 337,572 420,458 459,389 521,081 589,480 
Extra EU exports 24,672 24,977 30,768 35,965 40,660 
Extra EU Imports 21,180 19,894 21,850 24,220 -- 
Trade balance 3,492 5,083 8,919 11,745 15,170 
Employment (1000) 2,418 2,451 2,402 2,488 2,430 
 Source: Selected data, Eurostat: Panorama of EU industry 97, 1997, p. Chapter 3-2 
 
In Table 2.6.2 the EU’s share in world cereals trade has been indicated. After the Mac 
Sharry reform from 1993 to 1996 (except 1996) the import of cereal products slightly 
increased whilst export of cereals was in decline. From the beginning of the year 1996 to 
2000 import of cereals decreased whilst export of cereals increased. Against this trade of 
cereal products both in export and import were reduced by 2001.    
The price support mechanism sets out to guarantee minimum prices for farmers for 
much of their produce, which is shown in the above world prices, to prevent fluctuation on the 
internal market and to promote the income of farmers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13Lintner and Mazey: The European Community Economic and Political aspects, 1991, p.94 
14Lintner and Mazey: The European Community Economic and Political aspects, 1991, p.94 
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Table 2.6.2: The EU’s share in world cereals trade (mn/ tons)  
 
   1993 1996 1998 2000  2001 
    %  %  %  %  % 
World  116.4 100.0 113.3 100.0 119.1  125.8 100.0 120.7 100.0 
EU 12 1.2 1.0 2.2 1.9 :  : : : : 
Wheat and 
flour  
Wheat 
equivalent EU 15 1.4 1.2 1.9 1.7 3.7 3.1 4.2 3.3 0.3 0.3 
World 115.3 100.0 125.9 100.0 101.4 100.0 118.6 100.0 114.9 100.0 
EU 12 3.4 2.9 5.3 4.2 : : : : : : 
Other 
cereals 
EU 15 3.5 3.0 4.8 3.8 2.9 2.8 3.4 2.8 3.8 3.3 
World 231.7 100.0 239.2 100.0 220.5 100.0 244.5 100.0 235.6 100.0 
EU 12 4.6 2.9 7.5 3.1 : : : : : : 
I
M
P
O
R
T 
All cereals 
EU 15 4.9 3.0 6.7 2.8 6.6 3 7.6 3.1 4.1 1.7 
World  119.3 100.0 112.0 100.0 121.7 100.0 129.5 100.0 125.3 100.0 
EU 12 21.5 18.0 13.7 12.2 : : : : : : 
Wheat and 
flour  
Wheat 
equivalent EU 15 21.9 18.4 13.6 12.1 16.4 13.4 21.2 1.6 15.1 12.1 
World  116.0 100.0 121.7 100.0 105.8 100.0 119.5 100.0 111.0 100.0 
EU 12 8.2 7.1 6.4 5.3 : : : :  : 
Other 
cereals 
EU 15  9.2 7.9 6.9 5.7 7.9 7.4 19.7 1.6 14.2 12.8 
World  235.3 100.0 233.7 100.0 227. 5 100.0 249.0 100.0 236. 3 100.0 
EU 12 29.7 12.6 20.1 8.6 : : : : : : 
E
X
P
O
R
T 
All cereals 
EU 15 31.1 13.2 20.5 8.8 24.3 10.7 40.9 1.6 29.3 12.4 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/en41.htm (EU’s share in cereal trade) 
 
Since 1968 many regulations and reforms have been realized. Especially, during the 
Uruguay round, agricultural subventions were decreased to reduce negative effects of support 
measures, such as, trade distortion and price fluctuations in the world market. After the 
Agenda 2000, measures were been taken in the European Union such as environmental 
friendly production and cutting market support prices, increasing direct payment to farmers, 
maintaining the landscape and contributing to the vitality of the countryside, in order to reach 
the CAP’s planned goals which are stated in the Rome treaty article 39. However, 
achievement of CAP goals is not simple. First of all the price support policy within the Union 
reduces the effective functioning of the price mechanism. Price mechanism is a process which 
means any changes in prices affects and changes the capacity and types of goods and services 
that are produced. In any market price is dependent upon the supply and the demand for the 
products and services including transportation costs trade taxes etc, which affects and changes 
market prices. But in the EU’s CAP interventions to support internal producers affect and 
change the market prices. However, support measures can be applied for producers who have 
comparative advantages and for consumers in order to secure their welfare.   
An important function of the CAP’s PSS is the prices which are applied within the 
CAP system. In fact, prices in the CAP are fixed each year after a lengthy series of 
negotiations between the Council of Ministers and representatives of member states. It is, 
however, important to note that besides the economic effects, the political worries of 
politicians also have an important influence on the determination of price support measures of 
the CAP.  
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Agricultural prices: 
There are three types of roles which prices play in the CAP: “They guide production, 
trigger intervention mechanism, and secure common external protection.”15 Each of these 
three functions will be analysed in turn. In agriculture products differ depending on time and 
place, but they are similar in quality. Because of these variations between the EU members, it 
is not easy to fix the agricultural product prices in the Community. However, the basic idea is 
very simple; first, the Council of Ministers determines the desired internal product prices for 
each product in advance. This is the support price, known as the target price (Guide price). 
The Guide price is the ideal price for the EU, offering farmers a standard of living 
they should be entitled to while taking into account the needs of consumers. It is estimated 
from intervention prices which are set each year by the Council in accordance with both 
changes in the cost of living and supply and demand in each market. The target price is the 
highest price. It is very high relative to the world prices because the target price is fixed 
according to the highest production cost of the Union. For example, for cereals the highest 
production cost is in Duisburg, which is used for the calculation of cereal prices.   
Before October, the Commission fixes the intervention prices for the internal products. 
The market prices are determined by adding the profit rate and transportation costs to the 
intervention price. Therefore, EU farmers will be able to estimate their income before 
planting. According to the CAP “a target price is fixed for each good covered by the price 
support mechanism, as is an intervention price (sometimes as much as 30 per cent lower than 
the target price) below which the market price is not allowed to fall.”16 Target price is 
estimated for the products, which is in the common market regulation. These are cereals, 
sugar, milk, olive oil and sunflower seeds.    
Intervention prices: These are the guaranteed prices for the producers, who are 
allowed in the Union market to sell their products. This floor price is, somewhere near, but 
below, the target price, usually fixed at 9% below the target prices (see figure below). Such 
intervention buying is done by member states’ agencies. If prices fall below the intervention 
level, which means not selling at the target price, community agencies purchase the required 
quantity to push the price up to the desired levels. The surpluses, which are bought by 
community agencies, are either stored or subsidized for export. For fruit and vegetables, 
which cannot be stored, there are withdrawal prices where producers below these prices stop 
selling and send their products for distillation, to charities, or for destruction until the desired 
market prices are obtained. The payments of these are almost equal to the difference between 
intervention price and world price. Such surpluses from time to time are distributed to 
hospitals, old people, to the poor or the starving in the third world. 
The intervention measure is tied to a storage system. Stock levels are still excessively 
high, such that serious imbalances between supply and demand exist, which must, in 
principle, is corrected by lowering the intervention prices. Lower intervention prices will also 
help to reduce the amount of the surplus. Intervention prices are applied to cereals, sugar, 
butter, milk powder, cheese, olive oil, sunflower, seeds, pig’s meat, cattle and veal and 
tobacco.  
In the figure below the price support mechanism has been illustrated. As can be seen, 
on the one hand, the amount of import tariff (variable levy) has considerable effect on the 
prevention of imported products, which increase the product price of imported products up to 
the EU level. On the other hand, application of export subsidies reduces exported product 
prices to the world price level.   
 
 
                                                 
15Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.436 
16Lintner and Mazey: The European Community Economic and Political aspects, 1991, p.95 
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Figure 2.1: Relationship of main CAP price support mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prices outside the Union; 
Sluice-gate price: Sluice-gate price is calculated on the cost price of pig meat and 
poultry products. It is applied to support internal product prices from imported products. If 
imported product prices are lower than internal product cost prices, then an amount of levy is 
used to increase the imported product prices up to internal production costs.  
Threshold price: This is the price for the imported products (see figure above). It is the 
sum of the difference between target prices and highest production cost within the Union plus 
transport and distribution costs (usually from Rotterdam Harbour to Duisburg). It is applied to 
cereals, milk and olive oil. By means of the variable levy, import product prices are increased 
to the threshold prices to protect internal producers.  
Indicator Prices: These prices are applied for fruit and vegetables, wine and some 
fishery products to protect internal products from imported products. Import of those products 
can only be done with the minimum internal production costs. This minimum price is called 
the indicator price.  
Export Subventions. There were various subsidies to the export. The desired price and 
the integrity of the market are also protected by subventions for export and levies for import. 
The method of setting the price of products is the main cause of the surpluses. If the internal 
price has been set at a level that generates surpluses, then it is clear that the subvention rate 
would be high enough to protect internal production, and levies would be high enough to 
exclude all imports to protect local producers. 
“In theory, therefore, prices would not normally ever fall below the intervention price 
or rise above the target price for long.”17 The variable levy calculation is the same as the 
threshold price. It is applied especially to cereals, milk and olive oil.  
The variable levy is adjusted according to the variation between the EU consumption 
and production onto third country providers, which discourages these countries from 
subsidizing their exports. The price support system unfortunately does not only support the                     
large-scale efficient farmers, but also supports the less efficient farmers too. The system of 
import levies and export subsidies are phased out under the Uruguay round agreements.  
 
2.1.1 The Benefits of the CAP 
 
If the policy is seen in the light of its aim, the success of the CAP will be better 
understood. “The CAP policy was conceived against a history of 80 years of cyclical 
fluctuations in demand, prices and rural prosperity.”18 As is well-known, the agricultural 
depressions of the period 1918-1939 were devastating in the United Kingdom. After the 
                                                 
17Goodman S. F.: The European Union, 1990, p.129 
18Goodman S. F.: The European Union, 1990, p.115 
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Second World War food shortages in Europe, which were severe from 1943 to the early1950s, 
led to the foundation of the CAP in the European Communities. Briefly, rural poverty in 
Europe was a mainspring of political and social unrest.  
The EU’s CAP was founded particularly to improve the member countries’ prosperity 
which was destroyed during the Second World War. The foundation of the CAP took eleven 
years to support and secure in the agricultural sector. In the last decade an increasing trend of 
trade liberalization and the impact of the WTO on the world compelled the EU’s CAP to 
reduce the support measures and protection in agriculture. Especially after the Uruguay 
Round substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support measures were observed for a 
fair, and market oriented agricultural trading system. 
One of the important benefits of the CAP is “self-sufficiency in agriculture.”19 
According to Linter, this has led to balance of payment advantages and also food abundance. 
In the CAP, less effective small-scale producers are supported by EAGGF, which have   
comparative disadvantages in the market relative to the large-scale producers. In principle, 
farmers have always tended to enter markets where prices have been high enough in the 
recent past and to leave those where prices have been low. Many small-scale producers do not 
have the luxury of choice as to what to produce. Because of their land conditions, technique 
and machinery may all be specific to one type of production. Therefore, CAP finances some 
of the domestic producers to be able to maintain their insufficient production in the expense 
of the welfare loss to consumers. 
A second important benefit of the CAP is the price support system (PSS), which 
secures higher income levels for producers. In the CAP, existence of the PSS prevents farmers 
from losses despite the important role that the price elasticity of demand plays on agricultural 
markets. In agriculture, advance mechanization and new plant techniques cause rapid 
productivity growth and increases in supply. These outpace modest increases in demand, but 
exert downward pressure on farm prices.  
The demand for most agricultural products or food is price inelastic. The degree of 
inelasticity plays an important role for farmers, food processors and policy makers. “When a 1 
percent change in price calls forth more than 1 percent in quantity demanded, the good has 
price elastic demand.”20 The demand of consumers is changed if there is any change in the 
food price; this shows that there are close substitutes at existing market prices on these 
products. These products are in the luxury goods category, because demand elasticity of basic 
foods is between zero and 1 (0<e<1).  These are in the necessary foods category. The impact 
of the elastic demand on consumer behaviour is inversely proportional to price changes. This 
means any price increase reduces income levels of consumers. But “when a 1 percent change 
in price evokes less than a 1 percent change in quantity demanded the good has price-inelastic 
demand.”21 This indicates that substitution of this product is not easy, and that it is in the 
necessary goods category. For the producer, inelastic demand means that revenue will 
decrease when price decreases. 
In agriculture, processing, packaging, and branding of food etc. are expensive and 
financial support is needed to overcome such production costs before marketing. 
On the one side, agricultural products are perishable and need to be consumed within a 
short period which affects the market price of products. On the other side, income elasticity of 
demand for agricultural products is low; Engel’s law suggests that consumers increase their 
expenditure for food products (in % terms) less than their increases in income.  
This implies demand expansion must arise largely from the increase in the population to 
increase the demand capacity of products. 
                                                 
19Valerio Lintner and Sonia Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.97 
20Samuelson Nordhaus: Economics, 1998, p.65      
21Nordhaus: Economics, 1998, p.65      
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Agricultural product prices fluctuate more heavily than other product prices. Either 
subsidy or price support is required to prevent this price fluctuation. Farm product prices are 
not stable, especially in the short term, because most of the products are perishable and 
storage of these products is costly. Therefore, most of the products, especially in summer, are 
cheaper then ever. And for this reason, the Commission proposes guarantee prices for certain 
products, such as cereals, one year before planting. These target prices assist producers to 
estimate their income. The guarantee prices relative to the world market are high and 
encourage producers to plant more than demand, which causes over production. These 
plantings which are dependent on the Commission prices affect the number of seasonal 
workers who are employed in agriculture. Therefore, prevention of these problems requires 
new price regulations. Regulation of prices in the European Union is more difficult than in 
other countries. It is difficult to expect similar product quality and price, which, in the south 
of Europe is less costly than in Northern Europe because of the difference in labour wages 
and climate differences. The levels of economic development differ from one region to 
another, which affects the wages. In the southern European countries the level of wages is 
lower than in the other advanced countries of Central Europe. Especially after the eastern 
enlargement the wage differences between member countries increased, which then increased 
the price differences between similar products in member countries. However, the CAP 
support system contributes to a reduction of regional disparities between member countries. 
In the Union price equation on similar products trade between member countries is one of the 
important objectives of the CAP.   
Besides this, transport and production costs differ from one region to another. 
Therefore, prices, which are fixed by the Commission every year, cause higher profits for 
some farmers while others do not share the same rate.  
In the EU, liberalization is directed to the free market profit economy. But this does 
not imply a shift to a total laissez faire. In the CAP the economic structure is dependent on the 
high-regulated market. In this market standard price theory is taken into consideration. In 
standard price theory production price plays an important role in fixing the market price. 
Market price (supply price) is determined not by the average prices (or costs) of producers, 
but by the price (costs) of the marginal producers, as is done in the CAP. 
In the agricultural sector, impact of the price elasticity of demand / supply and the 
existence of a low-income elasticity of demand for some foods causes a price fluctuation in 
the market. But in the CAP, the price support system reduces the impact of the price 
fluctuation on the market. The important problem is to determine suitable support measures to 
reduce the negative effects of price instability.  
In agriculture, mainly fruit and vegetables, which are perishable, needs to be 
consumed as soon as possible after marketing. These seasonal product prices tend to decrease 
if they are produced in excess of demand.   
In the CAP, application of the price support system is used sometimes for political 
reasons. The fear of losing voters forces politicians to support farmers in maintaining their 
inefficient production which increases the production costs of domestic producers. 
In time, it was seen that the application of these policies (such as: intervention 
purchase and storage, export subsidies, domestic support commitments) reduced the ability of 
the CAP to reach its planned goals as stated in article 39 of the Rome treaty.  
In the WTO meetings from Seattle to Doha producers often raised objections to these 
applications. It is expected that in the future reform proposal member states will acquire more 
responsibility, such as contributions to the finances of the CAP budget.  
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The third benefit is that “the CAP has enabled European agriculture to experience 
rapid technological change and productivity increases in recent years.”22 The price support 
system may generate higher profits for efficient farmers. These higher profits, on the one 
hand, have induced them to increase the levels of investment and research and also to increase 
the production capacity or to use modern technology. On the other hand, this very increase in 
productivity has contributed to the problem of surpluses in the community. The nature of the 
demand for agricultural products is that part of it comes from industry and the other part from 
domestic consumers. The use of agricultural products in the food industry like fruit juice, jam, 
fruit and vegetable conservation etc. will reduce surplus and storage costs. In the 
manufactured food processing industry those perishable products in agriculture, after a serial 
process like packaging dehydration and freezing, will become long-lasting products. The 
extension of durability of agricultural products can help to smooth out seasonal fluctuation in 
supply.  
The fourth benefit is: “The CAP has to a large extent succeeded in achieving the 
objective of a single and unified market in European agriculture.”23 The contribution of the 
CAP to integrating the agricultural sector of the Western European countries should not be 
underestimated. Especially after World War II the food shortage was overcome throughout 
the Europe by using the measures of the CAP system. However, in the Western European 
countries, most of the smaller producers survive by producing a specialized product to a 
narrow section of the market, or by giving outstanding personal service and quality. But most 
such small-scale production in the CAP system is unfortunately not efficient enough to 
compete in the market. Besides their finance problem which increases the burden of the CAP 
budget, it is obvious that maintenance of such small scale producers cannot be dependent on 
their economic utility; indeed, vote expectations of the politicians play a major role.   
The European Union’s anti-monopoly laws contribute very little to producers in order 
to maintain their production during the integration process which is financed by the CAP.      
 
2.1.2 The Disadvantages of the CAP 
 
The faults of the CAP policies are seen to consist of lack of equity and efficiency. The 
policies, applied in the community, are not always put into effect because of their efficiency 
for the agricultural sector, but sometimes for political reasons such as vote expectations for 
the next term election. Therefore, politicians have sometimes applied politically unpopular 
decisions to increase their vote capacity for the elections. Due to this process the effective role 
of the CAP has been reduced. The disadvantages of the CAP can be summarized as below: 
First of all “the CAP has resulted in high food prices and welfare losses for European 
consumers.”24 The price support system which was enforced in the Community has caused 
higher prices for most agricultural products compared to the world market. These higher 
prices cause welfare losses in the EU.  
According to the principle of the Comparative Advantages theory, “comparative costs 
of a good are low in a country which has a comparative advantage in producing it and high in 
a country with a comparative disadvantage.” 25 In the CAP, economically less rational 
decisions of politicians have reduced the effective application of this principle. The share of 
small-scale producers in the CAP plays an important role in the decision-making process. The 
social and political need for protection for small-scale producers reduces the effective 
                                                 
22Lintner and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.98 
23Lintner and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.99 
24Linterr and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.99  
25Cem Alpar and Tuba Ongun: World Economy and International Economic Foundations, 1985, p.26   
 44
application of price support systems (PSS). In fact, the CAP was founded to increase 
productivity in agriculture and welfare of the nations.   
On the one hand, the CAP was founded to increase the productivity and marketing of 
the CAP products, but higher incomes of producers resulted from direct payments of the 
community agencies and not from profit of their production for the market. On the other hand, 
price intervention was contributed in the CAP system to balance the market prices. Even if it 
is used as a protective measure it has a preventive role on price fluctuation in the market.  
In fact import tariffs prevent imported product access but they stimulate development 
of internal production. However, the amount of protection must be carefully determined to 
reduce the negative effects on trade. In economics it is known that export and import can 
balance each other and there is no need to protect them. But it is obvious that most protective 
measures reduce the welfare of consumers and the nation. Furthermore, some NTMs (such as 
export and production subsidies) increase the cost of the budget. In a case where there are not 
any trade restrictions there are also losers, namely producers and governments, who receive 
tariff revenues.  
In fact, whether there are tariff or non-tariff measures, both have negative effects on 
the welfare of the nations. These protections increase the consumer prices which reduce the 
real income of consumers. Due to the import levies, the prices of the imported products are 
increased up to the threshold price level of the EU. The import levies protect domestic 
producers from imported products.  
Especially after the eastern enlargement of the EU, those producers with costly 
production methods in the EU may direct their production operation process towards the new 
members where production cost is lower because of the cheaper labour force. This will also 
contribute to increased competitiveness between domestic producers in the world market. 
The second important disadvantage of the CAP is the creation of surpluses. The 
Commission set support prices too high every year, especially for cereals. “As a consequence, 
because most other agricultural products are related to cereals, either as competitive arable 
crops or as users of cereals based feeding stuffs most other agricultural prices had similarly to 
be set at relatively high levels.”26 The Commission fixes high product prices one year before 
planting, especially for cereal products, which direct many producers to increase their product 
capacity (see Graph below). Increasing product capacity is a required intervention measure to 
prevent the price fall and fluctuation in the market (see Cobweb theorem in 1.3). If there is an 
excess supply in the market, the market price will fall below the intervention price, which is 
set at 9% below the guide (target) price. As a result of this, intervention supply is withdrawn 
from the market until the market price increases to match the intervention price. This 
intervention in the CAP is the main cause of surpluses. According to Lintner, there are two 
main reasons for the CAP surpluses: “Supply side factors, higher prices have directly 
increased production, while productivity has increased as a result of high levels of investment 
and research and development in the industry. Demand side factor, the income elasticity of 
demand for food in the EC countries is low (estimated at around 0.2).”27 In the developed 
countries an increase in income will not be directed towards basic foods, but usually people 
tend to spend their money on basic foodstuffs and services. And another fact is that the 
population of the European countries is not growing fast enough to generate additional 
demand for basic food products. In the EU though, all export subsidies and marketing of 
surplus in the world market is hindered by higher product prices. Insufficient marketing of the 
surplus compels Community agencies to distribute this over-production to the third world or 
even to destroy it. The reason for this is the expensive storage costs of these products. 
                                                 
26Ritson and Harvey: The CAP and the world Economy, 1991, p215 
27Lintner and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.99 
 45
Graph 2.4: Changes in the level of intervention stocks (or public stocks) of cereals and 
exports (cereals in grain form or after first-stage processing, including for food aid)  
           (mn/ tons)  
 
 
 
 
Source: The EU Commission: CAP Reforms: The Arable Crops Sectors, July 1999          
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/publi/fact/cereals/index_en.htm 
 
The third possible impact of the CAP is income transfers. When imports originate 
from non-member countries an import tariff is imposed so that the import price plus the levy 
equals the threshold price. The import revenue goes to the European Union budget. In other 
words: “It has redistributed income from the rest of the world to European farmers and 
governments, through import replacement and the variable levy.”28 Another possible income 
transfer can occur when the producers in member countries sell their products within the 
community at market prices, which are higher than the world prices. Consumers in the EU are 
compelled to pay more money than non-member countries’ consumers to buy food products. 
This is the cost of the tariffs, which are imposed on imported products, reducing the welfare 
of the consumer.  
The fourth disadvantage is that when “the CAP raises the intervention prices it favours 
the more productive farms, which are usually the larger farmers, due to their larger output unit 
of capital invested.”29 This means that the impact of intervention price is related to the 
capacity of production which affects the cost of production and also product prices. In the EU 
most of the small-scale producers have higher production costs relative to the large-scale 
producers; therefore, intervention price can only prevent the loss of small- scale producers, 
whilst large- scale producers profit from this intervention.      
The fifth possible impact of the CAP is the adverse effects on non -member countries. 
Non-member countries are able to trade their products among themselves without any 
restriction. But “The CAP has depressed world agricultural trade and has denied farmers in 
other countries fair access to one of the world’s most important markets.”30 There are a large 
number of products which are cheap and effectively produced in the rest of the world and 
which are displaced in the EU market by more expensive goods produced by farmers in EU 
member countries. This has been the result of the higher internal prices and the import levy 
which CAP applies to it. Such policies depress the world market prices by increasing world 
supply and cutting world demand, which means that CAP causes a reduction of world trade 
and increases EU export at the expense of third world countries. Briefly, CAP policies 
increase the prices of imported products and prevent their access to the EU market. 
                                                 
28Lintner and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.99 
29 Guglielmo Carchedi: For Another Europe, 2001, p.217   
30 Lintner and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.99 
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Another important effect is that the CAP expenditure has dominated the EC budget. 
Escalating costs of the CAP have forced member countries to increase the size of the budget, 
which has caused political crises in recent years. The reason for the budget cost increase is the 
financing of the surplus generated by the above equilibrium prices.  This causes a downward 
pressure on agricultural prices in the world, because higher product prices in the EU stimulate 
less developed countries by using their access opportunity into the EU market to increase 
production capacity on similar products. 
The sixth possible impact of the CAP can be defined as, the more you produce the 
more subsidies you effectively get. “One estimate (CEC July1991) is that 80% of the CAP 
spending goes on only 20 % of farmers who are overwhelmingly bigger and richer than the 
rest”31 This means that the lion’s share of the indirect subsidies goes to the large and efficient 
farms, which cover only 25 per cent of total farms. Consequently there has been a decline in 
the number of small farms and an increase in the number of large farms, because subsidies are 
directly related to the production capacity.  
Another possible disadvantage can be summarized, in that the CAP is unresponsive to 
consumer demands since it is subsidies rather than what consumers want that tends to 
determine what is produced. Instead of consumer preferences, producers tend to increase their 
production capacity where the price support mechanism encourages them to do so.  
Finally “the employment and balance of payments benefits of the CAP have been 
achieved at the expense of job and trade in other sectors.”32 
 
2.1.3 How the CAP might be improved 
  
The European Union agricultural markets of the member States are organised in 
various ways at national level. Structural measures of the CAP are still required to develop the 
farms into viable enterprises which can survive in international market conditions. According 
to the Buckwell report; “the LEADER program is a model initiative trying to address 
problems of rural development primarily by creating new, bottom up, institutional structures 
for economic development in rural areas. This, it is hoped, will lead to stimulation of new 
enterprises, thereby providing new employment, diversifying away from traditional 
commodity production and developing local specialities based on the characteristics of the 
regions.”33  
Since the mid -1960s the CAP has objected to improving productivity and welfare in 
agriculture. But the lack of knowledge of many farmers and less effective production prevents 
the improvement of agricultural production at the desired level to achieve self- sufficiency in 
this sector. Under the CAP system less effective and expensive labour forces reduce the 
competition of domestic producers. In the CAP labour productivity would be increased in four 
ways: “Raise production, lower production costs and improve farm organisation, increase the 
real price of agricultural commodities or reduce the agricultural working force.”34 In fact 
under the CAP system there is over-production, especially for cereals, sugar, milk and milk 
products and meat and meat products. Thus, it is not possible to increase production anymore, 
especially for these products. Lowering the production cost can be done either by lowering 
the labour wages.  It is not easy to apply this reduction or use high technical methods which is 
a very expensive process for those small-scale producers. Raising the production is already 
supported with production subsidies and production quotas, but small to medium scale 
                                                 
31Guglielmo Carchedi: For Another Europe, 2001, p.217  (translated by the author) 
32Lintner and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.104 
33DG VI Buckwell Report –Towards a Common Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe, p.3 
34 Rosemary Fennell: The CAP, 1997, p.95 
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producers have higher prices, and even if they are artificially subsidized for the market they 
have market difficulties. The size of the labour force since the Mansholt plan has reduced. 
Especially Application of the set-aside measures and early retirement, in particular, has 
reduced the amount of employed people in agriculture. But higher product prices and over 
production is still a considerable problem in the CAP.  
In the agricultural sector, farmers are not sufficiently informed about the planned 
goals. In the long run, mechanisation will be increased to replace the insufficient labour force, 
using machines for raising productivity in agriculture.  
In the CAP system decisions are not only taken for economic utility but also for 
political reasons. This has meant CAP reforms were not put into effect to increase agricultural 
productivity but also to maintain reasonable incomes for producers even if inefficient 
production is maintained. The reason for this is the vote expectations of politicians to secure 
their survival. This is also criticised in the Buckwell report: “An alternative interpretation, 
preferred by its severest critics, is that its survival is explained by the power of the lobbies of 
those who have captured the benefits of the CAP and that it is a sign of the political failure of 
EU policy decision, institutions, and procedures.”35 Such criticisms will bring about a better 
understanding as to why these policies had no success on CAP policies which had 
indefensible distribution impacts and were ineffective in delivering desired objectives to 
survive the CAP. But, nevertheless the CAP has always been involved in considering new 
proposals to increase its effectiveness in the Union. “The CAP does indeed have to be 
transformed. It should change from being essentially a centralised commodity policy to 
becoming a major component of more comprehensive, integrated and decentralised rural 
policy.”36 
Finally, it is important to mention the impact of the Agrimonetary system which was 
introduced in 1995 to reduce the CAP costs and to avoid dramatic price changes due to 
currency fluctuations in the different member states. In this system most agricultural support 
prices and payments within the CAP were set in ECU’s and then these amounts were 
converted into national currency terms using an exchange rate mechanism which was known 
as ‘agricultural conversion rates’ or ‘green rates.’37 However, on 1st January 1999 after the 
introduction of the single currency the agrimonetary system changed with a fixed exchange 
rate within the Euro zone (except UK, Denmark and Sweden - for them European Central 
Bank exchange rates are considered). It is obvious that within the Union there is no need for 
separate currency conversion but outside the Union an exchange rate mechanism is still 
maintained. Under this system more dependence on direct payments rather than price support 
has been given for internal producers. Direct payments on the one hand reduce the 
disadvantage of the farmers as a result of the loss of green rate freeze: “Green rates applying 
to all direct payments were frozen in member states (including the UK) which experienced 
appreciable revaluations between 23 June 1995 and 31 December 1998 and then until 1 
January 1999. The frozen rates were set at a rate up to a limit of 11.5% higher than the green 
rate applicable to other CAP payments.”38 Through time increasing amounts of direct 
payments have contributed to covering the farmers’ losses and have reduced the effects of the 
intervention price mechanism in the market. However, increasing direct payments to 
producers have increased the spending of the CAP budget.  
 
 
                                                 
35DG VI Buckwell Report –Towards a Common Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe, p.3-4 
36DG VI Buckwell Report –Towards a Common Agricultural and Rural Policy for Europe, p.4 
37 Green rates: Green rates have been mostly abandoned in favour of market exchange rates 
38 Guide to the Agrimonetary system and Euro after 1 January 1999, p.2  
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2.2 Major instruments of the EU’s CAP:  
 
Before explaining the support instruments of the CAP a short glance at the agricultural 
production and trade may contribute to distinguishing the products of the agricultural trade. In 
the EU’s CAP, agricultural production is dominated by livestock products (including dairy), 
grains, vegetables, wine, fruits, and sugar.  
Major export commodities include grains (wheat and barley), sugar, dairy products, 
poultry, pork, fruit, vegetables and wine, which are supported with guaranteed price and 
intervention measures. Poultry products receive only customs protection and beef is supported 
with guaranteed prices and direct aids to complement production. 
Most agricultural import products are not suited to the climate of northern Europe. 
Therefore, import products such as soybeans and soybean products, coffee, cocoa, tea and 
spices, are not restricted. “Cereals, milk and milk products and beef are supported with 
guaranteed prices through direct aid. Cotton, feeding stuffs and tobacco are supported through 
maximum guaranteed quantities (MGQ) which are national guaranteed production quotas. 
Tropical products, banana (MGQ), citrus fruits, some seasonal fruits and vegetables, which 
are from Community guaranteed production quotas (MGA), wine with national surplus 
quotas, milk and sugar national production quotas, are restricted with maximum guaranteed 
areas (MGA).”39 The EU also imports large quantities of animal feed to supplement 
domestically produced supplies. 
 In the third chapter the application of measures on agricultural products is more fully 
explained. 
 
2.2.1 Tariffs 
 
A tariff measure is the simplest trade restriction. It can be either specific, which is a 
fixed sum per unit or ad valorem, or a proportion of the value added. A tariff raises the price 
of a good in the importing country and lowers it in the exporting country. As a result of these 
price changes consumers in importing countries lose out while consumers in exporting 
countries gain. Producers in importing countries gain, while producers in exporting country 
lose. Besides the consumer and producer, governments gain from tariff revenue. The tariff 
measure is easy to collect, but it is important to remember that the reflection of tariff revenues 
on the social welfare is dependent on the political view of the government.  
The impact of the tariff measures is explained in the third chapter.        
 
2.2.2 Non-Tariff Measures 
 
The non-tariff measures are divided into two parts according to their direct and 
indirect effects. Quantitative measures, such as, import quotas and VER restrict import 
directly, while levies, minimum price requirements and technical standards have an indirect 
effect on imports.  
The use of variable levies and threshold prices is a foundation of the CAP and applies 
to important food items such as cereals, sugar, beef and dairy products. Tariff quotas limiting 
imports quantitatively apply to fresh fruit and vegetables, meat and tobacco manufactures. 
Imports of live animal, milk products sugar and honey are sometimes prohibited for 
health and sanitary reasons.    
Non-tariff measures can be classified into five major sections. These are:  
 
                                                 
39 EU Parliament Fact Sheets: Agricultural Markets Policy Common Organisations of the Market Legal Basis,   
 
 49
1- Subsidies: Intervention purchasing to support prices, 
  - Direct payments (Coupled or decoupled)  
  - Production quotas to prevent over production,  
  - Variable import levies and quotas (or Voluntary export restrains =VER) to protect  
     domestic producers from import, 
  - Export subsidies to encourage exports,  
  - Subsidies for storage of over production, 
  - Monetary compensatory amounts VER (Voluntary export restrains),  
2- Anti-dumping measures, 
3- Safeguard: Mainly to prevent a sudden surge of imported products on the domestic 
     products. Consequently, an importing country needs to impose, for a temporary 
     period, border controls. 
4- Technical barriers: Technical specifications such as sanitary, phytosanitary and 
     health regulations. 
There are three differing perspectives on the effects that the technical measures have 
on trade: 
“First, if a country has some strength in product standards which promotes the quality 
of the domestic products, technical standards can promote exports and reduce imports for this 
country through non price competitiveness. Second, non-tariff barriers may act as an 
impediment to imports, but can also be a barrier for export, as national product specificities 
may not be accepted by consumers in other countries. Third, in the economic integration 
literature it is argued that the existence of standards which are accepted across countries 
promotes intra industry trade.”40 
5- Government procurements: This measure actually was not covered by the GATT 
(WTO) measures, but governments may discriminate against foreign suppliers in favour of 
domestic suppliers to protect producers from imported products.    
There are also some other non-tariff measures, which cause a restriction on the trade. 
These are given briefly below:  
Environmental friendly production requirements,  
Food safety for health and hygiene requirements, 
Protection of domestic producers for protection of rural livelihoods, 
Promotion of rural development, 
Elaboration of measures on narcotic drugs; restrictions on raw materials, which could 
serve to  
Refinement narcotic drugs, cocaine, acetone, sulphuric acid etc 
Fiscal reasons: tobacco, alcoholic beverages, which are subject to added taxes.     
Import restrictions on certain products 
Security reasons, such as, war materials, firearms, munitions, etc 
Animal health and phytosanitary reasons  
Corruption: different items were subject to import restrictions due to lobbying and 
 bribery in the industry   
Special dispositions: on a variety of products, salt regale, importation of legal currency 
 (coins) etc. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Michael Landesmann and Robert Stehrer: Trade Structures, Quality Differentiation, and Technical barriers in 
CEEC-EU Trade, 2002, p.1     
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2.2.3 Exchange Regime Trade Barriers and Impact of the Financial Flow  
 
2.2.3.1 Impact of the Exchange Regime on Trade  
 
In the Union, exchange rates of different currencies were creating difficulties for trade, 
such as, deficit or excess of balance of payments. Exchange rate difficulties were required to 
be facilitated. As a consequence of this, in 1972, the ERM was introduced into the Union to 
reduce exchange rate difficulties. In 1975 the ECU (European Currency Unit) was put into 
effect to convert national currencies into the ECU value to facilitate the exchange rates of 
national currencies. In the EU, the ECU, a national unit of exchange, was based on a basket, 
or weighted combination of the currencies of nations belonging to the European Community. 
The ECU was created by the European Community with the aim of eventually making it the 
single currency of a unified western European economy. The ECU is increasingly used in 
commercial banking transactions because its relative stability renders it more suitable than a 
national currency for fixing contractual terms.  
In 1979 the European Monetary System (EMS) was put into effect to reduce all the 
above given difficulties. EMS covers ERM, ECU, EMCF (European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund) and VSTF (Very Short Term Financial Facilities).     
In January 2002 the new currency ‘Euro’ was put into circulation. The single currency 
reduced the difficulty between member states. First of all, it perceived lower transaction costs. 
It removed the exchange rate mechanism between member countries. It removed the 
Commission fees to the banks. The single currency in the EU gives consumers the advantage 
of being able to compare the price differences between member countries to find the most 
suitable and cheapest products in order to optimise its utility. The globalisation effect and its 
contribution to communication and information technology especially facilitate the sales 
options of internal producers. They can market and sell their products via the Internet. The 
Internet access to products contributes to consumers comparing product quality and product 
prices, which enhance their utility. Such transparency makes the product prices clear when 
comparing them with similar products, increases the competition, and forces producers to 
reduce and to equalize the product prices.      
There is also a negative impact of a single currency which occurs when a county falls 
into an asymmetric shock “The term refers to any serious distortion in a particular country, 
region or industrial sector that goes against the prevailing cycle in a given economic area.”41 
This may also affect the other member countries´ economies. Monetary policy was in the 
hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), which acted in the interest of the euro zone as a 
whole and could not respond to local problems especially in small member countries. The 
new system was powerless to prevent the increase in unemployment that, for example, might 
result from such a shock without directing fiscal transfers between countries to compensate 
for the loss of national monetary sovereignty. Such a solution would require political union, 
which was not on the stated agenda. 
 
2.2.3.2 Impact of the Financial Flow on the Customs Union 
 
The customs Union has not only meant the introduction of free trade, but it has also 
contributed to creating similar domestic institutions between nations i.e. convergence and 
economic practices. These convergences in macro economic performance are difficult to 
realize. It is obvious that the economic performance of the nations cannot be easily changed. 
Convergence between countries is required but realisation of this is not easy.  
                                                 
41 Herald Tribune, The world Daily Newspaper, Economic Achilles Heel: An Asymmetric Shock to System By 
Barry James 
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The Customs Union does not compel nations to replace their existing institutions and 
it is not the reason for domestic change. As a consequence of the Customs Union, countries 
become a part of trade, which is created by Customs Union. The Customs Union has meant 
free trade, financial flow and more profit. However, it requires many constitutional changes 
and series of negotiations in a country to accept and adopt their domestic institutions into the 
customs union.  
 The Customs Union has also meant free financial flow. Foreign direct investments by 
multi national firms especially accelerate financial flow between member countries. In the 
past, political stability and central location made Switzerland a financial centre, with hundreds 
of banks. However, nowadays globalisation affects and increases the financial flow between 
countries enormously.  
Completely open international financial flow may be secured to protect the economy 
from financial crisis. According to Robert Gilpin, a “completely open and unregulated 
international financial system is the best solution to the problems resulting from international 
financial flows.”42 He believes that the IMF and the World Bank controls monetary and 
financial matters as a ‘true lender of last resort’ causing harm to those economies in crisis. 
Such interventionist policies of the EU, IMF and World Bank may also encourage reckless 
behaviour by firms, as was seen in the Asia crisis. On the one hand, in the unregulated market 
those investors or borrowers will be better off knowing that in a crisis no single person or 
agency will rescue them, but on the other hand, without any financial guarantee (like IMF or 
the United States), no-one will invest outside the USA and Europe.   
It is obvious that intervention in the financial market is required to maintain economic 
development, because fluctuation causes uncertainty in the product prices in foreign 
currencies, and may be harmful for foreign trade. In cases where prices are increased foreign 
trade also reduces. A diminishing of foreign trade reduces production and results in low 
employment capacity. On the other hand increasing the price will affect the economies in a 
positive way.  
“The floating exchange rate theoretically secures the autonomy in monetary policies. 
But during the globalisation, effects of the foreign exchange rate may be not considered.”43 
Since the abolition of the Bretton Wood System (1973) many countries have continued to peg 
their currency to the US dollar. In fact, pegged exchange rates may be used to bring down 
higher inflation in short run stabilization programs. Later “perhaps in response to surging 
capital inflows and the risk of over-heating, more flexibility is likely to be required to help 
relieve pressure and to signal the possible need for adjustments to contain an external 
imbalance.”44 Instability of exchange rates create difficulties and are required to move toward 
full capital account convertibility for the economic globalisation, as it is done in the EU.  
In the European Union, the European Monetary System began in March 1979 with eight of 
the nine members of the EU participating in its exchange rate mechanism (ERM). At that time 
differences in inflation rates across members of the ERM were as large as 10 percentage 
points. This made it difficult to maintain stability in the ERM since, with fixed exchange 
rates; differences in inflation translate directly into changes in relative prices, which shift 
competitiveness across countries. Inflation rate differentials narrowed across Europe by the 
Mid 1980s. In 1999 the European Monetary Union was founded, and was expected to reduce 
the negative effects of liberalisation on economic parameters such as export, import, stability 
on price policy etc. It is obvious that monetary globalisation is not simple and it may cause 
economic instability.    
 
                                                 
42 Robert Gilpin: The Challenge of Global Capitalism, 2000, p.329 
43 Jaques Adda: La Mondialisation de l’economie, 2001, p.116 
44 Philip King: International Economics and International Economic Policy, 2000, p.263 
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2.3  The Price Support System within the EU  
 
The price support system (PSS) of the EU’s CAP was put in to effect to stabilize 
market and to secure reasonable income for internal producers, as is defined in article 39 for 
CAP objectives. “However, the fact that EU prices are higher than world prices will have a 
more significant effect on both production and consumption and consequently on trade and 
farmers’ revenue.”45 This implies application of CAP support measures not only excessively 
enhance the income of internal producers but also decrease the welfare of consumer.   
 
2.3.1 According to the Rome Treaty: Subventions  
  
According to the 92nd article of the Rome treaty, a proposal of the Commission to the 
Council gives subvention for financial promotion either to less developed regions to create a 
unified market, or to a sector for structural adaptation. However subventions are not only 
given to reduce the regional disparities in the CAP of the EU it is also given to increase the 
competition of internal producers against lower cost production of the third world countries in 
the world market.  
Indeed in the 1980’s the EU’s cereal export was successfully increased. However, the 
Mac Sharry reform, which negatively affected the market support and subsidies, reduced the 
EU’s export up to 2000. But after 2000 the decline in price gap between EU and world cereals 
increased the export share of the EU producers (see table 2.7.2).  The impact of the CAP and 
subsidies had a considerable effect on trade increase. As a consequence of support measures, 
domestic producers increased their trade capacity in the market. Application of these 
measures (such as export and production subsidies, import levies etc) creates an unfair 
competition in the market for domestic producers. The need for this protection, on the one 
hand, secures a reasonable income and market for domestic producers. On the other hand, 
some efficient production of exportable commodity in the third world countries is replaced by 
the insufficient production of internal producers.  
In the CAP, Common Market Organizations consist of four basic categories. These 
are: 
“Intervention prices comprise almost 70% of agricultural products such as; cereals, 
wine, cattle and pig meat, and some fruit and vegetables and fishery products. 
In the CAP approximately 21% of production is protected from cheaper products of 
third countries. These are cereals, wine, some fruit and vegetables and egg. 
Subvention is also given to some imported products to cover domestic demand with 
cheaper products, such as wheat, olive oil, tobacco, sheep meat. 
According to the production amount (5% of total production) lump payments for 
cottonseed, linen, fodder, hemp etc.”46 These regulations are used to protect the internal 
market. In fact 50% of the EAGGF Guarantee section expenditure is used to finance and 
support milk and milk products, cereal, rice and olive oil.                        
Major instruments can be given, such as: monetary (compensatory) amounts, export 
subsidies, promotions for small and medium sized enterprises (SME), tax exemption or 
reduction, lower interest rate credit, intervention buying to support prices, subsidies for 
storage of surplus.         
For the CAP there are two aspects: The first one is “a price support mechanism, which 
attempts to create a unified market for agricultural produce throughout the community”47; and 
                                                 
45 Mergos G., Stoforos C., Mishev P. and Ivanova N.: Analysing agricultural policy reforms under transition in 
Bulgaria, 2001, Pages 488  
46 Karluk Prof Rıdvan: EU and Turkey, 2002, p.245 
47Lintner and Mazey: The European Community Economic and Political aspects, 1991, p.94 
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the second one “a structural policy, which attempts to influence such factors as the nature of 
the workforce, the size of farms, their efficiency, the methods they employ and the technology 
they use.”48 According to the author, Linter, the structural part of the CAP is potentially of 
great importance but the price support system has been by far the most important and 
controversial aspect of the CAP.  
The price support mechanism sets out to guarantee minimum prices for farmers for 
much of their produce, which are set higher than supply, demand, and world market prices, to 
encourage farmers to produce more than they would in a free market. Obtaining these 
expectations, many regulations and reforms in the European Union are required to reach the 
planned goals. These can be summarized in the light of the CAP objectives which are defined 
in article 39: 
• Making the community self-sufficient in important food items,  
• Providing a reasonable livelihood for people who work on the land,  
• Increasing agricultural productivity to guarantee reasonable prices for consumers and   
• Promoting European integration by achievement of a unified market in a key area of 
economic activity.  
Since January 2002 the Euro has been in circulation, and the positive effect of the 
monetary compensatory amounts (MCA) increased. Therefore, the loss from the exchange 
rate has been overcome within the Union (except three Member States). The Euro increases 
the competition power of the EU. Fiscal integration reduces interest rates and therefore the 
cost of financing. Free movement of goods and labour force is also expected to increase in the 
coming decade.      
   
2.3.2 Monetary Compensatory Payments 
 
The producers within the EU were protected by different support mechanisms. There 
were four types of compensation payments in the CAP, which are given below. 
“a- Direct payments to farmers whose income were due to fall because of the lowering 
of cereal prices, 
b- Improvements in social, welfare payments to farmers and their families, 
c- Aids for the improvement of productivity and the rationalisation of agriculture,  
d- Aids to producers of durum wheat (Commission 1963 (f)).”49 
Payments were given only temporarily and independent of the price of 
agricultural products.         
 
2.3.3 Direct and Indirect Subsidies 
 
In 1973 direct aid to farm incomes as a preventive measure for the structural changes 
needed in agriculture was introduced. The direct payments were designed to compensate 
farmers for the reduction in price support. 
In CAP policy many reform packages have been applied to improve conditions of the 
internal farmers. However, it has often met with difficulties. In the first years of the CAP, 
incomes of the farmers were guaranteed by the intervention prices. However, the system of 
the intervention varies from one country to the other. But they are mainly divided into two 
categories: “Direct income aid system for farmers, which existed in the UK before entry to the 
community, was called deficiency payments and the other category the system of price 
                                                 
48Lintner and Mazey: The European Community Economic and Political aspects, 1991, p.94 
49 Rosemary Fennell: The CAP, 1997, p.92  
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support on the internal combined with external protection.”50 These direct income aid system 
and price support measures which were chosen for the EEC’s for agricultural protection were 
also recommended at the Stresa Conference,  
In the CAP application of direct aid to farmers is given to those who are in less 
favoured areas or those who cease farming or for the replacement of price support with direct 
payment.  “Such a policy, which would bring farmers as a whole into the category of those 
socially assisted, is wrong in principle, is costly to apply and is difficult to manage.”51       
Imported agricultural products usually have lower prices relative to internal products 
and the incomes of the internal producers will be topped up by a subsidy from the budget. 
This system is not suitable for application in a large group of countries like in the EU. It is not 
easy to cover the deficits of the farmers from the budget. The solution, as is seen in most 
reform proposals, was the replacement of the price support system with direct income 
supplementation for low-income farmers. “Because support prices were so high it was argued 
that CAP encouraged inefficient, high cost production; impeded structural adjustment; 
disadvantaged lower income consumers (because of high food prices); benefited large farmers 
greatly and small farmers very little (because the benefit was distributed pro rata to the 
amount produced) and damaged trade relations with both rich and poor countries alike.”52       
Unfortunately, the price support system was better adapted to the conditions of the 
community to protect cereal producers. But under this system, providing national farms with 
sufficient income is required to compensate for the higher internal prices. In the Union, 
import levies and export subsidies are also given to protect producers from lower product 
prices in the world market. This price supporting system is very costly to the CAP budget. 
The direct payments are applied “in a few countries in the world which are almost 
self-sufficient in agricultural production and/or where farms are not very numerous.”53 In the 
CAP, direct payments are mainly given to set-aside and livestock. 
Indirect subsidy is given to intervention purchasing and to storage costs which also 
play an important role within the price support system.    
Direct payments under the production limiting programs are not subjected to the commitment 
to reduce domestic support if: 
“a- Such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or 
b- Such payments are made on 85 percent or less of the base level of production, or 
c- Livestock payments are made on a fixed number of heads.”54 
 
Briefly, direct payment guarantees a minimum income to producers, and reduces the 
impact on world markets, which are financed through the CAP budget, because direct 
payments have no direct effect as market price support had. Direct payments have therefore 
positive effects both on consumers’ gain and producer surplus too. 
Direct payments are given according to the reference area or reference year, which is 
explained in chapter 3.  
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52 Ritson and Harvey: The CAP and the world Economy, 1991, p.296 
53 Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.434 
54 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1984)- (294A1223)(04), p.6 
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2.3. 4 Export Subsidy Commitments 
 
Given below are export subsidies which are subject to reduction commitments 
agreement: 
“a- The provisions by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, including 
payments in kind, to a firm, to an industry, to producers of an agricultural products, to a 
cooperative or other association of such producers, or to a marketing board contingent on 
export performance; 
b- The sale or disposal for export by governments or their agencies of non commercial 
stocks of agricultural products at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like 
product to buyers in the domestic market; 
c- Payments on the export of an agricultural product that are financed by virtue of 
governmental action, whether or not a charge on the public account is involved, including 
payments that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the agricultural product 
concerned or an agricultural from which the exported product is derived; 
d- The provisions of subsidies to reduce the costs of marketing exports of agricultural 
products including handling, up-grading and other processing costs and the costs of 
international transport and freight; 
e- Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments provided or mandated by 
governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments; 
f- Subsidies on agricultural products contingent on their incorporation in exported 
products.”55      
 One of the basic principles of the CAP is the Community preference, which means 
products of community origin are bought in preference to imported products. But application 
of the common custom tariff prevents imported product access in to the EU and reduces the 
welfare of consumers. Besides this, in the Union, product prices still relative to the world 
prices are high and still subsidized to increase the market share in the world market. But these 
expenditures still increase the burden of the CAP, because in the past CAP expenditure has 
been mostly distributed to finance the market support which comprises price intervention 
mechanism, but export subsidies have also increased the burden of the CAP budget. But 
nowadays these expenditures have been mostly replaced by direct payments. However, 
market support and export subsidies were reduced but not removed from the CAP agenda.  
In fact higher cost production of internal producers is required to be subsidized for the 
marketing of internal products. But increasing amounts of payments to internal producers not 
only increase the excessive transfers from consumers and tax payers to producers, but also 
increase the production capacity of producers which was not desired. The new reform 
proposals therefore try to remove the decouple payments which break the link between 
production of a specific agricultural commodity for receiving direct payment.       
             
2.3.5 Domestic Support Commitments 
 
The Domestic support commitments are defined in domestic support reduction 
commitments for agricultural producers. The commitments are expressed in terms of Total 
Aggregate Measurements of Support (AMS) and Annual and Final Bound Commitment 
Levels.  
“In accordance with the Mid Term Review Agreement that government measures of 
assistance, whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development are an 
integral part of the development programs of developing countries, investment subsidies 
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which are generally available to agriculture in developing country Members, and agricultural 
input subsidies generally available to low income or resource-poor producers in developing 
country Members shall be exempt from domestic support reduction commitments that would 
otherwise be applicable to such measures, as shall domestic support to producers in 
developing country Members to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic 
crops.”56        
“Direct payments under production–limiting programs shall not be subject to the 
commitment to reduce domestic support if: 
i- such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or 
ii- such payments are made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; or 
iii- livestock payments are made on fixed number of head.”57  
It is also stated that the exemption from the reduction commitment for direct payments 
meeting the above criteria shall be reflected by the exclusion of the value of those direct 
payments in a Member’s calculation of its Current Total AMS. 
 
2.3.6 De-coupled Income Support 
 
“a- Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by clearly- defined criteria such 
as income, status as a producer or landowner, factor use or production level in a defined and 
fixed base period. 
b- The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to or based on 
the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producer in 
any year after the base period. 
c- The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to or based on, 
the prices, domestic or international, applying to any production undertaken in any year after 
the base period. 
d- The amount of such payments in any given year shall not be related to or based on, 
the factors of production employed in any year after the base period. 
e- No production shall be required in order to receive such payments.”58            
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2.4  The Reforms of the CAP of the European Union 
   
 In the CAP there are two main problems which are waiting to be solved; the first is 
‘surpluses’ and the other is ‘budget.’ It is known that in the CAP over-production always 
occurs. In other words, intervention buying for cereals, milk and beef causes serious 
problems, such as, milk-mountains and beef-mountains in the Union which are highly 
expensive to store. From the beginning of the CAP reforms it is clearly stated that 
intervention stocks must be reduced. However, as is indicated in Table 2-7, reduction of 
intervention stocks has not been achieved.  
In the Rome Treaty it is stated that increasing the agricultural incomes is one of the 
main purposes of the CAP. However, on the one hand, due to this process, intervention 
buying is done to encourage the farmers to maintain their production and also to protect 
farmers’ incomes. And on the other hand, protection of farmers’ incomes becomes more 
expensive to the CAP budget than other expected utilities.  
 
Table 2.7.1: Intervention stocks in the EU at the end of the marketing year (1000t) 
  
Products 1985/86 90/91 92/93 93/94 94/95 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 
Common Wheat 10,312 8,520 14,974 6,480 1,993 6,395 3,079 656 457 
Rye 1,161 3,163 2,458 2,545 1,208 3,672 3,270 3,794 5,088 
Barley 5,296 5,538 8,694 6,526 3,276 7,802 2,325 2,216 2,397 
Durum Wheat 887 1,528 3,392 1,152 399 0 0 0 0 
Maize 392 1 3,670 1,130 8 100 22 12 15 
Sorghum 454 -- 151 160 0 49 5 5 4 
Total 18,502 18,750 33,339 17,993 6,884 18,018 8,701 6,683 7,962 
Source: http://ww.europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/index.htm and European Commission: The Agricultural Situation 
in the European Union 1994 Report, Office for Official Publications of the EC, Brussels, 1995, p. T182 and  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2002/table_en/4163.pdf 
 
According to Table 2.7.1 and Table 2.7.2 the intervention stocks in the EU fell but did 
not disappear between 1985 and 2002. However, within that period cereal production dropped 
slightly but surplus amounts were maintained. In the table above common wheat and barley 
intervention stocks increased from 1985 to 1993, but from 1994 to 1997 they were in decline. 
However, from 1997 to 1998 intervention stocks increased, not only for the common wheat 
and barley, but also for maize, rye and sorghum too. Only durum wheat intervention stock 
fell, between the years 1991 and 1998. The reason for this increase depended on variable 
factors; especially product prices. Cereals production was affected by some other external 
factors, such as, increasing trade, lower imported product prices and developing markets in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 Below in Table 2.7.2 production, consumption, export and intervention stocks 
increased slightly from 1988 to 1992. After the application of the MacSharry reform all four 
parameters fell in 1992. In 1996 production consumption and export began to increase with 
the exception of intervention stocks. However, intervention stocks also began to increase after 
1997, these increase continuing until 2000, but after 2000 they began to decrease. In 2002 
intervention stocks increased slightly but in 2003 a decline in intervention stocks was 
observed.    
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Table 2.7.2: EU cereals, production, consumption, exports and intervention stocks* 1988/89 
to 2002/03 (mn/ tons) 
 
Year  Production  Consumption  Exports  Intervention  
1988/1989  163.98  136.61 25.70 9.15  
1989/1990  162.29  133.32 33.88 11.80  
1990/1991  182.59  134.17 29.05 18.75  
1991/1992  180.94  140.28 34.78 26.38  
1992/1993  167.77  134.83 36.99 33.34  
1993/1994  163.96  146.13 32.53 17.99  
1994/1995  172.89  159.49 32.05 6.58  
1995/1996  176.58  166.56 24.53 2.68  
1996/1997  205.94  173.52 29.69 2.36  
1997/1998  205.89  177.36 22.85 13.66  
1998/1999  200.83  177.10 24.29 18.02  
1999/2000  213.82  182.01 31.05 8.70  
2000/2001  199.69  181.7 37.64 6.68  
2001/2002  211.58  186.85 29.48 7.96 
2002/2003  184.30  not added (n.a.) n.a. 7.24  
Source: http://www.cta.nl/agritrade/cereals/executive_brief.htm , CTA: Technical Centre for Agricultural 
 and Rural Cooperation ACP- EU: Agritrade Cereals, August, 2004  
 
First Reform in the EU’s CAP; 
In the European Union, the first tariff reduction between member countries on 
agricultural products was realised in 1960. Since that date many reform proposals have been 
put into effect and in the CAP system especially for cereals and some other agricultural 
products such as milk and milk products. For sugar, tariff measures have been steadily 
reduced and removed and then quotas between member countries have been replaced with 
levies which were calculated as the price gap between internal and external products. Finally 
trade restrictions between member countries have been completely removed since the removal 
of the internal tariffs and application of the common custom tariff (CCT) in 1st July 1968.   
In 1968 after the foundation of the CAP, the first reform proposal was planned by 
Sicco Mansholt to replace the amount of small-scale production (about 5 million hectares in 
the agricultural land area) with large-scale production. The Commission introduced a 
memorandum entitled ‘Agriculture 1980’which became known as the Mansholt plan, named 
after the Commissioner Sicco Mansholt in December 1968. This plan called for restructuring 
agriculture by “encouraging small farmers or let’s say, forcing them to leave the land and 
giving financial assistance for the amalgamation of holdings. The incentives included grants, 
pensions to farmer over the age of 55 and assistance to young farmers in finding new 
careers.”59 A growing opposition to the plan came from France and West Germany, which are 
important producers in agriculture. This reduction would be realised to reduce the cost of 
production. After three years of discussions within the Council, a final version of the 
Mansholt plan emerged in April 1972. The revised Mansholt plan provided only for a modest 
financing of loans to farmers, early retirement incentives and assistance for information, and 
training to increase efficiency. In addition to this, in his famous Memorandum on the reform 
of agriculture in the EU Sicco Mansholt warned that “market and price support policies alone 
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cannot solve the fundamental difficulties of farming’ (para.16) and that ‘our prices are too 
high to enable us to export on satisfactory terms’ (para. 38).”60       
1984 Second Reform Plan: 
 The second Reform package gave the green light to the Delors Package. This package 
covered reform of the common agricultural policy, the level of agricultural expenditure 
budgetary discipline, the system of own resources and support policies, including the reform 
of the structural funds, which included the EAGGF Guidance section. 
 As a consequence, market related measures, such as, dairy quotas, the system of 
stabilisers and the co-responsibility levies were adopted. In 1988 the stabilisers concept was 
put forward to the European Council. These stabilisers would be arranged according to the 
needs of the common market. The above-mentioned political regulations would be put into 
effect to increase the prosperity of farmers in the CAP. For this reason the measures given 
below were planned to increase the self sufficiency and planned goals of the CAP (described 
in article 39). These are:  
• Set-aside measure would be used in agricultural control, production extension, and 
conversation of production diversification and financial support for farmers to earlier pension, 
which would help to reduce production in agriculture. And the second one was more 
protection for the little farmers who were affected by fluctuations and some measures 
imposed on them by CAP. These measurements for achieving the above aims are 
summarised below: 
 a. Product prices, which are fixed for damping, will be more stable and will be used 
for the coming period.   
 b. Producers will be more responsible for overproduction. Producers will also 
contribute to the cost of redistribution of surpluses. 
 c. Guaranteed threshold prices, which are given for overproduction, will be bought by 
the Community agencies.  Besides this, lowering the market prices and reducing the support 
for producers is considerable. These measurers would be applied to cereals, milk, tomatoes, 
grapes, and olive oil and also to some fruits and vegetables. 
The aim of this reform was to promote the set-aside of arable land and extension of 
certain types of production and also to encourage older farmers to cease farming and living 
the land free for modernisation of holdings. Intervention purchase is used to maintain the 
supply side policy. However, people who were buying for the export affected the aim of 
intervention, because this intervention buying was done, not to push up the price to the 
desired target price level, but for the exports.  Later this intervention buying was taken to the 
end of cropping season to prevent competition between export product buyers and 
intervention buyers. Different intervention prices were also proposed to increase the quality of 
products.     
 In Table 2-8.1 and Table 2-8.2, it can be seen that the consumer prices in the EU were 
not reduced between the period 1985 to 2000, except in Holland and Germany.     
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Table 2.8.1: Consumer prices index for food (excl. drinks and meal out) 1985 =100 
 
Countries 1985 1986 1987 1988 
EUR   12 100.0 104.7 107.3 110.2 
Belgium 100.0 101.8 101.4 101.2 
Denmark 100.0 102.0 102.9 106.7 
Germany 100.0 99.5 99.0 98.9 
Greece 100.0 120.3 135.5 150.6 
Spain 100.0 110.4 115.5 119.6 
France 100.0 103.3 105.1 106.5 
Ireland 100.0 104.3 107.1 109.8 
Italy 100.0 105.4 109.2 113.0 
Luxembourg 100.0 102.2 100.4 101.4 
Holland 100.0 98.8 96.8 97.0 
Austria 100.0 102.5 103.2 104.0 
Portugal 100.0 108.8 117.9 127.2 
Finland 100.0 103.9 106.3 108.1 
Sweden 100.0 107.2 110.5 116.6 
United Kingdom 100.0 103.3 106.4 110.1 
Source: Eurostat: Agriculture statistical Yearbook, Brussels, 1997, p.184 
 
d. Intervention buying will be done at the end of the damping period. This will prevent 
competition between export product buyers and intervention buyers. Different intervention 
prices will be applied to increase the product quality. 
 e. Set-aside from production, extension and diversification of the production. 
 Set-aside measures will be used to reduce use of land products, especially for cereals 
wine and some others. Due to this process, use of land capacity for other purposes will be 
increased.  The loss of farmers will be compensated by community agencies. 
 f- Structural measures; the small farmers will be exempted partially or completely 
from production taxes. Direct support for small farmers and early retirement for people who 
are over the age of 55 was planned.  
Over the time mentioned measures have not been successful enough to solve the 
problems of the CAP. But nevertheless they could contribute to the reduction of intervention 
prices which were guaranteed to producers. By implementing these measures was expected to 
reduce over production. Unfortunately a reduction in surplus amounts has not been realised 
for the all cereal products.    
 The measures offered by the Council made very little contribution and set-aside from 
production, extension and diversification of the production (see Table 2-10), income aid, 
early-retirement which was over the age of 55 (see Table 2-15) lowering the consumer prices 
and some other measures have not been resulted in the expected way. Therefore, unsuccessful 
reforms between 1985 and 1988 have resulted in serious crises within the Union. 
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Table 2.8.2: Harmonised indices of consumer prices, index 1996 = 100 
 
Countries 1998 1999 01/2000
EUR   15 103,0 104,3 105,0
Belgium 102,4 103,6 104,7
Denmark 103,3 105,4 106,5
Germany 102,1 102,8 103,8
Greece 110,2 112,6 113,2
Spain 103,7 106,0 107,7
France 102,0 102,5 103,3
Ireland 103,4 106,0 108,2
Italy 103,9 105,7 106,9
Luxembourg 102,4 103,4 104,3
Holland 103,7 105,8 105,8
Austria 102,0 102,5 103,5
Portugal 104,2 106,4 107,3
Finland 102,6 103,9 104,8
Sweden 102,9 103,4 103,5
United kingdom 103,4 104,8 104,5
Source: Eurostat Luxembourg, Regional Statistics, (Regio) Agricultural, 2003 
 
2.4.1 Ray MacSharry Reforms        
 
 Increasing surpluses in the Union was the breach of trust against the CAP in the Union 
(see Table 2-7). Furthermore, the Commission approved a report by its agricultural 
Commissioner Ray MacSharry recommending a radical reform of the CAP. The plan was 
known as MacSharry, two proposals, which were accepted by the European Council during its 
Lisbon Summit in June 1992; the MacSharry Reform package consists of three main sections.  
These are: 
 “1- Measures regarding guaranteed prices and market systems, 
   2- Lower risk production, stimulation of forestation, 
   3- Social measures”61 
The centrepiece of the MacSharry reforms was the target price for cereals which are 
the most widely traded farm commodity. In Brussels the Agricultural Council “agreed to a 
29% cut in cereals support prices, a 15% cut for beef production was accepted but ministers 
would only agree to a 5% cut in support of butter production.”62 Application of the mentioned 
cut from cereals, beef and butter producer prices would be done to bring production back into 
line with consumption by cutting intervention prices, thus market balance could be restored. 
One of the other important objectives which were introduced by the MacSharry reform was 
the set-aside measure:  as well as the voluntary set-aside, the compulsory set-aside measure 
was introduced into the CAP system. By 1992 a reform of less intensive and environmentally 
friendly farming methods was also encouraged. In Table 2-9 nominal and real price indices of 
producer prices of agricultural products are indicated. According to Table 2-9 expected 
reductions from cereals (support) prices had not been realised after the period following the 
MacSharry reform.  
As a consequence of the MacSharry reforms, guaranteed prices for cereal and cattle 
support prices fell by 29% from the 1991-92 levels, and compulsory set-aside of 15% applied 
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until 1999. Through the MacSharry reform farmers has been covered by compensatory direct 
payments, which was planned to replace the market price support. Direct payments to 
producers, for which exemption from reduction commitments was claimed, should meet the 
basic criteria set out “in paragraph1 plus specific criteria applying to individual types of direct 
payments as set out in paragraph 6.”63 Besides this, the community agencies would continue 
to purchase surpluses. For this, current domestic market prices would be considered and sales 
from food security stocks should be made at no less than the current domestic market price. 
 
Table 2.9: Producer prices for agricultural products in the Community (EU- 15)  (excluding VAT). 
           1990=100 
Nominal Price Indices Deflated Price Indices Product 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total 98.4 97.4 101.3 105.8 89.2 84.9 85.3 85.8 
Crop products 96.3 95.1 100.4 110.0 86.8 82.4 83.8 88.5 
Cereals & rice 99.8 98.4 90.0 92.8 90.8 86.3 76.4 75.9 
Soft wheat 101.9 98.3 88.3 88.3 94.0 88.0 76.9 74.6 
Durum wheat 94.7 98.5 86.3 93.7 81.8 80.5 66.3 68.6 
Feeding barley 100.8 95.9 90.4 90.8 93.0 86.1 78.9 76.8 
Malting barley 98.7 95.7 91.6 100.4 89.5 83.8 77.3 81.7 
Oats 101.7 103.5 91.1 78.2 93.0 91.7 78.5 64.6 
Grain maize 94.3 95.7 87.8 98.0 84.0 81.2 71.2 76.5 
Paddy rice 110.1 134.6 137.9 150.8 96.5 112.6 110.2 114.9 
Other 94.1 87.6 81.7 67.6 84.2 74.2 66.8 55.1 
Animals & animal products 100.2 98.9 100.4 100.1 91.7 87.4 85.9 83.0 
Source: Eurostat: Agriculture statistical Yearbook, 1997, p.17-176    
 
The MacSharry reform of the CAP “introduced arable area payments to compensate 
for lower cereal support prices. In order to qualify for area- aid, large producers have set aside 
a proportion of the farm’s eligible area (land on which area- aid is claimed as industry set-
aside). Producers receive area aid on their land eligible crops and set-aside payments on land 
set aside. Alternatively, producers can exempt themselves from set-aside requirement and 
forgo all area aid payments.”64  
In the CAP the MacSharry reform package was applied initially to 22 products (which 
are dependent on CAP) but dropped to only 5-6 products such as cereals, cattle and beef 
products. Products mentioned which are subject to the MacSharry Reform are the basic 
foodstuffs in the Union. 
 Application of these measures would reduce the incomes of the producers, but the 
income loss of the farmers would be compensated by such direct payments. “Professional 
producers with annual outputs of more than 92 tons of cereals in order to benefit from 
compensatory payments would set-aside 15% of their cultivated land.”65 However, regarding 
application of set-aside measures, both efficient and inefficient farmers would be subject to 
this requirement, which would be another problem for discussion. Ineffective farmers have 
higher production costs than effective producers. According to the Mansholt plan only these 
ineffective farmers would have to cease farming. But the MacSharry reforms would force 
almost all producers to set-aside from production up to 15% of their land (see table 2-10). The 
cost of these payments would “create another piece of European farm bureaucracy; they at 
least had the merit of distorting markets less than a system that relies on price alone.”66 
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Given in the table below is the arable aid application according to the arable land use. 
As can be seen, application of the compulsory set-aside measure within the CAP system 
reduced the land use approximately 15% from 1993 to 1999 and then from 2000 to 2003 
about 10% decline in land use is observed. However, there are some important reasons why 
the total arable areas increased whilst the set-aside measure was applied. The first reason was 
the EU enlargement in 1995 which increased the arable land within the CAP. The second 
reason was the arable aid application which was observed especially for commercial 
producers and not for small farmers.  
On the one hand commercial producers reduced their land use and received arable 
payments, but on the other hand these producers used the rest of their arable land intensively 
which increased the production quantity. Therefore, the expected decline in land use and 
production amount was not observed within this period. 
 
Table 2.10: Arable aid applications between 1993 and 2003   (1000 ha) 
 
Breakdown of 
areas 
1993/ 94 1994/ 95  1995/ 96  1996/ 97  1997/ 98  1998/ 99 2000/ 01 2002/ 03 
Set-aside (%) 15 13 14 15 16 17 10 10 
Set-aside (five year) 6,104 7,353 7,259 5,761 3,978 4,212 : : 
Total base area 48,825 49,030 53,561 53,561 53,548 53,545 51,737 51,793 
Fodder area 1,232 1,023 939 890 807 679 693 765 
Crop areas 
Cereals and silage 
crops 
38,066 
31,333 
39,167 
32,598 
43,084 
37,077 
45,058 
38,928 
47,091 
40,288 
46,554 
39,307 
45,458 
39,322 
46,153 
40,137 
Small farmers  
of which- Cereals 
and silage crops  
13,944 
12,130 
13,343 
11,569 
13,797 
12,195 
13,374 
11,675 
12,553 
10,959 
10,140 
9,953 
12,513 
11,150 
12,448 
11,047 
Commercial 
producers 
Of which –set-aside  
Total crop area 
of which cereals and 
silage crops  
30,000 
4,640 
25,360 
19,203 
33,286 
5,995 
27,292 
21,029 
37,055 
6,411 
30,644 
24,882 
38,743 
5,567 
33,176 
27,254 
39,925 
3,978 
35,947 
29,329 
40,626 
4,212 
36,414 
29,354 
38,531 
5,131 
33,400 
28,173 
39,788 
5,563 
34,225 
29,100 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/table_en/35712.pdf , The EU Commission: Agriculture in 
the EU- Statistical and Economic Information in 1999 (selected data from table 3.5.7.1.2) and data for 2001- 
2003 from table: arable aid applications, http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/   from 
implementation of the common agricultural policy 
 
After the MacSharry reform, set-aside measures together with direct payments to 
producers reduced the intervention prices for cereals to close to world prices. However, the 
previously mentioned decline in intervention prices for cereals was maintained until the 
Uruguay round. After the Uruguay round the cereals intervention price began to increase 
steadily until the Agenda 2000 reforms. But after this reform package intervention price for 
cereals fell, as is shown in Table 2-11. By means of this reduction intervention stocks also 
dropped for cereal products but remained as an important problem within the CAP (see Table 
2-7).  
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Table 2.11: Intervention prices for cereals. (ECU/ ton) 
 
  Intervention Prices Cereals 
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 July  1994 
 to 2000 
July 2000 July 
 2001 
July 2002 
to 2006 
Durum wheat 227.70 220.87 115.49 106.60 119.19 110.25 101.31 101.31 
Common Wheat 168.55 163.49 115.49 106.60 119.19 110.25 101.31 101.31 
Barley 160.13 155.33 115.49 106.60 n. a n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Rye 160.13 155.33 115.49 106.60 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a 
Maize 168.55 163.49 115.49 106.60 119.19 110.25 101.31 101.31 
Source: European Commission: The Agricultural Situation in the European Union 1994 report, 1995, p. T60 and 
from http://www.cta.nl/agritrade/cereals/executive_brief.htm , CTA: Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural 
Cooperation ACP- EU: Agritrade Cereals, August, 2004 (n. a. = not added) 
 
 The reduction of intervention prices for cereals to near world market prices would also 
in the long-term cause import levy and export subsidy reductions (see tables above). 
However, in this reform package there was no explanation on distribution of export subsides 
or import levies. In addition, “20% of rich farmers would receive 80% of the subsidy, so as to 
direct money towards small group of farmers.”67 
 However, discussions about the MacSharry reforms had begun a year before the 
application of the MacSharry reforms (1992). According to the Commission the MacSharry 
reforms had two aims: “to reduce high guaranteed prices that have generated huge surpluses 
and stretched the Community budgets”68 (see Table 2-7). But the guaranteed prices for cereals 
were higher than those which MacSharry wanted and would remain above market prices, 
which would not be able to reduce the burden of the community budget. Besides this, the 
MacSharrys scheme would pay big farmers disproportionately less than small farmers. 
 One authority warned against the danger of open-ended financial commitments to 
farmers and stressed the need for revision:  
 “a- to base compensation payments on historical rather than current hectares and 
numbers  of animal, 
 b- to limit the duration of payments and 
 c- to predetermine the volume of payments over the whole payment period.”69 
 The complaints mentioned above have sapped the power of the MacSharry reforms. 
But nevertheless, “the MacSharry reform does cut domestic support and the value of export 
subsidies by enough to meet Americans’ wishes that it will not curb production enough to 
meet Americans’ demands over the volume of exports on each product.”70 
 The measures were not enough to restrain the cereals production of the European 
Union, and surpluses will occur if the necessary reforms are not brought into being. (See 
Table 2-7) If each Member State takes on more responsibility in their regional policy and in 
the agricultural sector, then a solution to the problems in the agricultural sector will be found, 
rather than implementing centralized policies which are planned for community level. 
Adoption of regional policies may contribute to reducing the level of support measures from 
region to region within the CAP. Such regional policies will also reduce the burden on the 
CAP budget.  
 
 
                                                          
67The Economist, May.23rd.1992, p.33-34 
68The Economist, May.23rd.1992, p.33-34 
69Lodge Juliet: The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 1995, p.126 
70The Economist, May.23rd.1992, p.33-34 
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2.4.2 The Uruguay Round Inclusive WTO 
 
In the Uruguay Round, after a long negotiations period from September 1986 to 
December 1993 in Punta del Este, the negative effects of the CAP and increasing protection 
on internal producers and immense difficulties of third world country producers required this 
reform package. In the Uruguay Round significant reform on the liberalisation of agricultural 
trade was observed. During the long negotiations period in the Uruguay round important 
changes on agricultural support measures were taken into consideration;  among these “the 
most radical change relates to the introduction of an agricultural income support system 
alongside the price support system which has been the hallmark of the CAP since the 1958 
Stresa Conference.”71 This was expected to ensure better matching of production to internal 
and external market requirements, while protecting income levels of farmers along with the 
rural economy and the environment.  Many of the changes were implemented in the 1993-
1994 marketing year.  
  In the URRA market price support, which contributes to estimations of amounts of 
price support to producers, has been classified into three main categories. “Subsidies in 
general are identified by “boxes” which are given the colours of traffic lights: green 
(permitted), amber (slow down, i.e. be reduced), red (forbidden).”72  In World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) terminology it is stated that in agricultural agreements there is no red 
measure. There is a blue box for subsidies that limit production. Market price support is 
calculated by using the gap between a fixed external reference price and the producer price 
multiplied by the quantity of production.  
The Uruguay round negotiations had significant effects on the export of agricultural 
products of the European Union. Export subsidies would be financed from the proceeds of a 
levy imposed on the agricultural product concerned, or on an agricultural product from which 
the exported products derived.  
The import regime would be determined according to the trigger price. The trigger 
level would be set according to the following schedule, based on market access opportunities 
defined as “imports as a percentage of the corresponding domestic consumption during the 
three preceding years for which data are available:  
a- where such market access opportunities for a product are less than or equal to 10 per 
cent, the base trigger level shall equal 125 per cent,    
b-where such market access opportunities for a product are greater than 10 per cent but 
less than or equal to 30 per cent, the base trigger level shall equal  110 per cent, 
c- where such market opportunities for a product are greater than 30 per cent, the base 
trigger level shall equal 105 per cent.”73 
 The additional tariff will be set under subparagraph 1(b), according to the following 
schedule:  
 “a-If the difference between the c.i.f. import price of the shipment expressed in terms 
of domestic currency (hereinafter referred to as ‘import price’) and the trigger price as defined 
under that subparagraph is less than or equal to 10 per cent of the trigger price, no additional 
duty shall be imposed; 
 b- If the difference between the import price and the trigger price (hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘difference’) is greater than 10 per cent but less than or equal to 40 per cent of the 
trigger price, the additional duty shall equal 30 per cent of the amount by which the difference 
exceeds 10 per cent; 
                                                          
71Nicholas Moussis: Access to European Union, 1997, p.445 
72 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.doc , from WTO terminology 
73Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1984)- (294A1223)(04), p.4 
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 c- If the difference is greater than 40 per cent but less than or equal to 60 per cent of 
the trigger price, the additional duty shall equal 50 per cent of the amount by which difference 
exceeds 40 per cent plus the additional duty allowed under b;  
 d- If the difference is greater than 60 per cent but less than or equal to 75 per cent, the 
additional duty shall equal 70 per cent of the amount by which the difference exceeds 60 per 
cent of the trigger price, plus the additional duties allowed under (b) and (c). 
 e- If the difference is greater than 75 per cent of the trigger price, the additional duty 
shall equal 90 per cent of the amount by which the difference exceeds 75 per cent, plus the 
additional duties allowed under (b), (c), and (d).”74 
According to the above given schedule internal producers were protected from 
imported products, as is indicated below in Tables 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14.  The trade balance of 
EU-12 was increased from 1130 in 1991 to 6021 in 1993. But, in 1995 the trade balance of 
EU-15 was reduced to 2,444, but then in 1997 the trade balance again increased to 5,889 
Million ECU. Increase on the trade balance continued until 2000 but a slight decrease was 
observed in 2001. However, this decrease was covered in 2002 and again increased up 
to12697 mn Euro.        
 
Table 2.12: EU-12 trade in agricultural and food products according to the principal customer 
countries (client countries based on 1993).      (ECU/ mn) 
 Countries  Exports Corresponding Imports Trade Balance 
 1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993 1991 1992 1993 
Total of 25 Countries   23,585 25,582 29,245 22,454 23,600 23,225 1,130 1,982 6,021 
Total of third world 
countries 
35,983 38,759 41,803 56,866 56,871 54,599 -20,883 -18,112 -12,796
Source: European Commission: The Agricultural Situation in the European Union 1994 report, 1995, p. T147 
 
Table 2.13: EU-15 trade in agricultural and food products according to the principal customer 
countries (client countries based on 1996).      (ECU/ mn) 
 Countries  Exports Corresponding Imports Trade Balance 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 19973 1995 1996 1997 
Total of 25 Countries 31,811 34,309 38,259 29,367 30,217 32,370 2,444 4,092 5,889 
Total of third (world) 
countries 
46,660 48,604 54,934 64,227 65,678 71,238 -17,567 -17,074 -16,304 
Source: EU Commission: Eurostat and DG-6, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/en37.htm 
 
In the last decade according to the European Commission statistics of agricultural 
years, an increasing trade capacity between the total of 25 countries is especially observed for 
the United States, which had more (above 10000 Mio Euro), than Japan’s and Switzerland’s 
(about 3000 Mio Euro) trade with the EU. However, Russia, Poland, Canada, Saudi Arabia, 
Norway, Hong Kong, the Czech Republic, Algeria and Turkey had more that 1000 Mio Euro 
trade with the EU and some other countries such as Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico, Libya, Hungary 
and some others had less than 1000 Mio Euro trade capacity with the EU countries. In the 
table below some of these countries have been listed.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1984)- (294A1223)(04), p.5 
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Table 2.14: EU Trade in agricultural products according to principal customer countries 
(ECU-EUR/ mn) (client countries based on 2001) 
 
Countries  Exports Corresponding Imports Trade Balance 
 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
United States  10,493 10,811 11,630 8,399 8,225 7,717 2,094 2,586 3,913 
Japan 4,205 4,296 4,080 166 176 159 4,039 4,120 3,921 
Switzerland  3,488 3,738 3,979 1,405 1,518 1,569 2,083 2,220 2,411 
Russia 2,725 3,361 3,536 447 466 681 2,278 2,896 2,855 
Poland  1,899 2,058 2,144 1,235 1,476 1,544 664 582 600 
Algeria 1,171 1,203 1,233 24 20 28 1,147 1,183 1,205 
Turkey  1,015 775 960 1,921 2,197 2,000 -906 -1,422 -1,040 
Taiwan 766 747 735 54 62 55 712 686 680 
Nigeria  403 584 594 154 244 309 250 340 285 
Libya 448 588 528 9 10 6 438 577 522 
Total of 25 Countries 40,888 42,449 44,081 30,009 32,509 31,384 10,880 9,940 12,697 
Total of third world 
countries 
58,468 60,123 61,579 58,705 62,150 62,337 -237 -2,027 -758 
Source: EU Commission: The 2003 agricultural Year, Eurostat, 2003  
 
In the Uruguay Round for cereal products the Commission proposed the following 
measures: 
 “The cereals intervention prices are fixed on step (2000) at a safety net level of 95.35 
Ecu/ton (presently 119.19 ECU/ton), a non-crop- specific area payment is established at 66 
Ecu/ton, this payment will be lowered if the market prices are sustained at a higher level than 
currently foreseen, 
Set-aside: The reference rate for compulsory set-aside is fixed at 0%, voluntary set-
aside is allowed, extraordinary set-aside is abolished; set-aside areas get the non-crop-specific 
payment,      
Silage cereals are excluded from the regime, 
Special cases: for protein crops, a supplementary aid is established at a level of 
6.5ECU/ton in order to preserve their competitiveness with cereals, maintained.”75 With 
respect to the above given regulations cereals intervention prices are expected to reduce and 
the non–crop-specific area payment will be lowered in accordance with the higher level of the 
market prices. Compulsory set-aside will be abolished while voluntary set-aside is allowed. 
But member States will be able to make the granting of direct payments for arable crops and 
set-aside conditional on the respect of environmental provisions. 
 In the cereal sector direct payment per hectare was fixed annually in relation to market 
prices and in relation to the size of holding; in addition, the payment was dependent upon the 
percentage of withdrawal from planting in agriculture (Table 2.16).  
The lands which ceased farming would be used in non-food processing industry, such 
as, oil-seed for manufacturing purposes. The corresponding levies on cereal and on milk 
products have been abolished. In the livestock sector direct income support was planned 
through a system of premium payments for certain types of producers. 
  The reform proposal also included for price control direct income support and set-
aside and reduced milk output quotas. Income support for forestry and rural environment was 
also considered.  
The Financial participation of government in income insurance and income safety net 
programme was decided in the form given below: 
                                                          
75European Commission: Agenda 2000, For a Stronger and Wider Union, 1997, p.5 
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a. Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by an income loss, taking into 
account only income derived from agriculture, which exceeds 30 percent of average 
gross income or the equivalent in net income terms (excluding any payments from the 
same or similar schemes) in the preceding three years period or a three- year average 
based on the preceding, excluding the highest and lowest entry. Any producer meeting 
this condition shall be eligible to receive the payments. 
b. The amount of such payments shall compensate for less than 70 per cent of the 
producers income loss in the year producers become eligible to receive this assistance 
c. The amount of such payments shall relate solely to income; it shall not relate to the 
type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the producers; 
or to the prices, domestic or international applying to such production or to the factors 
of production employed. 
d. Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and under 
paragraph 8 (relief from natural disasters), the total of such payments shall be less than 
100 per cent of the producer’s total loss.”76 
 
 In addition to these, a programme called “pre-pension scheme” recommended farmers 
for early retirement (see Table 2.15). According to the producer retirement programmes of the 
Uruguay Round:  
“- Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly defined 
criteria in programmes designed to facilitate the retirement of persons engaged in marketable 
agricultural production, or their movement to non agricultural activities, 
- Payments shall be conditional upon the total and permanent retirement of the 
recipients from marketable agricultural production.”77 
 Reform of wine, fruit and vegetable markets were not included. But there were 
environment payments; which would be given on the fulfilment of special conditions under 
the government programme, including conditions related to production methods or inputs.  
 In fact, there have been some obstacles to the realisation of reform programs. The first 
“major obstacle to overcome was that of accepting the idea that large number of farmers 
should be paid considerable sums of money to do nothing.”78 It is also stated that, the 
operation of set-aside has revealed many technical and psychological problems. “Most 
farmers do not like being paid for doing nothing and also does not like being told what to do 
with their land.”79 Nevertheless, few of them stopped arable farming, while direct payments 
became their main source of income.  
 Early retirement and set-aside measures were applied successfully. However, the 
positive effects of the early retirement programme on surplus reduction and on productivity 
increase were not seen until the end of the nineties, whilst over production and product prices 
began to reduce for cereals. Although application of the CAP reforms started in the Second 
Reform package and the Delors package, but reforms between 1985- 88 resulted in serious 
crises within the Union.  
 The number of the early retirement is indicated in table 2-15 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
76Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1984)- (294A1223)(04), p.14 
77 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1984)- (294A1223)(04), p.15 
78Goodman S. F: The European Union, Mac Millian Press Ltd., London, 1990, p.141 
79Goodman S. F: The European Union, 1990, p.142 
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Table 2.15: Early retirement, number of beneficiaries approved per year 
 
Number of beneficiaries approved 
Countries 15.10.1994 15.10.1995 15.10.1996 15.10.1997 
Belgian -- -- 502 739 
Denmark -- 291 339 340 
Greece -- 2,538 5,459 8,314 
Spain: Farmers 481 1,497 1,947 2,652 
           Workers 210 175 270 399 
France 25,583 27,158 22,576 20,983 
 Ireland:  Farmers 1,003 3,480 4,878 5,719 
               Workers -- 3 7 8 
Italy -- -- -- -- 
Portugal: Farmers -- -- 51 854 
               Workers -- -- -- 1 
Finland -- 329 938 1,826 
Total: Farmers 27,067 35,293 36,690 41,427 
           Workers  210 178 277 407 
Source: EU Commission, Eurostat- DG-6 for Agriculture, or http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/index.htm   
  
  
 In Table 2.15 early retirement schemes of the member countries can be seen. In this 
table it can be seen that up until 1994 Spain, France and Ireland had applied for early 
retirement. Respectively in 1995 Denmark, Greece and Finland, and in 1996 Belgium and 
Portugal also started to apply for early retirement measures for farmers. Italy and in some 
other EU members are not shown in this table. Relative to the other member countries France 
had the highest number of farmers who have been offered the early pension. Between these 
periods the number of the pensioners in France fell, whilst the number of early retirement 
programme in other member countries increased. 
In the Uruguay round the resources retirement programme was also defined: 
• Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by reference to clearly defined 
criteria in a programme designed to remove land or other resources, including livestock, from 
marketable agricultural production. 
• Payments shall be conditional upon the retirement of land from marketable 
agricultural production for a minimum of three years, and in the case of livestock on its 
slaughter or definitive permanent disposal.”80 As is briefly defined the resource retirement 
programme would be determined especially relating to the removal of land or other resources. 
It is also important to note, as stated in the coming chapters, the difficulties of inspection of 
planted areas would create another obstacle for the effective application of these measures; 
what crops are being grown and comparing the results with what farmers say they are growing 
and for which they are claiming subsidy. Briefly, whether or not the producer has made a 
proper declaration for obtaining subsidy is unknown, and therefore, once this payment is 
given to a farmer, it is difficult to recover it.   
 It is also difficult to assess the success of the set-aside policy “because, there have also 
been shifts in world supply and demand for cereals.”81 In microeconomics, the partial 
equilibrium position (as here considered for one product, the conditions for the existence and 
uniqueness of general equilibrium are often very complex for several markets, because of 
                                                          
80 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1984)- (294A1223)(04), p.15 
81Goodman S. F: The European Union , 1990, p.143 
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higher competition) depends on quantity supplied and demand at equilibrium price. But, here 
cereal production has been affected by some other external factors, such as, increasing trade, 
lower world prices and developing markets in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Below in Table 2.16 areas set aside for arable land use in member countries are also 
shown. The impact of the application of set aside after the Mac Sharry reform and the 
Uruguay Round is illustrated for the member countries between 1993 and 2003. Application 
of the compulsory set-aside measure reduced the amount of arable land use in almost all 
member countries. During this period a large amount of set-aside area was realised by 
Germany, Spain, France, United Kingdom and Italy. The important part of the set-aside 
measure comprises the land for arable products and partly for the industrial set-aside. 
 
Table 2.16: Areas set aside in the EU. (1000 ha) 
1993/ 94 1997/ 98 2002/ 03 Member 
countries Total  
Set- aside  
Industrial 
set-aside  
Total  
set -aside  
Industrial 
 set-aside  
Total set 
aside  
Industrial set 
aside  
Belgium 19 3 12 1.5 27.2 3.1 
Denmark 208 19 160 10.9 224.9 21.3 
Germany 1,050 68 821 111.4 1,174.6 352.7 
Greece 15 0 11 0 65.0 0.0 
Spain 875 6 1,080 5.7 1,428.0 52.6 
France 1,578 73 960 229.9 1,525.4 369.9 
Ireland 26 0 18 0.7 33.8 0.3 
Italy 195 43 157 14.8 229.9 22.6 
Luxembourg 2 0 1 0.4 2.9 1.1 
Holland 8 1 6 0.2 25.7 2.8 
Austria -- -- 72 3.8 105.3 14.5 
Portugal 61 0 32 -- 103.8 0.0 
Finland -- -- 146 0.3 208.1 0.9 
Sweden -- -- 203 17.9 289.0 21.6 
UK 568 51 297 30.2 629.0 77.7 
Total (EU-15) 4,605 264 3,978 427.6 6,072.6 941.0 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/index.htm  and European Commission: The Agricultural Situation in 
the European Union 1994 Report, 1995,p. T141 and for data 1998  DG-6 European Commission, 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/index.htm (from table: 3.5.7.2 and 3.5.7.1) and 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/en361.htm from Implementation of the common 
agricultural policy 
 
Due to the Reform package, intervention stocks for cereals fell up until 1997, but then 
as is indicated in Table 2-7 they increased for the above-mentioned reasons. In addition, 
compulsory set-aside for the year 1994-1995 decreased from 15 to 12 percent and for the year 
1996-1997 it fell from 12 to 10 percent.  
 Finally, the importance of the Uruguay Round agreement must not be forgotten. By 
means of this agreement all contracting parties to GATT came together to reduce all direct or 
indirect measures, which directly or indirectly restrict agricultural trade. In the Uruguay 
round, general obligations towards tariffs and replacement of quantitative measures with 
reduced tariff measures were planned. According to this, “Quantitative restrictions (quotas) 
should be converted into customs tariffs equivalents and custom tariffs should be reduced.”82 
By doing so negative welfare effects of the quantitative measures would be replaced by the 
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reduced tariff measures. In fact, neither tariffs nor quantitative measures increased the welfare 
of consumers. But tariff measures had more welfare effect on the nations, which it is analysed 
in depth in the third chapter. 
 In relation to the GATT Uruguay Round there are expectations that greater free trade 
in agricultural production could stimulate upward movement in world market prices. “For 
developing countries this could be felt by those exports gaining from price increases as well 
as those characterised by greater dependency upon food imports and external food aid 
programmes.”83 However in developing countries it is hard to estimate the possible impact of 
agricultural reform, because lack of know-how and communication between regions prevent 
mostly the successful application of those reform proposals. Therefore “CAP reform requires 
both a “macro” and “micro” approach in relation to developing countries.”84 The major 
omission of the Mac-Sharry reform was expressed by the EP’s Committee on Development 
and Co-operation, and according to a critic “no mention was made in the two communications 
of the specific situation and needs of the developing countries and the proposed creation of an 
impact assessment mechanism to measure the impact of EC policy proposals in the field of 
agriculture on developing countries.”85  
 The impact of CAP reforms has different effects on producers in and out of the Union. 
Therefore for countries which apply to become a member of the EU elaborate research is 
required to prevent possible negative impacts of the candidate country on the Union. What 
will bring the membership of this country to the EU? What is the socio-economic welfare in 
this country. How is the market? How big is the agricultural sector?  
 
2.4.3 Agenda 2000  
 
 Agenda 2000 key elements comprise mainly, environmentally friendly production, 
food safety, improvement of rural development and competition power of the CAP and 
maintenance of production, while applied set-aside measures require alternative job 
opportunities for those producers who have become redundant. 
 The commission proposals were prepared to make agriculture more competitive in the 
world market, more consumers friendly, and by giving a new priority to rural development, 
more environmentally sensitive. 
 If the present level of the CAP price supports and direct payments continue it is 
expected that after the eastern enlargement; “the Unions surpluses for sugar, milk, and meat 
will rise, because land use will be increased approximately 50% and the farm labour force 
will be doubled.”86 
 “The CAP’s future policy objectives according to the Agenda 2000 are given 
below:”87 
 -to improve the union competitiveness through lower prices, 
 -to guarantee the safety and quality of food to consumers, 
 -to ensure stable incomes and a fair living for the agricultural community, 
 -to make its production methods environmentally friendly and respect animal welfare, 
 -to integrate environmental goals into its instruments, 
 -to seek to create alternative income and employment opportunities for farmers and 
their family.   
                                                          
83Juliet Lodge: The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 1995, p.128 
84Juliet Lodge: The European Community and the Challenge of the Future, 1995, p.128 
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86European Commission: Agenda 2000, 1997, p.13 
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 The above measures seem to be the continuation of the MacSharry reforms. If we 
compare these objectives with article 39 of the Rome Treaty, the major difference between 
these objectives lies in the environmental measures.  
 In Agenda 2000 reforms were planned to reduce the support prices, which will also 
help to reduce various expenditures in the Union. The internal producers could be more 
independent and able to compete in the world markets. Price policy was supported by 
increasing the product quality. In crop sector especially in cereals a 20% reduction of 
intervention price in two equal steps was planned. 
 In the cereal sector, apart from the voluntary set-aside, compulsory set-aside would be 
applied to prevent surpluses. On the one hand, application of compulsory set-aside would 
steadily reduce the production, but on the other hand, decline in reduction might cause a price 
increase in the cereal products which would reduce their competition in the world market. 
However, inspection of compulsory set-aside is very difficult and the results of this 
application would mean that producers would receive financial support to reduce their 
production, while they might prefer to increase production capacity steadily in the rest of their 
arable land. This capacity increase then would require an increase of the market capacity in 
the world market to reduce the surplus amount.   
 
2.4.4 The Doha Round   
 
In June 2003 the Doha Round was put into effect. In the Doha Development Agenda at 
the new Round of CAP meetings the EU has included concrete measures which will 
contribute to liberalizing world trade. It was planned to offer a greater market access for all, 
lower the trade distorting farm subsidies and make a sharp reduction for all forms of export 
subsidies, as well as food safety and environmental friendly production for third world 
countries’ producers. But these measures must be taken bilaterally to be able to increase their 
effects on the world trade.     
The important contribution of the Doha round could be seen in the decoupling 
payments, which break the link between production of a specific agricultural product and 
payments. The Doha Round of Agricultural negotiations aimed at achieving the measures 
given below, which set to reform the EU’s CAP. These are:  
• “Substantial improvements in market access (reductions in tariffs)          
• Reduction of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies, 
• Substantial reduction in trade distorting domestic support.”88 However the Doha 
Round of multilateral agricultural negotiations has contributed little. In addition, during the 
Doha round the spirit of the MacSharry reform was maintained and most of its measures were 
extended until 2007. 
  
2.4.5 The Assessment of the CAP Reform Process 
  
The reform package in 1992 has helped to reduce stocks in most of the reformed 
sectors (see Table 2-16). “In the case of cereals, set-aside has helped to keep production under 
control, while the increased price competitiveness has allowed significant additional 
quantities to be used in the domestic market, mainly for animal feed.”89 A significant 
diminishing of the intervention stocks in the cereal and beef sectors was also observed. 
However, the current level of prices is still too high to be able to compete in the world market.  
The overproduction and higher costs of production increase the burden on the CAP 
budget. During the last decade (1992-2002) agricultural income per capital has also increased. 
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The number of producers in cereals sectors has decreased, due to the reform measures, 
particularly the set-aside from production measure. Decline in land use forced producers to 
use land intensively. Intensive land use on the one hand reduced the expected utility of set-
aside measure but increased the amount of direct payments result of set-aside.  
In 1992 CAP reform direct payments were based on historical production and partially 
decoupled from production decisions. These products, which farmers were excessively 
planting in the rest of their land, increased the supply amount, because the result of such 
obligatory production dependency meant that producers could receive direct payments. 
Unfortunately, coupled payments, which were dependent on producing a specific crop, had 
increased cereal production in the last decade. Indeed, producers were paid only for setting 
aside their land to reduce arable land use. However, decoupled payments, which were put into 
effect in 2005 due to the Doha round of 2003, broke the link between productions of specific 
corps and payment. This meant direct payments were fully decoupled from production after 
2005.  
 Consequently, the CAP had some negative effects, which were only partially corrected 
by the 1992 reform. “The support it provides is distributed somewhat unequally and is 
concentrated on regions and producers who are not among the most disadvantaged. This is 
having negative effects on regional development planning and the rural community, which 
has suffered badly from the decline in agricultural activity in many regions.”90  Consequences 
of this application are easy to predict: In some regions development of excessively intensive 
farming practices are having negative effects on environment and animal diseases.  
 The effect of the reforms on the environment was mixed. On the one hand, there were 
positive effects, such as, rational use of fertilisers and pesticides which resulted as price 
decreases; set-aside from production also had some benefits, especially incitement of 
improvement of the territorial distribution of livestock rearing. On the other hand, there were 
also negative effects “mainly the encouragement given to irrigated crops through the 
regionalisation of direct payments to cereals, oilseeds and protein crops, as well as the relative 
advantage given to intensive live stock farming through lower feed prices and subsidising 
silage.”91 
 The burden of the agricultural support had been shifted from consumers by means of a 
reduction of the price support and the introduction of direct payment to the producers. 
“Budgetary expenditure is therefore significantly higher in the sectors concerned.”92 Of 
course, there were some other factors which were taken into account in recent years such as 
world prices, dollar exchange rate and intervention stocks. 
 Briefly, “a feature of the new rural policy is that EU member states are given more 
flexibility in designing their own programmes, allowing them to be tailored to the specific 
conditions facing their rural areas. It also requires that EU member States define suitable 
environmental measures to be implemented by farmers and allow payments to be made in 
return for compliance with general or specific environmental requirements or agri-
environmental commitments entered into by farmers.”93 It is also stated by the Commission 
that agri-environmental measures are of key importance and have, in general, been welcomed 
by the public and well-received by farmers. However, the scale of support prices and crop 
specific payments may also discourage farmers (especially silage maize and flax) from 
committing themselves to dedicating land to environmental purposes. 
Application of the environmental measures has increased as shown in the Table 2.17. 
From the beginning of the application; Germany, Spain, France, Portugal and the United 
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Kingdom started to apply environmental measures. But by 1997 all member countries had 
started to apply them. As can be seen in Table 2-17 applications of the environmental 
measures   increased from 10,879.940 ha to 26,851.107 ha during the period 1994 - 1997.    
 
Table 2.17 Agriculture and environment (regulation EEC No2078/92): application of 
measures 
Application of measures  EU -15 
Aggregate total on 31/10/1997   
Approvals Number 1,642.178 
 Hectares 26,851.107 
 LU 455.335 
Average aid per hectares 91 
 Per LU 110 
Aggregate total on 31/10/1996   
Approvals Number 1,227.380 
 Hectares 22,866.424 
 LU 374.849 
Average aid per hectares -- 
 per LU -- 
Aggregate total on 31/10/1995   
Approvals Number 907.822 
 Hectares 18,882.640 
 LU 338.359 
Average aid per hectares -- 
 per LU -- 
Aggregate total on 31/10/1994   
Approvals Number -- 
 Hectares 10,879.940 
 LU 78.883 
Average aid per hectares -- 
 per LU -- 
Source: Eurostat and EU Commission-DG-6, or http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg06/index.htm 
 
 The agricultural market in and outside (assuming Turkey as a non- member country) 
the EU is dependent on many factors. However, there are two factors which are rather 
important for the estimation of the long- term outlook in the agricultural market. These are: 
“Population growth and rising incomes. The world population was expected to increase by 
more than 85 million people a year between 1995 and 2005. And the second factor 
determining increasing food demand is the favourable prospect for world incomes and 
economic growth particularly in developing countries.”94 But the expected increase in 
agricultural product supply outside the EU (let us say in Turkey) will be less than the growth 
in demand. There are some reasons for this: First of all “it has limited availability of land due 
to urbanisation and environmental constraints, and secondly to a slowdown in the growth of 
yields.”95 However, urbanisation in the less developed countries must not be expected in the 
coming decade to be much faster than population growth in these countries. In developing 
countries such as Turkey implementation of the industrial revolution is still not completed and 
the poverty culture in less developed regions has hindered people from adopting new 
technical and genetic production methods except in some industrialised areas. 
However, if the EU producers increase their investment in Turkey, especially in the 
agricultural sector, then such investments will contribute to an increase in the production 
capacity and technology of producers in less developed countries. Innovation in the 
production operation process may increase the cost of production near to the EU level, but 
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high technological production and know-how will also increase the quality and quantity of 
production. Such modernisation and innovation in production operation process will increase 
competition both in and out of the EU market. Moreover, adoption of know-how and high 
technological production methods and plant techniques will reduce regional disparities and 
price differences between countries.   
 
Table 2.18: Nature of intra industry trade in the EU-12 (1985-1996) 
IIT % of Intra EU trade Vertical IIT  % of IIT Horizontal IIT % of VIIT Country 
1985 1996 1985 1996 1985 1996 
France  52.3 66.6 46.3 51.0 62.8 61.4 
Belgium 45.1 58.0 52.0 55.6 51.2 61.2 
Netherlands 47.7 55.9 51.7 54.4 60.3 63.5 
Germany 53.4 63.9 51.0 55.5 68.6 68.9 
Italy 34.8 44.0 72.2 63.4 21.6 38.3 
U. Kingdom 46.5 59.7 64.2 64.3 55.4 56.5 
Ireland 23.1 29.6 77.1 85.5 59.4 67.3 
Denmark 27.6 42.4 70.6 72.9 58.1 69.7 
Greece 6.2 11.2 80.3 80.6 24.4 48.6 
Portugal 11.7 26.7 83.6 61.7 45.8 29.7 
Spain 29.4 52.5 70.6 55.4 43.4 37.7 
EU-12 45.5 56.7 55.2 57.2 56.0 59.0 
Source: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/research/seminars/CA-IIT.pdf Comparative Advantages and 
IIT, A panel data analysis for the EU from C. Diaz  
  
At the beginning of the 1990’s the effects of globalisation increased in almost all 
countries.  Increasing communication and information technologies, in particular, enhance 
collaboration, and countries with similar factor endowments increase their trade share more 
than countries with different factor endowments (see table above). The new theoretical 
developments show the existence of imperfect competition and scale economies especially in 
industrial markets (Krugman 1979 and Lancester 1980, Helpman 1981 etc.). Increasing 
similar product trade between countries compels producers to reduce the price differences on 
similar product trade. As seen in the table below, intra industry trade had considerably 
increased between 1985 -1996. During this period the horizontal IIT relative to the vertical 
IIT was observed, which implied that countries preferred to   increase their trade capacity on 
similar qualities of products. Increasing similar quality of product trade forced producers to 
reduce the price differences between countries. Decline in price differences between countries 
also meant a decline in price intervention, export subsidies and import tariffs.  
In the last decade, consequent on the CAP reforms, a sharp decline in the number of 
farms and in the number of people employed in agriculture was observed and these are 
expected to drop in the future too.  
The creation of complementary or alternative income and employment opportunities 
for farmers still remains a major aim for the future, as employment possibilities in agriculture 
itself fall away. In the table below the number of farms and number of people employed in 
Agriculture can be seen during the period 1989-1999. 
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Table2.19: People employed in agriculture in the EU (1000 people) 
 
Countries 1989 1994 1999 
EU- 15 -- -- 6,898 
B 120 108 95 
DK 149 127 90 
D 1056 1171 1034 
EL 930 788 669 
E 1,605 1,164 1,020 
F 1.503 1.128 968 
IRL 169 151 136 
I 1,912 1,550 1,118 
L 6 -- 3 
NL 286 262 231 
A -- -- 229 
P 881 522 611 
FIN -- -- 148 
S -- -- 121 
UK 593 534 424 
IS -- -- 13 
NO -- -- 104 
CH -- -- 178 
 Source: http://www2.wu-wien.ac.at/bib/dbueberblick.php , Statistical data from Eurostat yearbook   
 
Finally it is important to note that in the EU’s CAP 90% of agricultural products are 
bought at a higher price and sold to the consumer at a lower price. In fact, more than half of 
the EU budget is being spent on CAP expenditure. Especially in the EAGGF guarantee 
section, expenditure goes to finance intervention buying, storage and export subsidies, 
although the share of the agricultural sector in the national income is approximately 3% and 
6% of the working people are employed in agriculture.  
Due to the enlargement the Commission confirms the policy choice expressed in the 
‘Agricultural strategy paper’ of December 1995. New reform proposals will be dependant on 
the 1992 Mac Sharry reform, which shifted price support to direct payments. The reason for 
this is to reduce the possible effect on the market price.  
 In the near future “radical simplification of rules and a greater decentralisation of 
policy implementation, with more margins being lift to member states and regions”96 are also 
required. 
 
2.4.6 New Reforms in the CAP 
 
Over the coming decade, agriculture will have to adapt to further changes in market 
evolution, market policy and trade rules. These changes will not only affect the agricultural 
market but also local economies in rural areas in the Union. Agriculture in the EU-15 is 
highly diverse in its natural resources, its farming methods, its competitiveness and income 
level and also its traditions. In the Union diversity is one of the strengths of European 
agriculture, contributing to its character and quality. New reform proposals must be realised to 
cover the needs of the CAP. 
The New Reform proposal in the CAP is needed.  However, the Commission and the 
Council of Agricultural Ministers agreed to the historic Mac-Sharry reforms of the CAP on 
                                                          
96European Commission: Agenda 2000, 1997, p.26 
 77
May 21 1992, which paved the way for agreement in the Uruguay Round of trade talks under 
the WTO. However, there are some important reasons for starting to think about the next 
round of reforms. 
One of the important reasons for new reform proposal is the inefficient support measures of 
the CAP which increased the incomes of internal producers whilst consumer welfare and 
producers gain outside the union was reduced in the last decade. Another important reason for 
the new reform proposal occurred at the time of the “opening of the Berlin Wall on November 
9th 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union domination of Central and Eastern 
Europe.”97  Reunification of the West and East Germany slightly increased the financial 
burden of the CAP. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the application of those (so-
called East Block) CEECs countries to join the EU, and which became full members of the 
EU in May 2004, increased the need for new regulations within the CAP.  
The new reform proposal is expected to increase the competition capacity and 
sufficiency of internal producers in the market. But also the EU “Commission wants to make 
agriculture more competitive in the world market, more consumer-friendly and, by giving a 
new priority to rural development, more environmentally sensitive.”98 
 In the new reform proposals it must be taken into account that eastern enlargement 
brought approximately 100 million consumers into the Union “whose average purchasing 
power would, however, be only roughly one third of that of the current consumers in the 
union. The agricultural area would be expanded by half and the agricultural labour force 
would at least double.”99 These negative effects could be reduced by diversification of their 
rural economies. Application of the existing level of the support prices and direct payments 
would create particular problems. Inordinate cash injections through direct payment would 
risk creating income disparities and social distortions in the rural areas of eastern countries.   
 New multilateral trade negations attempt to reduce border protection, to reduce export 
subsidies and to reshape internal support instruments. Another increasingly sensitive issue is 
the need to introduce environmental and social standards at the international level and to take 
into account consumer concerns. Since the Uruguay round similar measures have been taken 
to increase the contribution and effectiveness of the CAP on the trade liberalisation. 
 In the Union, GATT (WTO) commitments also affected trade liberalisation and 
especially export from the Union. According to earlier GATT commitments, tariff reduction 
on industrial goods was performed, but for agricultural products, this reduction was not done. 
On the one hand, restrictions on agricultural products from the third world are required to 
protect domestic producers. But on the other hand, export subsidies for domestic products are 
given to increase domestic export and competition change of domestic producers on the world 
market. In time the negative impact of this unfair trade liberalisation increases the abyss 
between the rich and the poor. 
 The protests of 30 thousand people against the WTO meetings in Seattle were not 
casual. Similar protests have been observed in Prague, in Melbourne and in Geneva, although 
during those protests in Seattle, the demands of the labour union in the USA contradicted the 
demands of less developed countries representatives. The demands of the labour unions in the 
USA concentrate on the quality of labour and environmental standards; this will increase the 
protection level of developed countries against the third world countries exports. 
 Further liberalisation of the agricultural trade is needed, because import levies in the 
EU are still extremely high. “Because the tariffication of import in the EU, as elsewhere, was 
based on the base period 1986 to 1988, the initial tariff equivalents or maximum bindings 
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were extremely high. So even after these have been reduced by the agreed 36% tariff 
reduction in the URRA between July 1995 and 2001, the applied tariffs are expected to be 
well below the maximum bindings.”100 It was therefore difficult to expect from this tariff 
reduction any positive effects on the domestic market. Nevertheless this was the first tariff 
reduction and the new reform proposals are expected to lower it for the welfare of the world 
nations. According to the Buckwell Report such tariff measures will be needed against sudden 
price collapses or surges of import. As mentioned above due to this process internal producers 
will be protected at the cost of the consumer’s utility.   
         The demands of the producers in the USA during the Uruguay Round were almost the 
same; furthermore, they requested free movement of agriculture from the Union and also 
financial resource possibilities in the Union, such as banking, stock shares etc. However, 
obtaining the mentioned demands will be the end of the agricultural sector in the Union, 
because, the USA has the biggest export capacity of agricultural products and obtaining the 
free movement of agricultural products will cause the collapse of the agricultural sector in the 
Union. The recent debate on long-term prospects has revealed factors of uncertainty; in 
particular, the result of the next WTO Round could also affect the dairy sector. Furthermore, 
subsidies from the WTO will also not be able to protect internal producers, and internal 
producers will never be able to compete with these low product prices. 
 According to the decisions of the Council in Brussels in November 1997, it was 
planned to prepare the agriculture sector to be more “effective, multifunctional and 
competitive and it must be divided or distributed up to the less favourable areas,”101 in order 
to become more effective and productive. The inspection of the producers will also be 
required, for control of the proper application of the CAP. Measures for environmental 
protection are becoming more important for healthy feeding and living.       
In October 1998 at the Gmunder Conference it was declared that the reform proposals 
of the Commission for the agriculture and forestry sectors have an important function in 
maintaining energy and raw material requirements. According to the experts “production of 
heat, electricity and motor fuel from growing raw materials is equal to 40 million tons of oil 
in 1995 although this amount would be 130 million tons of oil in 2010, which approximately 
corresponds to a 14 million hectare area.”102 Maintenance of raw material is important and it 
will also contribute to increasing the environmental protection and reduce the dependency of 
the EU countries on third world countries. Improvement of raw materials will also help to 
substitute fossil energy use with bio energy. 
 Implementation of the above-mentioned regulations would help to increase the use of 
raw material in the industry sector, which will also contribute to protecting the environment. 
However, realisation of raw material and bio energy use require structural innovation and 
know-how. 
The other important contribution to the development of the raw material use will also 
create employment opportunities for the unemployed people in the agriculture sector. In the 
reform proposals it was stated that if the “use of raw materials and energy transporters can 
double up from 6% to 12%; it is estimated by the Commission that this will create 
approximately 500.000 job opportunities.”103 The realisation of these reform proposals will 
help ex-farmers who were sent into early retirement to become more useful in the agricultural 
sector. However, it would be better to remain within the EU where there are approximately 18 
million unemployed people, which is a considerable amount, and, in order to create new jobs, 
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a more radical solution must be used, such as, cooperation with eastern countries’ producers 
to increase the investment amount in these regions, or the pension age, which it is very high in 
the EU, can be lowered, thus allowing young and dynamic people to start work and become 
useful. 
At the Berlin summit the Commission proposed to improve the less developed regions 
and develop the CAP reforms to cover the need for producers to become more competitive in 
the market. Agriculture was also to undertake the responsibility of environmental protection.    
In 1999 the Seattle Millennium round stated that custom free trade of industrial goods 
would be a hindrance to the less developed countries, which are producers of agricultural 
goods. Besides this, the importance of environmental friendly production facilities in world 
trade and an investment increase was demanded. Seattle has altered the terms of liberalisation 
in two respects: 
Firstly the liberalisation of trade cannot be determined only through reduction of 
tariffs because the, “fundamental rights of workers, protection of the environment and health 
cultural diversity, the multi-functionality of agriculture, quality of the environment,”104 have 
also a great impact on world trade. 
Secondly, negotiations can no longer be the privilege of just a few major groups of 
countries; the EU, the United States and the Cairns group. “Seattle had to take far greater 
account than before of the major third world partners particularly India, Brazil, South Africa 
and Egypt, the emerging economies especially in South East Asia and our ACP partners.”105       
The impact of globalisation on world trade, which is based on a single market and a 
liberal trade, is expected by the WTO, which has 134 member states and 31 applicant 
countries, to remove the trade barriers and subventions in world trade. During the Seattle 
round it was discussed that the advantage of  free trade and removal of the trade barriers 
would contribute to the welfare of the less developed countries because according to them; “in 
1997 the richest developed 20 countries realised 86% of the world production and the rest of 
the world only 13% of the total production. Developed countries obtained the 68% of direct 
investments and the other countries obtained the rest. Between, 1980-1997 the growth rate of 
the 20 developed countries was above 4%, in 79 countries it was less than 3%, and in 59 
countries negative growth rate was observed. Between these periods the income of the labour 
force in 14 developed countries was 10 times more than in 113 countries.”106 In contrast to 
this it was stated by the EU that if it was possible to reduce the protection approximately 
“50% of the production in the world could increase to approximately 370 billion dollars, of 
which 60% of this - approximately 220 billion dollars could be distributed to the developing 
countries.”107    
 The protests in Seattle and then in Prague, in Melbourne and in Geneva started the 
process of alliance building and the preparation for broader based negotiations for further 
liberalisation of the world trade especially for agricultural products. This implies that in the 
new reform proposals a sharp reduction in market support measures will be expected. In 
addition, this removal of trade distorting measures, which are defined in the amber and in the 
blue box, will also be in the new reform proposal. Therefore direct payments which are 
considered in the blue box will be transferred to the green box measures. The expected 
reduction on support measures was also pointed out by the Commissioner Fischler. In his 
speech he defined the new framework of the new CAP reform. This is given briefly below:    
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• “cut import tariffs by, on average, 36%, to improve market access for agricultural 
products coming from third world countries;  
• cut export subsidies by, on average, 45%, and, for certain products abolish them 
altogether;  
• cut trade-distorting support by 55%;  
• take account of non-trade concerns; and  
• give developing countries a better deal, by creating better opportunities for market 
access, recognising the importance of food security, and allowing a preferential 
implementation period for any new commitments.”108 These measures indicate that 
liberalisation of world trade on agricultural product trade will continue in the coming 
decade and negotiations will continue in the same direction to ensure a better living 
standard for all.  
The pressure on the CAP reforms is concentrated in four groups. These are budgetary 
pressure, because of the expensive finance of the CAP, consumer pressure, because of the 
increasing consumer prices in the CAP, external pressure, especially the Uruguay round and 
WTO pressure on the EU, and environmental pressure on the production operation process of 
CEECs, which must be realised to increase the quality standards on the EU level and also 
must consider the environmental friendly production methods.  
 In the new reform proposal given below, considerations must not be neglected which 
mostly affects the producers in the EU. These are: 
a. Production capacity must be lowered for those products which are causing surpluses 
and higher prices and during and after the transition period direct payments must be paid to 
the farmers in accordance with the decouple area payments (no dependency on production 
volume to avoid abandonment of production). 
b. Internal products, which are highly protected in the Union and production costs are 
highly expensive in the Union, must be substituted with imported products which are 
relatively cheap. This will increase  fair trade and  consumer welfare, 
c. Substitution of imported products will prevent price intervention and increase in the 
Union, but also in time it will help to reduce the export subsidies and the import levies within 
the Union. 
d. Regulations must be carefully applied to prevent a strong fluctuation within the Union. 
On the one hand, reduction on tariff amounts will cause a price fluctuation in the market and 
decrease the production capacity for the next term. But on the other hand, declining levies will 
increase production capacity outside the Union which will reduce the price of imported 
products for the next term if the existing market capacity is maintained. This will either force 
importers (non-EU farmers) to increase the market share for marketing their overproduction, 
or they will reduce their product price which will have a small contribution on consumer 
demand because price elasticity of agricultural products is lower as it is in other basic food 
stuffs. Therefore, any increase in the market can be realised if the market share of internal 
producers is decreased. The internal producers must be able to increase their competition 
capacity against external producers. The competition capacity cannot be increased by higher 
protection walls, especially in the international market. This can be overcome in time if the 
application of new planting methods and techniques etc. are used to reduce production costs. 
e. Consumers’ nominative incomes will increase if the lower prices of imported products 
are sold in the market. Increasing the nominal income, (because of negative effects of the 
income elasticity mentioned above for agricultural products) will be reflected in luxury 
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products. Increase in nominal income without changing real income will increase the welfare 
of consumers.    
f. In principal, producers seem to be more affected than consumers by price changes. 
However, a percentage of consumers are employed in the production of the basic-foodstuffs. 
On the one hand, (because of lower prices of the imported products) their nominal income 
will increase, but on the other hand, after some time their real income will reduce, while they 
are working in the agricultural sector. Hence, decline in internal product prices will be 
reflected in the cost of production, which means usually wages will be reduced to reduce the 
product prices. 
g. Set-aside from production must be increased for those products which are excessively 
produced and cause overproduction. By doing this export subsides will be reduced. Decline in 
import levies will force internal producers to reduce the products which are costly to produce. 
Direct payments will be given therefore, for those producers who set aside their land and/ or 
replace their higher cost products with lower cost products, or jump up to the other sectors, 
which will be more productive than agriculture for the Union. 
h. Ex-producers may be educated in their new job with intensive training programmes to 
increase their know-how and information capacity, in order to attain a leading position ahead 
of those new members who have factor endowment but are suffering from lack of know-how 
and information technology. In the future it is expected that all citizens of United Europe will 
be able to work and dwell within Europe. This will help unemployed people, who are less 
productive in their own country, to travel to other Member States to become more productive 
in a related field.   
 In addition to the above, the reform of the CAP must improve the competitiveness of 
the CAP both for external and domestic markets. The rate of protection must be done to 
increase the member and non-member countries’ welfare. Anxiety within the Union against 
the lower product prices of the third world would then be overcome by access by new 
members to the Union. On the one hand, increasing the market capacity within the Union will 
facilitate the progressive integration of new member States, and on the other hand, lower 
prices will benefit consumers. Once again in developed countries income elasticity of demand 
against the basic foodstuffs is negative and there is no need to worry about the lower product 
prices. Any increase in income will be reflected in the quality products and environmental 
friendly (ethnic) production. 
 The set-aside measures will be required for the basic foodstuffs, which will be 
obtained in the future from new candidate Member States, where their agricultural production 
is cheap relative to the other Member States. But the alternative income and employment 
opportunities must be realised for the ex-farm producers within the Union. Briefly “ensuring a 
fair standard of living for the agricultural community and contributing to the stability of farm 
incomes remain key objectives of the CAP.”109   
 All these proposals together have the aim of giving concrete form to a European 
Model for agriculture in the years ahead. In the list below lines of this model are given, which 
should be: 
   “-A competitive agriculture sector, which can gradually face up to the world market 
without being over -subsidised, since this is becoming less and less acceptable internationally;  
 -Production methods, which are sound and environmentally friendly, able to supply 
quality products of the kind the public wants; 
 -Diverse forms of agriculture, rich in tradition, which are not just output-oriented but 
seek to maintain the visual amenity of our countryside as well as vibrant and active rural 
communities, generating and maintaining employment; 
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 -A simpler more understandable agricultural policy which establishes a clear dividing 
line between the decisions that have to be taken jointly and those which should stay in the 
hands of the Member States; 
 -An agricultural policy which makes clear that the expenditure it involves is justified 
by the services which society at large expects farmers to provide.”110   
 
2.5 Turkey’s EU Membership  
 
The integration of Turkey into the EU will affect her economy, but membership by 
Turkey probably mostly affects the EU’s CAP because the size of employment and 
productivity in agriculture differ between the EU and Turkey. First of all Turkey’s 
membership will bring approximately 70 million new consumers to the EU market. However, 
roughly 8% of the working population in Turkey is unemployed and 15% lives in absolute 
poverty. The agricultural land is estimated at 34% as a percentage of the total land area which 
means 36.430 ha utilized agricultural area with approximately 32.7% agricultural people in 
total employments which is estimated about 12 million people working in the agricultural 
sector. (See Table 2.20).      
 
2.5.1 General Glance at the Accession Period to the EU: 
 
 The Transition period into the EU is dependent on the progress which is made by 
applicant countries in developing their economic and social conditions, adopting, 
implementing, and enforcing the acquis. In recent years Turkey has also implemented many 
reform proposals, but still there are many other requirements which must be realised for 
possible full membership by Turkey.     
 At the Lisbon European Council in 1992 The Commission, in response to a request by 
the Council noted that: Membership to the European Union implies the acceptance of the 
acquis communautaire, which means: 
1. “The contents, principles and political objectives of the Treaties.    
2. The legislation adopted in implementation of the Treaties, and the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice. 
3. The declarations and resolutions adopted in the Union framework. 
4. The international agreements and the agreements between Member States connected 
with the Union’s activities.”111  
  Both Turkey and other applicant countries are required to strengthen administrations 
and institutions and to strengthen investment in business and infrastructure. 
 Economic integration in the Union is expected to be realised between countries which 
have economic power such as qualified labour, capital and infrastructure etc. and other 
countries can be forced to integrate into these countries. 
 The well-known surpluses and higher EU market prices are expected to affect Turkey 
as was observed in CEECs. However, the advantages and disadvantages of the EU 
membership will affect both the EU side and Turkey. For example, the higher prices of the 
EU are still a hindrance for marketing of EU products worldwide. However, in the last decade 
application of the CAP support measures have reduced the surplus amount, but the surplus 
problem was unfortunately not removed from the CAP agenda. To avoid this, strict supply 
control and sharp reduction on export subsidies is required. Market-oriented agricultural 
systems simultaneously reduce consumer burdens and eliminate the need for export subsidies 
                                                          
110Berlin European Council: Agricultural Council, Political Agreement on CAP Reform (European model of 
Agriculture), 11/ March/ 1999, p.7 
111Delegation of the European Commission (Anouil and Karides): The European Union and Cyprus, 1997, p.7 
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and supply management. Turkey must ensure the necessary liberal market conditions, which 
are in the EU’s CAP agenda. Restructuring the agriculture sector will help to create 
competition in the food processing and distribution sectors. The EU announced also a list of 
conditions that must be met under agriculture include: 
“1-increasing production through sustainable agriculture, 2- phasing out existing support 
policies and replacing them with a direct income support system targeted to low income 
farmers, 3- establishing a land register system, 4- upgrading food inspection and control 
mechanisms and, 5- establishing a clear strategy for phytosanitary conditions.”112 In addition, 
it is also planned to reduce the Turkish government’s role in agriculture by privatizing its 
State Economic Enterprise (SEE). This may contribute to a reduction of the cost to the state of 
supporting these institutions, some of which experience economic difficulties maintaining 
their existence in the market.  
Improvement of the agricultural sector will also create better conditions for employees 
in agriculture. It could be more expensive to stimulate rural activity and employment than to 
deal with the problems of large numbers of disaffected unemployed persons migrating to 
towns. 
 It is also the case that there are significant environmental improvements required in 
rural areas. Large-scale productions, in particular, have suffered serious industrial pollution. 
Application of the environmental measures and inspection of measures must be undertaken. 
 
2.5.2 Turkey’s EU Membership Impact on the CAP 
  
 A glance at Turkey and EU relations  
Turkey’s first application to the Council of the EEC (EU) for becoming a full member 
was realized on 31 July 1959. Unfortunately, difficulties and differences between Turkey and 
the EU prevented this membership. However, relations between Turkey and the EU 
increasingly developed. The first agreement was signed on 13 September 1963, known as the 
‘Ankara agreement’. This was a partnership agreement which was signed to develop relations 
for customs union and for possible membership. Its additional protocol which established the 
framework of the Customs Union was signed in 1970.  In January 1996, Turkey finally 
became a member of the Customs Union after a long negotiations period.  After this Turkey’s 
trade relations with the EU increased slightly.  Particularly in recent years Turkey has made 
many structural and legislative reforms within the customs Union of the EU, and this 
contributed to Turkey receiving applicant country status on 17 December 2004.  
The Customs Union covers industrial and processed agricultural products. Traditional 
agricultural products will be included in the Customs Union after Turkey’s adaptation to the 
CAP. Turkey has started to apply the common custom tariff (CCT) for imports from third 
world countries, with the exception of products which are exempted in the Turkey- EU 
association council decision No 2/ 95 (WT REG 22/ 2). However, reduction of custom tariffs 
was partly realised in the following years but not completely removed. In addition to this 
Turkey acceded to the GATT in 1951 and has participated in all multilateral trade 
negotiations. Turkey became an original member of the WTO in 1995 and is bound by all 
measures of the Uruguay round agreement. But as a non-EU member, non-tariff measures of 
the EU’s CAP, such as intervention price increases in the imported product prices, export 
subsidies, date limitations such as seasonal imports for certain products and quotas on 
agricultural products maintained, create difficulties for producers in Turkey. 
With trade in the basic agricultural products Turkey and the EU agreed to develop the 
current agricultural trade regime which will contribute to increasing Turkey’s agricultural 
policy moves towards the EU’ CAP. Consequently, tariff and quota reductions have been 
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steadily made to achieve better market access for Turkey’s producers. As a result of these 
negotiations, from the one side, certain agricultural products such as tomatoes, poultry 
products, olive oil, cheese, certain fresh fruits, hazelnuts, and fruit juice gain access to the EU 
market. On the other side, frozen meat, butter, cheese, cereals, refined vegetable oil, sugar, 
tomato paste, some alcoholic beverages and animal feed stuffs from the EU gain access to 
Turkey’s market. In the subsequent years of the Customs Union EU exports to Turkey 
increased, but exports from Turkey to the EU decreased.    
 “The share of the EU in Turkey’s total exports which was 51.2 % in 1995 fell to 49.7 % in 
1996 and to 46.7 % in 1997. Meanwhile, the share of EU goods in Turkey’s imports shifted 
from 47.2 % to 53 % in 1996 and to 51.2 in 1997.”113 It is obvious that the small scale 
production and inefficient competition capacity of producers in Turkey reduced their trade 
share to member countries. However, the appreciating Turkish Lira (TL) in real terms also 
caused this result in the last decade. Particular trade partners of Turkey in the EU are the UK, 
Germany, Italy and France which are mostly large scale producers compared to Turkey, 
because in Turkey almost 70 percent of producers have less than 5 ha UAA. In Turkey most 
of the western region producers have larger farm sizes and receive a significant amount of 
agricultural support relative to eastern regions.           
It is obvious that the impact of possible EU membership will differ from region to 
region, and regional development for Turkey is needed to increase the competition of 
Turkey’s producers with the EU 25 countries. The difficulties of Turkey during the accession 
period to the EU will require both parties to undertake the actions, noted below, for the 
prevention of a possible and undesirable economic effect on the market, such as price 
stagnation, an increase in the unemployment rate etc. These can be classified as: 
1- Equation of the prices between EU producers and Turkey (especially for cereals and 
dairy products) 
 This measure has been used for the integration of other applicant countries in the past. 
Equation of the prices does not mean the same price, but the difference between applicant 
country and the EU producers may need to be increased to the same level for similar products 
to protect price fluctuation. This can be obtained by restructuring the existing production 
technique, increasing the quality and the capacity of production, which is also demanded in 
Agenda 2000. A consequence of these restructuring, production costs of Turkey’s producers 
will be an expected increase in the short run, which is desirable for domestic producers to 
protect their market share in the EU. 
 In Western countries welfare of the consumer is higher relative to Turkey’s 
consumers. The higher income effects reduce the relative lower cost products of third world 
countries in the EU market, because product prices at retail level are not the only important 
consideration for EU consumers; some other important things such as hygienic and organic 
production methods, labelling, ethnical food preference etc are also important. This means 
negative effects of income elasticity reduces their demand on basic foodstuffs and increases 
their demand on high quality, hygienic and environmental friendly products. The production 
process in Turkey does not operate according to this criterion.  
 Since the 1930 economic crisis, such policies have been applied. Although, an 
increase in custom duties, reduction of production, competitive devaluation etc. were not 
sufficient to avoid the crisis. The negative effects of these measures caused more reduction in 
production in world trade. These policies, which were called “‘beggar thy neighbour’ policies, 
resulted in a negative reaction.”114 Such negative experiences have caused a move from the 
existing system to more liberal and less protectionist policies.  
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114Alpar Cem/ Tuba Ongun: World Economy and International Economic Organisations, 1985, p.124 translated by author  
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The impact of free trade facilitates cooperation between countries and increases 
foreign direct investments. Increasing technical capacity and know-how accelerates the 
production operation process. This process also contributes to extension and improvement of 
product variation for the market.  
 The demand by consumers in Turkey for western products is high, because the western 
appearance of products is more attractive. In many regions of Turkey, lack of attractive 
presentation, advertising, promotion and lack of corporate identity image, jars, quality and 
especially labels, all of which need to be adjusted quickly to western standards, reduce the 
demand for Turkey’s products. These hindrances too many producers in Turkey reduce the 
power of large-scale producers in the EU market.  
2- ‘The elimination of Tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade’  
 Turkey had already joined the customs union in 1996. However, this was mostly 
realised for industrial products and for certain agricultural products only the tariff reductions 
were observed. If Turkey becomes a full member of the EU it will increase Turkey’s 
agricultural product trade with the EU market and this increase will create some difficulties 
which must be overcome before full membership. These difficulties are given briefly below.          
 For the EU members: Elimination of the tariffs may cause excessive imported 
products from Turkey, which is not desirable for internal producers. This may cause price 
fluctuation in the market. Therefore it is necessary to reduce certain agricultural products 
which are produced by both parties to prevent excessive production.  
 For Turkey: Abolition of the barriers may affect SME in agriculture which are not in a 
good enough condition to compete in the market. Insufficient capacity and technical 
equipment, lack of know-how in organic farm methods, lack of hygienic production etc will 
reduce the competition of Turkish producers in the EU market. In Turkey industrial 
production is still not sufficiently developed to be able to compete with developed countries 
products. Therefore trade in agricultural products is more important than it is in EU countries 
which have more shares in total GNP and the population living and working in the 
agricultural sector in Turkey is also higher relative to the EU countries. (see Table 2.20).  
The demand for agricultural products is also more elastic compared to industrial 
products which reduce the power of cause problems for Turkey’s producers. This means if 
any price reduction for basic foodstuffs in agriculture is realised in the EU, demand will not 
also increase at the same level to preserve the equilibrium position. But, price fluctuation in 
the market will be reduced within the CAP system by using the price support system.  
Consequently trade capacity between Turkey and third world countries is expected to 
reduce (trade distortion) whilst trade capacity between EU and Turkey will increase (trade 
creation).      
3- Wages in the EU are higher than in many regions in Turkey, and lower wages and 
lower productivity will create problems. The reasons for these lower wages are many; such as, 
increasing rate of population, insufficient labour unions, unemployment etc. In cases where 
free movement of people is realised for Turkey, migration into the EU countries must be 
expected. However, this problem can be eliminated if the free movement of labour and people 
is restricted as occurs in some CEECs. In some of these countries such as Poland, Czech 
Republic, Lithuania, Hungary and Latvia free movement of people is not allowed for five to 
ten years until necessary improvements are made in adopting the Community Acquise, which 
means the application of Community rules and standards and all the measures implementing 
common policy. The higher wages, in particular, in the western countries may become 
attractive to those people who are not employed in their own countries, but lack of 
qualifications reduces their chance of getting jobs easily. First of all, communication 
difficulties and the lack of technical and professional knowledge prevents them competing 
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with qualified labour power in western countries. There are also strong labour Unions, which 
will also prevent such people immigrating to the EU countries for work. 
4- In Turkey, as in the CEECs the cost of production for basic foodstuffs is cheaper than 
in the EU. 
CAP policies protect domestic farmers from imported products. Since the EU 
enlargement into the CEECs such protection is in decline, because the cheaper products of the 
eastern countries slightly reduce the costs of agricultural production, in the long run. Thus, 
strong protection will only be required for those products which have over production like 
cereals and milk products. But if the existing price supports and direct payments maintain and 
apply to these products, then product prices will increase in Turkey in the same way as in 
eastern countries. These price increases reduce the competition change of the EU products in 
the world market. Thus, protection of the CAP products will harm both member and non-
member producers.  
5-  The number of unemployed people in Turkey is higher than in the EU. After EU 
membership, the number of unemployed people will continue to increase, because new 
planting techniques and high technological production methods will reduce the need for a 
labour force in agriculture. In the near future this will cause a large outflow from this sector if 
necessary measures for the education of the labour force and rural activities are not incited 
and encouraged in Turkey.     
6- Emigration to the western countries is expected to increase. Welfare effects will play a 
major role in this. The higher living standards of the EU are more attractive for the lower 
income people in Turkey. Besides this, political and criminal problems in Turkey are greater 
than in the EU. This will also encourage Turkish citizens to immigrate into the western 
countries, but protection against such migration is limited by Acquise measures as much as 
possible. 
7-  Turkey’s membership will increase product amounts within the CAP. As a result of 
this increases in expenditure of community agencies will also increase to provide support 
measures in Turkey such as direct payments and set-aside measures for the prevention of 
overproduction. An increasing number of producers within the CAP system will increase the 
burden on countries such as Germany, UK and France, which are the net contributors of the 
CAP budget, thus increasing their share in the CAP budget. On the other hand countries such 
as Greece and Portugal, which are net receivers of the CAP budget, are expected to receive 
less financial support after Turkey’s membership, as was observed after the eastern 
enlargement, because in Turkey production costs are also lower as they were in Slovakia, 
Poland, Hungary and in Lithuania. Hence Turkey will also become a net receiver of the CAP 
budget. In addition the population of the Turkey is about two thirds of the CEECs, which 
means the monetary amount will be considerable.      
8- The trade creation effect is more advantageous for producers in Turkey than those in 
the EU.  
The EU membership will remove the import tariffs on agricultural products from 
Turkey.   Turkey joined the customs union in 1996, but this membership only contributed to 
an increase in the industrial trade capacity of EU countries because only tariffs for non 
agricultural products were reduced. Therefore removal of import tariffs on agricultural 
products will positively affect producers in Turkey, if the product quality increases up to EU 
standards whilst production cost still remain low relative to the EU producers. 
 On the one hand removal of the import tariffs will increase the trade capacity between 
Turkey and EU producers, but on the other hand import tariffs of the EU for non-member 
countries will become higher relative to the previous custom duties of Turkey, which are 
applied to  non-member countries, because after Turkey’s EU membership is finalised a 
considerable amount of imports realised by third world countries will be replaced/ substituted 
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by internal products of the EU and the application of compulsory minimum import prices 
(MIP) to the third world country producers will reduce such imports from non-member 
countries. 
 Due to the Customs Union, the trade creation begins to show an effect on trade 
capacity increase between the EU and Turkey as was explained by Viner (1950). According to 
him there are discriminations between member and non-member countries, because there are 
two different aspects of a trade situation. One is trade creation, in which production is 
transferred from a higher cost to a lower cost source of production (let’s say within the Union 
from the home country to a new partner country) because tariffs have been removed from the 
latter country’s product. The second, trade diversion, occurs when production is transferred 
from a lower cost source to a higher cost source of production (let’s say from third world 
countries) because of higher tariffs now applied to the new member countries.  
 It is expected that Turkey will lose the market in non-member countries (trade 
diversion), as happened in the UK. After EU membership the UK lost its preferential position 
in the EFTA countries; because after EU membership trade barriers have been removed, 
which created a new market for the UK. Consequently, trade capacity between the UK and the 
EFTA decreased. Because of removal of the barriers within the Union trade between the UK 
and the EU increased and imports reduced from EFTA because of custom duties. 
 The situation of Turkey related to non-member countries will be the same, because 
before membership producers can export their products without any restriction (except local 
government measures). But after joining the EU prices are offered by the Community 
agencies and export subsidies can only be determined by these agencies, with these prices 
usually being higher than the world prices. 
 
2.5.3 EU Enlargement and Turkey’s Prospective Difficulties with Full Membership 
 
 For an assessment of the possible enlargement of Turkey into the EU it is necessary to 
apply the whole of the Community acquise. This does not mean an additional budget, but   
organizing the Union’s response in a more coordinated manner to assist and to cover the 
needs of the new member.   
 Economic justification for the enlargement of the European Union arises from the 
expansion of opportunities to exploit competitive advantages that result in the removal of 
barriers to trade. The advantage of such removal of trade barriers results in the substitution of 
lower cost of supply sources (or production) for the higher cost sources. However, the major 
reason for this enlargement was not only trade creation. For example, financial assessment of 
the eastern enlargement shows that “the total annual cost of the enlargement of the ten CEECs 
would cost the EU some 30 billion ECU (or 0.4 of EU’s GDP or 31% of the EU’s total budget 
expenditures) in the year 2000.”115 The cost of eastern enlargement is expected to be 
compensated in the long run by the positive trade creation effect.  
 The number of countries which have become members has grown considerably since 
its foundation and despite many problems a number of countries are queuing up to join. 
The CEECs which joined the EU in 2004, as well as Bulgaria and Romania are 
relatively poorer countries than the EU they all have a smaller GDP than the EU, higher 
inflation and a high proportion of employees in agriculture relative to the EU work force. 
However, Turkey, which has applied for full membership, has still lower GDP per capita, 
higher inflation and a higher unemployment rate, all of which will cause a problem for 
integration of the Turkish economy into the EU. Indeed “Turkey’s agricultural employment of 
9.7 million people will unquestionably have significant implications for the EU’s agriculture 
sector, where a total of 6.9 million people are employed in the EU. Although the share of 
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agricultural output in the whole EU economy accounted for 1.7 %, the value added generated 
through the agricultural sector reached 133.9 billion, whereas, in Turkey, although agriculture 
is still a significant sector with a share of 14.3 % in the total GDP, it accounts for an output of 
merely 54 billion.”116 These mentioned factors increase the cost of integration for full-
membership. Moreover, these difficulties in Turkey require large grants from the EU’s 
structural fund and from the CAP in order to achieve membership.  
The possible membership of Turkey will obviously increase the use of arable land and 
share of employed persons in agriculture in the EU. However, production capacity of Turkish 
producers is low relative to the EU and higher than the CEEC. Furthermore, the share of the 
agricultural sector in total GDP is 14 percent, which is also higher than both the CEEC (7%) 
and the EU (1.7%), although in monetary values it accounts for about half of the EU’s 
contribution to the total GDP.  
 
Table 2.20: Comparison of agriculture in the European Union (EU-15), in the ten new 
members and in Turkey (in 2000). 
 
(1) GDP price deflator, 
(2) Purchasing power standard,  
(3) Total all products- CEEC trade with extra CEEC 
 
 Source: Florence Jacquet: Future Agricultural Policy in the European Union, 2003 and collected data from 
http://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit (country profiles Turkey) and from IMF direction of trade statistics CD- 
Rom for agricultural value added and agricultural employment data. and Eurostat, European Commission, 
Director General for Agriculture, FAO and UNSO and UAA % data from, O. Onema: Governmental policies, 
2004, table: 1 and for Turkey’s UAA% from http://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit/turkey-cp.htm and Production 
data for Turkey from Oskan, Burell, and Vilchez: Turkey in the EU Final Report, 1. 12. 2004, table.4.4, p.54, 
Turkey’s foreign trade data from http://www.fifoost.org/EU/statistik/tuerkei.php and GDP form Commission of 
the European Communities: Issue Arising from Turkey’s Membership perspective, 2004, (COM2004 656 final), 
data for agricultural employment: http://www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement_new/statistics/pdf/22a1_12_02_en.pdf  
2002 by Jens Dalsgaard, & http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/en2.htm 
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Agriculture with the Common Agricultural Policy by Secretariat General for EU Affairs in Turkey 
 
 
  EU-15 10 CC ‘s Turkey   
Total area (km2) 3,234.3 738.574 769.604 
(UAA) Utilized agricultural area (1000 ha) 130.443 38.381 36.430 
UAA of total area in % (2004) 40 51 34.1 (in 1997) 
Agricultural employment/total employment (%) 4.3 21.5 32.7 
Agricultural GNP/GNP, (%) 1.7 7 14.2 
Production of the agricultural sector, 1999 (mn Euro) 274,768 16,734 28,940 
Agricultural foreign trade balance (mn Euro) -122 -2,287 -28,455 
Exports share to turkey %  1.2 2.0 : 
Exports share to EU % 62.1 67.6 52.3 
Population (mn) 376.0 73.9 68.6 
GDP (per capita) (PPP) (2) 8,829.4 11.320 5.500 
Inflation %(1) 1.8 7.7 43.5 
Trade Balance  (mn/Euro) (3) 49,918 -33,596 -16,397 
GDP in value Bn Euro 9,716 for EU 25 212.3 
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In the table above basic statistics are given for the EU, for new members of the EU 
and for Turkey. If the given indicators are compared with the data for Turkey, it can easily be 
seen that Turkey’s population is approximately 7% less than the new EU members and the 
number of people employed in the agricultural sector is much higher that the CEECs. The 
UAA is about the same as the new members of the EU. Compared to the new members, the 
total area is a bit larger in Turkey. The GDP per capita is about half of that of the new 
members. However, the unemployment rate is about the same as in the new members of the 
EU.     
In Turkey approximately 10 million people still work in agriculture, but also land use 
(34.1%) is lower than in the EU and the share of agriculture in total GDP (14.2 per capita) is 
higher than most of the EU countries. Such differences increase the difficulties. Turkey’s 
membership will probably increase the CAP expenditure for financing producers in Turkey. 
This will reduce the share of EU countries which are the net receivers of the CAP budget. 
Turkey’s membership will increase the market capacity of EU producers by about one sixth of 
the Union population. Turkish producers will try to enter into the EU market, and internal 
producers will expand into Turkey’s market. But there is need of agricultural restructuring for 
creating competition in food processing and distribution sectors, improvement of productivity 
standards and development of labour productivity in agriculture. These will inevitably involve 
a further and perhaps quite large outflow of labour from the primary sector. There are also 
significant environmental improvements required in Turkey’s rural areas.  
In Turkey and in three other applicant countries, higher inflation and higher interest 
rates greatly hinder producers in developing their production capacity. The above-mentioned 
difficulties affect growth rate which must be accelerated in order to bring production 
operation processes closer to the developed member countries’ level.  
To date there has been some financial support from the EU to Turkey. Up until 2002 
Turkey had received financial support under the MEDA programme (Financial Instrument of 
the Euro Mediterranean Partnership) which provides financial support to the Unions 
Mediterranean policy. The following years 2004 - 2006 focus on support (about 1 million 
Euro) to meet the Copenhagen criteria and especially political support to strengthen the 
institutional capacity.      
It is obvious that financial aid will continue for the improvement of structural 
conditions in Turkey. However, Turkey’s large share in agriculture and its other structural and 
cultural differences from the EU will possibly make it the most expensive, controversial 
enlargement in the EU’s Agenda.  
Nevertheless, the financial burden of Turkey’s membership will possibly be 
compensated for by a positive trade effect. There are some other important reasons which may 
contribute to understanding the advantage of this membership. These are: 
• It will contribute to an increase in the market capacity of EU producers; this means a 
market worth approximately 200 billion dollars.  
• It will increase foreign direct investment, especially in agriculture, in services and in 
infrastructure.  
• It will increase the average age of the young population in EU, which is now over 40 
years, because the average age in Turkey is some 25 years.  
• It will reinforce the EU labour market by offering thousand of young workers.  
• Finally, this membership will increase the defence power of the EU through her young 
and strong military forces.  
These points are mostly used to argue in favour of Turkey’s EU membership.  
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3. The Structure of Protection in the CAP  
 
 The EU was founded by the original six members of the European Community. Eleven 
years later the CAP came into effect to achieve common policies in agriculture. According to 
the findings of the Spaak report agricultural markets should be supported; the Spaak 
Committee experts, therefore, settled down to examine three important systems. “These are 
price intervention, crop limitation and deficiency payments.”1 
 The first system, price intervention, is used to prevent an excessive price fall. The state 
agency intervenes in the market to purchase a part of the supply effectively increasing the 
product price. If an opposite effect occurs and the product price becomes too high then the 
state agencies release some of their stocks to reduce prices to the desired level. This system, 
therefore, combined with stocks policy has a stabilizing effect on the market.  
The second system, crop limitation, was first used in the US to set aside arable land. 
  The third system, deficiency payments, was first used in the UK. It is a subsidy per 
unit of production. These payments are used to cover income losses of producers where there 
is no internal protection. In the CAP system frontier protection is the most visible element in 
the price and market system. These payments support producers and keep prices close to 
world market prices. The subsidy is the difference between a guaranteed price and the world 
market price. Deficiency payments are costly to the CAP budget.  
The impact of the deficiency payments is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Before the 
application of deficiency payments producer output is q1 where the consumer demand is q2. 
But after the application of deficiency payments the producer price will increase from p1 
(world price) to p2 (target price) and production expand from q1 to q 3; that increases the 
producer gain by an amount of the area Z, while consumer surplus stays constant. In fact, 
deficiency payments (which, in the CAP, are called direct payments) are a short-term solution 
to cover the income loss of producers from the results of set-aside measures. But in the long 
term these payments may contribute to increasing the capacity that will raise the production 
amount in the next period. Increasing production (supply) causes a price decrease in the 
market.  
Figure 3.1: Effects of deficiency payments 
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Source: Adopted from Rosemary Fennell: The CAP, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p.198  
 
Deficiency payments were made to farmers who participated in an annual commodity 
program for wheat, feed grains, rice, or cotton, prior to 1996. The crop-specific deficiency 
payment rate was based on the difference between the legislatively set target price and the 
lower national average market price during a specified time. The total payment was equal to 
the payment rate, multiplied by a farm’s eligible payment acreage and the program payment 
yield established for the particular farm products such as Soya bean and oilseed.  
                                                 
1 Rosemary Fennell: The CAP, 1997, p.133  
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All of these three systems require public funds for their operation. The tariff was the 
major classic instrument to increase the finance capacity of the CAP budget. The tariff 
revenues were usually used to finance NTM’s to producers. But liberalisation of trade in the 
market and sharp tariff reductions compel the agricultural market to develop other non-tariff 
measures, NTMs, which were first introduced in 1960 and in 1962. 
In the CAP a more effective application of NTMs was required to protect domestic 
producers. The new protectionism, on the one hand, was not directly restricting imports as 
tariff and import quotas did. And on the other hand, it was as effective as tariff measures to 
keep third world country products out of the Union.  
In order to establish the above common market regulation within the six member 
countries some important changes within the market had to occur, such as, harmonised 
support prices and intervention measures, eliminating border taxes and controls between 
themselves in transitional steps. A common level of the tariffs on imports of products from 
third world countries and export subsidies to domestic producers was to be established. The 
transitional system introduced a mechanism with a set of intra-Community levies on trade, to 
be gradually eliminated in a series of steps as external tariffs and internal intervention 
measures were harmonised. Agreement in this process was achieved by the gradual alignment 
of the level of protection afforded by measures in the highest-price country. 
3.1 Descriptive Analyses of the Price Support System of the EU’s CAP 
Since 1962 to date, endeavors have been made to maintain price stability in the Union 
and to secure reasonable income to producers. However, the price of agricultural products still 
differs widely among EU member states.    
 
3.1.1 The Choice of Market Price Support  
  
The market price support is usually selected as an instrument to protect producers 
from third world country exporters under the circumstances noted below: 
“a- When supply and demand elasticity are low, so that the direct distortion costs are low.   
b- For commodities which are imported (rather than exported) where the effect on the 
government budget is positive,  
c- When the decrease in income, to which the policy is a response, is considered to be 
temporary so that the set-up costs of administering more complex support schemes play an 
important role relative to the distortions costs and 
d- When the administrative infrastructure is weak so that the implementation and enforcement 
costs of alternative transfer instruments are high and opportunity cost of government revenue 
is high.”2  
 Besides these considerations, it is also important to remember that “an important 
characteristic of agricultural price and trade policies is that they vary considerably by product 
and, thus require individual treatment of various products in policy simulations.”3 Therefore, 
each support measure and policy should be treated separately for different agricultural 
products.    
Finally, the selection of suitable price support measures is important, but the selection 
of those farmers who will get subvention is more important, because such support instruments 
may induce rent-seeking behaviour by interest groups (i.e. collusion between farmers who 
look to gain subsidies without working the land). Therefore, the identification of producers 
                                                 
2 European Commission: The Economics of the CAP, 1995, p.41 
3 Mergos G., Stoforos C., Mishev P. and Ivanova N.: Analysing agricultural policy reforms under transition in 
Bulgaria, 2001, Pages 482,  
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who will get subvention must be strictly done; because once subvention is given it is difficult 
to remove.    
    
 3.1.2 The Level of Market Price Support  
 
 When market price support is the instrument chosen to support producers, the level of 
support will be higher. The following are the factors that, in the view of the Commission, 
should ideally determine the level of support: 
1- “A lower level of income of farm households relative to that of households employed 
in other sectors, 
2- When more production is concentrated among farmers with small incomes  
3- The higher the income elasticity of the agricultural commodity in question, the smaller 
the proportion of the transfer from consumers from low- Income households. 
4- The greater the net-import of the supported commodity, the more favourable the 
impact on the government budget. 
5- The smaller the supply price elasticity, the smaller the distortion costs in production 
(as would be the case if the use of intermediate inputs and the mobility of primary 
factors were low and if the support were provided for a short term period) and 
6- The smaller the demand price elasticity, the smaller the costs in terms of consumption 
distortion.”4       
 
3.1.3 Methodology of OECD to Estimate the Producer Subsidy Equivalent in the CAP  
 
The Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) was originally introduced by Timothy Josling 
for the FAO in the mid-1970s. It is an aggregate measure of support which;  
• “Combines various of transfers or benefits to producers into one total value aggregate, 
• Provides a common basis for sharing country policy information,  
• Provides background information for trade negotiations, 
• Used to monitor country progress in reducing trade distorting support.”5    
 
In 1999 the Producer Subsidy Equivalent was renamed and redefined by OECD as the 
Producer Support Estimate (PSE), which is accepted as a precise way of measuring the 
transfers from government/ community agencies to producers. According to OECD data and 
current OECD methodology, measurement of the support and use in agricultural policies is 
expressed in four different ways: “As the total value of the transfers to a producer or group of 
products; as the value per unit of output; as a percentage of the domestic production value 
(including production- dependent transfers), or, of the consumption value; and as a Nominal 
Assistance Coefficient (NAC).”6     
 The impact of support measures from state agencies and consumers to producers is 
estimated by using the PSE method. “The biggest advantage in using the PSE indicator is that 
it derives from large and very reliable sets of general economic information and that it 
involves the calculation of both direct and indirect transfers, which may be related to the 
agricultural producers of a specific farm commodity group.”7 Indeed, the PSE method gives 
more accurate results than consumer support estimate (CSE) on the estimation of support 
measures. The CSE method is used to determine the welfare effect on consumers, but 
                                                 
4 European Commission: The economics of the common agricultural policy, 1995, p.41 
5 Frederick J. Nelson: Producer Subsidy Equivalents for Dairy, 18/Oct./1999, p.4     
6 Silvis H. J. and C. P. C. M. van der Hamsvoort: The AMS in agricultural trade negotiations, 1996, p.529  
7 Rednak M, Erjavec E and J. Turk: The Levels of Protection in Slovene Agriculture and Policy Implication,  
1995, p.250   
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statistics on consumption of products are either not available to make a precise forecast or not 
relevant for my research. For example, production figure are  obtained from the producer, but 
consumption is not so easy to calculate as it is required to know where and in what quantity 
products are distributed, how much of these are consumed and what quantity of these 
perishable agricultural products is damaged. 
 Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE): PSE is “an indicator of the annual monetary 
value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at 
the farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their 
nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income.”8 This has meant that transfers 
both from consumers and tax payers are supported through the increase in internal product 
prices and direct payments.  
PSEs can be expressed in different ways. The total PSE is simply the value of transfers 
to producers as is stated both in the WTO and in the OECD notifications. The PSE has two 
major components, of which market price support (MPS) is the first component, which cover 
import restrictions and export subsidies. The price gap between producer price at farm gate 
(Pp) and world price (Pr) is used to calculate the market price support as is expressed in the 
PSE formula below. The second major component of PSE is the budgetary outlay: “It includes 
all government budget expenditures on farm programs, including WTO exempt (green box) 
outlays that are made directly to producers, all of the WTO non exempt (amber box) subsidies 
and all of the WTO blue box forms of domestic support.”9  
The PSE is not actually the only method for estimation of the amount of support to 
producers. In agricultural economics, reduction commitments are also expressed in terms of 
Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) of the WTO, which is the sum of 
expenditures on non-exempted domestic support across all commodities. “It generally avoids 
the effects of fluctuation in exchange rates and classifies subsidies into: those that are 
permitted (green); others policies included in the AMS subject to reduction commitments 
(amber); decoupled direct payments associated with production limiting programmes (blue), 
not in the green box but excluded from the AMS; and those that are prohibited (red).”10  
The AMS was derived from a different aggregate support measure of the URRA. The 
AMS is used in the WTO for measuring the support in agriculture and is based on products in 
a given period. In contrast to the PSE the AMS comprises only the Amber box policies which 
is a production distorting support measure and not preferred by the Commission for use as a 
support measure. “The AMS calculation also excludes support that does not exceed 5 percent 
of the members’ total value of production (10 percent for developing countries), although this 
support is notified.”11 On the other hand, the PSE method provides more comprehensive 
information about the support measures for certain commodities in countries. The PSE 
method comprises trade oriented policies that restrict import and support export of 
agricultural products, which is defined in the green box. The AMS includes only domestic 
policies and is not dependent on market price. Therefore, the MPS, which is one of the major 
components of the PSEs, is also excluded in the AMS computation. “Although the two 
measures are similar in basic concept, the PSE includes support (or costs) of some policies 
that are left out of the AMS - such as trade policies and certain green box policies assumed by 
negotiators to be non-trade distorting.”12  
The estimation of PSE differs from AMS because calculation of the MPS is different 
in the PSE and AMS methods. The MPS is calculated for all agricultural products in the PSE 
                                                 
8 OECD database:  Methodology for the Measurement of the support and use in policy evaluation-   
9  Young , Burfisher, Nelson and Mitchell: Domestic Support and the WTO, 2000, p.4   
10 Wohlmeyer H. and Theodor Q: The World Trade Organisation and Sustainable development, 2002, p.150   
11 Young, Burfisher, Nelson and Mitchell: Domestic Support and the WTO, 2000, p.4 
12Economic Research Service: US Ag Policy Well Below WTO Ceiling on Domestic Support, 1997, p.30   
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method, but in AMS the MPS is only included if price support is combined with trade 
policies. In AMS the MPS is calculated as the difference between administered price and 
fixed average reference price multiplied by the current production. In contrast  to this, the 
MPS for PSE is calculated for the relevant year as the difference between producer price (at 
farm gate) in domestic currency units and world reference price in world currency units 
multiplied by a exchange conversion factor, rather than with the production amount for the 
relevant year.  The AMS price gap, therefore, reflects only the variables which policy makers 
have control over rather than current market conditions. This has meant calculations of the 
AMS- MPS can only be used as a means of controlling the success of programs, which are 
applied for keeping a country under control, whereas the PSE- AMS is used to estimate the 
amount of protection. By doing this the amount of payments to producers are estimated that 
contributes to all domestic production being kept competitive with imports at the existing 
level of commodity output, current producer income and import prices.  
The PSE is a method of evaluating the support system that maintains internal 
production and imports at their current level. The PSE is the computation of the price support 
system which changes the product price and affects trade capacity directly. “However, 
conceptual analysis shows that the PSE and its derivatives are not a sound measure of trade 
restrictions and distortions caused by agricultural policies. Limiting or reducing PSE does not 
guarantee that the trade distorting effects of national import and export policies will 
decline.”13 It is obvious that such support measures can only be used for protection of internal 
producers. Therefore, the impact of such support measures affects only the internal market. 
The exogenous factors such as exchange rate fluctuation can only minimally be affected by 
the PSS. For example, if all support measures for high cost production of the CAP could be 
withdrawn at once; world agricultural product requirement would rise and might increase the 
import price of agricultural products at least in the short term. Therefore, measures such as 
intervention price mechanism of the CAP contribute to the maintenance of a stable product 
price in the market, but have the least effect on exogenous factors.    
It is obvious that the PSE in a given year does not presuppose some different level of 
import; it only estimates the amount of support that is maintaining the existing situation. “The 
measurements are thereby given a purely static character; PSEs do not gauge dynamic effects. 
Thus, the outcomes cannot predict trade effects; they simply shed light on an existing 
situation.”14It measures the amount of support for each particular year and it uses data from 
that year only. The evaluation of the PSE, therefore, only contributes to an evaluation of the 
amount of payment in that year and not for some other year.    
The PSE method provides a measure that can be used for evaluating the support 
system to producers (or consumers if there is any transfer) in agricultural production, but 
unfortunately it does not provide useful data for any other policy decision in agriculture. 
“Neither the OECD data nor the WTO data are sufficient for the comprehensive and 
consistent comparison of domestic support policies potential production and trade distortions 
resulting from the domestic support program.”15 The PSE can be accepted as a descriptive 
method for the estimation of the support system in agriculture. However, it is important to 
note that it provides useful information for estimating the amount of support to producers and 
for estimating the differences between countries in this respect, and there is no alternative 
measure for these purposes.     
The PSE takes no account of the estimation of economic parameters such as 
unemployment and social and regional problems. But an estimation of the PSE leads to an 
interpretation of the effects of support measures on export, import capacity, production 
                                                 
13 Silvis H. J. and Hamsvoort: The AMS in agricultural trade negotiations, 1996, p. 538 
14 Silvis H. J. and Hamsvoort: The AMS in agricultural trade negotiations, 1996, p. 532 
15 Young, Burfisher, Nelson and Mitchell: Domestic Support and the WTO, 2000, p.3   
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amount or similar economic parameters. An estimation of the impact of support measures on 
such economic parameters contributes to determining the best possible CAP measure to 
reduce destabilizing effects on selected product trade and to reform the CAP system for 
increasing the contribution to free but fair trade between the EU and Turkey as a non-member 
country.        
The data calculation of the PSE, according to the OECD, is defined below: 
 
PSE = Q (Pp –Pr.X) + D + I  
 
Where; 
Q = quantity produced             
 Pp = producer price (at farm gate) in domestic currency units. 
 Pr = world reference price in world currency unit  
 X = exchange conversion factor 
D = Government payments to producers (in United Nations data it is expressed with 
PP) 
I = Indirect transfers through policies such as input subsidies marketing assistance or  
Exchange rate distortion  
The unit PSE is the total PSE per ton or unit of production. 
Unit PSE= PSE/ Q 
Percentage PSE= [PSE/ Q.Pp +PP] .100 
 
The percentage PSE gives an indication of the proportion of total farm revenues 
originating from support, whether that support comes through domestic prices higher than 
those on world markets or more directly from government budgets. Such direct transfers 
include subsidies paid directly on outputs, subsidies on the use of inputs, and more general 
subsidies that lower the costs of production. 
 PP= PSE- Market price support  
Q.Pp= value of production at producers prices   
 
3.1.3.1  The Process of Estimation of the Price Support in the CAP  
 
Application of the CAP’s PSS is intended to raise EU product prices over world 
prices. The impact of the PSS increases the market share and income of internal producers, 
both being created artificially in the market and thus causing a trade distortion in the 
international market. The effect of the PSS is especially observed on cereal products, sugar, 
butter, milk powder, cheese, olive oil, sunflower seed, pig meat, cattle, veal, and tobacco.  
In the CAP market price support is fixed every year by the Commission with 
intervention prices for certain agricultural products, such as, cereals, beef etc. However, 
application of intervention prices is dependent on the representatives of Community agencies 
in each member country. For example, in Austria, Agrar Markt Austria (AMA) communicates 
with producers and determines the price support amount which is fixed by the Commission. 
By doing so the amount of intervention price, which is applied for certain products, differs 
from one member country to another. 
Every October the Commission determines the prices of cereal products for the next 
year of production. The local agencies in member countries inform producers about given 
market support for these products. The announcement of product prices has an indirect effect 
on market stability. If the prices are high producers tend to increase their production, if it is 
lower then they reduce their production. This intervention price mechanism, which is set 
above the world price, but 9% percent below the target price, prevents market instability (see 
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cobweb) and farmers’ losses on the market by supporting them with an intervention price 
guarantee, because this is the minimum price at which these products can be sold on the 
market.  
In the CAP system, besides producer and community agencies, processors also play an 
important role in market prices. “At least one-quarter of the CAP budget is paid to processors, 
exporters and other organisations rather than to the producer.”16 These are the trade partners 
of agricultural producers. The processors also affect the higher product prices in the Union 
because they purchase the producers’ yield cheaper and sell it in the market at a higher price. 
The considerable price difference between producer price and consumer price occurs as a 
result of this commission, which is collected by processors as a dealer profit. This marker 
price, which is increased by processors, is the price at which producers would prefer to sell 
their products on the market. In the table below this price differences are shown throughout 
recent years; it can be seen that the price gap between producers’ and consumers’ price tends 
to diminish.  
 
Table 3.1: The difference between consumer price and producer price  
 
Producer price (1995=100) Market price (as a percentage of 
intervention price) 
Product 
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 
Cereals 80.4 79.5 81.5 129.8 120.17 110.3 
Source: European Commission DG for Agriculture: Agriculture in the European Union Statistical and Economic 
Information, Brussels, 2002 (table 3.3.2) and before given intervention prices were used to estimate market 
price.  
 
The function of the price support system of the CAP reduced the impetus for 
producers to research into other production methods and to increase their productivity and profit 
on the market. In the last decade, in the cereal sector, direct payments only contributed to an 
increase in farmers’ income, not because of their profit, but because of direct payments.  
The graph below shows the impact of price support on the CAP. In the below graph, it 
is assumed that there is less production in the EU. Partial equilibrium, not the general 
equilibrium position is considered here. There is no income or technical changes and no 
externalities which may affect and change the price. 
The impact of the price support contributes to a price increase in the market. The 
reason for this is explained in Figure 3.2. It is assumed that the world price is P0, which is 
lower than market price. At the Po price production in the EU is intended to be a Q0 amount 
which is lower than the consumer demand and needs to be covered by the import products, 
which are estimated as Q0Q2 amount of products to reach the equilibrium position as 
illustrated in the figure above. However, in the CAP product price should be higher than the 
world price, which is shown by P1, but at that price in the Union the cost of production is not 
covered and needs to be supported by intervention price mechanism of the CAP.  This price 
increase is necessary, not only to protect producer loss but also to prevent the imported 
product access which is set by the difference between world price and EU price. However, in 
the CAP application of the price support measures the product price increases to P2; this 
reduces the imported product amount whilst internal production is increased. Hence, the 
amount of goods produced is increased from S0 to S2 and goods consumed are reduced from 
D0 to D2. This is the equilibrium position where consumer demand and producer supply reach 
the optimum level. The intervention price level is P2, which prevents a price fall and secures a 
                                                 
16Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP): The CAP: How the CAP operates, the key commodities, 
competitors and markets for the European Union, 2002, p.18, http://www.ukfg.org.uk/docs/CAPBB1.pdf 
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reasonable price for producers in the market. This is the lowest price level allowed within the 
CAP system. On the one hand, this means that the intervention price prevents a price fall and 
guarantees producer gain at a reasonable price level, while the production amount increases 
from S0 to S2. On the other hand, consumer surplus is reduced whilst product price increases 
from P1 to P2.   
 
Figure 3.2: Impact of the price support in the EU market.  
   
 
The net result of producer gain is shown as areas ‘abc’ and consumer loss in the areas 
‘abcde’. This is the minimum welfare loss for the consumer. The prices can be increased over 
the intervention price up to market price level. But such price increases will then increase the 
welfare-loss of consumers whilst producer gain is increased deliberately on the cost of 
consumer welfare.    
Below in Figure 3.3 the effects of the price support on production value are shown. 
In the figure it is supposed that in the union there is an over production, and Pr is the world 
price and Pp is the EU price which is secured by the price support mechanism. As shown in 
the figure prices increased from Pr to Pp, whilst production amounts(S) stayed constant in 
1990. Increasing product prices reduced consumer demand from QD1 to QD2 in the EU 
market. Decline in consumer demand compelled EU producers to increase the exported 
product amount from  
 
QS-1990 - QD1 to QS-1990 - QD2 (indicated in the figure with yellow lines).  
 
A consequence of price support is that production value artificially increases from A to 
A+B.  
This is the simple expression of producer value after the support measure.  
Production value before price support = Pr. QS-1990 = A 
Production value after price support    = Pp. QS-1990 = A+ B 
This contributes to the calculation,  
MPS = (Pp-Pr) Q and  
 
Then, 
PSE = MPS +    Money or other things / Direct payments/ Export Subsidy/  
                          Taxes/ General Services   
 
 
D 
 
 
 
 
P2 
 
P1 
P0 
 
a b c d e
S
      S0    S1    S2Q2    Q1  Q0                        Q
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Figure 3.3: Impact of the price support on production value in EU  
 
In this study the impact of the support measures is only considered for PSE and not for 
CSE (consumer support estimate); as previously stated, in cereal products there is no transfer 
from consumers to producers. The sample cereal products, which are selected for use in the 
calculation of the PSE, usually show over production in the CAP system. This surplus amount 
requires to be subsidized for exporting to third world countries. Such support measures are 
financed by the CAP budget to cover producers’ losses. To determine this transfer, the PSE 
method is used for the estimation of the amount of support to producers. 
Selection of suitable statistical data for the calculation of the PSE: 
The statistical data which is used for the calculation of the PSE is obtained from the 
Eurostat New Cronos-Agris data base, which is the official publishing organ of the EU and 
comprise statistics on European and national short/ long term indicators. There are also other 
publishing organs such as OECD and WTO, which comprise statistical data on the EU’s CAP, 
but each of these sets of statistics has different numbers on different indicators, therefore it 
will be more accurate to use the statistics of the Eurostat.   
Selection of the sample product for the calculation of the PSE: 
The selection of a sample product is also important in obtaining more accurate results 
from the PSE method for the estimation of the impact of the PSS on the CAP. “Which product 
should be included? Should the AMS be calculated for all products that distort trade most? 
The parties more or less agreed to start with surplus products because they are the most trade 
distorting.”17 Therefore, selection of sample products for the PSE calculation is determined 
after a strict elimination. In this study cereal products have been selected as a sample product 
for the PSE calculation. The reasons are given below:   
First, it is important to choose a product which has sufficient statistical data. 
Second, the selected product must contribute to a better result than others, because, if 
the product selected has no effect on the PSE amount, then there is no need to select it. 
Therefore, cereal products which receive more than 45 percent of market support within the 
CAP system have been selected.  
The third factor is the worldwide production option. Regional/ ethnical foods such as 
avocado cannot be selected for the estimation. The product selected must be produced in 
                                                 
17 Silvis H. J. and Hamsvoort: The AMS in agricultural trade negotiations,1996, p.533  
                  B 
Increase on production valu after PSS 
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almost all countries considered in the study. Cereal products are largely produced both in and 
outside the Union and this is important for comparing the impact of support measures on 
international trade.  
Therefore cereals products, which have more reliable and accessible statistics data and 
receive support measures mostly in the EU’s CAP, have been selected.    
 
3.1.3.2 The Transfers Associated with Market Price Support in the PSE 
 
The source of support to agriculture is calculated by the Market Price Support, and 
consumers give support to agriculture in the form of higher prices. Taxpayers have also to 
contribute when product surpluses, generated by the high prices, have to be disposed of 
through export subsidies. For example, the higher consumer prices are maintained by 
domestic supply.  
Restrictions such as supply quotas and foreign trade barriers, import quotas, import tariffs and 
export subsidies also contribute to the maintenance of price support in the EU.  
PSEs can be expressed in three ways “(1) as the total value of transfers for the 
commodity produced; (2) as the total value of transfers per unit of the commodity produced; 
and (3) as the total value of transfers as a percentage of the total value of production including 
transfers.”18 The PSE expressions as measured by the OECD are required first to calculate 
market price support (MPS) and then the total PSE amount, which comprises the market price 
support as a major component of PSE. The MPS is calculated using the formula below: 
MPS=  (Pp- Pr).Q 
  
This price gap (Pp-Pr), if it is positive, is the support per unit of product for 
agricultural products. But if it is negative, then it is a tax on agriculture and thus benefits 
consumers. In order to measure the price gap, it is important to use world and domestic 
reference prices for products so that the price gap only reflects a difference in price and not 
differences in quality, variety or degree of processing.  
The difficulties in assessing market price gaps also indicate differences between net 
exporting and net importing countries. “For net exporting countries, the prices are derived on 
the basis of a ‘free on board’ (f.o.b.), and for net importing countries on the basis of a ‘cost, 
insurance, freight’ (c.i.f.) concept. Thus reference prices vary by country.”19 Therefore, the 
PSE calculation is required to consider a different reference price for the EU which has over 
production, because producers are the net exporter of cereal products.  
The major problems in the use of reference prices are summarized below: 
“First, the developing countries are even more likely than the OECD countries to 
utilize border policies or commodity price support programs backed up by market 
interventions and government stockholding. There are policies whose effects are measured in 
a MPS. Second, with less well developed infrastructure, various costs associated with 
adjusting the reference price are likely to have larger magnitudes in developed countries, so 
taking them into account (or not) will have a larger effect on the estimated MPS and its 
interpretation.”20  
The estimation of the world reference price is also affected by the exchange 
conversion factor, which creates difficulties, especially in developing countries, in obtaining 
more accurate results from the PSE calculation. The use of the exchange conversion factor in 
the PSE calculation is not clearly defined; under discussion is the question whether the 
                                                 
18 Strokov and Meyers: PSE to Russian Agricultural Producers, WP 96-WP 168,  November 1996, p.3  
19 Silvis H. J. and Hamsvoort: The AMS in agricultural trade negotiations, 1996, p. 538  
20 Mullen, Sun, Orden and Gulati: Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) for Agriculture in Developing Countries: 
Measurement Issues and Illustration from India and China, 2004, p.16      
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adjusted (shadow) exchange rate or the decomposition method should be used for obtaining 
better results from the PSE calculation. “For example Liefert et al. (1996) show that the 1994 
PSE estimates for Russia change from negative to positive if a purchasing power parity 
(PPP)21 exchange rate is used instead of a nominal one. Doyon et al. (2001) contend that in 
the context of comparing of support levels across countries, PPP adjustments would provide a 
better conversion factor than nominal exchange rates.”22  
Another problem with the PSE calculation is the estimation of the farm gate price 
which is used in the MPS calculation. The EU producer price, which is used for the 
calculation of the MPS, is determined by the Commission for each commodity once a year. 
However, application of the producer price is affected and changed by the community 
agencies, which differ from region to region. Hence, differences in product prices are not 
reflected in the MPS calculation. In the results of this application, an estimation of the PSE 
may not indicate the real numbers of support measures.   
However, since the monetary Union in 2002, the above-mentioned problems have 
lessened in the EU, but have remained the same outside the Union. Hence, the calculation of 
the PSEs is still affected by the reference price and by the exchange conversion factor which 
affects and changes the results of the PSEs. In short, an incorrect estimation of the PSE 
creates difficulties in determining the effects of the support measures in agriculture.      
The PSE for EU-15 is estimated as shown below, and is adapted from OECD data for 
cereal products: 
PSE = (Pp-Pr.X). Q + (I-C) + (I-B) + (I-E) + (I-F) + (I-H)    
 
Where; 
Q = quantity produced (in OECD data indicated with S2)            
 Pp = producer price in domestic currency units. 
 Pr = world price in world currency unit 
 X = exchange conversion factor (to convert world reference price from dollar etc. to 
euro) 
The indicators that are used for the PSE calculation of the support amount to producers 
are explained below:  
The estimation of the MPS and PSE for the cereal products is required to consider the 
indicators given below: 
Indicator ‘A= (Pp-Pr.X). Q’ is the market price support. It is the major component of 
the PSE estimation and comprises:  
I-Aa = (Pp-Pr.X). Q, Based on unlimited output. It was started in 1988 and applied 
until the MacSharry reform (1992) and is used for output amount. 
I-Ab = (Pp-Pr.X). Q, Based on limited output. It was started with MacSharry reform 
and is used for crop products (calculation of output amount). 
Indicator ‘I-B’ = Based on output payments. Of which ‘Ba’ is based on unlimited 
output and indicator ‘Bb’ is based on limited output.  
Indicator ‘C’ which is the payments based on area planted (or animal number which is 
not relevant for cereal products) comprises:   
I-Ca = ‘payments based on unlimited area’ (especially interventions and 
environmental amounts are considered). It was introduced in the 1988 reform.   
I-Cb = ‘payments based on limited area’ (consist of set-aside and per hectare aid for 
cereals). It began in 1993 after the MacSharry reform.   
                                                 
21 (PPP is a theory states that exchange rates between currencies are in equilibrium when their purchasing power 
is the same in each of the two countries.) 
22 Mullen, Sun, Orden and Gulati: Producer Support Estimates (PSEs) for Agriculture in Developing Countries, 
2004, p.33 
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Indicator I-D: payments based on historical entitlements. Of which indicator ‘Da’ 
comprises historical planting (or animal numbers or production) and ‘Db’ is based on 
historical support program.  
Indicator ‘I-E’ is based on payments for input use.  
Of which ‘Ea’ comprises a concessional loans fertilizer subsidy, hybrid seed subsidy, 
pesticide subsidy, seed loans and electricity subsidy (irrigation), water subsidy (irrigation),    
‘Eb’ is based on use of on farm services. 
And ‘Ec’ is based on farm investment on farm development work and concessional 
loans.    
Indicator ‘F’ is based on payments on input constrains and environment.  
‘Fa’ comprises payments based on constraints on variable inputs and ‘Fb’ is based on 
constraints on fixed inputs and ‘Fc’ is based on constraints on a set of inputs.  
There are also miscellaneous payments which make a small contribution to the PSE 
calculation. The miscellaneous payments are indicated by ‘H’. Of which indicator ‘Ha’ 
comprises national payments and ‘Hb’ sub-national payments.          
The method that is used to estimate the impact of non-tariff measures on the producer 
subsidy estimate is as follows: 
The estimation of the MPS and the PSE is calculated first for the EU-15. The amount 
of the MPS is fixed, because non- tariff measures are related to the PSE. The PSE comprises 
all the non-tariff measures, such as, direct payments, set-aside and intervention payments. 
Therefore, the only possible way to estimate the impact of these non- tariff measures is by 
subtracting each of the NTMs from the total PSE, or adding each to the fixed MPS, to 
estimate the effect on market support. In this study direct payments, set-aside and intervention 
payments are subtracted from the total PSE to show their impact on the producers support 
estimate. 
For the export subsidies it is required to calculate the amount of subsidies from the 
Agris database. These subsidies are then added to the MPS to obtain the effect of the export 
subsidies on the market support.  
 
3.1.3.2.1 The Transfers Associated with Market Price Support for Imported Products 
 
The Market price support (MPS) is the amount of price support which is given by a 
community agency (government) to support producers. The mentioned MPS for imported 
products are illustrated in the figure below. This is not actually relevant for cereal products 
because in cereal products there is only over production. 
 
Figure 3.4.1: MPS for imported Products 
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In Figure 3.4.1 above, it is supposed that there is less supply than demand in the CAP. 
In the figure, Pp represents the internal producer’s price and Pr represents the world reference 
price for the commodity, let us say wheat. The wheat production as shown in the figure results 
from the market support being higher than the world price Pr. This higher price reduces the 
demand for the product from D1 to D2, while the amount of production increases from S1 to 
S2. The MPS for imported products, according to the OECD methodology, is calculated in 
different forms by using the formulas given below: 
   
1- The transfer to producer associated with the MPS is measured in the area  
abcd = (Pp –Pr.X) .S2. This is considered under the MPS indicator I-A. This area also 
shows the transfers from consumers to producers.  
This formula is also used for indicator III-P: transfers to producers from consumers in 
the consumer support estimate (CSE), which is not relevant for cereal products, because there 
is no transfer from producers to consumers. 
 
2- The transfer from consumer to budget, through import receipts or as rents to importers 
or exporters due to tariff quotas is the area, dcfg = (Pp- Pr.X). (D2- S2) is represented in the 
OECD indicators with III-Q: other transfers from consumers or total support estimate which is 
indicator IV-V: budget revenues. This is also not relevant for cereal products because there is 
no transfer to consumers.  
 
3- The CSE is measured in the area, abfg = (Pp- Pr.X) D2, indicator III P: transfers to 
producers from consumers and III-Q: other transfers from consumers.  
 
4- Indicator III- R: transfer to consumers from tax payers abcd = Pp- Pr.S2 
The numbers 3 and 4 are also not relevant for cereal products.   
 
3.1.3.2.2 The Transfers Associated with Market Price Support for Exported Products  
 
The market price support estimation is now used for exported products. The estimation 
of the MPS for exported products is illustrated in Figure 3.4.2 below. This will be used in this 
study for selected sample products to estimate the PSE, because in the CAP there is over 
production in cereal products. Therefore, market price support for exported products is 
considered in this study.  
 
Figure 3.4.2:  MPS for exported products  
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The impact of the support measures is illustrated in Figure 3.4.2 above. The market 
price support (MPS) for exported products is formulated according to the OECD data as 
shown below: 
1- In the domestic market, income transfer to producers is realized by consumers and 
Government Purchasing Agencies (GPAs). Community Agencies purchase products in 
domestic markets. MPS is calculated with MPS= abcd = (Pp-Pr.X). S2 in OECD date, 
indicator I-A: market price support measure. 
 
2- The area abgf= (Pp-Pr.X) D2 is financed by the consumer. It is expressed in the OECD 
data with indicator, I-A: MPS in the PSE. 
The formula is also used for the CSE (consumer support estimate) estimation with 
indicator, III- P: transfers to producers from consumers.  
 
3- The area = (Pp-Pr.X) (S2-D2)= gfcd 
It is defined with indicator, I-A: MPS, transfer to producers from taxpayers. This is 
realised through food aid export subsidies and public storage. 
 
4- The area = (Pp-Pr.X) (D2)= abfg 
It is defined with the indicator III-R: MPS transfer to consumer from taxpayers, which 
are not relevant for cereals, because there is no transfer to consumers from producers in cereal 
products. Hence, only the first part of this section is used for the calculation of the MPS and 
the PSE amounts. 
 
3.1.3.3 Selection of Suitable Indicators for the Calculation of the PSE 
 
The PSE includes implicit and explicit payments, such as, price gap on output or input, 
budgetary payments etc. In order to receive a given payment farmers need to produce or plant 
a specific commodity, or use a specific input, which incurs costs.  
The estimation of the PSE is related to its major component MPS, which contributes 
to estimating the amount of price support. As mentioned above an estimation of the PSE is 
firstly considered only for exported products in cereal products. Secondly, there are transfers 
from consumers to producers in the CAP. Hence, a transfer from consumers and taxpayers to 
producers occurs, for example, when subsidies are used to finance export.  
It should be noted that within the CAP there are several supplementary payments 
which cover measures such as, premiums to stimulate production, payments to low-profitable 
farms, payments compensating expenses of some inputs, and investments which are usually 
not included in the PSE calculations. However, as the entire supplementary price payments 
were channeled indirectly to producers through the purchase prices paid by the community 
procurement agencies, it was not possible to treat them as distinct budgetary expenditures. 
Therefore, for the estimation of support measures in the EU’s CAP only the indicators 
given below are considered: 
 I-Aa, I-Ab, I-Ba, I-Ca, I-Cb, I-Db, I-Ea, I-Eb, I-Ec, I-Fa, I-Fb, I-Fc, I-H  for the EU 
producers and for producers in Turkey indicators I-Aa and I-Ea, I-Eb, I-Ec are considered for 
PSE calculation in the OECD database. These indicators are briefly defined below.   
Indicator ‘I-A’ is market price support and comprises:  
I-Aa: Based on unlimited output in MPS 
I-Ab: Based on limited output in MPS 
Indicator ‘I-B’ based on output payments.  
I-Ba: Based on unlimited output  
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Indicator ‘I-C’ Payments based on area planted (or animal number which is not 
relevant for cereal products). It is only considered for the cereals PSE calculation in the EU’s 
CAP. It comprises:   
I-Ca: ‘payments based on unlimited area’ and  
I-Cb: ‘payments based on limited area’  
Indicator I-D: payments based on historical entitlements. Of which ‘I-Db’ payments 
based on historical support program is only considered for the EU’s CAP producers.  
Indicator ‘I-E’ is based on payments for input use, comprise product extension, 
drainage, irrigation etc, which is relevant for the estimation of the PSE for cereal production 
especially in Turkey, because an important part of transfers to producers is realized by means 
of these input payments, But input payments are also used in the EU’s CAP.  However, the 
EU’s input payments, relative to Turkey’s input payments, make a minor contribution to 
cereals support and PSE calculations. The annual transfers from tax payers to agricultural 
producers arising from support measures is based on the use of a specific fixed or variable 
input.         
Of which ‘I-Ea’ comprises concessional loans fertilizer subsidies hybrid seed subsidy, 
pesticide subsidy, seed loans and electricity subsidy (irrigation), water subsidy (irrigation),    
‘I-Eb’ is based on use of on farm services. 
And ‘I-Ec’ is based on farm investment on farm development work and concessional 
loans.    
 Indicator ‘F’ is based on payments on input constrains and environments which are 
also very minor amounts in cereal products and only considered for PSE calculation for 
cereals in the CAP.   Of which ‘I-Fa’ comprises payments based on constraints on variable 
inputs and ‘I-Fb’ is based on constraints on fixed inputs and ‘I-Fc’ is based on constraints on a 
set of inputs.  
Indicator ‘H’ (miscellaneous payments) comprises ‘I-Ha’ national payments and ‘I-Hb’ 
sub-national payments. It is only relevant for the PSE calculation in the EU’s CAP.          
 
The market price support in the figure above, represented by the ‘abcd’ is the area, 
which is estimated for the MPS.  
The estimation of the MPS for cereal products is considered for the exported products, 
because for cereal products there is excessive production which is exported within the CAP 
system.  
MPS calculation for the area ‘abcd’: 
MPS = (Pp-Pr). Q  
 
For the PSE calculation from the OECD indicators Aa (since the MacSharry reform), 
Ca, Cb, Ba, Ea, Eb, Ec, Fa, Fb, Fc, Ha and Hb are used to estimate the PSE amount for cereal 
products.  
PSE = (Pp-Pr). Q+ Ca +Ba +Ea +Eb +Ec +Fa +Fb +Fc +Ha+Hb    
 
In the last decade, internal product prices of the CAP were above the world reference 
price, but they were supported by direct payments and export subsidies to increase the market 
share outside the EU. There are two types of direct payments which are given to producers in 
the arable sector. The direct payments, which are based on the area, can be divided into 
limited and unlimited payments.   
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3.2 Application of Tariffs and non-Tariff Trade Measures  
  
In this section the economic impact of tariff and non-tariff measures on the prices and 
quantities of goods produced and traded, and on the economic welfare of the EU is 
researched. 
 It is difficult to expect the removal of these measures in the near future, but at least a 
decrease in their negative impacts on the nation welfare is possible if suitable measures are 
used to protect domestic producers. In fact, only the roughest estimates can be made on the 
cost of protection by non-tariff barriers (NTBs). “Most comprehensive measures of NTBs are 
rather limited, simply measuring either the coverage of protection or the presumed effects on 
trade flows.”23   
The statistical data on the non-tariff measures are roughly estimated. Agricultural 
products are perishable and an estimation of sales is not possible relative to durable products. 
First these products relative to other products required a good storage, such as dairy products 
or crops requiring good preservation until marketing. In the summer only a few hours are 
needed for these products to perish from the heat. These negative effects of agricultural 
products reduce the estimation of consumption relative to production because the production 
amount is obtained from producers, but the consumption or sale amount is very difficult to 
estimate, even if statistical data is accurately compiled. Therefore, measuring the protection 
proved to be more difficult than expected.  
 In the Agricultural sector production techniques vary from one product to another and 
from farm to farm. The effects of the production operation process and product quality and 
quantity are not similar. Advance mechanisation and fertilization and irrigation, selective 
breeding and development of new seeds increase the productivity of agricultural input in some 
large-scale production more than small-scale and less effective production. Distribution of 
export and production subsidies is also affected by these production techniques, because 
large-scale producers receive more subsidy than small-scale producers. Thus “the largest and 
most efficient 25 percent of farms were estimated to receive about 75 percent of budgetary 
support in the mid 1980s, on average roughly 9700 ECUs per farm per annum, while the rest 
received an estimated average of only 1100 ECUs each year.”24 This means the most 
important part of the indirect subsidies goes to the large and efficient farms, which are only 25 
percent of the total amount of farms. 
   In the Agricultural sector rapid productivity growth greatly increases supply, causing a 
sharp increase in supply outpacing the modest increase in demand. But this causes a 
downward increase on farm prices. This is the result of the price elasticity of supply, because 
the quantity response to price is positive for the supply elasticity (for the demand this is 
negative).  
 In the CAP the Commission took the required measures to prevent the fall of the 
farmers’ incomes. Unfortunately, as explained, the Commission has raised some of the 
producer income excessively, while the rest of the farmers are only able to maintain their 
production in the market.  
 
3.2.1 Basis of the Foreign Trade: What Signifies Duties? 
 
  Taxes are imposed on goods or some services which are imported from abroad to enter 
into the domestic market. It can be in the form of either fixed tariffs or various import levies.  
In all countries, tariffs play an important role in creating finance for the budget. 
However, a tariff trade measure has a direct negative effect on free trade in the world market 
                                                 
23 Corden W. M: Protection and Liberalisation, 1987, p.3-4   
24 Linter and Mazey: The European Community, 1991, p.104 
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because it increases the product prices as much as the tariff amount is applied. Tariffs can 
either be specific or advalorem, of which various effects are analysed in the following section. 
The tariff measure contributes to the replacement of some lower cost production with higher 
cost products between countries. In fact, all support measures have negative effects on free 
and fair trade. But tariffs are directly applied on the product prices and this has an apparent 
effect on consumer welfare.  
The tariff trade measure has very often been subject to WTO disciplines and reduction 
commitments. The important role of the WTO (1995), which superseded the GATT (1948), 
contributes to promoting the rules of free trade between nations.  One of the most popular and 
controversial round of the trade negotiations namely the Uruguay round (1986-1994) had a 
considerable impact on tariff reduction between countries. Most of the developed countries 
and some other groups of countries preferred to substitute the tariff measures for non-tariff 
trade measures.      
In the EU’s CAP, the CCT is primarily applied to protect internal producers from 
cheaper products of third countries. However, tariff measures have also had a considerable 
positive effect on the Community budget relative to other non tariff measures.  
 
 The significant impact of tariffs can be classified as shown below: 
1. By raising the price on domestic sales to redistribute incomes from consumer to 
producers. This causes welfare losses for consumers while the producers and community 
agencies gains are increased. The amount redistributed is the price increase multiplied by the 
average quantity of domestic sales.   
“2. A tariff shifts some purchases from foreign goods to home goods and  
  3. A tariff makes consumers pay tax revenues directly to the government.”25  If 
politicians follow a social approach then it is expected that these tax revenues are returned to 
the consumers as social services, otherwise the tax revenues are used either for election 
campaigns or for private use, which is corrupt. 
4. Another important impact is that a “tariff discourages some purchases that were 
worth more than they cost the nation.”26 Both by shifting some purchases toward costly 
domestic goods, and by discouraging some purchases worth more than they cost, as is done 
for imported products, the welfare loss for both exporter and importer is considerable, because 
in an exporting country higher common custom tariffs reduce the products’ access to sales in 
the importing EU market, and in the EU, higher custom tariffs increase the imported product 
prices so that the consumer cannot buy these imported products.   
5. “If a country forms a preferential trade area (PTA) with another country with 
substantially lower tariffs than its own, its losses are larger the more it imports from the 
partner.”27 This implies that if one country has lower tariffs than its partner, which forms a 
customs union, the losses of the former country will increase proportionally to its imports 
from the partner country.     
6. A tariff sometimes lowers the internal price of imported products. According to the 
Metzler Paradox if the inflation rate is higher than the exchange rate, the real value of 
domestic currency will be appreciated and will increase the demand of imported products. In 
this case application of the tariff amount will have less negative effect on reducing the 
demand of imported products. This drives the world price down by even more than the size of 
its tariff as it may do if the foreign demand for the importing country’s export good is 
inelastic. The partial equilibrium analysis suggests that, “the degree of protection will be 
                                                 
25Lindert and Pugel: International Economics, 1996, p.130 
26Lindert and Pugel: International Economics, 1996, p.130 
27 The Australian journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Blackwell Publishing, Volume47, Issue: 47, 
September 2003   
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lower the lower the foreign elasticity of supply. If the latter were zero, so that a tariff would 
lead to a fall in the foreign price equal to the tariff, there would be no rise in the domestic 
price and hence the tariff would provide no protection.”28  
Higher tariffs may also affect the internal product price and shift it upwards. 
 
3.2.2 Tariff Measures (Considering the EU 15 and Turkey) 
 
The impact of the common custom tariff (CCT in 1968) within the EU has 
considerable impact on the finance of the CAP budget. The reason for this is very obvious, 
because support measures have two important functions in the CAP. Firstly, they protect 
internal producers from external producers and prevent their access to the EU market, and 
secondly, support measures play an important role in creating finance for the CAP budget. 
The tariff trade measure on cereal products are researched in this section. After the 
application of common custom tariffs on cereal products, imported product prices increase 
enormously.  
    
3.2.2.1 Application of the Common Custom Tariffs  
 
 Tariffs can be either specific or advalorem.  
A specific tariff is a fixed charge per unit of import such as dollars per ton of steel bars. 
P = P1+ t 
P= imported product price, P1= world price and t = tariff per unit. 
The advalorem fraction of the value of import, which means a percentage of estimated 
market value of a good, is taxed on reaching the importing country. 
P= (1+t) P1= P1+ t P1 
 
The application of tariff measures reduces the advantage of international trade, both 
for consumers and for producers who have been taxed on their commodity. Internal producers 
increase their cost when they use imported input to produce and when consumers buy 
expensive products. The effects of the CCT can be best explained by Viner’s Customs Union 
theory.  
According to this theory, free trade under a customs union affects world trade in two 
ways: “a welfare increasing trade creation effect and welfare reducing trade diversion effect. 
The overall consequence of a customs union on the welfare of its members, as well as on the 
world as a whole, depends on the relative strengths of these two opposing forces.”29 In the 
Union, trade creation occurs when internal tariffs are removed between member countries. 
This contributes to increased trade between member countries. By doing so, some efficient 
production of exportable commodities in third countries is replaced by insufficient production 
in the EU, which is prevented by tariff barriers in the countries outside the Union, this is trade 
distortion. 
 The impact of the customs Union is illustrated in the figure below.  The trade capacity 
will be distorted because of custom duties and is explained either as trade distortion or trade 
creation. Trade diversion happens where lower cost sources are transferred to higher cost 
sources, lets say from a third world country to a partner country with higher import tariffs. In 
this case (tariff effect) increased product prices will cause an increase in production, as is 
shown in Figure 3.5, from P to Pt and production increases from Q1 to Q2 and consumption 
reduces from Q4 to Q3. Triangle ‘abc’ is production loss and ‘def’ is consumer loss. The 
                                                 
28 Corden W. M.: The Theory of Protection, 1971, p.250 
29 Robert J. Carbaugh: International Economics (eight edition), 2002, p.271  
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amount of production loss occurs because of imported products which cause an additional 
cost for obtaining extra output. The rectangular ‘bcde’ is tariff revenues and Q2bdQ3 is 
foreign exchange revenues. 
Figure 3.5: Optimal tariff rates and tariff revenues 
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Source: Williamson and Milner: The World Economy, 1991, p.159 
 
If we now consider that a customs Union is realised between the home and partner 
country, it is then assumed that the custom tariff within the union is removed, while the 
amount of common custom tariff P Pt is maintained for the perfectly elastic supply of third 
countries. However, for the partner country, supply (after customs union when the tariff is 
eliminated within the Union, but not with third countries) is now perfectly elastic at Pp. The 
trade creation in the home country is the difference between consumer’s gain and domestic 
producer’s loss (ncel), and the trade distortion is measured by the loss in community agencies 
revenue (bced).       
The results of the customs union trade creation between home and partner country 
show that production loss is reduced from ‘abc’ to ‘amn’ and consumption loss is reduced 
from ‘def’ to ‘fkl’.  
The Community agency’s revenue is the difference between ‘bcde’ and ‘klnm’. For 
the internal products, consumer’s gain is PpPtel and producer’s loss is PpPtcn.  
For the imported products consumer’s loss is PPtef and producer’s gain is PPtca. The 
producer surplus increases within the Union in which, production is transferred from a lower 
cost to a higher cost source of production, let’s say from third countries to home country 
because of the common custom tariff. 
 The impact of the common custom tariff on the world market is given in the figure 
below. 
 It can be seen that the impact of higher internal prices causes an increase in the 
internal production amount, while product prices in the world market are reduced, because a 
production increase in the internal market causes similar reductions in world production. This 
means higher tariff measures in the EU reduce world supply. In the foreign market, results of 
excessive production and subsides of the CAP reduce product prices. This process reduces the 
world prices. 
In the figure below, the effects of the Customs union on the international market are 
illustrated. On the one hand, application of the common custom tariff increases the imported 
product price in the union, which is stimulated to increase the prices outside the union. On the 
other hand, export subsidies reduce exported product prices of the EU, below the world prices 
and increase the share in the foreign market. By doing so, the share in the world market of 
third countries reduces from Qw to QT.   
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Figure 3.6: Effects of the common custom tariff    
   
 The application of common tariffs is analysed below. 
Now it is important to research the impact of the tariff measure on the products and 
also of the tariff measures on the input. This leads to the distinction between nominal rate of 
protection (NRP) and effective rate of protection (ERP).  
Nominal rate of protection is measured as the amount of tariff and/ or NTB on its 
output, ignoring effects of other trade barriers on the industry's inputs. In contrast, the ERP is 
a measure where the percentage changes in domestic value are added after the tariff on inputs 
as well as on outputs are levied. In the import competing firms the effective rate of protection 
is greater then the nominal protection and the firms usually have less incentive to lower their 
costs. The ERP is used, in particular, to measure the social cost of agricultural output which 
was first developed by Balassa (1965) and Corden 1966.    
Let P1 be the world price of a good, suppose in a non EU member country say Turkey, 
levies are ad valorem tariff of t% on the commodity X. Then the price of that commodity X in 
Turkey will be  
P = P1 (1+t)  
The NRP is now defined as NRP= (P- P1)/ P1  
And NRP= (P1+ P1. t - P1)/ P1 
 
Thus NRP = t 
 
The use of the tariff rate is dependant on effective protection, a concept developed by 
Max Corden (Australian) and Harry Johnson (Canadian). The rate of effective protection is 
defined as “the percentage increase in value added per unit in an economic activity which is 
made possible by the tariff structure relative to the situation in the absence of tariffs but with 
the same exchange rate.”30 And it is more complicated than NRP to calculate. The ERP is 
used to measure the social cost of agricultural output. For example, if a coffee is protected 
from imported coffee with 20% tariffs in the domestic market, but internal producers use 
imported coffee beans, with 40% tariffs, as an input to produce coffee, the 20% tariffs on 
imported products would not be effective enough to protect internal producers. This is 
because domestic producers will then pay 20% more for the coffee bean as an input to 
produce it in the domestic market. The aim of such tariff measures may not contribute to 
                                                 
30 Max Gorden: Protection, Growth, and Trade, 1985, p.98  
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protecting internal producers. It may cause welfare loss for the nation. Thus it is important to 
research the effect of this protection.  
The effective rate of protection (ERP) relies on the concept of value added on to the 
commodity. The value added per unit of a commodity (in the absence of any tariffs either on 
the products or its input) is denoted as  
 
V’= P1 - Σ Pj Xj   
 
Where P1 is the world price of the commodity, Pj is the world price of inputs, in the 
absence of tariffs world prices and domestic process are equal, and Xj is the amount of input 
used for producing 1 unit of the commodity. 
Suppose now that an ad valorem tariff of t% is levied on the product and an ad 
valorem tariff of tj % is levied on input J. Then the gross value added per unit of the product 
becomes: 
“V= P1 (1+t) – Σ (1+tj) Pj.Xj 
 
The ERP is now defined as  
 
ERP= V-V’/ V   
ERP = (t P1– Σ tj .Pj.Xj) / V’ ”31 
  
  Now it is important to evaluate the impact of the tariff measures both on the input and 
on the final products to determine its tariff escalation.    
  Let us suppose in Turkey 1 ton of concrete requires 1.2 tons of iron and 0.5 tons of 
cement as input to build concrete blocks. The world price of concrete, iron, and cement are 
respectively (per ton) €1000, €300 and €100, then; 
 
V’= 1000 - [(1.2) (300) + (0.5) (100)] = 1000 – 410= 590  
 
  Now let us suppose there are three different cases to evaluate effects of the tariff 
measures on the final and intermediate products.  
 
Case 1: A nominal tariff of 20% on concrete imports, a tariff of 10% on iron and 5% on the 
cement. 
 ERP= V-V’/ V’    
  = (t P1– Σ tj .Pj.Xj)/ V’ 
= (1000) (20/100) – (10/100) (1.2) ((300) – (5/100) (0.5) (100) / 590 
 
  = 161.5 / 590  
 ERP = 27.4 % 
 
When the tariff is taken from the final product then the tariff would be 20 % from the 
given (NRP= t) formula. But as is seen here the ERT value is already above (27.4 percentage) 
the given tariff rate which is applied on the final product.  
  Thus if inputs (here iron and cement) are subject to a lower tariff than final product 
(here concrete) than,  
  ERP> NRP  
                                                 
31James Anderson: Effective Protection Redux, WP: 5854, 1996 
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Case 2: Suppose now that there is a uniform tariff of 20 % on concrete, iron and cement. 
Then 
ERP = t P1– Σ tj .Pj.Xj / V’     
          = 20/100 [1000 – (1.2) (300)-(0.5) (100)] / 590 
 = 20/100(590) / 590 
= 20%       
  In this case if the inputs are subject to the same tariff as the final product then  
  ERP= NRP, since we know that NRP = t  
 
Case 3: Suppose now that there is a tariff of 20% on concrete and 25 percent on both iron and 
cement. 
ERP = t P1– Σ tj .Pj.Xj / V’     
  = 20/100 1000-25/100 [(1.2) (300)-(0.5) (100)] / 590 
  = 97.5 / 590 
  = 16.5% 
   Thus when inputs are subject to higher tariffs than final products  
  ERP<NRP 
 
  In conclusion, tariff escalation may be present when tariffs on inputs of a commodity 
are lower than tariffs on the final products. As in the first case, if the tariff rate of input is 
lower than that of the final product then this will be a more effective protection for the 
country. If the tariff rate of input is higher than the tariff rate on final product this will cause 
an increase in the profit rate of the producer, or in other words, reduce tariff expenditure. 
  Tariff escalation is a common feature of the developed countries’ tariff structure. In 
LDCs export of raw materials is supported by the Government. This creates an advantage for 
developed countries to import those raw materials from LDCs, because in the Union, tariff 
rates on input products are much lower than tariff rates on final products (see table below 
3.2.1).  
  In the Union, since the 1993 Maastricht agreement, there has been no internal tariff 
between member countries. The application of tariff barriers to the countries outside the 
Union is also not published either in Eurostats (Agris) or WTO statistics; therefore, it is not 
possible to estimate the impact of the PSE calculation either for applicant countries or other 
important trade partner of the EU such as US. 
     
Table 3.2.1: Selected tariff rates on some of inputs and final products in the Union 
Description Conventional rate of duty% 
Mineral ores or products Free 
Aluminium ores Free 
Nickel  Free 
Iron Free 
Silver Free 
Fluorspar Free 
Cement Free 
Primary Metals   
Stainless steel 0.5 
Granules 0.5 
Plated with aluminium  0.5 
 
 112
Table 3.2.2: Selected tariff rates on some of inputs and final products in the Union 
Agricultural products  
Cereals:  
Wheat and meslin: Durum Wheat 148 € /t 
Other 12.8 € /t 
Rye, barley for seed and others  93 € /t 
Oats:  89 € /t 
Maize: 94 € /t 
Seed, hybrid, double hybrid three 
cross hybrids 
Free 
 
Rice:  211 € /t 
For sowing 7.7 € /t 
Parboiled, Round grain, medium, 
long 
211 € /t  
Source for table 3.2: EU Commission: Official journal of the EC Commission regulation (EC) No: 1832/ 2002, 
amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC), No: 2658/ 87     
 
According to the table, given above tariff amounts are calculated for the sample 
products, which are taken into consideration in this study. The higher internal product prices 
calculated by using the advalorem tariff formula are shown below. 
 
   P= (1+t) P1= P1+ t P1 
 
As shown in the table below the result of the MacSharry and Uruguay Round Reforms 
is very obvious; imported product prices to the Union were increased over the community 
level to protect internal producers. By doing so, producers and community agencies increased 
their tariff revenues, while consumer surplus in the Union reduced results of the common 
custom tariff.  
 In the table the price difference between world producers, let us say Turkey as a non-
member country, and the EU is calculated. The enormous price differences between world 
and EU product prices are a consequence of the CCT of the CAP.     
  
Table 3.3:  The impact of the tariff measure on the imported agricultural products is 
compared with world prices (Euro/ t)     
Wheat Maize               Other grains Rice Year 
World 
price 
EU 
import 
price  
World 
price 
EU 
Import 
price 
World 
price  
EU 
Import 
price 
World 
Price 
EU import 
price 
1994 103.4 256.68 99.6 193.6 68.5 77.27 154.5 480.46 
1995 125.3 310.7 105.5 204,67 92.2 104.0 191.1 594.32 
1996 152.5 378.20 139.4 270.4 122.7 138.4 275.8 857.74 
1997 134.5 333.56 113.3 219.8 106.3 119.90 242.7 754.79 
1998 99.4 246.5 98 190 67. 152.76 248.8 773.77 
1999 89.8 222.70 97.1 188.28 75.7 85.39 284.8 885.73 
2000 109.3 271.06 112.1 217,47 104.3 117.42 302.4 940.47 
2001 121.9 302.31 120.2 233.18 110.1 124.19 189.2 587.99 
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003 
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In the figure below, the above common custom tariff is calculated compared with the 
world prices in percentage. The application of the common custom tariff has caused a 
considerable increase in cereal products price in the EU. In the figure, the share of wheat and 
maize prices after the tariff application increases approximately more than twofold in the EU 
market, while the rice price increases compared to the world price are threefold.         
 
Figure 3. 7: The share of world cereal prices and EU import prices  
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3.2.2.2 Tariff - Versus Variable Import Levy 
 
The impact of the tariff measure is explained, but to better understand the welfare of 
the nation it is important to explain the effect of a variable import levy. In Figure 3.8 the trade 
between EU producers and third world countries is shown. The tariff measure makes third 
world country exporters inefficient in the EU market. The tariff measure increases the product 
prices from P1 to P2. This price increase, as explained previously, reduces the consumer 
demand and welfare while increasing the producer surplus and supply on the market. 
Now suppose that in the Union variable import levies are applied rather than a fixed 
tariff. In the first case consider the negative effect of variable import levies. Suppose that the 
world price declines from P1 to P1’. Under the variable levy system the frontier charge, 
imposed as it was before the difference between (P1’- P2) when applied as a CCT will not 
effect a change in internal prices for non member producers. In the second case now let us 
suppose a positive effect of variable import levies. Here if the world price is raised then the 
internal price would exceed P2 if a similar tariff were applied but would remain unaltered if a 
variable levy were applied.      
   
Figure 3.8: Impact of tariff and variable levy 
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Source: adapted from Rosemary Fennell: The CAP, 1997, p.196 
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3.2.2.3 The Requirement to Reduce the Custom Duties   
 
 Tariff barriers between industrial countries have been reduced through more than eight 
rounds of multilateral negotiations of the GATT (WTO). The regulations have been taken in 
the form of tariffs and some other non-tariff measures, such as, export subsidies, import 
quotas, quality standards, VER, domestic content requirements (importing countries must also 
buy some domestic products), environmental measures etc.    
 Many developing countries feel that the EU and US have abused the WTO-sanctioned 
right to put up tariffs against imports of products that are being dumped, especially with 
agricultural products. This has had a negative effect on the agricultural products of third 
countries and hindered access into the Union market.  
 It is clear that any interventions on imports directly affect the price of imported 
products, and as a consequence, import volumes. However, the form of intervention varies 
from one country to another and the amount of intervention is dependant on products. In 
many developed countries custom duties, in addition to export subsidies and quotas, are 
applied to protect their producers from external producers. Such interventions may cause an 
overproduction, with higher internal prices which indirectly affect the volume of trade flow.  
 The new protectionism comprises non-tariff measures such as set-aside and direct 
payments, support for storage costs, export subsidies and price support, which have been 
classified by two key features; “first, the measures used have tended to be less overt and more 
subject to administrative discretion than the instruments of old protectionism and second, the 
measures have tended to be applied in a manner which discriminates between products and 
countries.”32  Whether this measure was used to increase the welfare of nations or only tried 
to discriminate against nations and some undesired producers in the market is questionable, 
because trade distortions were created through an increase in CAP measures during the last 
decade. The potential adjustment problems which arise from the implementation of the CAP 
supports directly affect fair trade negatively by causing resource transfers from lower cost of 
production in third countries to higher cost of production of the EU producers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
32Williamson and Milner: The World Economy, 1991, p.138   
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3.2.3 The Non-Tariff Trade Measures (Considering the EU-15 and Turkey) 
 
In the CAP protection is also obtained through the use of non-tariff measures. In recent 
years non-tariff measures within the new protectionism have become more important than 
tariffs as an obstruction to the flow of international trade. Indeed “agriculture is the most 
heavily protected sector of international trade with the EU, the USA, Japan and many other 
states pursuing interventionist policies designed to stabilise domestic prices and guarantee 
security of supply.”33   
In the CAP system, the aims and means of organizing the markets changed between the 
1992 and 1999 reforms, which were aimed at redesigning the support mechanism through the 
non-tariff trade measures from market price support to direct subsidies. In the CAP cereal 
products guaranteed prices and direct payments are applied as complementary support for 
production. The amount of support measures which are given to “arable crop production 
represents 21% of agricultural income and covers 40% of utilised agricultural area (UAA) in 
the European Union. Nearly 42% of total expenditure by the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) goes on this type of crop, and the sector is of considerable 
importance in terms of human consumption and the feeding stuffs industry.”34 In the table 
below a breakdown is given of expenditures by sector, according to the economic nature of the 
support measures. The important share of the EAGGF guarantee section expenditures is still 
distributed between market support, price intervention measure and direct payments. However, 
“in the EU, this indirect support to farms still accounts for the main part (60%) of the Producer 
Support Estimate (PSE) by the OECD.”35 However, in the MacSharry reform the replacement 
of market support with direct payments was planned but unfortunately has still not been 
achieved.  
 
Table 3.4.1: EAGGF Expenditure by support measures in CAP of the EU in 2002  
EAGGF support measures Percentage   
Export refunds 4 
interventions  45 
withdrawl from market  2 
Storage 1 
direct payments 37 
Other interventions 4 
Other support 7 
Source: Eurostat: The 2003 Agricultural Year, 3. Economic data, from Table:  Breakdown of expenditures by 
sector, according to the economic nature of the measures (EAGGF Guarantee) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/2003/table_en/en34.htm 
 
In the table below distribution of the agricultural expenditure by support measures in 
Turkey is given. The amount of market support measures within the agricultural expenditures 
is considerable.  Although, since the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP 2001- 
2005) was introduced in 1999, direct income support (DIS) has begun to be applied in Turkey 
to reduce the disparities between regions and to replace the market support with DIS measures. 
                                                 
33 David Pinder: The New Europe, 1998, p.58 
34 Activities of the EU Summaries of legislation Common Organisation of the Agricultural Markets, Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1251/1999 of 17 May 1999, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l60028.htm 
35 Haering, Dabbert, Aurbacher, Bichler, Eichert , Gambelli, Lampkin, Offerman, Santiago, Tuson , Zanoli: 
Impact of the CAP measures on Environmental Friendly Farming Systems, 2004, p.37, http://www.scirus.com/ 
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However, market support still covers an important share, as in the EU’s CAP.  This shows that 
the realisation of some measures is not easily put into effect by the force of law.         
 
Table 3.4.2: Distribution of agricultural expenditures by support measures in Turkey in 2004. 
EAGGF support measures Percentage   
Direct income support  
(Via input payments) 
45 
Market support 13 
Animal support 12 
Rural development support 10 
Compensatory payments 5 
Product security payments 5 
Catak program payments 5 
Other supports 5 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs: Agricultural Strategy in Turkey 2006-2010 
 
The table below shows the share of crop products in the total expenditure of the CAP 
which covers approximately 40 per cent of the CAP budget. 
 Worldwide production of cereals together with a higher share of expenditure on cereal 
products from the CAP budget and a considerable surplus amount in the CAP was the reason 
for selection of cereal products as sample products for use in the PSE calculation; this will 
increase the accurate assessment of CAP support measures showing their effects on market 
price support in the CAP and in Turkey as a non-member country. 
 
Table 3.5: EAGGF expenditure by products in 2002  
Products        2002 (2) 
 Mio EUR   % 
Arable crops 17,916.0 40.51 
Sugar 1,401.0 3.17 
Olive oil 2,366.0 5.35 
Fruit and Vegetables 1,650.0 3.73 
Wine 1,392.0 3.15 
Tobacco 983.0 2.22 
Milk products 1,912.0 4.32 
Beef /veal 8,095.0 18.30 
Sheep meat and goat meat 1,832.0 4.47 
Pig meat eggs and poultry 475.0 1.16 
Source: European Commission Directorate General for Agriculture: Agriculture in the European Union Statistical 
and Economic information 2002, 2003, (selected data form table 3.4.3.1) (FAO Data)  
 
  3.2.3.1 The Market Price Support, the CAP and Turkey  
   
 In the 1950s food was scarce and expensive in the European countries; choice and 
quality was very poor. The people employed in agriculture made up a high percentage of the 
working population and support for farmers was dependent on the European countries’ 
governments mostly led by the Christian Democrats. The number of small-scale farmers was 
very high. In the initial year of the EU there was no intervention in the market price or in the 
incomes of the farmers.  
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 From 1968, after the founding of the CAP, it was necessary to build a common market 
organization, because the lack of common market food prices in different member countries 
would prevent the integration of member countries into the EU. In fact, the removal of trade 
barriers was not sufficient; protection for farmers from external producers and from price 
fluctuation required a common market regulation in the EU’s CAP. For this reason market 
price support (MPS) policies have been used, including common custom tariff, intervention 
price mechanism, and export subsidies, to support but also to protect internal producers from 
external producers by raising internal producer and consumer prices above world price levels; 
this  contributed to increasing production incentives whilst decreasing consumption.       
 Over time the application of the CAP support measures had considerable negative 
effects on fair trade though several reform proposals that have been applied to date. The 
financial burden on the CAP budget steadily increased. In the 1970s “production rose rapidly, 
increasingly outstripping EC consumption of cereals, meat, butter and other commodities. 
Surplus stocks and exports financed by the CAP grew rapidly, increasing in real terms 
from11.3 billion ECU (at 1998 prices) in 1972, to 29.6 billion ECU in 1984.”36                
        Especially in the last decade the CAP reforms applied have contributed considerably to 
reducing the negative effects of the CAP measures on fair trade. However, the replacement of 
price supports with direct payments indirectly contributed to increase the transfers from 
consumer to producer. Consequently welfare of consumers was reduced and trade distortion on 
third world country producers increased.  
It is obvious that “without major reforms to the CAP, the old ills could return in more 
virulent guise. That is because, with a few changes in the 1992 reforms carried out by Ray 
MacSharry, an earlier EU farm commissioner, the basic shape of the CAP is the same as it was 
in the 1960s.”37 Therefore, a new reform proposal is required to reshape the existing support 
measures for increasing the fair trade and welfare on the world. 
In 1994 all the 134 members of the GATT (WTO) together with the CAP of the EU 
adopted the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) aimed at protecting producers 
with different support measures, including domestic support, reducing tariffs trade measure and 
cutting export subsidies. Such support measures are planned not only to protect internal 
producers but also to maintain price stability and to transfer collected payments from 
consumers and taxpayers in order to finance the support measures of the CAP. Since the 
URAA, the market price support measures have been classified into three main categories: 
“subsidies in general are identified by “boxes” which are given the colours of traffic lights: 
green (permitted), amber (slow down, i.e. be reduced), red (forbidden).”38 In World Trade 
Organization (WTO) terminology it is stated that in agricultural agreements there is no red 
measure. There is a blue box for subsidies that limit production. The effects of these subsidies 
are given below. 
“Green Box: These are called the ‘minimally trade- distorting support measures’. They 
should not include price support or be linked to the quantity of production. They can include 
payments for research or food security stocks, direct payments to farmers decoupled from price 
or quantity, safety net payments and environmental or structural adjustment payments. 
Blue Box: Blue Box payments include payments that do not increase the production of 
crops below the cost of production, i.e. payments for leaving field’s fallow or reducing animal 
numbers subject to keeping production below a specified quota. 
Amber Box: These are the most trade-distorting kinds of support such as those that 
increase the level of production, i.e. those that guarantee a minimum price and so encourage 
                                                 
36 Malcolm Chalmers: Paying for EU enlargement; can a new burden sharing bargain be sustained?, University of 
Bradford, London, 2000, p.9  http://www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2000/chalmers%20Malcolm.pdf 
37 The Economist: Wanted: a farming revolution, Article, Brussels, 1997  
38 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.doc , from WTO terminology 
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the production of a surplus at below the cost of production.”39 The Amber box covers only the 
aggregate measurement of support (AMS), which excludes explicit trade policies (import 
restrictions and export subsidies). The Blue box policies were those that evolved into the direct 
payments under production limiting programs. The Green box policies were directly related to 
the decoupled payments to producers but which are not related to the volume of production or 
to the price that is applied for the relevant year.       
The above classifications may help to explain the concepts of support measures which 
are also applied within the CAP system and in Turkey but with some differences. Indeed, 
support measures vary from country to country. In some countries support measures are 
concentrated in the amber box type of support which is the most trade-distorting measure, and 
in some other countries in the EU, MPS are concentrated on blue and green box policies which 
are less trade-distorting trade measures.  
In Turkey agricultural support policy has been classified into four groups, in accordance 
with the WTO boxes. These are: the market price support; payments to producers for storage of 
over-productions and for damages caused by the natural disasters; indirect payments for 
reducing the costs of producers and long term support for reducing the costs in agriculture.  
In agriculture, support measures have been mostly based on the input subsidies and 
output price supports which were applied until 2000, and after 2001 these measures were 
steadily reduced by direct income support, which began with the agricultural reform 
implementation project (ARIP) in the 2000 programme, mainly introduced to reduce input 
subsidies which were steadily replaced by the support system for agricultural producers and 
farms. But incentives also are given to increase productivity, responsive to real comparative 
advantages. The ARIP programme aimed at adopting Turkish agriculture into the CAP system. 
“By the end of 2002 the implementation of the main themes of the program had significantly 
reduced artificial incentives for inputs and particular crops, and had switched the main focus of 
agricultural policy to the DIS program. Annual fiscal transfers were reduced from USD 6.08 
billion (3.06 percent of GDP) in 1999 to USD 1.79 billion or 0.67 percent of GDP in 2002. 
This was affected largely through elimination of credit subsidies and substantial reduction in 
crop price subsidies and financed crop purchases.”40 However, market support measures still 
play an important role in subsidizing agricultural producers. The application of price support is 
concentrated in the amber box policies which are applied especially in the form of import 
levies and input subsidies such as fertilizer and credit subsidies. In the crop sector subsidies are 
concentrated particularly on domestic input prices and price support on final output. In the past 
mainly import quotas were observed and in recent years higher import duties have also been 
applied as a protective measure. Indeed, “the dominant component of agricultural support in 
Turkey is (was) in the form of border measures. During 1999 – 2001, for example, the 
producer support estimate averaged 6.5 billion dollars. Of that 5.1 billion dollars were 
transferred through border measures.”41 Such interventionist support measures (input price 
subsidy, import levies, export refund etc) were broadly applied until 2001.  
Another important point about the MPS in Turkey was the distribution of subsidies. The 
MPS was distributed mostly to large scale producers in western and south coastal regions. The 
unequal distribution of subsidies in different regions of Turkey is given below. In the first table 
the amount of subsidies is given. The Western (Marmara Aegean and Mediterranean) and 
Central Anatolian regions received half of the support which was transferred to producers via 
                                                 
39 EU and the International Trade, Briefing Paper 2, Council for European Affairs 
http://www.quaker.org/qcea/TradeBP2.doc    
40 Lundel, Lampietti, Pertev, Pohlmeier, Akder, Ocek, Jha: Turkey, A review of the Impact of the Reform of 
Agricultural Sector Subsidization, 2004, p.3   
41 Baffes John: Experience with Decoupling Agricultural Support, 2004, p.13  
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input subsidies. However, the rest of the regions (Black Sea, East and South East) which have 
only one fifth less arable land received almost one fifth of the total subsidies.   
According to the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) report, which was published in 
Ankara in 2001, the reasons for this unequal distribution of subsidies were: 
• The south and western regions comprises almost 50 % of the total production. Due to 
this higher production capacity, they received the highest income, which comprised almost half 
of the total support.  
• The East and Southeast Anatolian regions are the lowest income regions and have less 
than 20 percent of total production in Turkey. They received, therefore, about one fifth of the 
total input subsidies. 
 
  Table 3.6: Regional PSE by cereal products, 1999 and 2001 Billion Real 2001 TL  
1999 Mediterranean East 
Anatolia  
Aegean South e. 
A 
Central A. Black Sea Marmara  Turkey  
Wheat 213.995 91.632 114.205 122.191 380.724 142.287 189.358 1,254.391 
Maize 60.115 438 10.267 2.468 380 42.328 25.563 141.558 
Other 
Grains 
31.246 37.849 65.681 54.610 221.475 47.573 57.354 515.788 
Total 
crops 
761.368 289.323 661.636 351.875 1,344.111 665.383 665.142 4,738.839 
2001         
Wheat -26.032 -12.757 -13.738 -24.638 -38.108 -163.68 -25.616 -157.257 
Maize 7.313 36 1.623 414 249 5.364 5.038 20.067 
Other 
Grains  
2.665 3.536 4.731 10.649 13.599 4.022 5.018 44.220 
Total 
Grains 
347.765 71.388 326.099 146.771 267.122 248.153 235.140 1,642.438 
Source: Lundel, Lampietti, Pohlmeier, Akder, Ocek, Jha: Turkey, A review of the Impact of the Reform of 
Agricultural Sector Subsidization, 2004, p.14   
 
In Figure 3.9 the amount in percentage of farmers and registered areas in agricultural 
use are given. The Western regions together with the central Anatolian region have the highest 
amount of arable land and farmers. However, in the East, South East Anatolian and in the 
Black Sea regions land use and number of farmers is only about twenty per cent less than the 
other regions.  
  
 
Source: Lundel, Lampietti, Pohlmeier, Ocek, Jha: Turkey, A review of the Impact of the Reform of Agricultural 
Sector Subsidization, 2004, p.43   
 
The next Table 3.7 illustrates the amount of the DIS program which was first applied in 
2001. It is also important to state that the distribution of DIS has been mostly realised in 
Central Anatolian region and, interestingly enough, in the East and South East Anatolian 
regions which have less land for farming and farmers.     
Figure 3.9: Regional registration level by farmers and Area (2001) 
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The distribution of subsidies was not applied in accordance with the over-production 
and/ or marketing difficulties of producers and/ or number of farmers or land use in different 
regions. It is mostly dependent on political reasons. Such unequal distribution of support 
payments has also been observed within the CAP system. Those large scale producers who had 
over-production in certain agricultural products such as cereals received a significant part of 
the CAP expenditures. But financial support was mostly given for exportation of over-
production and for those producers who had marketing difficulties and were not sufficient for 
maintaining their production in the market.  
 
Table 3.7: Average DIS payments by regions in Turkey 2001 program (Euro/mn) 
Average DIS payments per 
registered farmers by regions 
Total 
payment  
Marmara 352 
Aegean 285 
Mediterranean 293 
Central Anatolian 608 
Black Sea 249 
East Anatolian 523 
South East Anatolian 662 
Total 2.972 
Source: Table adopted from Lundel, Lampietti, Pohlmeier, Jha: Turkey, A review of the Impact of the Reform of 
Agricultural Sector Subsidization, 2004, p.44 (1Euro= 1.313,000 TL in December 2001) 
  
It is obvious that in Turkey market price support policies have had less effect on 
changing the regional distribution of income, since the large scale (20 ha and above) high 
income producers which comprise only 5 percentage of the total holdings, received an 
important part of agricultural support. In contrast less market price support has been given to 
small scale producers (less than 5 ha arable land use) which comprise about 70 per cent of total 
holdings (arable land) so it is difficult to expect a reduction in the disparities between regions. 
By the beginning of the year 2000 both input subsidies and intervention price 
mechanism had been partly replaced with decoupled direct income support (DIS) which was 
mostly distributed by means of input payments and output payments. The aim of this reform 
was to reduce the trade distortion effect and financial burden of the state. However, lack of 
information and communication between some regions and insufficient data on registered 
farmers and land use reduced the effective application of these new measures in Turkey.  
The measurement of the producer price index was another problem for the Turkish 
producers, because according to article 41 in the ‘Stand by’ agreement, which was signed 
between Turkey and the USA, it was suggested that the producer prices be linked to the 
Chicago stock exchange. By doing this any change on the world price index would be reflected 
directly by the Turkish Grain Board (TMO) on the grain product prices. However, producer 
prices could be estimated in accordance with the price movements of commodities bought and 
sold by manufacturers in a country’s market.  
The above mentioned problems affect an accurate estimation of the PSE in Turkey.    
The application of the PSS differs from product to product and from country to country. 
However, in arable products (especially for cereal products) price support measures are 
combined both in Turkey and in the EU with the direct input support measure (with some 
differences) to estimate the market support. Therefore, an estimation of the PSE on cereal 
products will contribute to a comparison of the possible effects of these measures between EU 
and Turkey. However, the  application of the EU’s CAP support measures is wider than in 
Turkey; in particular, the  application of direct payments, defined in the OECD database with 
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indicator ‘C’, are not used in Turkey. In addition, indicator ‘B’ payments based on input, 
indicator ‘D’ payments based on historical planting, indicator ‘F’ payments based on 
constraints, and indicator ‘H’ miscellaneous payments are not used as support measures in 
agricultural sector in Turkey.    
 The impact of market price support is explained in the figure illustrated below. It is 
assumed that in the EU the intervention price causes an increase in product prices from PW 
(price in World) to PEU (price in EU), which causes an increase in production amount from Q1 
to Q2. By doing so, the production amount which would be exported into the EU market is 
reduced, because increasing product price has also meant an increase in the import tariffs. The 
price gap (PEU-PW) is applied as a tariff amount on imported products.  
In the EU’s CAP application of the export subsidies reduces the exported product price 
from Pw to Px. A decline in product price increases the demand for EU products outside the 
EU, which increases EU exports from Q4 to Q5. But export subsidies outside the Union reduce 
the product amount from Q3 to Q4. 
On the one hand, in the EU, common custom tariffs prevent the access of third world 
country products to the EU market. But, on the other hand, higher internal product prices 
stimulate external producers to increase their next term production. 
Export subsidies outside the Union reduce the product price of the internal producers. A 
decline in product prices stimulates the demand by consumers for products of internal 
producers outside the Union. An increasing demand for EU products boosts the market share of 
the EU producers from Q4 to Q5, whilst producers outside the Union reduce their market share 
from Q3 toQ4.       
In Figure 3.10 the blue colours represent the change in production. In the EU 
production is increased, which is shown with the blue coloured areas C+D, while the level of 
production outside the EU is decreased as shown with the blue areas A+B.  
 
Figure 3.10: The market price support causes a trade distortion. 
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As the above-illustrated results of the market price support show, the expected utility 
from trade liberalisation has not been achieved for all nations. Some people and nations 
became richer while the other nations, especially in the third world, became poorer than ever 
before. The abyss between rich and poor deepened. According to the UN Human Development 
report published in 2000, at the end of 1990, 20% of the world’s richest population living in 
developed countries had  80% of the world products and 20% of the world’s poorest population 
had only 1% of the world products. 
One of the important reasons for income inequality in the world is probably unequal 
and unfair distribution of (commercial) income which is applied on agricultural products, 
´ C 
 
D 
   A 
B
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because most of developing countries are dependent on agricultural sector and application of 
different tariff and non-tariff trade measures replace lower cost products of developing 
countries with some higher cost products of developed countries. However, agricultural 
support policies newly reformed in Turkey had also contributed to increasing the absolute 
income difference, not only between countries but also between different regions in 
undeveloped countries. For example, in Turkey, input subsidies which are distributed to 
producers increased the absolute income difference, because an important share of subsidized 
inputs went relatively more intensively to the higher income regions than the lower ones. This 
implies that the large-scale farmers who cultivated small portion of the land received more 
subsides than small-scale farmers who cultivated less than 5 ha of the land and comprise about 
70 percent of farmers.     
 In the EU’s CAP the application of the MacSharry reform has had a considerable 
positive effect on reducing the negative impact of market support on unfair trade. The 
application of measures reduced the price support for cereals and cattle by 15%, for beef by 
29%. But also 15% compulsory set-aside as well as voluntary set-aside was planned. However, 
through the MacSharry reform producers began to receive direct income support which was 
accepted as a less trade-distorting blue box support measure in the WTO terminology. In the 
CAP support system replacement of market support with direct payments was very evident: 
- Direct payments have less effect on the market prices while they cause an increase in 
producer income, 
- They have less trade-distorting effect relative to the price support measure,  
- The direct payments were acceptable for the WTO.  
- Market price support is one of the most trade-distorting trade measures, being one of 
the most important components of producer subsidy equivalent (PSE).  
 
The estimation of the PSE in the OECD database is explained in the previous chapter. 
In this section it is now required to adopt the PSE calculation for the calculation of transfers 
from consumers to producers in cereal products. The important component of MPS is 
calculated before the PSE. The estimation of the MPS and PSE for cereal products (as 
previously explained in detail in the methodology section 3.1.3) is considered for indicators 
Aa, Ab, Ba, Ca, Cb, Ea, Eb, Ec, Fa, Fb, Fc and indicator H  for the EU and for Turkey 
indicators Aa and Ea, Eb, Ec are considered.    
The formula below is used to calculate the MPS for the EU. 
MPS= (Pp – Pr.X).Q 
 
MPS for EU; 
Aa = ‘based on unlimited output’ 
Ab = ‘based on limited output’ 
Where; 
Q = quantity produced (considered only indicator A1= based on unlimited output)           
 Pp = producer price in domestic currency units. 
 Pr = world price in world currency unit 
 X = exchange conversion factor (to convert world reference price from dollar to euro) 
 
The estimation of MPS and PSE for EU-15 is calculated by using the formula below to 
estimate the impact of the market support for producers within the CAP. This is adapted from 
the PSE formula for cereal products:  
PSE = (Pp-Pr.X).Q+ Ba + Cb + Ca + Db + Ea + Eb + Ec + Fa + Fb + Fc + Ha + Hb  
 
PSE for EU; 
Ba = ‘based on unlimited output’ 
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Ca = ‘payments based on unlimited area’ (especially interventions and environmental 
amounts are considered) and  
Cb = ‘payments based on limited area’ (consist of set-aside and per hectare aid for 
cereals). 
Db = ‘based on historical support programmes’  
Ea = ‘payment based on variable input use’ 
Eb = ‘payments based on use of on-farm services’  
Ec = ‘payments based on-farm investments’ 
    Fa = ‘payments based on constraints on variable inputs’, 
    Fb = ‘based on constraints on fixed inputs’  
    Fc = ‘based on constraints on a set of inputs.  
Ha = ‘National payments’ 
Hb = ‘sub-national payments’ 
 
The formula below is used to calculate the MPS for Turkey. 
MPS= (Pp – Pr.X).Q 
 
MPS for Turkey; 
Aa = ‘based on unlimited output is only considered’ 
 
The estimation of MPS and PSE for Turkey is calculated by using the formula below to 
estimate the impact of the market support for producers in Turkey. This is adapted from the 
PSE formula for cereal products:  
 
PSE = (Pp-Pr.X).Q+ Ea + Eb + Ec   
 
PSE for Turkey; 
Ea = ‘payment based on variable input use’ 
Eb = ‘payments based on use of on-farm services’  
Ec = ‘payments based on-farm investments’ 
 
For the PSE calculation from the OECD indicators, Aa, Ab, Ba, Ca, Cb, Db, Ea, Eb, Ec, 
Fa, Fb, Fc, Ha and Hb are required and for the estimation of the PSE amount in cereal products 
in the EU’s CAP and for Turkey indicators ‘Aa’ and indicator ‘Ea, Eb, Ec’ are considered.  
However, some of these indicators which are explained above have been partly used for 
the calculation of the PSE amount in the EU’s CAP whilst others were extracted from the PSE 
calculation for the reasons given below. 
- Only selected indicators of OECD data have an impact on the PSE calculation for 
cereals. However, it is not used for the whole period of time (1986- 2003) considered for the 
PSE calculation because:  
- The payments based on limited area (Cb) began in 1993 after the MacSharry reform. 
- The payments based on unlimited area (Ca), were introduced in the 1988 reform.  
- Market price support, based on limited output (Ab), was also started with the 
MacSharry reform and comprises of crop products. 
- Market price support based on unlimited output (Aa) was started in the 1988 reform 
and applied until 1992.   
- The payments based on constraints on variable inputs (Fa) were started by the end of 
the Uruguay round of trade negotiations in 1994. 
- The payments based on historical support programmes ‘Db’ were started by the 1988 
reform programmes. However, this has made little contribution to the PSE calculation to date.    
 124
The calculation of the MPS and then the PSE amount within and outside the Union is 
considered.   
It is also important to remember that some of the OECD indicators, which are defined 
above, were not relevant for the whole period from 1986 to 2003, which is taken into 
consideration for this study. Therefore, some of above given indicators are not used either for 
the calculation of the MPS or for the PSE’s amount, because the MPS based on unlimited 
output was replaced with limited output. That means these direct payments based on unlimited 
output were only valid until the 1992 MacSharry reform, which then were replaced by limited 
output. One other important difference which is indicated in this calculation is the limited area 
payments which were also replaced with the unlimited area payments after the MacSharry 
reform. Consequently these changes are taken into consideration in MPS and in PSE 
calculations and the impact of reform proposals are then compared with Turkey’s MPS and 
PSE in order to answer the questions given below. These are:  
• Do CAP reform proposals, which were realised between 1980 and 2003, have positive 
effects on reducing transfers from consumers to producers on those cereal products in the EU’s 
CAP?  
• Do the reform proposals reduce the negative effects of the CAP, compared to Turkey as 
a non-member country, who applied her own support policies to the cereal products during this 
period?           
 The answer to these questions cannot be simply given, because, on the one hand, the 
amount of direct payments for the member countries is not published in the EU, therefore, it is 
not possible to calculate the total amount of PSE for member countries of the EU, although part 
of the PSE can be calculated by using the formula for cereals products given below.  
The measures which are used both in the EU’s CAP and in Turkey are not unique and 
differ between countries. Nevertheless, calculations of these measures can give a better 
understanding to the amount of support which is distributed to producers.  
The distribution of subsidies between member countries is not published; only 
published statistics in the Agris database and/ or OECD database are estimated for the EU-15. 
Therefore, estimation of the indicators for the MPS and PSE calculation are only considered 
for the EU-15. Some of these indicators, such as payments based on limited area (Cb) which 
began in 1993 after the MacSharry reform and MPS based on limited output (Ab) also started 
with the MacSharry reform, were only calculated from the beginning year of application. 
The estimation of the MPS for Turkey is also only considered for the indicator ‘Aa’ 
based on unlimited output. And for the PSE calculation indicator E is considered, because there 
was no other support measure during this period. However, input subsidies and output 
payments have been decoupled from using input or producing output by the market regulations 
planned in 1999.      
In the OECD methodology MPS (market price support to producers) is the important 
component of the PSE calculation. It is estimated by the price gap between producer price and 
world reference price. In Table 3.8 below the PSE calculation is only given after the date of EU 
membership for Austria, Finland and Sweden. Previous calculations are not possible because 
related statistical data are not published for these countries. But after EU membership the PSE 
calculation is considered in accordance with the published statistical data in the Agris database. 
Previous calculations are not considered because these countries were not EU members until 
1995 and no payments for these countries were given by the CAP. In OECD database Turkey’s 
MPS and PSE amounts are published and calculated. Therefore required data is indicated 
between 1986 and 2003.        
In the table below the amount of MPS and PSE for the most widely produced cereal 
products is calculated first for wheat and then for barley, in the EU for Austria, Finland and 
Sweden and, outside the EU, is estimated, in Turkey as a non-member country. The effect of 
the MPS of the CAP in EU countries before and after EU membership is shown. The 
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comparison of the impact of support measures is calculated by using indicator Cb (limited area) 
for the EU producers, and for Turkish producers by using Ea (input subsidies: comprises 
concessional loans fertilizer subsidies, hybrid seed subsidy) which can be considered as an 
important support measures for transferring monetary values to producers. This comparison 
brings about a better understanding of the amount of transfers, realised via different support 
measures, which contribute to an increase in the finance and/ or income of producers in and out 
of the Union.  
 
Table 3.8.1: MPS and PSE for Wheat (Euro /tons) 
year Turkey Euro/mn Austria Euro/ mn Finland Euro/mn Sweden Euro/mn 
 Wheat---- Wheat---- Wheat----- Wheat----- 
 MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE 
1990 375 724 209.28 : 3162,3 : 157.37 : 
1993 248 650 183.04 : 85.46 : 23.31 : 
1994 150 563 197.1 : 49.78 : 49.51 : 
1996 95 464 12.07 140.9 14.69 54.02 -10.55 80.79 
1998 1.126 1.501 34.47 132.7 18.96 46.17 180.21 110.29 
2001 -137 -90 -37.413 56.4 -0.044 39.6 -67.04 44.11 
2003 1.282 1.294 : : : : : : 
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003 and for Turkey from OECD 
database: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005.     
 
As seen in the table above, the decreasing amount of MPS in member countries has 
been covered by direct subsidies. For cereal products direct payments are mainly used by the 
Community agencies as an important support measure.  
The negative values given in the table for the MPS and PSE does not mean that there 
was negative production, but the producers paid more tax than the profit earned from sales in 
that year. In the CAP producer income loss is covered by different support measures. However, 
if the tax which is paid by them is higher than their income, then the PSE will result in negative 
numbers.      
It is evident that the MPS was rather high for Austria, Finland and Sweden, before EU 
membership. Having EU membership increased the amount of support measures for these 
countries. It can be seen that, prior to EU membership, the amount of MPS was rather high, but 
after achieving EU membership the PSE increased while the MPS fell. The reason for this is 
very obvious; the above-mentioned three member countries of the EU began to apply CAP 
measures (direct payments, intervention price, common custom tariff (CCT) and export 
subsidies, in order to adapt their market structure into the EU. But after EU membership the 
amount of MPS was reduced, while the amount of direct payments added to the MPS to 
estimate the PSE amount steadily increased.  
In contrast, the amount of PSE in Turkey steadily decreased, whilst the amount of MPS 
decreasingly increased. This meant that both in Turkey and in the EU the MPS had an 
important effect on the PSE calculation, but in the EU application of direct payments, which 
replaced the market price support after the 1992 reform, made an important contribution to the 
PSE increase. However, in Turkey the MPS had a considerable positive effect on the PSE 
amount, because the increase in input subsidies and decreasing increase in output payments 
was maintained until 2000. But after 2000 the application of the new regulations, especially 
direct income support (DIS) which breaks the link from input use and/ or producing output, 
contributed to increasing the MPS,  and in 2003 the amount of  MPS again increased nearer to 
the PSE amount. This happened because unfair distribution of support measures between 
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producers still continued. Although necessary measures were put into effect in 2001, lack of 
information and inspection and some other political expectations caused this result.            
In the table below, market price support (MPS) for barley is calculated. As with wheat, 
the estimated amount of market price support for barley was extremely high prior to EU 
membership. But after achieving EU membership, the support amount in these countries was 
steadily replaced with direct payments which do not have a direct effect on the market price. 
On the one hand direct payments support the income of internal producers whilst reducing 
negative reactions against CAP measures in the world markets. However, as well as direct 
payments other support measures such as export subsidies and market support were 
maintained, and this had a negative effect on reducing unfair trade in the world markets. By 
doing so higher cost producers of the CAP continue to receive market price support together 
with direct payments whilst producers in non-member Turkey, with a lower cost advantage, 
have been partly supported by input subsidies which were replaced with direct income support 
(DIS) in 2001. However, over time, both in Turkey and in the EU the increased amount of 
support measures is considerable. On the one side in Turkey direct income support which 
breaks the link between input use and producing output is mostly distributed between large 
scale producers.  On the other side, in the EU direct payments, which are first decoupled and 
then break the link between production, contributed to an increase in the transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to producers. Consequently, over time, transfers from consumers to 
producers reduced the welfare of consumers more and more.   
 
Table 3.8.2: MPS and PSE for barley (Euro /tons)  
Year Austria - ( Euro/mn) Finland - ( Euro/mn)    Sweden -(Euro/mn)    Turkey (Euro/ mn) 
 Barley Barley Barley Barley 
 MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE
1990 39.029 38.739 525.687 500.712 128.465 166.287 239 301
1992 27.026 26.649 278.029 245.987 58.247 107.860 225 290
1993 25.250 24.814 211.214 186.081 8.286 37.023 393 457
1994 27.436 27.436 244.285 248.747 42.636 76.129 72 132
1996 9.133 30.133 59.509 121.396 39.906 121.291 151 260
1998 4.800 21.127 59.890 123.426 22.659 104.429 551 655
2001 0.017 14.152 25.225 125.545 6.619 87.601 30 40
2003 : : : : : : 229 229
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003 and for Turkey from OECD 
database: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005 (TL converted to the Euro).     
 
The market price support which is calculated for the three member countries and 
Turkey gives some important information. The MPS was higher in all three counties before EU 
membership, but as is indicated in the tables, the amount of the market support differs from 
one country to another. This is the reason why these support measures are not published. Both 
in Turkey and in the above given three member countries application of the MPS amount 
together with the PSE amount differ from one country to another and from one year to another. 
This has meant that the application of the CAP support measures differ from one region to 
another and the result of this distribution of financial support vary between regions. Such 
differences on distribution of financial support between countries prevented publication of 
statistical data on financial support, which probably prevents discussions between member 
countries.  
Indeed, market price support, which increased the product prices and prevented product 
access from third world countries into the EU market, was often criticised and seen as the 
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reason for unfair trade in WTO meetings, despite the application of the MacSharry reform 
(1992), later followed by the Uruguay round and Agenda 2000 reform proposals aimed at 
reducing those trade-distorting effects of the CAP measures. The replacement of the MPS with 
direct payments in the CAP (1992) and DIS in Turkey (2000) made some important 
contributions to the reduction of the trade distortion effect. But neither in the CAP nor in 
Turkey did those income support measures increase the welfare of the consumer Unfair 
application of amber box support measures in Turkey, which increases the trade distortion on 
the world market has been slightly reduced but not removed. Furthermore, in Turkey the 
application of market support causes an increase in the income of some large scale producers 
whilst others have been neglected. Such unequal distribution of subsidies is actually realised 
both in Turkey and in the EU’s CAP.  
As previously explained market supports were very high both in Turkey and in Austria, 
Finland and Sweden. However, after joining the EU, market support was reduced and replaced 
with direct payments in order to reduce the negative effects of price support in the market.  
The PSE calculation before EU membership was not calculated for the three EU 
countries; because necessary data for PSE calculation was published neither in OECD data nor 
in Eurostat Agris database. But as is indicated in the table above, a decline in market price 
support has been steadily replaced with the direct payments indicated in the PSE amount.  
 
Table 3.9: The production amount in cereals in EU and in Turkey (mn/ tons)  
                          EU Turkey 
Year Wheat Barley Other grains Maize Wheat  Barley  Maize Other grains 
1986 72.0 46.8 52.1 25.5 15.4 6.2 2.2 6.2 
1991 90.7 51.5 55.8 27.3 16.9 7.1 2.1 7.1 
1992 84.8 43.3 46.8 30.0 15.9 6.3 2.1 6.3 
1993 80.8 42.9 47.2 29.8 17.4 6.8 2.4 6.8 
1994 82.8 38.9 43.3 28.2 14.5 6.4 1.8 6.4 
1995 87.7 43.4 49.2 30.1 14.9 6.8 1.1 6.8 
1996 99.9 52.7 59.6 35.5 15.3 7.3 1.9 7.3 
1998 103.8 51.6 57.9 35.8 17.2 8.2 2.2 8.2 
2000 105.2 51.4 58.1 38.4 17.2 7.3 2.2 7.3 
2001 91.8 48.1 54.3 40.5 16.0 6.8 2.1 6.8 
2003 92.0 46.6 53.5 34.2 15.8 7.4 2.7 7.4 
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database 1973-2003, CD- Rom, 2003 and for Turkey from OECD 
database: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005.     
 
From 1995 to 2000 an increase in the market support in Turkey and in direct payments 
in the EU increased transfers to producers. However, these transfers had a negative effect on 
production amounts, which increased cereals both in the EU’s CAP and in Turkey. (see table 
below). 
It is also important to note that increasing direct payments were not reflected in rising 
production amounts as an increase in the rate of direct payments (see tables above and below).    
Over time an increase in the amount of market price support and direct payments from 
taxpayers and consumers to producers strengthened reactions against the application of the 
price support system of the CAP. In addition to this, the price gap between world and EU 
products, especially for the cereal industry has dropped since 2000. The decline in cereal 
product price and the increase in product price outside the Union should be reflected in the 
intervention measures too. This implies that the market intervention price, which is lower than 
the world cereal prices, should be reduced, because any increase in the intervention price has 
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also meant an increase in the CCT. However, product price outside the Union is higher than the 
EU prices. Therefore, there is no need to increase the market price artificially, because by 
doing so some unavoidable outcomes would have to be considered. These are:  
• Market intervention increases the surplus amount 
• Increase on the market price will be directly reflected in the CCT, which is not required, 
because cereals prices outside the Union are already well below the prices of internal 
producers. 
• In the EU there is an over-production for cereal products and any price intervention will 
only contribute to increasing the production of the next term (see Cobweb theorem). By doing 
this prices move further away from the equilibrium position which means price stagnation.  
The impact of the 1988 reform, which comprised voluntary set-aside and early 
retirement measures, increased cereal production until 1991, compared to production in 1986. 
With the 1992 reform, this shifted market price support to direct payments and extended set-
aside measures to compulsory set-aside, production increased until 2000. After 2000 a decline 
in cereal prices below the world level reduced the direct payments together with market price 
support slightly. However application of the direct payments were given to producers, even if 
the price support is zero, that means the price gap between internal and world producers was 
closed (Pp=Pr).    
Next I analyse the impact of the various support measures of the CAP. The impact of 
each support measure on producer gain is estimated to determine the trade distortion effect of 
CAP support measures in economics.  
The support measure or measures that can best fit into the CAP system to reduce the 
trade distortion effect in both the EU’s CAP and Turkey, as a non-member country, will be 
estimated.  
The PSE has been calculated for each selected cereal product for the EU-15 in Table 
3.10.1.  
In the last decade MPS was in decline whilst the PSE increased. The PSE increase was 
the outcome of the policy changes in the CAP which were started by the MacSharry reform in 
1992 and increased transfers from consumers to producers was caused by the application of 
direct payments.  
 
Table 3.10.1: The MPS and PSE compared in the EU 15. (Euro/mn) 
Year Wheat Barley Other grains Maize 
  MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE 
1986 7,469 8,315 4,845 5,106 5,234 5,515 2,688 2,926 
1988 6,036 6,933 3,859 4,125 3,971 4,263 2,238 2,468 
1990 4,706 6,018 3,649 3,960 3,871 4,212 2,136 2,417 
1992 5,728 7,424 3,345 4,032 3,568 4,329 2,638 2,991 
1993 4,424 8,900 3,071 5,401 3,277 5,896 1,927 2,423 
1994 3,299 9,392 2,561 5,683 2,734 6,276 1,264 2,019 
1995 1,589 8,680 1,653 5,665 1,857 6,588 1,706 2,713 
1996 0 7,769 136 4,542 367 5,557 727 2,108 
1997 5 7,566 442 4,872 606 2,437 915 2,225 
1998 2,408 9,981 2,215 6,511 2,437 7,563 1,168 2,448 
1999 2,879 10,673 1,645 5,966 1,949 7,105 1,435 2,788 
2000  1,039 9,948 122 4,795 409 6,039 940 3,038 
2001 337 9,559 0 5,131 181 6,313 550 2,812 
2003 147 9,566 114 5,155 0 5,587 873 2,710 
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003  
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In the following decade the MPS amount has tended to diminish. In the table above the 
PSE amount in the given period shows a tendency to increase while the amount of MPS falls. 
This means that the amount of direct payments has increased while the price support measure 
has fallen.  
The reform of Agenda 2000, which was planned to increase productivity of producers 
in the CAP and reduce subsidies, contributed to a reduction in the market support which is 
given to producers but increased the direct payments. The impact of these measures can be 
observed in the PSE amounts (see table above). The PSE results after 2000 show a tendency to 
fall, while the price gap between internal and world producers declines.  
In Table 3.10.2 given below the MPS and PSE is compared for selected cereal products 
in Turkey. As indicated in the table the market price support comprises an important part of 
support measures in Turkey, of which payments based on unlimited output are considered for 
distributing market support to producers. However, in the EU as well as the unlimited output, 
the limited output has also been used since the MacSharry reform for distributing market 
support to producers.   
 
Table 3.10.2: The MPS and PSE compared in Turkey. (Euro/mn) 
Year Wheat Barley Other grains Maize 
  MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE MPS PSE 
1986 101 348 175 220 175 220 17 36 
1990 375 724 239 301 239 301 76 100 
1992 335 720 225 290 225 290 101 126 
1993 248 650 393 457 393 457 73 100 
1994 150 563 72 132 72 132 -19 5 
1996 95 464 151 260 151 260 45 80 
1998 1,126 1,501 551 655 551 655 136 170 
2000  516 710 239 291 239 291 97 113 
2001 -137 -90 30 40 30 40 14 18 
2003 1,282 1,294 229 229 229 229 175 175 
  Source: OECD database: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005, own 
calculation.     
 
In Turkey the MPS given to producers in Turkey increased continuously up until 2003 
whilst measures such as payment based on input (defined in the OECD database with indicator 
E) were considered mostly for the PSE calculation, because payments based on area which are 
considered for the estimation of the PSE calculation for cereal products in the EU are not 
relevant for the PSE calculation in Turkey. However, as in EU, payments based on the 
unlimited output indicator ‘A1’are also considered for cereals PSE calculation in Turkey.  
The important difference in support measures between Turkey and the EU occurs 
therefore in Turkey’s input subsidies (indicator Ea) calculated in the PSE, which is accepted by 
WTO in the amber box as the most trade-distorting support measure, and the EU’s direct 
payments (indicator Ca), calculated in the PSE, which is accepted as a lesser trade-distorting 
support measure in the blue box measure of the WTO.        
In Figure 3.11 below, the impact of price support mechanism of the CAP is considered 
for cereal products. In the CAP of the EU cereal products have over-production. This excessive 
production of cereals is indicated between QD1 and QS2.  
The supply curve is assumed to be an increasing function of price and the demand curve 
is a decreasing function of the price. In the CAP, on the one hand, producers are protected by 
higher common tariff measures from countries outside the EU, and on the other hand, 
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producers are supported by intervention prices to prevent a price fall in the market and income 
losses for producers. However, besides these measures, there is an export subsidy as a measure 
to increase the exported product amount from the Union. The export subsidy is given by the 
Community agencies to the producers to reduce their high product price to below that of the 
world price in order to increase their market share and sales amount in importing counties.  
In the case below, the cereal products are assumed to be subsidized with the price gap between 
world’s ‘Pw’ and Union’s ‘Pc’. The subsidy increases the production amount from QS1 to QS2. 
As a consequence of this subsidy; consumers are compelled to pay more than the world price 
(Pw), which is guaranteed by the community agencies through intervention prices to producers. 
This higher internal price reduces consumer demand from QD1 to QD2.  
The export subsidy can then be estimated by using the formula below: 
 ((PC-Pw). (QD2-QS2)) 
This will guarantee the producer Pc price to continue producing QS2 amount of cereal 
product. However, the export subsidy is a burden on the community budget. It is inconsistent 
with the comparative advantages theory because internal producers will hinder countries with 
lower relative cost advantage in the world market. The results of this subsidy cause internal 
producers to increase their trade capacity in the world market while third world country 
producers reduce theirs. This is the trade distortion effect of internal producers in the world 
market.        
  p 
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Figure 3.11: Excessive production of commodity x  
 
 In the figure above, intervention purchase will be used to prevent a price fall below the 
intervention price, Pi. Community agencies will purchase QS1QS2 amount of commodity x. The 
surplus mentioned is either stored or exported to third world countries.  
In the EU’s CAP product prices are high relative to world prices. The internal producers 
are protected by different support measures in the EU market. But outside the EU the export 
subsidy which is given to increase the market share of internal producers is an important 
support measure for protecting internal producers from producers outside the Union. On the 
one hand, internal producers are supported to increase their trade capacity outside the Union in 
Turkey, but on the other hand, economic difficulties such as higher inflation, exchange rate 
difficulties, the lower techno and capacity production of Turkey’s producers facilitate an 
increase in Turkey in the trade capacity of the EU’s producers. However, the higher inflation 
and exchange rate advantage, which was reducing the nominal price of cereal products from 
Turkey into the EU market, increased the cereals exports from Turkey to the EU. But the 
relative cost advantage of producers and the H-O model of production which is dependent on 
the factor endowment also contributed to increasing the trade capacity of Turkish producers in 
the EU market up to 2000. But after 2000 the decreasing inflation rate in Turkey and the 
application of a single currency in the EU which was put into effect in 2002, reduced imports 
from Turkey whilst exports to Turkey increased (see Table 3.11 below). 
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Table 3.11: Cereals trade between EU and Turkey (mn Ecu / €)  
  Evolution of trade (%) 
Share in all 
agriculture (%)
Agricultural Product: Cereals  
   
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 95/03 02/03 1995 2003 
EUR15 - Export to Turkey 35 58 75 43 54 61 23 51 70 101.1 36.9 4.1 6.8 
EUR15 - Import from Turkey 6.2 4.3 2.9 26 22 43 43 32 23 265.4 -30.2 0.4 1.1 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/agriculture/agrista/tradestats/index_en.htm , European Commission: Eurostat: 
Agriculture: Trade statistics (10.08.2004) 
 
Exchange rate differences are given in the table below. According to this table the 
negative effect of higher inflation in Turkey can be easily seen in the exchange rates which 
change the monetary value of the Turkish Lira after conversion into the Euro and USD. 
However, as seen in the table the great difference between Turkish Lira and Euro steadily 
dropped after the inflation rate in Turkey fell from the year 2000 to 2003. Similarly, the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) also increased until 2000 and then reduced.  
 
Table 3.12: Exchange rate differences between the EU’s Euro/ USD and Turkey’s Lira  
Year USD/EUR TL/EUR REER TL/ Euro (1) 
1980 1.392.23 54.58 0.05 
1982 0.999.71 164.03 0.06 
1986 0.984.167 679.76 0.23 
1989 1.101.75 1.924.21 0.89 
1990 1.273.43 3.329.06 1.2 
1992 1.298.1 8.930.95 3.7 
1993 1.171 12.879.30 5.2 
1994 1.895.2 35.535.30 13 
1996 1.269.75 103.214.00 42 
1998 1.121.09 293.736.00 137 
2000 0.923.6 574.816.00 203 
2001 0.895.6 1,102.425.00 377 
2002 0.945.6 1,439.680.00 365 
2003 1.131.2 1,694.851.00 186 
(1): exchange rate of TL in Euro and exchange rate of USA dollar in Euro is considered for the computation of the REER.  
Source: USD/EUR exchange rates are from European Central Bank reference rates published by Eurostat. 
TL/EUR exchange rates are based on TL/USD rates published by OECD, for 1980-1989. From 1990 to date are 
from European Central Bank reference rates published by Eurostat. (Exchange rates yearly averages)  
For the REER: data for consumer price index for the USA from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and for 
Turkey from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (calculated by author).  
  
3.2.3.2 The Direct Payments  
 
Direct payments are recurring non-market transfers to farmers from consumers and 
taxpayers. In the OECD database payments are divided into three main categories: (a) 
compensatory allowances (headage), (b) arable land premium and (c) agri-environmental 
payments. However, for the cereal products only b and c are considered when estimating PSEs 
(for more details see chapter 3.1.3)  
In 1992 when MacSharry introduced direct payments they were only planned to cover 
the income loss of producers resulting from set-aside measures. However, increasing transfers 
to producers reduced the expected benefit of this measure, which was aimed at reducing over-
production. Direct payments were first based on historical production (the products that 
producers used to plant on their arable area), which increased the supply amount; because it 
was necessary for farmers to produce in order to obtain the subsidy. Over time increasing 
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subsidies for producers made it necessary for the Commission to introduce new regulations on 
direct payments into the CAP system, because these payments contradicted the aim of set-aside 
measures. On the one hand, set-aside measures were planned to reduce production, but on the 
other hand, direct payments compelled farmers to produce in order to obtain the subsidy.  It 
was necessary to resolve this contradiction between direct payments and set-aside. 
The direct payments given to producers in accordance with their set-aside, based on 
limited or unlimited area, increased the transfers from consumers to producers.  
In the CAP income support is mostly given for arable crops in the form of area 
payments. It was first introduced in 1987 in the form of voluntary set-aside area payments. 
According to this measure farmers may voluntarily set-aside part of their land in order to 
receive payments. Regulations for voluntary set-aside areas differ in member states. The 
application of voluntary set-aside is unrestricted; this means producers are free to set aside their 
land.    
The impact of set-aside land on the market and surplus reduction occurred after the 
MacSharry reform (1992) where obligatory set-aside payments were introduced into the CAP 
system. Obligatory set-aside: “The core period for set-aside is 15 January to 31 August. 
Specific rules are laid down relating to the management and maintenance of set-aside land 
during that period. The obligatory rate for 2004 is 5%.”42 Farmers are required to leave aside a 
minimum percentage of their land as a condition of receiving compensatory payments. Set-
aside requirements are determined annually in response to market conditions. Set-aside land 
can be used for production of certain non-food crops. As a result of this set-aside direct income 
support measures were introduced into the CAP system instead of market price support.  
In Turkey application of direct payments is not a relevant support measure; in this 
section, therefore, the impact of the direct payments is estimated only for the EU’s CAP.  
The effect of the direct payments on producer support can be estimated by either, 
totalling the amount of direct payment to the market price support (MPS), or subtracting it 
from the total PSE. It is preferable to subtract it from the total PSE. It is easier to compare the 
difference between the total PSE and the PSE without direct payment which shows the impact 
on total producer support.  
The increasing transfers from consumers to producers have compelled the CAP to 
reform the concept of direct payments. Below, planned decoupled area payments are compared 
with flat rate area payments and less favoured area payments.        
• Decoupled single area payments:   
In 2003 the Commission proposed single farm payments to replace the product specific 
direct payments with decoupled area payments. Decoupled single area payments mean 
breaking the link between production of a specific agricultural commodity and receipt of direct 
payment. This means that there will be no dependency on production volume to avoid 
abandonment of production. There will be no obligatory production to receive these payments, 
but farmers must maintain their land in good condition to receive it. These single farm 
payments which were based on the reference amount in the reference period would be linked to 
environmental and food safety. 
These new single farm payments were started in January 2005 and this meant a shift of 
payments from blue boxes to green boxes in WTO terms. The green box payments mean 
farmers receive aid based on their historical production. The green box includes support 
measures which have minimal trade distortion effects compared to the other blue and amber 
boxes.  
The opponents of direct payments such as IFOAM (International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movement) believe that the application of direct payments, which are paid to 
                                                 
42 Teagasc Irish Agriculture and Food Development Authority: CAP payments supplementary material        
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farmers to do nothing on their land, is not fair. According to them there is no reason to 
continue these payments for land which is no longer in agricultural use.   
• Flat rate area payments: 
In the reform proposal there was a new approach to replacing the crop specific 
payments with flat rate area payments. 
Flat rate area payments are calculated by dividing the total subsidy payment by the 
reference area, which is then the rate applied uniformly across farms.  
 The scheme comprises of area payments for cereal products which include set-aside 
payments. The flat rate area is based on “the direct payments the farmer received in 2001 or the 
average of three preceding years. Currently, direct aid schemes make no distinction between 
farmers receiving small amounts and those receiving larger amounts, with the eligibility 
conditions and administrative and control provisions being the same. The yearly global 
payment will be based on the amount of the direct payments the farmer has received during the 
reference period and will be paid until the end of the scheme, once the farmer continues to 
fulfil the conditions for the simplified scheme.”43  
• The less favoured area payments are the area based per hectare payments. These 
payments are given for the development of less favoured areas to reduce the disparities 
between member countries.      
In the graphics below, applications of the ‘flat rate area payment’, ´single farm 
payments’ and ‘less favoured area payments’ are compared.  
The importance of area payments in agriculture is dependent on the supply and demand 
elasticity of land. “Because of the lack of alternative use, supply of agricultural land is rather 
inelastic. The demand for land and the land rent depend on the marginal return to land, 
including the effect of direct payments.”44 The effect of payments depends on the amount of 
the payment; it can either increase demand (or rent paid) for land or reduce it.  
In Figure 3.12.1 flat rate area payments are illustrated. Producers who are receiving 
payments are not required to set-aside or leave their land fallow for this payment. By doing so, 
producers will be free to produce on the demand of consumers, which means there will be no 
limitation on production type. The amount of payment is illustrated with R as land revenue 
which represents Rp=300 as an amount of returns to farmers. 
 
Land rent                     Land rent  
marginal        m. rev. 
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Land demand      Land demand   
 
 
 
 
 
                    q2      q1   
 
 
Figure 3.12.1: Flat Rate Area Payments Figure 3.12.2: Decoupled Farm Payments 
 
Source for figures a, and b: Osterburg: EU: CAP and Enlargement an Opportunity for Nature and Environment, 
2003 
                                                 
43 Decision to cut red tape for small farmers : - Fischer : This makes life of our farmers easier, Luxembourg, 19 
June 2001, Reference: IP/01/882, Date:  20/06/2001   
44 Bernhard Osterburg: EU: CAP and Enlargement An Opportunity for Nature and Environment, 2003  
 
S2   S1 
Land 
supply
Land 
supply 
Area 
payment 
Rp= 300 
 
 
Rp= 0 
Farm 
area 
payment 
fallow 
Reference area 
Rp=0
 134
Decoupled Single Farm payments are illustrated in Figure 3.12.2. The obligatory set-
aside is represented by the area ‘fallow’ which reduces the production from q1 to q2. Area 
payments are only paid on the basis of historical reference area, which means there is no 
obligation to produce specific crops to receive the payment. These payments were proposed in 
the MacSharry reform. However, these payments were started in 2005 aimed at breaking the 
link between production and area payments. The single area payments were also planned to 
finance healthy planting and environmental conditions for organic farming. The single farm 
payment cannot avoid agricultural land from being abandoned (shown in Figure 3.12.2 as 
“fallow”).  
 
Figure 3.12.3: Less favoured area payments 
 
Land rent  
marginal. rev. 
 
 
 
  Land demand 
 
Rp=200                   a    
 
Rp=0                  
                      b          c 
 
Source for figures c: Osterburg: EU: CAP and Enlargement an Opportunity for Nature and Environment, 2003 
 
The less favoured area payment (figure 3.12.3) is concentrated in the marginal areas 
such as mountain farming. These payments cover producers’ costs in maintaining production. 
Shown in the graphic is the area of possible decline in production ‘bc’, as well as the amount of 
payment for farmers’ losses, ‘ab’, because of difficulties in land use.   
 
3.2.3.2.1 Payments based on Unlimited Area 
  
Income support is mostly given to arable crops in the form of area (aid) payments. In 
the CAP system, unlimited area payments, related to the voluntary set-aside, were introduced 
in 1987 and had considerable effect until the 1992 MacSharry reform. The unlimited area 
payments via voluntary set-aside were mostly distributed between large -scale producers, 
because small scale producers were exempted from set-aside. By the end of this programme 
only 9% of the arable land was set-aside because in this programme producers were free to set-
aside their land. In voluntary set-aside farmers may voluntarily set-aside part of their land 
beyond compulsory requirements and receive the full set-aside payment. Regulations for set-
aside differ in member states. 
 The impact of set-aside on the market, and surplus reduction, occurred after the 
MacSharry reform through which obligatory set-aside payments were introduced into the CAP 
system. The obligatory set-aside is a compulsory measure, which means at least 10 percent of 
producers’ arable land must be set aside. As a result of the set-aside, the direct income support 
measure was mostly replaced with the market price support.  
One important support measure in the CAP is direct payments. In the first table below 
the direct payments of the EU’s CAP are shown.  
The calculation of total PSE for cereal products in the CAP is estimated using the 
formula below. In the OECD database only the indicator ‘C’ (payments based on area planted) 
is relevant to direct payments. Therefore, only the indicator ‘Ca’ is considered for the 
LFA 
payments
S2 S1 
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calculation of the PSE and after this subtracting the payments based on unlimited area is 
required.  
There is a more detailed explanation in the methodology section 3.1.3. 
 
PSE = (Pp-Pr.X). Q+ Ca    
Where; 
Q = quantity produced             
Pp = producer price in domestic currency units. 
Pr = world price in world currency unit 
X = exchange conversion factor (to convert world reference price from dollar to euro) 
Ca = payments based on unlimited area (interventions and environmental amounts, in 
particular, are considered) and  
 
The direct payments measure was first introduced as coupled historical payments to 
producers and applied until 2005. Since 2005 coupled direct payments have been replaced with 
the decoupled area payment which breaks the link between production and payments.      
The effect of the direct payments on producer support can be estimated by either; 
totalling the amount of direct payment to the market price support (MPS), or subtracting it 
from the total PSE.  I prefer the latter, as using it makes it easier to compare the difference 
between total PSE and PSE without direct payment which shows the impact on total producer 
support.  
In the table below, the total PSE is compared with the PSE amount which is subtracted 
from direct payments that contain indicator I-Ca. As shown in the table below, after subtracting 
the amount of direct payments based on unlimited area from the total PSE, producer support is 
slightly reduced in the EU’s CAP.  
 
Table 3.13: The total PSE and PSE after subtracting the direct payments base on unlimited 
area (Euro/ mn)  
Year Wheat (W) Barley (B)  Other grains (o.g.) Maize (M)  
 PSE  
W total  
PSE w-Dp 
unlimited 
PSE  
B total 
PSE B- Dp 
unlimited 
PSE 
 o. g. total  
PSE o.g.- Dp 
unlimited 
PSE 
 M total 
PSE M- Dp 
unlimited 
1986 8,315 7,996 5,106 5,088 5,515 5,131 2,926 2,892 
1988 6,933 6,517 4,125 4,112 4,263 4,249 2,468 2,433 
1990 6,018 5,401 3,960 3,935 4,212 4,184 2,417 2,364 
1992 7,424 6,904 4,032 3,997 4,329 4,290 2,991 2,942 
1993 8,900 8,823 5,389 5,349 5,896 5,851 2,402 2,373 
1994 9,392 9,370 5,672 5,667 6,276 6,270 2,000 1,987 
1995 8,680 8,620 5,649 5,565 6,588 6,461 2,658 2,632 
1996 7,769 7,621 4,531 4,400 5,557 5,377 2,035 1,993 
1997 7,566 7,470 4,857 4,750 5,828 5,677 2,152 2,125 
1998 9,981 9,872 6,491 6,363 7,560 7,370 2,385 2,357 
1999 10,673 10,576 5,955 5,832 7,105 6,927 2,727 2,699 
2000 9,948 9,837 4,813 4,713 6,039 5,895 2,988 2,958 
2001 9,559 9,465 5,131 5,037 6,313 6,175 2,792 2,767 
2003 9,566 9,464 5,155 5,056 6,242 6,099 2,710 2,684 
Source: calculation from the Eurostat database and by myself, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003  
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The small difference in PSE amount after subtracting the direct income amount for 
wheat, barley, oats, and maize is indicated in the figure below.  
In the figure below the effect of the direct payments on producer support in the CAP, 
based on unlimited area payments, is illustrated. The small difference after subtracting the 
direct payments from the PSE amount is important in showing the small effect of voluntary set-
aside in the EU’s CAP.       
 
Figure 3.13: The PSE for cereal before and after subtracting direct payments based on 
unlimited area (Euro/ mn) 
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In the figure below, the effective supply curve shifts down by the amount of the subsidy 
from S to S’. This increase in supply increases the product amount, whilst product prices stay 
intact, because direct payments have no effect on product prices and product prices start at Pw 
level constant, whilst producer income increases. The imported product amount, Q1C1, also 
accesses the EU market.  
 
Figure 3.14: Impact of the direct payments   
 
Source: adapted from Paul Brenton, Henry Scott, Peter Sinclair: International Trade Oxford University Press, 
1997, p.171  
 
The difference from the tariff is that tariff measures increase the prices and thus reduce 
the imported product amount as in Figure 3.14, as well as reducing imports and consumer 
Pw(1+S) 
Pw 
S’
a b
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D
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S
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surplus. But as is seen here, consumer surplus is still the same after the payments. The 
community agency has to pay for the payment and lose a+b area amount. Producer gain is area 
‘a’ and production loss or deadweight loss is represented by the triangle b. 
The impact of the direct payments cannot be calculated for cereal products in Turkey, 
because there were no transfers as direct payments to producers. Therefore, there is no need to 
indicate the impact of direct payments on producers in Turkey.  
 
3.2.3.2.2 The Payments based on Limited Area, 
  
In this part of the payments compulsory set-aside measures will be analysed. In fact, 
since the 1992 reform the amount of set-aside payments have been of considerable importance. 
The area payments are given to producers according to their set-aside amount. The obligatory 
set-aside measure which was started by the MacSharry reform has had considerable impact on 
increasing the transfers from producers to consumers. In obligatory payments farmers are 
required to leave a minimum percentage (about 10%) of their land as a condition of receiving 
compensatory payments. Set-aside requirements are determined annually by the Council in 
response to market conditions. This means set-aside is rotational and all land must be set-aside 
in turn without considering the quality of the land. Set-aside of the land and receiving 
payments were linked for the production of certain non-food crops until 2005. After 2005, 
direct payments were decoupled.  
Compulsory (Obligatory) payments vary from year to year. But from the time of 
Agenda 2000 “area payments for cereals, oilseeds, linseed and set-aside were standardised by 
the year 2002 at 63Euro/ton (about £240/ha in Great Britain at 1999 exchange rates).”45 This 
price equation implies that effects of these payments on the market seem to be similar.   
The above given formula is now considered for the limited area payments. Therefore, 
indicator ‘Cb’ is used for the estimation of the PSE after subtracting the payments based on 
limited area. 
PSE = (Pp-Pr.X). Q+ Cb    
Where; 
Cb=‘payments based on limited area’ (consist of set-aside and per hectare aid for 
cereals). 
 The impact of the production subsidies is shown in the table below. As can be seen, 
there is a considerable change after subtracting the limited area payments from the PSE which 
was applied after the MacSharry reform. In the CAP obligatory payments were distributed to 
the large-scale producers which caused a large decline in PSE (see table below).      
The estimation of PSE gives better information on the amount of support which is given 
to the producers. In the table below, the amount of the producer support based on limited area 
for set-aside payments per hectare is subtracted from the total PSE. The strong decline after 
subtracting the direct payments based on limited area payments worsened after the MacSharry 
reform and continued until the end of the decade. The huge difference between the PSE and the 
PSE after direct payments based on limited area payments is the increasing amount of transfers 
from consumers to producers. This is especially done to show, where set-aside payments are 
not used as an instrument to support producers on the market, what will be a possible effect of 
the PSE on the producers.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 The UK Parliament: Science and Technology- First Report, Chapter 4: Agricultural Support Programmes, 1999  
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Table 3.14: The total PSE and the PSE after subtracting payments based on limited area.  
(Euro/ mn) 
Year  Wheat Barley Other grains Maize 
 PSE  
W total  
PSE w-Dp 
limited 
PSE  
B total  
PSE  B-Dp 
limited 
PSE  
o.g. total  
PSE o.g.-Dp 
limited 
PSE  
M total  
PSE m-Dp 
limited 
1986 8,315 8,271 5,106 5,099 5,515 5,508 2,926 2,924 
1988 6,933 6,900 4,125 4,114 4,263 4,251 2,468 2,466 
1990 6,018 5,941 3,960 3,951 4,212 4,202 2,417 2,414 
1992 7,424 7,311 4,032 3,997 4,329 4,299 2,991 2,986 
1993 8,900 5,315 5,401 3,620 5,896 3,890 2,423 2,194 
1994 9,392 4,129 5,683 3,043 6,276 4,207 2,000 1,489 
1995 8,680 6,287 5,665 2,260 6,588 2,600 2,658 1,919 
1996 7,769 1,120 4,542 9,370 5,557 1,339 2,035 1,006 
1997 7,566 1,119 4,872 1,289 5,828 1,642 2,152 1,200 
1998 9,981 3,584 6,511 3,081 7,563 3,531 2,385 1,459 
1999 10,673 4,172 5,966 2,580 7,105 3,116 2,727 1,780 
2000 9,948 2,611 4,795 1,120 6,039 1,692 2,988 1,340 
2001 9,559 1,720 5,131 942 6,313 1,373 2,792 963 
2003 9,566 1,495 5,155 992 5,587 1,264 2,710 1,289 
Source: calculation from the Eurostat database and myself, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003  
 
In the figure below, the PSE and the PSE after subtracting direct payments based on 
limited areas which were calculated above are also illustrated. The important difference after 
subtracting the direct payments based on limited area had a considerable negative effect on the 
transfers from consumers to producers. The application of the compulsory set-aside measure, in 
particular, made an important contribution to transfers from consumers to producers. 
 
Figure 3.15: The PSE for cereal before and after subtracting direct payments based on limited 
area (Euro/ mn) 
PSE total and PSE after subtracting the direct payments based on limited area payments 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
years
m
n 
to
nn
e 
Eu
ro
0
1.000
2.000
3.000
4.000
5.000
6.000
7.000
8.000
PSE wheat total 
PSEw-Dp limited
PSE Barley total 
PSE B-Dp limited
PSE other grains 
PSE o.g.-Dp limited
PSE maize total 
PSEm-Dp limited
 
 139
In the figure below, the impact of the direct payments based on area set-aside combined 
with the market price measure is shown. Here only large-scale producers, who must use set-
aside (obligatory) and receive direct payments based on limited area, are considered.  At the 
original support price, P1, farmers produce at Q1. The price was then reduced to P2 and 
farmers now receive compensatory payment for this reduction, in accordance with their 
production level. This reduction is calculated for producers with the amount of withdrawal 
from production.  
 
Figure 3.16.1: The impact of the price support measures combined with set-aside measures. 
 
 
 P                       D           
          
                        C                        F  A     
     P1                  
      
    P2                     E           B                         H    
 
 
 
                    S1 
 
 
  S   
                        Q3   Q4    Q2              Q1  Q 
 
Source: Rosemary Fennell: The CAP, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p.201  
 
Over time the arable area which is left for set-aside reduces the amount of arable area 
and therefore the surplus amount. The shift in supply curve from S to S1 reduces production 
from Q1 to Q2 while demand for products increases because of the price reduction from Q3 to 
Q4.  
As a result of this support system, consumer surplus increases to an amount of P1P2CE, 
Producer gain from price support payment is P1P2FB and set-aside is FBAH. In fact these areas 
would be a loss of producers in absence of the support scheme.    
The effects of the price support measures when it is combined with set-aside measures 
are given below: 
• If direct payments are used with set-aside then this has a better impact on the consumer 
surplus and producer gain (see table above),            
• It has an surplus reduction effect on production, 
• The set-aside measure is better if it is compulsory because voluntary set-aside has less 
effect on the surplus reduction, 
• Set-aside is combined with direct payments to reduce the income loss of producers. 
However, by doing so, producer income increases together with production amount, which 
means 15 % set-aside forces producers to increase production in the other 85% of arable land. 
(see Table 2.7.2) 
• Compulsory set-aside increases the cost of the budget to prevent a surplus amount.  
It is not evident whether the use of intervention measures or set-aside measures is best for the 
prevention of overproduction. It is also not clear which of these measures costs the CAP 
budget the most. 
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• In the Union after 2000, cereal product prices fell, while on the world market they 
increased. This price fall led to a sharp decline of export refunds in 1996 compared to 1990 
(see Table 3.18.1). This resulted in an increase in direct payments. (see table 3.14) “If the 
desired level of supply control had been attained by an uncompensated price cut, a large saving 
to taxpayers and consumers would have been made initially for the CAP budget. However, as 
world prices rose in the mid-nineties these gains tended to diminish as much as the price gap 
reduced.”46   
 A considerable fall in producers’ incomes would have occurred because MPS are 
calculated according to the price gap between world and internal producers. If the direct 
payments did not exist in the CAP then the amount of payments would be very minor and not    
considerable as market support. 
The effects of direct payments on the market are given below: 
Positive effect of direct payments: 
• Direct payments are not directly related to the  price support system and have less of an 
effect on price support,  
• Direct payments are given to cover the income gap of producers, 
• They have a less distorting effect relative to the market price support, 
• Direct payments relative to other measures have less negative effects on unfair trade. 
• They have reduced the tension between the EU and third world country producers, 
• Direct payments create an income for farmers, 
• They have reduced  surplus amounts, because they are based on compulsory set-aside,     
• The application of the decoupled payments removes link to historical production levels, 
• Market price support influences the market share of producers whereas direct payments 
have no direct influence on market creation.  
Negative effects of flat rate payments: 
• Redistribute income from consumer and taxpayer to producer, 
• Direct payments have a negative effect on price support and market stability,  
• Direct payments are distributed to ensure the farmers do nothing with their land,  
• Politically unpopular with producer representative outlook, 
• Reduce the productivity of producers, because they are getting paid to do nothing, 
• They have an indirect effect on  production depending on whether the producer  uses 
them to increase production capacity or not, 
• They have negative effects on productivity, 
• Once given it is difficult to stop these payments, 
• It is difficult to estimate application and control, 
• Direct payments increase farmers’ income and this increased income of the farmers also 
increases their financial capacity which stimulates the next term investment and 
production in the short run.     
 
Future perspective of direct payments;   
Begun in 2005, the application of decoupled payments is expected to reduce the 
negative effects of direct payments such as over-production and excessive monetary transfers 
to producers via other support measures such as price support and export subsidies which have 
a direct effect on the market and reduce fair trade in the world. Indeed, breaking the link 
between production and payments will reduce the production of specific crops and the share of 
crop land which is set- aside will increase. Since 2000 the decline in cereals prices in the EU 
has fallen below the world prices. Therefore, the price gap between the EU and world 
producers disappeared. This implies that price support which was applied in the CAP could be 
                                                 
46 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs: Defra Economic Evaluation of Set-aside, p.10 
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removed. In fact it should be adjusted in accordance with the price gap between internal and 
external producers used for the calculation of the CCT and export subsidies. However, neither 
the CCT nor the export subsides has been adjusted to the new price gap. By doing this, on the 
one hand, excessive transfers to producers via tariff and export subsidies together with direct 
income support were increased, whilst cereals export to third world countries were also 
increased. On the other hand, imported product access to the EU market was reduced because 
of maintenance of the CCT, in spite of the disappearance of the price gap between internal and 
external producers. It is expected that newly applied decoupled payments will replace market 
support which affects the CCT and export subsidies. By doing this the trade-distorting effects 
of CCT and export subsidies will be reduced. In the figure below a future perspective of the 
decoupled direct payments is illustrated.  
 
Figure 3.16.2: Direct Payments – level in new Member States (phased in over 10 years) 
 
Source: Gay S.H., OsterBurg B, Baldock D, Zdanowicz A: Recent Evolution of the EU CAP, WP.6,   
 
3.2.3.3 Intervention Purchasing for Storage to Support Prices, 
 
The intervention price is one of the most important policy instruments of the CAP. The 
intervention price has two important roles within the CAP system. First it has a price stability 
effect on the market, and second it secures the income of the producers by preventing a price 
fall below the intervention price. Under the CAP system the intervention price determines 
import tariffs, export subsidies and payments for storage. 
Import tariffs determine the difference between world reference price and producer 
price. The price gap is applied as import tariff. The export subsidies are also estimated by using 
the same price gap, which is then multiplied with the difference between production and 
consumption. The storage payments are also made according to the amount of intervention 
purchase to cover storage costs and insure orderly marketing over the season. 
The intervention price for cereals is the price at which wheat, barley; maize, rye, 
sorghum, and durum wheat are purchased. In the last decade the intervention price mechanism 
has played a very important role in price stabilization within the internal market. But after 2000 
intervention prices tended to decrease. “In 2000 and 2001 cereals intervention prices reduced 
7.5% as in the schedule given below: 
   119.19 €/t (for 1999/2000)  
110.25 €/t (for 2000/2001)   
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 101.31 €/t (for 2001/2002) and further decrease is also expected because of 
improvement in the market capacity”47 The reason for this decline is the decreasing gap 
between world price and the EU market price. However, the world reference price for cereal 
products has tended to increase since 2000, and if the price increase is maintained there will 
be no need to prevent the access of imported cereals with higher tariffs or support exports 
with subsidies (see table below).  
 
Table 3.15: The price gap between world reference price and producer price at farm gate in the 
CAP for barley and wheat products in Euros (€) 
Barley Wheat year 
Farm gate 
price 
Reference 
price 
Market 
Price gap 
Farm gate 
price 
Reference 
price 
Market 
Price gap 
1986 172.1 68.6 103.7 205 94 109 
1988 160.7 89.7 71.0 187 100 87 
1989 162.4 115.0 47.3 188 141 47 
1990 157.3 84.9 72.4 176 1  09 98 
1992 152.1 74.7 77.3 167 100 67 
1993 139.5 68.0 71.5 155 101 55 
1994 131.6 65.8 65.8 140 104 36 
1995 130.8 92.8 38.0 143 126 17 
1996 128.3 125.8 2.6 143 153 0 
1997 119.5 111.0 8.4 134 135 0 
1998 109.1 66.3 42.8 123 100 23 
1999 111.4 77.7 33.8 121 91 30 
2000 111.5 109.1 2.4 120 114 6 
2001 109.5 109.5 0.0 123 125 0 
2002 104.4 100.8 3.6 116 119 0 
Source: selected from OECD database -agricultural statistics used for PSE calculation for barley and wheat 
products.   http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,2340,en_2825_494504_35009718_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
In the table above, world reference prices and producer price at farm gate are given, of 
which the price gap for cereal products is calculated for barley and wheat. The decreasing price 
gap for selected cereal products between world reference price and producer price at farm gate 
in the CAP of the EU is of considerable importance. This indicates the unnecessary application 
of an intervention price mechanism in the EU’s CAP, because such small price differences 
between producers price at farm gate are also observed in member countries. But such a market 
price differential between member countries is not considered for protecting producers from 
each other. Furthermore, producers in cheaper regions together with higher cost regions are 
taken into consideration and a unique price intervention mechanism is applied to prevent a 
price fluctuation in the market. However, the above-mentioned price gap is used as a 
preventive measure and applied with a previous percentage as a CCT on third world country 
products in the CAP.  This price gap, which has almost disappeared between world price and 
producer price in the CAP, is still maintained and applied as an export subsidy for exporting 
surplus products outside the Union. These unfair applications of the EU’s CAP on the one 
hand, reduced consumer welfare both in and out of the Union, and on the other hand, increased 
transfers from consumers to producers.            
In the table below, the impact of the intervention measures is calculated for the PSE in 
the EU’s CAP, but for producers in Turkey intervention measures are not relevant because 
                                                 
47 Markus Hofreiter: Der Reform bedarf der CAP aus Österreichischer Perspektive, 2002, p.4 (Translation by the 
Author)  
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there is no transfer in the form of intervention price support, therefore, the PSE calculation for 
the intervention price mechanism is only calculated for the CAP. The estimation of the 
intervention price is calculated by subtracting the market price support (indicator ‘Aa and Ab’ 
in OECD database) from the total PSE. Besides the indicator ‘A’ there are also some other 
transfers from consumers to producers which are defined in indicator ‘Ca’ payments based on 
unlimited area. However, the amount of transfers to producers is very small and can be ignored 
in this calculation     
 
Table 3.16: The total PSE and the PSE after subtracting intervention amount in EU- 15.  
(Euro mn) 
Year Wheat Barley Other grains Maize 
 PSE PSE-I PSE PSE-I PSE PSE-I PSE PSE-I 
1986 8,315 846 5,106 261 5,515 281 2,926 238 
1988 6,933 897 4,125 266 4,263 292 2,468 230 
1990 6,018 1,312 3,960 311 4,212 341 2,417 281 
1992 7,424 1,696 4,032 687 4,329 761 2,991 353 
1993 8,900 4,476 5,389 2,318 5,896 2,620 2,402 475 
1994 9,392 6,093 5,672 3,111 6,276 3,542 2,000 736 
1995 8,680 7,091 5,649 5,649 6,588 5,731 2,658 985 
1996 7,769 7,769 4,531 4,395 5,557 5,190 2,035 1,359 
1997 7,566 7,561 4,857 4,416 5,828 5,222 2,152 1,289 
1998 9,981 7,573 6,491 4,283 7,560 5,123 2,385 1,264 
1999 10,673 7,794 5,955 4,310 7,105 5,156 2,727 1,336 
2000 9,948 8,909 4,813 4,690 6,039 5,630 2,988 2,089 
2001 9,559 9,222 5,131 5,131 6,313 6,132 2,792 2,290 
2003 9,566 9,419 5,155 5,041 6,242 6,107 2,710 1,837 
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database and by myself, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003  
Note; PSE= PSE total and PSE-I= PSE after subtracting the calculated intervention measure from PSE total 
 
As is seen, there is a considerable decrease after subtracting the intervention amount 
from the total PSE at the beginning of the PSE calculation. However, at the end of the decade, 
especially after the application of the direct payments, a sharp declination on the intervention 
price amount is observed. The application of the intervention measure is actually a price 
support and stability measure on the market. However, there is a considerable effect on the 
price support relative to the other support measures. Over time direct payments, which were 
planned to be replaced by market price support, had reduced the effect of the intervention price 
mechanism in the CAP. The direct payments were less trade-distorting support measures and 
given especially for storage costs. The intervention price support had a considerable effect on 
the PSE calculation, because most of the over-production was bought by the Community 
agencies and this prevented the price fall below the given intervention price level, therefore 
producers were protected from a strong price fall and secure with a guaranteed product price, 
thus guaranteeing income level. The community agencies, on the one hand, shared the cost of 
over-production with producers, who are supported by the intervention price mechanism, and 
on the other hand, these agencies support producers with direct storage payments in order to 
gain a reasonable income. 
Subsidies for storage of over-production are illustrated in the figure below. The 
intervention measure, which increases the surplus amounts, is compared with set-aside on the 
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same table in order to bring about a better understanding of the possible effects of these 
measures.  
 In Figure 3.17 Pw is the world price and Pe is the market price. The intervention price 
is the minimum price which is offered to producers by the community agencies. At that price 
community agencies will purchase over-production if the market prices, Pc, fall below the 
intervention price, Pi. An intervention price of Pi producer surplus is ‘7, 8, 9, 10`, which will 
be purchased from producers by the community agencies. At the intervention price (Pi), which 
is higher than the world price (Pw), consumer surplus reduces to ‘7, 8, 9’. The subsidy amount 
which is given to producers is the areas ‘1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10’, which will allow the EU to 
sell the surplus in the world markets. If Pw is the world market price and Pi is the intervention 
price, the impact on consumer and producer surplus and CAP-costs are explained below.  
At Pe (EU price), consumer surplus decreases with the areas 1 2, 7, 8, 9 (= A) 
And producer surplus increases with the areas A + 3, 4, 5, 10 (= B)  
Net: 3, 4, 5, 10 
CAP costs: 3, 2, 8, 4, 10, 9, 11, 5, 6, 12 
Net effect: cost: 2, 8, 9, 11, 12, 6 
 
Figure 3.17: Illustration of surplus and intervention payments 
 
Now let us consider the set-aside measure on the same table where production after the 
set-aside reduces from Q5 to Q4.  Then,  
Producers are restricted to produce up to Q4 and save costs is the area 5, 6, 12 
Consumer surplus would remain intact 
Producer surplus would fall by the area 5 
A net gain of 6, 12 
Now suppose there is an alternative price cut from Pe to Pi: 
Consumer surplus increases 1, 2 
Producer surplus decreases 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Save costs: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12 
A net gain: 2, 8, 6, 12 
 
Conclusion,  
A decline in the price gap between world price and Union price will continue to 
increase the demand of consumers for the cereal products of the CAP. The increasing 
substitution of third world countries’ cereal products with the CAP’s cereals will continue to 
reduce the share of third world countries products in the world market. Furthermore, 
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application of intervention measures will continue to increase the internal product prices above 
the world price. The increase in internal product price means the price gap between internal 
and world cereal products, which is applied as tariff measure on imported products, will 
continue to increase the price of the imported products in the EU market. On the one hand, 
imported product access will prevent the results of high common custom tariffs, and on the 
other hand, export subsidies of the CAP will continue to reduce the third world countries’ share 
in the world market. It is obvious that the application of price support measures will 
increasingly raise the trade distortion in the world market, if its existing application of price 
support, which affects the application of CCT and export subsidies, is maintained in the EU’s 
CAP.  
 
3.2.3.4 Payments Based on Input Use   
 
In the following section one of the important agricultural support measures which are 
used both in Turkey and in the EU is estimated. This will facilitate a better comparison of the 
amounts of the support measures between Turkey and the EU. However, there are some 
difficulties in comparing transfers via support measures between Turkey and the EU, because 
in the EU there are various support measures which cause monetary transfers from consumers 
to producers. But in Turkey the support measures are mostly concentrated in indicator ‘E’ 
which is based on input use.                  
An input payment is dependent on the use of variable inputs or farm services or farm 
investments in a firm. “These payments which are conditional on the on-farm use of specific or 
variable inputs include explicit and implicit payments affecting specific variable input costs (a. 
Based on use of variable inputs); the cost of on-farm technical, sanitary and phytosanitary 
services (b. Based on use of on-farm services); or affecting fixed costs, including investment 
costs (c. Based on use of fixed inputs).”48  
 In the tables below a comparison of the input subsidies between the EU and Turkey is 
given. In the given period important differences in transfers via input subsidies between Turkey 
and the EU is observed. The reason for higher transfers via input subsidies in Turkey relative to 
the EU is related to support measures, because input subsidies were the only support measure 
besides the market support. However, in the CAP there were some other support measures 
which were used for monetary transfers from consumers and taxpayer to producers.  
In the OECD methodology for PSE calculation, input subsidies are concentrated only in 
the indicator ‘E’. Indicator ‘E’ is based on input use. The annual transfers from taxpayers to 
agricultural producers arising from support measures based on the use of a specific fixed or 
variable input, of which ‘Ea’ comprises concessional loans, fertilizer subsidies, hybrid seed 
subsidy, pesticide subsidy, seed loans and electricity subsidy (irrigation), water subsidy 
(irrigation).  ‘Eb’ is based on use of on-farm services. And ‘Ec’ is based on-farm investment, 
on-farm development work and concessional loans. However, in Turkey all the input subsidies 
are based on variable input use. But in addition, in the EU, payments based on on-farm services 
and farm investments were also realised.   
The estimation of the indicator E which is calculated by using the formula below will 
contribute to determining the amount of transfers via input subsidies both in the EU and in 
Turkey. This is adapted from the PSE formula for cereal products:  
 
PSE = (Pp-Pr.X).Q+ Ea + Eb + Ec   
 
 
                                                 
48 OECD Database: Methodology for the Measurement of Support and Use in Policy Evaluation 
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Where; 
Q = quantity produced (considered only indicator Aa= based on unlimited output)           
 Pp = producer price in domestic currency units. 
 Pr = world price in world currency unit 
 X = exchange conversion factor (to convert world reference price from dollar to euro) 
And indicator E is considered both for the EU and for Turkey, where;   
Ea = ‘payment based on variable input use’ 
Eb = ‘payments based on use of on-farm services’  
Ec = ‘payments based on-farm investments’ 
 
Table 3.17.1 The total PSE and PSE after subtracting payments based on input use in the EU’s 
CAP (Euro/ mn)  
Year Wheat Barley Other grains Maize 
 PSE PSE-Ip PSE PSE-Ip PSE PSE-Ip PSE PSE-Ip 
1986 8,315 7,876 5,106 4,899 5,515 5,288 2,926 2,738 
1988 6,933 6,518 4,125 3,907 4,263 4,025 2,468 2,285 
1990 6,018 5,512 3,960 3,758 4,212 3,999 2,417 2,209 
1992 7,424 6,902 4,032 3,780 4,329 4,051 2,991 2,806 
1993 8,900 8,464 5,389 5,159 5,896 5,635 2,402 2,250 
1994 9,392 8,974 5,672 5,461 6,276 6,039 2,000 1,864 
1995 8,680 8,298 5,649 5,438 6,588 6,343 2,658 2,535 
1996 7,769 7,297 4,531 4,274 5,557 5,257 2,035 1,896 
1997 7,566 7,140 4,857 4,607 5,828 5,539 2,152 2,006 
1998 9,981 9,571 6,491 6,262 7,560 7,289 2,385 2,249 
1999 10,673 10,252 5,955 5,725 7,105 6,834 2,727 2,569 
2000 9,948 9,463 4,813 4,570 6,039 5,746 2,988 2,815 
2001 9,559 9,116 5,131 4,901 6,313 6,042 2,792 2,589 
2003 9,566 9,098 5,155 4,922 6,242 5,963 2,710 2,521 
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database and by myself, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries,   
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003  
Note; PSE= PSE total and PSE-I= PSE after subtracting the calculated input payments from PSE total 
 
Indicated in the table below is the important share of input subsidies which is 
transferred from consumers to producers in Turkey.  As mentioned above, in Turkey indicator 
‘E’ is the only measure which is realised for supporting producers. For this reason a large 
transfer from consumers and taxpayers to producers is realised in this period. However, 
unequal distribution of subsidies, which are given mostly to those large scale producers in 
western regions relative to the eastern regions, reduced the effectiveness of support measures 
for reducing regional disparities in Turkey.     
The negative values which are observed in the Table 3.17.2 does not mean that there 
were negative transfers in that year, but was caused by the higher support amount which is in 
excess of the monetary value obtained from products sold in the market.     
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Table 3.17.2 The total PSE and PSE after subtracting payments based on input use in Turkey                      
(Euro/ mn) 
Year Wheat Barley Other grains Maize 
 PSE PSE-Ip PSE PSE-Ip PSE PSE-Ip PSE PSE-Ip 
1986 348 101 220 175 220 175 36 17 
1990 724 375 301 239 301 239 100 76 
1992 720 335 290 225 290 225 126 101 
1993 650 248 457 393 457 393 100 73 
1994 563 150 132 72 132 72 5 -19 
1996 464 95 260 151 260 151 81 46 
1998 1,501 1,126 655 551 655 551 170 136 
2000 710 517 291 238 291 238 113 97 
2001 -90 -137 40 30 40 30 18 14 
2003 1, 294 1, 282 229 229 229 229 175 175 
Source: OECD database: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005 calculated by 
myself.   http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,2340,en_2825_494504_35009718_1_1_1_1,00.html 
 
Conclusion   
Input subsidies have an important effect on reducing the producer price. Input subsidies 
contribute to reducing the cost of production. If the reduction of production cost is reflected in 
the product price then the consumer will profit from a decrease in product price. But if the 
decline in production cost is not reflected in the product price and captured by the producer as 
a profit, then input subsidies will only contribute to an increase in the profit rate of producers. 
By doing this producers may increase their profit rate in the short run, but in the long run the 
share of producers in the world market will be reduced because of higher product prices which 
could be reduced in accordance with input subsidies which cut the production cost. A decline 
in the market share will also reduce both producer profit and consumer welfare.               
In Turkey input subsidies have had both positive and negative effects on producers. On 
the one hand decline in production cost contributed to an increase in the income of producers. 
But for consumers it has had less effect because input subsidies, which were expected to reduce 
the producer price and consequently the consumption prices, were not realised. On the other 
hand a decline in producer price for exported products into the EU market made no change in 
exported product prices, because the application of the CCT prevents such a reduction in the 
producer price. Therefore, input subsidies have had no effect on exported product prices. This 
has meant any decline in the producer price can only contribute to an increase in the price gap 
which is used to calculate the CCT amount in the EU market.                   
In the EU input subsidies contributed to reduction in the producer price and 
consequently in the consumption price. On the one hand, a decline in production cost has been 
reflected in the producer prices and on the other hand a decline in producer price was used to 
increase the market share in Turkey, because there was not such a high tariff restriction as there 
was in the EU.       
 
3.2.3.5 Export Subsidies to Encourage Exports 
 
 An export subsidy is a payment to a firm or to an individual who ships goods abroad. It 
can be either specific or ad valorem. As a consequence of subsidy measures, the “producer will 
export goods up to the point where domestic price exceeds the foreign price by the amount of 
the subsidy.”49 Export subsidies are distributed to increase the market share of internal 
                                                 
49 Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfiled: International Economics, 1996, p.198  
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producers in the world market. In the CAP most of the cereal products have over-production 
and the need to reduce this over-production is the main reason for export subsidies, because in 
the EU product prices of cereals have been higher than the world prices particularly in the last 
decade. Over time the above-mentioned price gap fell and almost disappeared between internal 
and external producers. However, the application of export subsidies, which should have been 
halted, was still maintained, because the calculation of export subsidies was estimated in 
accordance with the price gap between world and internal product prices. Nevertheless, export 
subsidies were the only support measure in exports which was transparently negotiated, 
quantified and reduced during the Uruguay round. Over a six year period from 1986 to 1992, a 
36% reduction of subsidy level in each of 22 products was planned, and the volume of export 
subsidies was to be reduced by 21% within this period for each of these products.  
In the MacSharry reform, on the one hand, producers were supported so that the 
production cost fell in recent years below the world price, and on the other hand it contributed 
to an increase in exports of cereal products. As a consequence of the MacSharry reform, 
producers received reasonable incomes which were transferred from consumers and taxpayers 
to them. However, export subsidies increased the cost of the CAP budget whilst producer gains 
increased and consumer surplus decreased.  
 In this section, the impact of export subsidies on producer gain is researched. Export 
subsidies are trade-distorting support measures, because due to this support some lower cost 
products of third world countries are replaced with the higher cost products of developed 
countries in the world market. It is obvious that, if let us say the EU stopped giving export 
subsidies for cereal products this would reduce exports to that country. However, when the EU 
withdraws from a market it is obvious that products from other developed countries, which are 
equally competitive whether, subsidised or not, will take over. So the development and fair 
trade effect of removing export subsidies is exaggerated. Therefore, WTO measures are 
required to be applied all over the world to increase fair trade.              
In the CAP some exported agricultural products are subsidized, such as, cereal 
products, olive oil, tobacco, sheep meat, wine and some fruit and vegetables. In addition, in the 
CAP export subsidies which were given to producers were rather high compared to Turkey’s 
and some other developed countries’ export subsidies. For example, “in 1990 the overall cost 
of EU agricultural subsidies amounted to US$ 134 bn compared to $ 74 bn in the USA and $ 
59 bn in Japan”50 But, in Turkey in the same decade, export subsidies were calculated as 
17.637 mn/ USD in 1996 and it was increased up to 27.996 mn/ USD in 1999 (State Institute 
for Statistic, report in 2001). This increase was rather lower in Turkey, which contributed little 
to the agricultural GDP in the last decade not only for EU producers but also for Turkish 
producers. The declining trend in the share of agriculture in the total GDP is indicated in Table 
4.9.2.         
 In the EU, the impact of export subsidies is dependent on the Commission and its 
agencies. The producers offer the Commission different prices for different amounts of 
products. Let say producer x demands from the Commission100 Euro per ton, for the 
exportation of wheat, and other producers offer 80 Euro per ton; then the Commission chooses 
the lowest subsidy offer and allows the exporting of its product. The problem here is that there 
is no limitation or any order for the member countries producers; it is possible that the same 
producers may receive export rights for each consecutive year. 
 In Turkey policies on export subsidies are applied in accordance with the policies 
undertaken by the WTO. The application of the Turkish policy has a direct effect on export 
subsidies in Turkey and the application of the WTO policy on export subsidies in other 
countries has an indirect effect on Turkey’s exports.      
                                                 
50 David Pinder: The New Europe, 1998, p.58    
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Therefore, both in the EU and in Turkey export subsidies are calculated according to 
the differences between the consumption and production amount multiplied by the market price 
differential as in the formula given below.  
The formula below is used for the estimation of export subsidies for cereal products, 
which is used for the estimation of the PSE amount for export subsidies. 
 
Export Subsidy = (Pp-Pr). (Qp-Qc)    
Pp: EU producer price at farm gate (estimates by intervention price) 
Pr: World reference price at farm gate 
Qp: production amount of commodity  
Qc: Consumption amount of commodity  
 
In Table 3.18.1 below subsidized cereal products for exportation are shown. In the 
beginning of the 1980s up to the MacSharry reform in 1992 and the Uruguay round in 1994, 
export subsidies had a considerable effect on the exportation of cereal products and “For most 
of its life CAP spending, mainly on support-buying and export subsidies, absorbed two-thirds 
or more of the EU's budget. It has recently accounted for just less than one-half, due to 
increases in such items as Regional and Social Funds.”51   
In Table 3.18.1 export subsidies in the EU are given. As H. Richard mentioned, the 
amount of export subsidies together with the intervention purchasing comprises almost two 
thirds of the CAP budget in the nineties. However, as indicated in Table 3.6.1, the export 
subsidies together with market interventions comprises almost half of the CAP budget, of 
which 4 percent goes to the export subsidies according to the Eurostat statistics in 2002.  
 
Table 3.18.1: The export subsidies in the EU for cereals (Euro/ mn) 
 Year Wheat EU Barley Other grains 
 Export sub.   MPS Export sub.  MPS Export sub. MPS 
 Euro/ mn % in MPS Euro/ mn Euro/ mn % in MPS Euro/ mn Euro/ mn % in MPS Euro/ mn 
1986 1,209 16 7,469 595 12 4,845 306 5 5,234 
1988 1,662 27 6,036 1,070 27 3,859 159 4 3,971 
1990 2,591 55 4,706 941 25 3,649 860 22 3,871 
1992 1,500 26 5,728 369 11 3,345 256 7 3,568 
1993 1,085 24 4,424 558 18 3,071 539 16 3,277 
1994 528 16 3,299 177 6 2,561 156 5 2,734 
1995 218 13 1,589 176 10 1,653 148 7 1,857 
1996 -223 -- 0 38 28 136 78 21 367 
1997 -15 -300 5 86 19 442 107 17 606 
1999 348 12 2,879 229 14 1,645 229 12 1,949 
2000 126 12 1,039 22 18 122 82 2 409 
2001 0 -- 337 0 -- 0 0 -- 181 
2003 -6 -4 147 4 3 114 6 -- 0 
 Source: calculated from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries,           
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003 and OECD database.   
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,2340,en_2825_494504_35009718_1_1_1_1,00.html calculated by myself 
 
  
                                                 
51 Howarth Richard: The failures of CAP, 1999, http://www.globalbritain.org/BNN/BN03.htm 
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In the table above, the amounts of the export subsidies for cereals were about 7% for 
wheat, 10% for barley and 18% for other grains in 1986. Since 2000, the amount of export 
subsidies has sharply reduced in the CAP (see table below). According to the given calculation, 
the amount of export subsidies in the EU has less value as a share of the PSEs, compared with 
the second table which indicates Turkey’s export subsidies. However, export subsidies in the 
EU were higher only in the period beginning early in 1986 to 1993 and in the second half of 
the nineties. In contrast to this, in Turkey the amount of export subsidies as a share of the PSE 
showed a considerable increase after 1993. This increase on export subsidies was maintained 
until the millennium and after that, a steady decrease on export subsides was observed. As 
noted in the table the negative values indicate that in that year there was less production than 
consumption which caused a negative value. However, this did not mean that there was not any 
subsidy in that year.      
In the 1980s higher subsidies also contributed to an increase in EU exports of cereal 
products. However, after the Uruguay round and the MacSharry reform a decline in exports 
and an increase in production and intervention stocks was observed (see also Table 2.7.2). One 
of the most important reasons for these increases in production and surpluses of cereal products 
is their dependence on coupled payments which required specific production in order to receive 
direct income payments.    
The effect of export subsidy on the EU market, which is calculated above, is illustrated 
in the figure below.  A higher share of export subsidies and a sharp decline after the Uruguay 
round is observed. 
 
Figure 3.18.1: The export subsidies and the PSE for cereals in the EU  
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In the Table 3.18.2, the amount of the MSE for export subsidies to Turkish producers is 
calculated. In the mid-nineties the amount of these subsidies tended to increase because world 
prices for cereal products rose. This increase in world prices reduced the market price 
differential between producer price for Turkish producers and the reference price of third world 
country producers. Therefore, in some years the calculated export subsidies are given with a 
negative value. However, this does not mean there was negative subsidy. In the table below a 
sharp increase in the MPS, especially for wheat, is observed. The reason for this is the 
considerable decline in production amount in recent years which increased the MPS for the 
wheat producers in Turkey (see Table3.9).         
 
 
 
 151
Table 3.18.2: The export subsidies in Turkey for cereals (Euro/mn) 
Year Wheat TR Barley Other grains 
 Export 
sub.  -w 
 MPS-w Export 
sub. -w 
MPS-w Export 
sub.-w 
MPS-w 
1986 8 101 11 175 11 175 
1990 34 375 22 239 22 239 
1992 7 335 -14 225 -14 225 
1993 19 248 56 393 56 393 
1994 22 150 11 72 11 72 
1996 -6 95 8 151 8 151 
1998 49 1,126 87 551 87 551 
2000  14 516 6 239 6 239 
2001 4 -137 1 30 1 30 
2003 -50 1,282 11 229 11 229 
Source: OECD database: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005.    .   
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,2340,en_2825_494504_35009718_1_1_1_1,00.html calculated by myself 
 
In Turkey, during this period, a steady increase in export subsidies was observed. This 
increase was noticed particularly after 1995 and continued until the millennium. However, 
afterwards, the application of the 2001 measures, which were planned to adopt the agricultural 
sector into the CAP system, contributed to reducing export subsidies.    
 
 Figure 3.18.2: The export subsidies and the PSE for cereals in Turkey 
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In Figure 3.19 below, the effects of the export subsidies are illustrated. Let us suppose 
that in the EU for domestic producers, a subsidy of ‘s’ amount per unit is given. With this 
subsidy, domestic producers will be able to earn Ps= Ps’+s in the world market, while prices in 
the importing country decrease to Ps’ level. The price in the domestic market is higher than in 
the importing country. In the world market, prices are lower than the EU, but after the 
application of a subsidy in the domestic market, prices in the world market will become lower 
as well as in the foreign country. 
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Figure 3.19: Impact of the Export subsidies on the export 
 
 
 
 
Source: Paul Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld: International Economics, 1996 p.198 
 
The impact of the export subsidies is given below: 
The producer gains a+b+c, the consumer loses a+b, and the community agency also 
loses b+c+d+e+f+g. Thus, from these given amounts, the net welfare loss of export subsidies 
is: 
Consumer loss – producer gain + government loss = net loss 
      (a+b)  _          (a+b+c)   +  (b+c+d+e+f+g)   = b+d+e+f+g  
  
It is evident that export subsidies cause unfair competition in the market for the EU 
producers, and it causes a welfare loss for the nations (see also figure and graphic). The result 
of support policies in the CAP has negative effects on world prices. The reason for this 
negative effect is the strong protection of internal producers in the CAP system. But “the 
countries, which can influence world prices the most are the major producers and to a lesser 
extent, the large exporters which are relatively small producers.”52  
In the table below, the CAP expenditure is given. The amount of expenditure on export 
subsidies has decreased considerably. The excessive export subsidies which had negative 
effects on the world market prices for cereals were in decline in the Nineties.     
 
Table 3.19: The CAP expenditure in the EU 
Expenditure 1990 1995 2000 2001 
Total expenditure EU (billion 
Euro) 
45.6 68.4 92.3 96.7 
CAP Expenditure (billion €) 25 34.5 41.5 44.6 
Idem in %total expenditure 56% 50% 45% 46% 
Total export subsidies (billion €) 9.4 6,4 5.6 3.4 
Idem in % total CAP 37% 19% 14% 8% 
Intervention. Stock grains 14.4 6.9 8.7 6.8 
Idem in % total intervention  31% 10% 9% 7% 
Source: Regine Neyli and Ignace Coussement : The EU export subsidies and their impact on developing countries: Not losing 
sight of the real priorities, http://www.copa-cogeca.be/pdf/expsubsid_03_1e.pdf 
 
                                                 
52 Gary Storey, Andrew Schmitz, Alexander Harris: International Agricultural Trade, 1984, p.232 
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In the graphic below, excessive export subsidies, which are given within the EU, are 
illustrated.  
Figure 3.20: Excessive Export subsidies in the EU compared to the other nations  
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Source: http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/WTO/subsidies.html , US proposal for global agricultural trade 
reform, United States Department of Agriculture. 
 
The impact of this excessive protection of internal producers with export subsidies has 
negative effects on the world market for cereals, as it is illustrated in Figure 3.21 below. The 
higher cereal product prices in the EU are Ps but the community agency subsidises producers 
with an amount of Ps –Pw. By doing so internal producers increase their market share in the 
world market. This export subsidy reduces the product price below the world price to Ps1. The 
increasing market share of EU producers reduces the market share of world producers.  
The EU producers have, in the last decade, reduced their cereal production costs and 
product prices. A decline in product price reduced the price gap between world and EU cereal 
products so that the EU producers have the advantage on the world market without any export 
subsidy.  
Figure 3.21: Effects of the Export subsidies on the Nations Welfare   
 
    EU market    World    Importing Country
   
Source: Export subsidies and taxes, Reed Chapter 4 and Houck chapter 10 and 12 
http://www.umanitoba.ca/afs/agri_economics/course/069.303/notes/oct21.pdf 
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The EU is a large country. Application of the export subsidies in the EU has negative 
effects on the cost of the CAP budget.     
According to the s above, welfare loss for the nations can be summarized as: 
EU as a small country: 
Gain in producer surplus: a, b, c, e, f, g, h  
Loss of consumer surplus: a, b, f, g, h  
Community Expenditure: b, c, j, i 
Net welfare loss for EU: consumption cost + production cost + budget cost  
       b g f               +      e c d             +    g i d j   
World as a large country: 
In the figure, the impact of the export subsidies, financed by the CAP budget, is 
illustrated as the world market in the middle graph. It can be seen that the export subsidies 
product price of the internal producers has fallen below the world level from Pw to Ps1. The 
decline in product price has increased the market share (demand) of EU producers in the world 
from Q1 to D2, while the market share (supply) of third world countries has fallen from Q1 to 
S1.     
The loss for the world as a large country is given below:  
Gain in producer surplus:  a, b, c, e, f, g, h     
Loss of consumer surplus: a, b, f, g, h 
Community expenditure:  b, c, d, f, g 
Net welfare loss: consumption cost + production cost 
                       b g f      +       e c d     
Conclusion: 
The most important result for the CAP exports is a decrease in the price gap between 
world and EU cereal product prices. After 2000 cereal product prices in the world market went 
beyond the EU prices. This means that the CAP expenditure on export subsidies will not be 
required. The world market share of EU producers will increase without any subsidy. A 
decrease on cereal prices export subsidies has not been removed from the CAP agenda, and 
they continue to be maintained for the support of internal producers’ share in the world 
markets. The effects of the export subsidies for internal producers and for Turkish producers 
are given below: 
Positive effects; 
• Increased export of commodity, 
• Subsidies protect producers and rural welfare, 
• Subsidies have income effect, which contributes to increased producers’ profit and 
income via an increase in the market share, 
• Support insufficient producers to maintain their production, 
• Subvention redistributes income from the domestic consumer who pays a higher price 
to domestic producers of a commodity (who receive the higher price), 
• Price support or intervention price, prevent a fluctuation in the market, 
• Subsidies increase the market share that gives an impetus to increase the productivity in 
cereal production,      
• Subsidy is more preferable than tariff, subsidy is a direct form of aid    
 
Negative effects;   
• Subsidies cause over-production, 
• Subsidies reduce the product price in importing country but, internal product prices stay 
intact, 
• Because of the subsidy some efficient production of exportable commodity in the third 
world country is replaced by the insufficient production in the EU, 
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• Subsidy is a trade distortion for non-member countries, and reduces the welfare of the 
world economy, 
• Subsidies cause unfair competition and are inconsistent with the comparative 
advantages theory, 
• Subsidies reduce the welfare of the consumer if there is over-production,  
• It is difficult to estimate which producers get subvention, and once it is given it is 
difficult to remove (protective tariffs may have the same effect),   
• Reduce consumer surplus or cost, 
• Reduce competition of third world country producers, 
• Subsidy is used for political purposes, such as work place guarantee, because it is 
difficult to find a job for the low skilled workers, 
• Restrict import of commodity indirectly.   
 
 
3.2.3.6 The Production Quotas to Prevent Over-production 
   
 In the EU’s CAP production quotas are used to prevent over-production in certain 
agricultural products such as cereals, sugar, milk and milk products. There are four coexisting 
mechanisms for controlling production quantities. These are:  
“1.  Production quotas as such 
Quotas are fixed at national level for milk and sugar and allocated to farms or enterprises. 
Producers exceeding the quotas in each Member State face penalties.  
2.  National guaranteed production quotas 
These quotas (Maximum Guaranteed Quantities - MGQ -, Maximum Guaranteed Areas - MGA 
- and premiums per head of cattle) cover a long list of products and are equivalent to direct aid 
to producers, reduced proportionally if predetermined thresholds are exceeded.  
3.  Guaranteed production quotas at Community level 
These quotas, which are calculated on the basis of overall EU production, are being phased out 
and at present only apply to some processed fruit and vegetables, pulses and bananas.  
4. National quotas for surpluses 
These quotas are for some Mediterranean products (wine, using approved distillation volumes) 
and some fresh fruit and vegetables (using thresholds for withdrawal from the market).”53 
The National guaranteed production quotas are applied for cereal products. National 
guaranteed production quotas comprise of three application quotas: Maximum Guaranteed 
Quantities- MGQ -, Maximum Guaranteed Areas - MGA - and premiums per head of cattle) 
cover a long list of products and are equivalent to direct aid to producers, reduced 
proportionally if predetermined thresholds are exceeded. 
The impact of the production quotas is illustrated by using the theory of supply and 
demand. 
In the 1997, farmers were only allowed to produce a specific number of goods. 
Production quotas are required for cereals, beef and dairy products. Quotas can be considered 
as a production permit for farmers. The amount of restriction is required to reduce the surplus 
in the Union. “The Commission in Brussels says that intervention stocks of cereals, currently at 
5m ton, could rise to a record 58m ton in ten years. The beef mountain is expected to double, to 
1.5m ton. Alpine ranges of dairy products and sugar, lakes of olive oil and wine, could all 
reappear.”54  
                                                 
53 European Parliament Fact Sheets: (4.1.3) Agricultural Markets Policy Common Organisations of the Market 
(coms) general concept European Parliament (12/10/2000),  http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/4_1_3_en.htm 
54 Economist: Wanted: a farming revolution, Europe, Brussels, 1.September.1997 
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If the Commission requires producers to apply the production quotas, then the supply 
curve would shift to the left, which implies a decline in supply. The possible effect on the 
market from this decrease in production is the price increase, because the demand for basic 
foodstuffs is inelastic. Increasing prices will increase the profit and income of producers.     
 
Figure 3.22: Effects of the production quotas on the overproduction  
           S2         S1 
  
 
 
As is seen in the figure, the CAP restriction Q1 to Q2 increases the product price P1 to P2 
and total revenues of farmers from OP1EQ1 to OP2EQ2 which gives more revenue than the first 
one. Here it is clear that consumer welfare is reduced to P1P2EE’while producer gain is 
increased. This Quota measure therefore raises the income of one group at the expense of 
others.    
 
3.2.3.7 Quotas to protect from Import. 
 
Import quotas are the restriction of imports allowed into a country every year. Quotas 
help to ensure that the quantity of imports is strictly limited. If increasing foreign 
competitiveness lowers the world price of imports then the total amount spent on imports will 
reduce. These quotas to limit imported products are a protective measure for securing a balance 
of payments. They secure the protection of domestic producers because the producers know 
that the amount of imported products will never exceed the quota limit. The restricted quota 
amount is a guarantee for a balance of payments, because it prevents excessive import access 
into the domestic market, which might cause an imbalance of payments.  
There are two basic types of quotas: “absolute quotas and tariff-rate quotas. Absolute 
quotas limit the quantity of imports to a specified level during a specified period of time. 
Sometimes these quotas are set globally and thus, affect all imports, while sometimes they are 
set only against specified countries. Absolute quotas are generally administered on a first-come 
first-served basis. For this reason, many quotas are filled shortly after the opening of the quota 
period. Tariff-rate quotas allow a specified quantity of goods to be imported at a reduced tariff 
rate during the specified quota period.”55 These tariff rate quotas which are used in agriculture 
now exist in the EU along with the other WTO member countries. Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) do 
not limit trade. On the contrary they provide for imports at a favourable tariff up to an offered 
                                                 
55 Steven Suranovic: International Trade Theory and Policy Lecture notes, 8/ 16/ 2003, 
http://internationalecon.com/v1.0/ch10/10c060.html 
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limit. Beyond these limits an import is unlimited but at the normal tariff rate no reduction on 
tariff is now offered.         
In the EU TRQs were started as a result of the Uruguay round. The TRQs are managed 
by the European Commission and handled on a basis of first come first served, or on a basis of 
licence or on historic imports.  
First come first served. “Under this scheme, importers who are first to import products 
up to the limit set by the quota get the quota rents. Under the second form, the government, can 
either issue license on a first come first served basis allocate licenses across importers based on 
predetermined criteria, or sell the licenses at the auction.”56      
TRQs have been put into effect especially to secure the interest of exporters for certain 
traditional products such as bananas and coffee beans etc from developing countries.       
 Import quotas require greater collaboration with domestic firms. This has both negative 
and positive effects on the government trade policy. It has a positive effect because, “they give 
government officials greater administrative flexibility and power in dealing with domestic 
firms.”57 Government incitements are required to collaborate with domestic firms to increase 
economic development. But adaptation of quotas is dependent on the domestic production by 
using local resources and consumers’ demand, which is not easy to estimate. The process used 
to estimate the quota amount is obtained from producers. The government needs to know the 
required production capacity and its cost. This will then help to estimate the demand capacity 
of consumers and market price of the product. After these estimations, the government must 
determine the import capacity and the quota amount for the domestic market. This estimation 
process requires a strong collaboration between the government and producers to determine the 
import quota amount. On the one hand, restricted imports are desirable to prevent excessive 
imports in the domestic market, to prevent price fluctuation and to protect producers gain in the 
market. But on the other hand, a restricted import reduces the supply of this product, which 
causes a price increase in the domestic market and reduces the welfare of the consumers.  
 A tariff, by contrast, does not require such intensive research and relations with firms, 
but the adaptation of tariffs directly affects producers and it “allows later foreign price cuts to 
raise both import quantities and (if demand of imports is elastic) import values, thus 
complicating any official forecasts of the balance of payments.”58 
 However, adaptation of quotas is not the optimal way to protect producers and to 
increase welfare in the world by using international trade, as is explained in the figure below.  
 
Figure 3.23: Impact of import quotas 
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Source: Mia Mikic: International Trade, 1998, p328  
                                                 
56Bowen, Hollander, Viaene: Applied International Trade Analysis, 1998, p.172  
57Lindert and Pugel: International Economics, 1996, p.136 
58Lindert and Pugel: International Economics, 1996, p.136 
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Suppose that in the Union an import is limited under perfect competition and 
substitution between imported products and domestic products. In the figure above, under the 
no trade assumption, intersection of demand and supply corresponds to the equilibrium autarky 
price and quantity at point Eo. The domestic product is supplied at P1 where the equilibrium is 
at point E1 supplied by domestic producers, where the Q1Q2 amount would be imported. 
However, the import of products is restricted to an amount of Q3. This means the highest level 
of imported products is Q1Q3; beyond this the amount of products must be supplied by 
domestic producers. Therefore, the post quota supply curve is S1 and the new equilibrium E2. 
At this point total consumption is Q4, where the price is increased because of the import quota 
up to P2.    
The restricted import, which is represented by Q1Q3, reduces the consumers’ welfare. 
The triangle ‘def’ shows consumption loss and ‘abc’ shows the production loss.  
The loss to consumer is A+B+C+D   
The producer gain is ‘A’ 
Revenues of the Government replace the quota rent to producers. The quota rent goes 
here to the producer who has the license right to import. The amount of the quota rent (profit) 
is the area ‘C’. 
The impact of import quotas is given below: 
 Quotas have some important negative effects. First of all “quotas increase the monopoly 
tendency in the home country.”59 The restricted amount of quotas increases the monopoly 
tendency of internal producers, because imported products will never exceed the quota limit 
and competition will continue to rise up to the quota amount. As a consequence of quota 
restriction, internal producers remain alone in the market. The second negative effect is that the 
quotas may reduce the amount of world trade. 
 “Quotas are rigid”60 i.e. fixed according to the amount and period of time. The 
restricted quantity of import quotas may have welfare effects different from the national 
perspective than the equivalent global quotas. Bilateral quotas affect production capacity of 
countries and the exporting producers may take advantage of the monopolization of the export 
supply of a specific product. 
Quota versus tariff:   
 Common Custom tariffs are applied to reduce the imported product amount in order to 
protect internal producers. The application of tariffs is dependent on the price of domestic 
products. In the Union, the product prices are higher than the external (imported) product 
prices, which require some restriction to protect internal producers. The amount of the tariff is 
determined with respect to the amount of the next term product prices, which in turn is 
determined by the Community agencies. The aim of the custom duties is to prevent the access 
of imported products into the domestic market by reducing the demand capacity of customers 
to those imported products. As a consequence of this process, the demand for domestic 
products will be prevented. However, the impact of import restrictions may reduce the utility of 
customers and also reduce the inclination of producers to replace the higher cost production 
technique with a lower one.  
 Quotas seem to be a more radical solution for the domestic producers. In this case a 
tight collaboration between the government and producers is required in order to obtain 
detailed information on the next term production so as to estimate the amount of the quota.  
The impact of quotas affects domestic producers and gives them an opportunity to determine 
the next term production which it is dependent on the demand of consumers. The restricted 
imported products will become ineffective, within the domestic market, in changing the 
consumer demand or product prices. As a consequence these domestic producers will be alone 
                                                 
59Lindert and Pugel: International Economics, 1996, p.138 
60 Mia Mikic: International Trade, 1998, p328  
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in the market and will have the opportunity to affect and to protect consumer demand by using 
the price policy. (See Figure 3.22)    
 In the long run the application of quotas increases the monopoly tendency and reduces 
the utility of consumers. 
 
Conclusions on import quotas: 
1. Quotas reduce the competition power of third countries and increase the market 
capacity of internal producers to become a monopoly power in the market, 
2. It is more costly if it creates internal monopoly power,   
3. Producers gain is much smaller under quotas; relative to other measures, 
4. Community agencies or licence owners profit from quotas, 
5. Quotas have less positive effects on the government/ community agencies revenues,   
6. Necessity for continual price reductions as supply shifts right avoided by quotas. 
 
3.2.3.8 Export Quotas   
 
The exporting country, in order to limit the volume of export over a period of time, 
applies export quotas. The methods for administering export quotas are the same as those for 
import quotas. “The country can allow exports to be shipped on a first come first serve basis or 
an export license can be issued or sold at auction.”61 Here, as in import quotas, there exists a 
problem, namely that export tax can duplicate the price and volume effect on an export quota. 
In the EU’s CAP the EU export quotas given particularly for sugar were introduced in 1968 to 
increase the amount of exported products.  
 The important difference between export quotas and import tariffs is that the export 
quota is more preferable for an exporting country, because export quotas increase the profit 
rate of the exporting country. The application of export quotas reduces the exported product 
amount (supply amount) in the importing county. By doing so, the product price tends to 
increase in importing countries. Increasing the price in importing countries gives an 
opportunity to the exporting country to increase the product price and thus to capture the quota 
revenues in the importing country. Therefore, exporting countries prefer to negotiate with 
importing countries to apply export quotas or VER (voluntary export restraint) to increase the 
profit rate.     
 In the figure below, the impact of the export quotas is illustrated. It is supposed that in 
the EU maize production (supply) is less than demand and it is required to cover the consumer 
demand through imports. In the figure SEU and DEU are the supply and demand curves of the 
EU. STR denotes the supply schedule of Turkey, assumed to be the world’s low cost producers 
and SJ is the supply schedule of Japan, which is too costly to be exported into the EU market.  
 Now it is expected that the cheaper products of Turkey will cover less supply (1 unit) 
than demand (7 units) in the EU market. However, Turkish producers decided to restrain their 
exports, rather than face possible protectionist measures on their exports. Assuming that the 
Turkish producers apply 2 units export quota on maize export, the export amount would 
decrease from 7 units to 5 units. However, a decline in the export amount will increase the 
product price in the EU market from 10 € to 30 €. An increase in the maize price will increase 
the supply from 1 unit to 3 units in the EU. An increasing supply in the EU will reduce the 
exported product amount from 4 units to 2 units. The total supply now is equal to the Turkish 
supply plus the export quota amount. The advantage for the producers in the exporting country 
is the price increase in the EU market, which contributes to the Turkish exporter increasing the 
product price (profit rate from export) and capturing the quota revenues.          
 
                                                 
61 Bowen, Hollander, Viaene: Applied International Trade Analysis, 1998, p.172 
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Figure 3.24: Impact of export quotas 
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Source: adopted from Carbaugh Robert: International Economics (eight edition), South Western Thomson 
learning, US, 2002, p.162  
 
The impact of the export quotas as seen in the figure; application of the export quotas 
reduces the amount of exported product in the importing country. 
Consumer loss is shown with the area “a+ b+ c+ d+ e+ f+ g+ h+ I+ j+ k+ l” 
Producer gain is the area “a+ h”, 
Protective effect is “b+ c+ i” 
Consumption effect is “f+ l+ g”  
The rent from the export quotas goes to the exporter who receives the license right to 
export and this is shown in the area “d+ e+ j+ k”.   
The dismantling of the export restriction will increase the opportunity of countries to 
compete in the market.    
 
Conclusion 
The export quotas are preferable for the exporters, because export restraints in the 
importing country reduce the exported product amount in the importing country, and increase 
the product price. Increasing the product price, on the one hand, causes an increase in the 
supply amount for internal producers in the internal market. And on the other hand, any 
increase in product prices in the internal market reduces the exported product amount, whilst 
the product price of exported products is also increased. Application of the export restrains, 
results in a profit increase for exporters which captures the quota revenues.  
Export quotas are more preferable for exporting countries because producers restrain 
their exports rather than facing possible import restrictions on its exports which compels the 
exporter to pay import tariffs or variable levies to the importing country.              
 
3.2.3.9 Voluntary Export Restrains 
 
An attempt to eliminate the negative impact of quotas is made through the application 
of VER’s (voluntary export restraints), which “are arrangements by which the government of 
an importing country coerces foreign exporters to agree ‘voluntarily among themselves on how 
to restrict their exports into that country.”62 Although application of such protection is 
completely dependent on exporting countries, they may choose voluntarily to reduce their 
                                                 
62Lindert and Pugel: International Economics, 1996,p.138 
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export amount. It is difficult to predict the action of exporters, because bilateral negotiations 
are not fixed. As a consequence of VER’s, the importing country loses all price mark-up by 
letting foreign exporters limit in the importing country. Briefly, the importing country induces 
another nation to reduce its export of commodities voluntarily. 
A voluntary export restraints agreement is negotiated between an importing country and 
one of the supplier countries. The aim of this agreement is to limit the export of goods in 
importing countries.    
 The VER has an increasingly common form of protection in the US and the EU. 
Although they do not completely give authority to exporters if they do not voluntarily reduce 
the export amount. In the case where the export amount is excessive for the importing county 
then “the importing country threatens foreign exporters with stiff quotas.”63  But they give the 
exporter the freedom to charge the full mark up on their limited sales to the importing country. 
This has a positive influence on domestic producers, because imported products become too 
expensive. 
 The effect of VER is shown in Figure 3.24. Similar assumptions are taken for import 
and export quotas. The effects of the VER on the nation welfare are given below. 
The terms of trade deterioration implies the loss of consumer surplus equal to the area‚ 
“a+ b+ c+ d+ e+ f+ g+ h+ I+ j+ k+ l” 
Producer gain is the area “a+ h”, which is the same as export quotas. 
Protective effect is “b+ c+ I” 
Consumption effect is “f+ l+ g”  
The rent from the export quotas goes to the exporter who receives the license right to 
export and this is shown in area “d+ e+ j+ k”.   
   The government receives nothing; only the foreign Supplier receives a quota rent of P2-
P1 per unit exported. The effects of VER’s on domestic prices, production and imports are 
equivalent to those of tariffs or import quotas. “The only difference is an appropriation of the 
rents which in the case of VER’s goes to the foreigners.”64  
 
3.2.3.10 The impact of the Support Measures on Trade  
The impact of support measures is summarized in the table below. Within the European 
Union a “free market” policy is applied. A free market perspective leads to a more efficient use 
of the world’s scarce resources which will result in the maximization of global wealth and 
enable people to benefit economically. However, as is seen in the table, both in the EU and in 
Turkey, the amount of the loser is much more than the winner, because most producers, 
especially in the EU, get more, both EU and Turkish consumers pay more, EU and Turkish 
taxpayers pay more, the EU generally exports more/ imports less, Turkish producers outside 
the Union lose. And finally, after the monetary union, money is mostly redistributed among EU 
countries and less in Turkey as a non-member country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63Lindert and Pugel: International Economics, 1996,p.151 
64 Mia Mikic: International Trade, 1998, p333 
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Table 3.20: Cost and benefits of tariff, subsidies and quota measures for cereal products 
 
 Impact of the trade measures in the EU  Impact of the trade measures in Turkey as a third world 
country  
Trade 
measures 
Consumer Producers Community 
Agency 
Consumer Producer Government 
Market price 
support 
applied by 
the EU  
Loss - 
Increasing 
prices reduce 
the nominal 
income and 
reduce the 
consumer 
surplus  
Gain - 
Increase the 
income of 
producers 
and producer 
surplus 
Loss- 
Market 
support 
increases the 
expenditure 
No change  
 
Loss -Increasing 
price gap via 
MPS increases the 
applied CCT, 
which increases 
the cost of export 
into the EU and 
reduces the export 
income       
Loss -
Increasing 
price gap via 
MPS increases 
the applied 
CCT. This 
increases the 
government 
expenditure 
and reduces the 
export 
revenues      
Market price 
support 
applied by 
Turkey  
No change  
 
Loss 
Increasing 
price gap via 
MPS 
increase the 
applied 
tariff, which 
increases the 
cost of 
export into 
Turkey. This 
reduces the 
export 
income       
Loss 
Increasing 
price gap via 
MPS 
increase the 
applied 
tariff. This 
reduces the 
export 
revenues      
Loss  
Increasing 
price reduces 
the nominal 
income and 
reduces the 
consumer 
surplus  
Gain  
Increases the 
income of 
producers and 
producer surplus 
Loss 
Market support 
increases the 
expenditure 
Tariff 
applied by 
the EU for 
Turkey as an 
importing 
country 
Loss  
Increases the 
imported 
product 
prices 
Gain 
increases 
market share 
and  income 
Gain  
tariff 
revenue 
No change  Loss reduces 
market share and 
profit  
Loss reduces 
the tariff 
revenue 
Tariff 
applied by 
Turkey for 
EU as an 
importing 
country   
No change Loss 
reduces the 
profit   
Loss reduces 
the tariff 
revenue  
Loss  
Increases the 
imported 
product 
prices 
Gain increases 
market share and  
income 
Gain-  
tariff revenue 
Direct 
payments on 
limited area 
applied in 
the EU  
Loss  
Restricted 
production 
reduces 
supply and 
increases 
product 
price. This 
reduces the 
purchasing 
power of 
consumer   
 
Gain 
increases 
income  
Loss 
increases 
expenditure  
No change  
  
No change   No change   
DIS (Direct 
income 
Support) 
applied by 
Turkey 
started in 
2001  
No change  No change  No change  Loss via 
transfers 
from 
consumers to 
producers   
Gain income 
increase  
Loss- increases  
expenditures 
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Decouple 
Direct 
payments on 
Unlimited 
area support- 
with set-
aside applied 
in the EU  
started in 
2005 
Gain  via 
reduced 
prices  
Gain 
increase 
income 
support 
Loss 
increase 
expenditure 
No change  No change  No change  
Intervention 
purchase in 
the EU  
Loss 
increases 
product 
prices 
Gain 
increases 
producer 
surplus 
Loss 
increases 
expenditures 
No change  Reduces the 
market access into 
the EU via 
increase on  CCT 
Reduces 
revenues via 
decline in 
import   
Input 
subsidies 
applied in 
the EU  
Gain via 
decline in 
product 
price. But if 
the decline in 
production 
cost will be 
reflected in 
the producer 
price and 
particularly 
consumer 
price. If not 
then it is loss 
for 
consumer.   
Gain 
increases the 
profit rates 
via decline in 
input prices  
Loss 
increases the 
burden of the 
CAP budget  
Gain via 
decline in 
product 
price. But if 
the decline in 
production 
price is used 
by Turkey to 
increase the 
import tariff 
then no 
effect. But to 
date there 
was no 
change in 
accordance 
with the 
price change 
in imported 
products    
Gain- decline in 
product prices via 
decline in 
production cost in 
the EU will 
reduce the applied 
CCT. (But if 
reduced 
production cost is 
reflected in 
producer prices 
which will reduce 
the CCT), then 
this decline in 
CCT will reduce 
the expenditure of 
producers in 
Turkey that is 
spent on the CCT, 
This also 
increases the 
market access to 
the EU 
No direct 
effect.  
Gain if the 
export share to 
the EU 
increases then 
this will 
increase the 
revenues of the 
government  
Input 
subsidies 
applied  in 
Turkey 
No change. 
Because in 
the EU there 
is the CCT 
which is 
used to 
increase the 
external 
product 
prices up to 
the EU level  
Loss 
because 
decline in 
input price 
may reduce 
the 
production 
cost and 
price in this 
case . 
Producers in 
the EU will 
be required 
to reduce 
their product 
prices more 
to maintain 
their market 
share in 
Turkey  
Gain if the 
decline in 
product price 
is used for 
the 
calculation 
of the CCT. 
But if there 
is no decline 
in product 
price then 
there is also 
no gain. 
Gain via 
decline in 
product 
price. 
However, if 
the decline in 
production 
cost is not 
reflected in 
the consumer 
price then it 
is loss. 
However, to 
date there 
was decline 
also in 
consumer 
prices   
Gain increases the 
profit rates  via 
decline in input 
price 
Increase the 
expenditure of 
the government  
Only Set-
aside in the 
EU 
No change   Loss- via 
decline in 
production 
and profit  
Loss- 
increase the 
expenditure 
of the CAP 
budget which 
is distributed 
to  producers 
for set-aside 
No change  No change  No change  
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Product 
Price cut in 
the EU 
Gain via 
decline in 
producer 
price   
Loss via 
decline in 
profit 
Gain   No change No change No change 
Subsidy in 
the EU for 
export into 
Turkey as a 
third  
country 
Loss- 
increases 
transfers 
form 
consumers 
Gain -  
reduces the 
exported 
product 
prices but 
also 
increases the 
profit and 
income via 
subsidies     
 
Loss- 
increases the 
expenditures   
Gain- 
decline in 
product 
prices from 
the EU, 
increases the 
nominal 
income  
Loss- reduces the 
market share and 
profit   
Gain - if tariff 
is increased in 
accordance to 
the tariff 
Subsidy in 
Turkey for 
export in to 
the EU  
No change 
because it 
only 
increases the 
price gap 
which is 
applied for 
third world 
country 
producers in 
the EU    
No change 
because of 
the CCT 
which is the 
price gap 
between 
internal and 
external 
products 
Gain - 
because 
increases the 
price gap 
which is 
applied as a  
CCT in the 
CAP 
No change   Gain-reduces the 
exported product 
prices but also 
increases the 
profit and income 
via subsidies     
 
Loss- increases 
the 
expenditures 
1; if the owner of the license is the government then the rent income goes to the government. 
 
The CAP, which was founded by the six original members of the EU, has only achieved 
a part of its objectives. It is obvious that the CAP has achieved the objectives below: 
• Fair standards of living for farmers, who are supported with a reasonable income, even 
if they are not sufficiently competitive in the market. In Figure 4.2 it is shown that during the 
nineties producers’ incomes considerably increased. In 1992 the MacSharry reform reduced the 
arable land by 15% as a result of the application of the compulsory set-aside. However, the 
application of set-aside showed a small decline in production, as seen in Table 4.2. 
Furthermore, “the reality was that farmers simply intensified even more on the other 85% of 
their land.”65 On the one hand, producers received direct payments for their compulsory set-
aside, but on the other hand, intensive use of the other 85% of their land made little 
contribution to surplus reduction. Increasing production was supported with export subsidies to 
become competitive in the world market and this increased the market share of internal 
producers (see Table 2.7.2).    
• Agricultural productivity increase has been achieved, especially in cereal products. If 
the productivity can be measured (for arable land products) in output per acre for land, then it 
is obvious that despite the compulsory set-aside measure, which reduced arable land use, 
production amount has increased in the last decade (see Table 2.7.2)   
• The CAP support measures contributed to the Market stability. The CAP has also 
increased the competitiveness of internal producers by setting the intervention price 
mechanism as a protective measure to lower cost production of third world countries. By doing 
this imported product access and extreme price fluctuation were taken under control. It is 
obvious that existence of the intervention price mechanism reduces price fluctuation in the 
market. 
                                                 
65 http://www.courseworkbank.co.uk/coursework/examine_examples_government_policies_can_2894/ Critically 
discuss the following quote from bong p 2004 from racial to class apartheid: South Africa’s frustrating decade of 
freedom monthly review, 55, and (10) 45-59". 
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• The export subsidies have increased the world market share of EU producers which 
contributed to a reduction of the surplus amount, even if it is maintained as a problem for the 
CAP budget (see Table 2.7). 
• Availability of supply is achieved. Furthermore, it caused an overproduction (see Table 
2.7). This is one of the CAP’s best achieved objectives of the. Furthermore, endeavours are 
given to reduce the supply amount in certain agricultural products. However, application of set-
aside measures has less of a contribution on surplus reduction (see Table 2.7).      
 The CAP system has had no success on the points given below: 
• Reasonable prices for consumers. In the last decade consumer price has steadily 
increased. This reduces the welfare of consumers (see Tables 2.8.1 and 2.8.2), 
• For the rural community preservation of employment opportunities. Since the 
foundation of the CAP, a decline in agricultural employment has been observed (see Table 
4.11). However, it is difficult to predict whether this has resulted from the CAP support 
measures or not, but it would not be wrong to say that the CAP has not had any positive effects 
on the amount of persons employed in agriculture.              
 In the CAP, guaranteed prices and direct payments are applied to complement 
production for cereal products. In fact, the amount of support measures which are given for the 
cereals cover approximately half of the CAP expenditures. The considerable share of support 
on cereal products was the reason for selection of cereals as sample products. This was done in 
order to estimate the amount of PSE necessary for a better analysis of the impact of support 
measures on the welfare of consumers and the distribution effect on producers. By means of 
PSE calculation estimation of the impact of support measures on producer in the CAP and in 
Turkey is realised.     
For this reason, first of all, it was planned to estimate the trade distortion effect of the 
CAP. The cereal products are first researched for the last three members of the EU. The results 
of MPS calculation for these countries showed that market support is not the result of the CAP 
system; moreover, it was even higher in those countries before EU membership. After EU 
membership, the calculation of the PSE for these countries showed that the support measures in 
the CAP system have also considerable market support for producers. In the last decade, in 
particular, the increasing amount of direct payments, which increase the transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to producers, had a considerable negative effect on the welfare loss 
for the consumer.  
In the last decade, the MacSharry reform and later Agenda 2000 contributed to a 
decrease in the welfare of consumers and caused trade distortion in the market. The price 
support system had a direct effect on the market price. However, direct payments have indirect 
effects. The finance of direct payments is obtained from other support measures, such as, 
common custom tariffs and levies, intervention price mechanisms, or sometimes from import 
quotas. These measures are not only used to protect internal producers, but also used to collect 
revenue to finance other support measures, such as, direct payments or export subsidies. In the 
last decade especially, transfers from consumers and taxpayers to producers increased, which 
compels them to pay higher prices, resulting in intervention measures for the producers. By 
doing so, on the one hand, internal consumers are forced to pay more to buy expensive goods 
from internal producers thus reducing consumer surplus. On the other hand, the existence of 
intervention measures contributes to an increase in the price gap between internal and world 
producers which then increases the tariff amount on imported products and reduces the market 
access of third world countries. As a consequence of these measures, trade distortion occurs for 
third world country producers.  
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The CAP system caused a trade distortion and price instability in the world market. The 
price reductions on cereal products are supported with direct payments and export subsidies; 
altogether these caused a trade distortion for third world country producers.  
In the cereal sector, especially for wheat products, a sharp price decline and an increase 
in production caused internal producers to increase their share in the world market. The 
increasing shares of internal producers in the world market reduced the share and production of 
third world country producers. Consequently, third world country producers lost their market 
share which resulted in price increases for cereal products after 2000. In the next decade it can 
be expected that export subsidies will disappear, while internal EU prices are brought into line 
with international prices. Finally, the amount of direct payment will be reduced and replaced 
with decoupled single farm payments which will break the link between production and 
payment.  
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4. The Impact of the Support Measures on Cereals Trade (Considering the EU-15 
and Turkey) 
 
4.1 General Considerations   
 
In the CAP there were two main problems: the surplus and the finance of the CAP 
budget. In the last decade CAP reforms were planned to overcome these two major problems.  
The lack of sufficient information and of published data on market support via price 
interventions, CCT and export subsidies to EU members resulted in an under-estimation of 
support amounts for the calculation of the producer support estimate (PSE) for each support 
measure in member countries and in Turkey. In particular, different applications of market 
support and distribution of subsidies in each member country and in Turkey’s different 
regions prevented the publication of statistics on agricultural subsidies in the last decade. This 
was obviously done, to reduce reactions of Turkish producers on the distribution of 
agricultural subsidies. Therefore, it was very difficult to predict whether intervention 
measures in all member countries had similar effects or not. Nevertheless, the calculation of 
PSE for the EU-15 and for Turkey contributed to an estimation of the monetary amounts of 
various support measures in the CAP and in Turkey (see chapter three). 
In the table below PSE percentage amount of agricultural support is illustrated.  The 
PSE percentage for the EU, Turkey and for OECD is compared between 1988 and 2002. As 
illustrated in the figure the PSE percentage for Turkey increased about 7% in 2002. In 
contrast, the PSE percentage both for the EU and for the OECD countries decreased by 4% 
and 7% respectively. 
 
Figure 4.1:  Indicators of Agricultural Support in EU, in Turkey as an applicant country and 
in the OECD as non-EU countries   
OECD; 38
EU; 40
Turkey ; 
15
Agricultural support in 1986-88 
 
OECD; 31
Turkey ; 
23
EU; 36
Agricultural support in 2002 
 
Source: EU Commission: Agricultural situation in the Candidate Countries, 2003, p.20, illustrated by myself. 
 
The effects of the CAP support system in and outside the Union are given below. 
1- The CAP price support system was one of the most important and controversial 
policies of the EU. From its foundation in 1962 to date many reform proposals and policies 
were applied in the CAP. However, increasing negative reactions of producers against the 
CAP and WTO former measures forced a reduction in trade distorting support measures in the 
last decade. For this reason Turkey as a WTO member and applicant country of the EU 
followed the rules and policies of the WTO and CAP very closely. Therefore, CAP reforms 
and GATT (WTO) measures contribute to the regulation of the mechanism for agriculture 
remaining competitive in world markets. However, endeavours are also made to reduce trade 
distorting support measures in world markets.      
2- Intervention prices differ between member countries and increase price disparities 
between member countries. 
The price support measures, which are guaranteed by intervention prices, are 
determined by the Commission, but applied by Community agencies.  
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Community agencies in member countries regulate the intervention price according to 
the production levels of regional producers. By this means intervention prices differ between 
member countries. Therefore, intervention prices, which are applied differently by the 
community agencies, increase the price differences in member countries. Moreover, different 
market prices in member countries also have negative effects on the increase of price 
disparities in member countries. In the table below, price differences between member 
countries are illustrated. Market prices differ between member countries. These price 
differences have a negative effect on economic integration within the CAP. Price differences 
for cereals in different member countries are illustrated in the table below. 
 
Table 4.1: Market price for cereals as a percentage of the intervention price 
                           2001                        2002 Member 
Countries Common 
wheat 
Barley Maize Common 
wheat 
Barley Maize 
Austria 117.47 108.10 106.92 116.4 108.2 110.95 
Belgium 124.60 110.77 -- 122.81 108.62 119.12 
Germany 118.54 101.11 -- 117.22 104.13 120.71 
Greece 149.19 148.73 133.91 155.21 153.61 148.41 
Spain 155.02 133.35 123.56 156.00 135.52 136.65 
Italy 149.42 136.34 112.09 144.27 136.69 131.01 
Portugal 138.99 134.16 131.36 152.97 134.41 140.93 
United Kingdom 149.79 113.87 -- 147.77 113.86 -- 
Source: European Commission DGeneral for Agriculture: Agriculture in the European union Statistical and 
Economic information 2002, 2003, (selected data form table 4.1.6.2)     
 
3- The finance of the CAP support system is costly and support measures such as price 
intervention, CCT and export subsidies all increase unfair trade for Turkish producers as a 
non-member country in the EU market. 
4- The CAP policies secure a reasonable income for producers but at the cost of 
consumer welfare. The weakness of existing CAP support measures to increase the 
productivity in agriculture reduces the integration of internal producers in the world markets. 
Indeed, in the last decade, the support measures price gap between internal and world 
producers fell.  However, the application of import tariff and export subsidies, applied in the 
past to protect and support internal producers from third world countries’ lower-priced 
products, was maintained.  The business interests and policies which are imposed on the CAP 
are unfortunately more united and effectively coherent than the welfare of the people. 
5- The Support measures cause a trade distortion in the market. “The CAP causes misery 
for millions of poor farmers around the world. The EU pays the agribusiness £2 billion a year 
to “dump” excess food, such as milk, sugar and wheat, on to poor countries, driving poor 
farmers out of the markets and into even deeper poverty.”1 
6- The EU’s CAP has brought about many changes and opportunities for farmers. “All in 
all the contribution of the EU to the agricultural budget of the federal government amounts to 
about 50%.”2 The CAP budget finance EAGGF guarantee and guidance section supports 
                                                 
1 Oxam Press Release: Aid agencies welcome Chancellor’s demand to Cut the CAP, Joint Agency Press Release 
- 29 September 2003 (Oxfam GB is a development, relief, and campaigning organisation that works with others 
to find lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world.), 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/press/releases/cap290903.htm 
2 BMLF: Österreichs Landwirtschaft mit der Natur, BMLF, Vienna, 1999, p.47 
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member countries’ producers in maintaining their production and securing their income with 
different subsidies. But consumer welfare has mostly been neglected.  
7- The WTO membership of the EU’s CAP has made an important contribution to the 
reduction of the trade distorting measures in agriculture.  The Uruguay round, in particular, 
has made an important contribution to the reduction of the amount of subsidies. However, 
negative reactions from fewer developing countries during the Seattle WTO meetings were 
proof of the trade difficulties for poor WTO members, as a result of the trade distorting 
measures applied by the CAP. However, the CAP did contribute to liberalization of trade, but 
only in the EU market. In 1968, both the foundation of the Customs Union and the removal of 
trade barriers increased the trade capacity between member countries, but the price support 
system, the application of the CCT and export subsidies had negative effects on marketing of 
less developed countries’ agricultural products, in the EU market as well as in the world 
markets.  
After joining the EU Austria’s foreign trade capacity, for example, increased in favour 
of EU members, while its trade capacity with EFTA countries fell. A consequence of 
Austria’s membership in the EU was that it had to redirect its trade flow from its neighbours 
to other EU countries. This is the result of the Customs Union theory, which causes trade 
creation between member countries, whilst trade distortion is increased between member and 
non-member countries.     
If free trade is based on the theory of comparative advantages it is difficult to accept 
the support measures which were applied within the CAP. The liberal trade is based on the 
comparative costs advantage which implies that countries with lower relative costs would 
become trade partners. But the CAP support measures were, unfortunately, creating unfair 
competition between countries and replacing some efficient production of exportable 
commodities with inefficient production in the market. 
8- Export subsidies of the CAP increase the trade distortion in the world markets. Over 
time, especially in the Uruguay round, a sharp decline in export subsides was observed, 36% 
of the budgetary expenditures for export subsidies (outlays) and 21% of the volume of 
subsidized export were reduced.  However, export subsides on cereals were of considerable 
importance in increasing the market capacity especially for the internal producer who 
exported to Turkey. But, export subsidies from Turkey to the EU market had no effect, 
because application of the CCT in the CAP prevented the reduction of cereals prices from 
Turkey to the EU markets. Moreover, any decline in exported product prices from Turkey to 
the EU market would only increase the price gap between internal and external products, 
which is used for the calculation of the CCT. Therefore, any increase in export subsidies 
given to a producer who exported to the EU market would only increase the monetary 
transfers which would be paid via CCT to the Community budget. However, producers who 
export to the EU and do not get supported by export subsides could obviously increase the 
profit rate via decline in CCT and capture part of the expenditure which could be spent from 
the community budget. 
9- The EU contributes to a reduction of the disparities between EU regions, such as, less 
favoured areas or less developed countries. The aim of this is that “Länder (states) those 
whose tax revenues fall below some predetermined range should receive compensation from 
Länder whose tax revenues exceed that range.”3 This system of fiscal equalisation contributes 
to equalizing fiscal differences between member countries. For this reason, the EU budget 
finances countries in less favoured regions together with the EAGGF of the CAP. 
 In the table below the net contributors and beneficiaries of the EU are shown. The 
main contributors of the EU budget are Germany, Holland, Austria and Sweden. The net 
                                                 
3 Paul de Grauwe: Economics of Monetary Union, 2000, p.11 
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receivers of the EU are Greece, Portugal and Spain. It is also important to note that almost 50 
% of the EU budget goes to finance the CAP.  
 
     Table 4.2.1: Net contributors and receivers of the EU 
 
Source: http://www.business.uiuc.edu/lneal/EU-budget.ppt     
 
Table 4.2.2: Net contributors and receivers of the EU budget (in million Euro /ECU) 
     ECU million 
Countries 1998 1999 2000 
B+ Lux 
DK 
D 
GR 
E 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
A 
P 
Fin 
S 
UK 
 
188.7 
154.3 
-7,172.7 
4,798.6 
7,449.2 
-108.6 
2,513.0 
-1,007.4 
-964.8 
-391.6 
3,160.1 
-10.6 
-570. 9 
-3,062.1 
 
359.6 
279.4 
-7,578.1 
3,888.8 
7,758.3 
-859.5 
2,137.7 
-312.1 
-1,197.7 
-355.0 
3,026.3 
-120.0 
-671.4 
-2,265.4 
558.4 
402.0 
-7,229.9 
4,496.7 
5,832.9 
200.5 
1,910.0 
1,710.7 
-901.6 
-170.4 
2,336.8 
376.6 
-827.0 
-2,504.6 
 
Source: Blankart and Kirchner: Nettoempfanger gegen Nettozahler Die Blockadedes EU Haushalts und İhre 
mögliche Überwindung, 2003 http://www.vfs.unizh.ch/papers/Blankart.pdf 
 
If full membership for Turkey is realised it is obvious that Turkish producers will be 
the net receivers from the CAP budget, because producers in Turkey are poorer and receive 
less support than the EU producers. This will require an increase of transfers from the 
Community budget to Turkey to support the Community budget’s first pillar measures, which 
comprise agricultural price support and payments, especially for direct payments, and second 
pillar polices which comprise rural development programmes such as rural development 
projects and environmental measures. The adoption of the Turkish agriculture into the CAP 
system will also require some planned programmes. For example, in 2001, the ARIP 
programme was started in order to replace the input subsidies with DIS. By doing this support 
measures in Turkey would come closer to the CAP measures as well as WTO measures.  This 
was planned in order to reduce the trade distorting support measures in the world by reducing 
the amber box measures and increasing the green box measures on world trade.   
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10- In the CAP system the application of direct payments increased the income of 
producers. But distribution of subsidies in member countries is not dependent on farm size. 
Some member countries received more income support due to the fact that farm size was not 
relevant, so large scale farms received more subsidies whilst producers in other countries 
received less.  
In fact, at the start, the application of direct payments was planned in order to support 
income loss to producers who were setting aside their land so as to reduce the surplus in 
cereals. However, coupled direct payments were dependent on the production of a specific 
product to receive them. By coupling payments the expected reduction on surplus amounts 
was not obtained and monetary transfers from consumers and tax payers increased, with 
different shares in each country, without consideration of land use, efficiency, or income loss 
of producers.  
The decoupled payments, which started in 2005, are expected to reduce the surplus 
amount together with excessive transfers to producers, thus breaking the link between 
production and payment. In consequence the unequal distribution of income support in each 
member country is expected to be overcome.  
Direct income support was also started in Turkey in 2001 in order to adopt the Turkish 
agriculture into the CAP under the ARIP program. Therefore, less trade distorting measures 
which were applied in the CAP were led and preferably accepted by the WTO in blue and 
green box measures to reduce the trade distorting measures in the world markets. The CAP 
measures have directly affected trade partners which have trade relations with the EU because 
the EU is a very huge market for third world countries and adoption of these measures will 
increase the market capacity.  
  In the EU CAP during the nineties, application of direct payments increased the 
incomes and the size of the farms in almost all member countries.  However, it is important to 
note that a decline in small-scale farms and an increase in large-scale farms began with the 
Mansholt plan, which replaced approximately 5 million hectares in the agricultural land area 
with large-scale production. As a consequence of this replacement in the 1980s, the number of 
small-scale producers of less than 5 ha fell from 8.916 mn/ha to 7.384 mn/ha) in 1993, while 
farms of more than100 ha increased from 33.526 mn/t) to 46.012 mn/t in 1993 (see also Table 
2.2). As illustrated in the figure below this decline in small- scale farms has continued up to 
date. “The process of enlarging of farms and the decrease in the number of farmers 
contributed to a better organisation of the professional interests of the farmers for two reasons. 
First, the educational level rose as the farmers became bigger and richer. Secondly, the 
articulation and promotion of interests became more effective as the farmers acquired a higher 
level of professionalism.”4    
During my research in various institutes in Vienna, in Turkey and in other institutions 
I came to the conclusion that the data on support measures for each member country would 
not be easily obtained, because the distribution of support measures was not published. 
Therefore, the only data that can be used to indicate the unequal distribution of payments in 
member countries were the rough figures illustrated below. 
In the figure below the sizes of farms in member countries are illustrated. The highest 
utilized arable land by size of holdings of more than 100 ha is observed in the UK, which has 
approximately 65 percent and the subsidy amount given to producers in the UK is almost one 
third of Finland, which has approximately 4 percent of cultivated arable land of more than 
100 hectares. It must be remembered that the greatest number of inefficient farmers in the EU 
are among the small and medium-scale producers. However, most of the subsidies go to 
                                                 
4 Kourvertaris and Moschonas: The Impact of the European Integration, 1996, p.123 
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efficient farmers who have financial capability and inefficient farmers who have costly 
production and are mostly neglected.    
 
Figure 4.2: Utilized agricultural area by size of holdings as a percentage of all utilized 
agricultural areas, 1995 (in %) 
 
Source: Eurostat Yearbook 98/99 A statistical eye on Europe 1987-1997, 1999, p.336 or 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/ERD/DB/data/eco/agr/images/agr_eu4.g 
 
In Turkey, in the nineties, the number of arable areas, which were used in agriculture, 
declined. But this reduction of farm land was also observed, not only in small-scale producers 
but also in large-scale producers, although in the CAP, the fall in numbers was mostly in the 
small-scale producers who had difficulties producing and competing adequately in the market. 
In the figure below the decline in small and large-scale production is indicated.       
     
Figure 4.3: Number of holdings in Turkey between 1991 and 2001 (mn holdings) 
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Source: EU Commission: Agricultural Situation in the Candidate Countries, 2003, p.5, illustrated by the author. 
 
In the figures below the development of farm size and income between 1995 and 2000 
is given, which may contribute to an understanding of the reason for higher payments to 
countries such as Finland and Austria which are net contributors to the CAP budget.  
In fact countries which are net contributors to the CAP budget, when compared to 
other member countries, rarely receive financial support.  However, between 1995 and 2000 
Finland, Germany, Ireland and Austria, which are net contributors, received more financial 
support than other members. The increasing transfer to these countries can only be dependent 
on the development of farm size as seen in Figure 4.4, because the development of farm size 
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0 
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in Austria and in Finland was rather high in this period. Due to this development producers 
received more financial support relative to other countries’ producers.  
In the figure, the increase in farm size and incomes is given in the European size unit 
(one ESU is defined as 1200 Euros).  It is obvious that direct payments caused a considerable 
income transfer to producers in the nineties.  
 
Figure 4.4.1: Trends in income during the nineties  
  Development of farms per country in accordance to the European size unit (esu) 
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 Source: Dr Hans K. J., Poppe, Bont, Koole, Jager, Wisman,: Evolution of farm incomes in the EU, LEI, Agricultural 
Economics research Institute. http://www.europarl.eu.int/hearings/20030930/agri/vrolijk_en.pdf 
 
In Figure 4.4.2 the average total subsidies in the EU-15 are shown as being between 
10 and 50. The yellow circles are the difference in subsidies between the period 1995 - 2002, 
and the blue columns are the amount of subsidies for each member country.   
 
Figure 4.4.2: Share of subsidies on products in member countries in accordance to the 
European size unit (esu) 
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Source: Hans, Poppe, Koole, Jager, Wisman,: Evolution of farm incomes in the EU, LEI, Agricultural 
Economics research Institute. http://www.europarl.eu.int/hearings/20030930/agri/vrolijk_en.pdf 
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 In Turkey also, such unequal distribution of DIS in different regions was observed. However, 
in the CAP excessive transfers via direct payments increased the income of producers in some 
countries with different level in the nineties. Similarly, the new agricultural programme ARIP, 
which started in Turkey in 2001, increased the direct income support of some producers in 
different regions; this also contributed to an increase in the transfers from consumers and tax 
payers to producers without considering income loss and/or arable farm land level (see figure 
below).    
 
Figure 4.5: Average DIS Payment per registered farmer 2001 Programme in Turkey    
 
  Source: Mark, Lampietti, Pertev, Pohlmeier, Akder, Ocek, Jha: Turkey, A review of the Impact of the Reform of 
Agricultural Sector Subsidization, WP Volume: 9, 2004, p.44  
 
11- Direct payments are accepted as a less trade-distorting trade measure. However, these 
payments to producers differ between regions and member countries. Due to different 
distribution in EU countries, publication of direct payments in member countries is realised. 
This is done to prevent possible discussions for reducing negative reactions in and out side of 
the Union between countries on its distribution. Therefore, it was very difficult to obtain any 
detailed information on the distribution of payments. Hence, these payments are only for the 
EU-15 level estimated in the PSE calculation for the EU countries whose level statistics have 
not been published.   
12-  In the CAP reduction of regional disparities is the planned goal, but the application of 
support measures differs between producers in member countries and this reduces the success 
of the planned measures.  
The impact of the price support system (PSS) can be defined as: the more you produce 
the more subsidies you effectively get. “One estimate (CEC July1991) is that 80 % of the 
CAP spending goes to only 20 % of farmers who are overwhelmingly bigger and richer”5  
This means the lion’s share of the direct subsidies goes to the large and efficient farms which 
are only 25 % of the total farms. Furthermore, once the subsidy is given to a producer it is 
difficult to reclaim it..  
In the table below, the distribution of support payments is given. In the CAP small- 
scale producers, who cover 53 % of  total farms, receive only € 405 per farm, and those 
producers with farms between 50 and 100 ha, which is less than 1 % of total farms, receive € 
67,095 per farm.  Support payments have unfortunately increased more than proportional to 
the increase in farm size. Farm sizes over 100 ha, in particular, receive a significant share of 
the payments as was observed for the CAP producers (see Figure 4.4). Farms between 100 
and 200 ha which make up only 0.24 % of total farms, receive €133,689, whereas farms over 
500 ha, which make up only 0.01 % of total farms, receive € 768.333 per farm payment.   
 
 
                                                 
5Guglielmo Carchedi: For Another Europe, Verso, UK, 2001, p.217   
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Table 4.3: CAP support payments 2001  
Size Class 
(hectare) 
 
Payment per farm 
 
 
% of EU15 farms 
in size class 
 
Number of farms 
in size class 
 
% of EU15 
payments to 
size class 
Cumulative % of 
budget (from 
largest to smallest) 
Cumulative % of 
farms (from largest 
to smallest) 
0 to 1.25 € 405 53.76% 297,630 4.3% 100.0% 99.97% 
1.25 to 2 € 1,593 8.54% 380, 800 2.7% 95.7% 46.21% 
2 to 5 € 3,296 16.30% 726,730 10.7% 93.0% 37.67% 
5 to 10 € 7,128 9.17% 409,080 13.0% 82.2% 21.37% 
10 to 20 € 13,989 6.81% 303,500 19.0% 69.2% 12.20% 
20 to 50 € 30,098 4.13% 184,100 24.8% 50.2% 5.39% 
50 to 100 € 67,095 0.94% 41,700 12.5% 25.4% 1.27% 
100 to 200 € 133,689 0.24% 10,720 6.4% 12.9% 0.33% 
200 to 300 € 241,157 0.05% 2,130 2.3% 6.5% 0.09% 
300 to 500 € 376,534 0.03% 1,270 2.1% 4.2% 0.04% 
over 500 € 768,333 0.01% 610 2.1% 2.1% 0.01% 
Average, All 
farms 
€ 5,015  :  :  :  :  : 
Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz: The Economics of European Integration, chapter 8: CAP, 2001, p.15 
http://hei.unige.ch/~baldwin/PapersBooks/BW/slides/Slides%20Chapter%208.ppt   
 
 In the table below, cereal production is shown. Cereal products cover approximately 
40 percent of the total subsidy in the EU. Therefore, the data given may help in highlighting 
the difference in distribution in member countries, of subsidies which are not dependent on 
production amount or farm size (see Table 4.4). The amount of cereal production, especially 
in Spain, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany, is very high relative to other 
member countries. However, besides Germany, subsidy amounts in the United Kingdom, 
Italy, France and Spain are below the average subsidy line (see Figure 4.4). On the other 
hand, in some other EU member countries such as Luxembourg, Ireland and Finland the 
production amount, compared to other member countries, is low, but the distributed subsidy 
amount is higher.           
 
Table 4.4: Total cereal production in the EU member countries (1000t) 
EU countries 1985 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2000 2002 
Belgium 2,065 1,987 2,139 2,212 2,394 2,407 2,513 2,580 
Denmark 7,956 9,607 8,198 9,150 9,530 8,775 9,413 8,793 
Germany 25,914 25,883 35,547 39,864 45,486 44,452 45,271 43,271 
Greece 4,489 4,581 4,416 4,420 5,046 4,457 4,231 4,238 
Spain 20,972 18,763 17,473 11,571 19,338 18,138 24,561 21,501 
France 55,812 55,060 55,393 53,270 63,014 64,246 65,698 69,161 
Ireland 1,987 1,965 1,626 1,796 1,943 2,011 1,963 2,156 
Italy 17,823 17,394 19,750 19,658 19,906 21,002 20,622 19,922 
Luxembourg 157 148 152 148 162 154 153 160 
Holland  1,129 1,359 1,512 1,549 1,623 1,416 1,819 : 
Austria 5,551 5,290 4,206 4,452 5,009 4,806 4,490 4,745 
Portugal 1,375 1,426 1,449 1,446 1,560 1,658 1,608 1,567 
Finland : : 3,332 3,328 3,799 2,868 4,089 : 
Sweden : 6,484 : 4,791 5,986 4,931 5,670 5,471 
U K 22,467 22,583 19,500 21,868 23,533 22,119 23,985 : 
Source: Illustrated from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003  
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4.2 Effects on Trade Balance 
 
The balance of trade is the indicator of trade flow in current account between 
countries. In a nation, the balance of trade is the difference between sales of export and the 
cost of buying imports. “The balance on goods and services (or net export for short) is a major 
component of aggregate demand for expenditure on the reporting country’s aggregate 
output.”6 However, current account together with the financial account is the two most 
important parts of the international transactions, relative to the capital account.   
In the CAP system the application of support measures such as CCT, import quotas 
and VER prevents access of the imported product into the EU market and contributes to a 
reduction of the current account deficit together with export subsidies, which increases the 
export of internal producers. This means that the existence of internal support measures in the 
CAP makes an important contribution to the maintenance of current account balance at a 
desired level. 
In the last decade, the application of CAP measures had positive effects on increasing 
the trade share of internal producers whilst non-member countries producers such as those in 
Turkey were negatively affected by the CAP measures. On the one hand, higher CCT 
increased the internal product prices over world prices and reduced the access of the imported 
product into the EU market. By this means, the value of tax revenues collected by the 
community agencies increased. On the other hand, the maintenance of export subsidies 
reduced the exported product price of internal producers and increased their market share in 
Turkey and in other non-member countries. Consequently, support measures had directly 
affected consumers and especially producers in their decision making process, production 
operation and marketing of products. But CAP measures have also affected the behaviour of 
consumers and changed the demand for products in and outside the Union. Consequently, 
support measures affected the amount of exports to non-member countries and Turkey, as 
well as imports from Turkey and from non-members countries to the EU and this created an 
unfair market share for EU producers. The support measures have artificially but positively 
changed the trade balance.  
Since 2002 the single currency has been in circulation in the EU. Over time the Euro   
appreciated in value against foreign currencies, especially the Turkish Lira. However, the 
appreciation in value of the Euro had less effect on increasing imports into the EU market, 
because of the CCT as explained above.  
The import and export amounts of the EU and Turkey are illustrated in Table 4.5 
below. The higher share of cereals export is the result of excessive export subsidies in the 
CAP which reduce the product price on the world market and increase the trade capacity.  
Soya cake and beans comprise almost half of the import amount, which has tax free access to 
the EU Union and there is very low production of Soya cake and beans in the Union. They 
therefore enjoy Union access without tariff restriction.   
The excessive surplus amount in cereals and higher storage costs increased the amount 
of export subsidies for cereals which covered almost 43% of the total export, whilst import of 
cereals was highly protected and comprised only 11 % of the total import in the last decade. 
One of the other important export products of the CAP is wine which covers 25 % of the total 
EU export. Also sugar and fruit and vegetables become important items of the exported 
products in the CAP. In contrast to this, corn gluten feed together with fruit and vegetables 
from third world countries covered approximately 20% of the total import. The rest of the 
imported products were a very small percentage.   
 
                                                 
6 Chacholiades Miltiades: International Economics, 1990, p.292  
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Table 4.5: Import and export amount of selected agricultural products in the CAP and in 
Turkey (in 2003) 
CAP of the EU (%) Turkey (%) 
Agri. products Import  Export  Agricultural products Import  Export  
Cereals 11 43 Cereals 12 5 
Rice 2 1 Oilseeds and oleagnous fruits 8 1 
Corn gluten feed 10 0 Edible vegetables roots and tubers 3 8 
Soya cake and bean 49 3 Edible fruits and nuts 2 30 
Vegetables & Fruit 10 7 Live animals 1 0 
Olive oil  0 0 Dairy products 1 1 
Milk/ milk products  0 3 Products of animal origin 1 1 
Sugar 4 12 Animal or vegetable fats & olis 13 6 
Tobacco 1 0 Preparation of veg. fruits & nuts 1 13 
wine 11 25 Sugar and sugar confectionery 0 7 
Beef and veal 1 2 Coffee, tea  mate & spices    1 1 
Pig meat 0 2 Cacao and cacao preparations 2 2 
Sheep & goat meat 0 0 Tobacco and tobacco products 11 12 
Poultry Meat 1 2 Others 44 13 
Source: for the CAP; Eurostat database, Agris database 1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003 and for Turkey; EU 
Commission: Agricultural situation in the Candidate Countries, Country Report Turkey, 2003, p.18 Illustrated by 
the author 
 
In the last decade about 30 % of Turkish exports consisted of edible fruits and nuts, 
13% preparations of animal origin, 13% others, 12% tobacco and tobacco products, 8% edible 
vegetables, roots and tubers, 6% animal and vegetable fats and oils and finally cereals which 
covered 5% of Turkish exports. There were also some other exported products from Turkey 
but they were less than 1 percent in total agricultural product trade. 
In the last decade 44% of imported products comprise others, which are not indicated. 
But cereals comprise 11.60% of agricultural import. The animal and vegetable fat and oils 
comprises 12% and tobacco products comprise 11% of the Turkish import on agricultural 
products.              
In the table below the export and import amount of cereals between the EU and 
Turkey is shown. In the last decade imports from the EU to Turkey vary from one year to 
another,  the reason for this being dependence on the decline in export subsidies which were 
reduced in the Uruguay round to about 36 %  for a six year period. In 2000, a sharp decline in 
price gap between internal and external cereal price increased exports from the EU to Turkey. 
In contrast to this, exports from Turkey to the EU between 1990 and 1995 increased almost 
five fold. The reason for this increase was the MacSharry reform which cut the support price 
15%, whilst compulsory set-aside (15%) began to be applied for cereals.  
 
Table 4.6: Turkey’s agricultural trade with the EU 
 Imports from EU, % share Exports to EU, % share 
 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Trade 
with EU 
44.4 47.2 48.8 44.2 45.2 45.8 55.4 51.2 52.2 51.4 51.2 51.8r 
 Value of imports (euro/ mn) Value of exports (euro/ mn) 
Cereals  448.2 359.7 458.6 234.7 429.2 -- 58.5 337.1 440.1 366.0 290.0 -- 
Source: EU Commission: Turkey in EU, Chapter Eight: Turkey’s Trade Position, EU Commission, 2004, p.125 
and 128, http://www.scirus.com 
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 Statistical data from one publisher differ to that of another. Therefore, it is difficult, to 
estimate exactly what the precise outcome of the support measures are. For example, total 
agricultural product trade and cereal products import and export in the Eurostat Agris 
database (above figures for statistics) differ from the DG VI for agriculture statistics (below 
given figures) and from FAO database. But, at least it is obvious that the decline in export 
subsidies has had less negative effect on reducing the export capacity of the CAP in the world 
markets, because first, cereal prices were in decline in the CAP, which reduced the price gap 
between internal and external producers and second, export subsidies were maintained, in 
spite of a sharp reduction in the price gap between external and internal products, and third, 
maintenance of the CCT reduced the import of third world countries producers. As a 
consequence of these measures, the amount of export and import changed, and this has had a 
positive effect on the trade balance for the EU CAP, in the last decade. 
In the following part an estimation of the trade balance and the applied formula have 
been reformulated and adapted to the CAP system to better calculate the correct value of the 
trade balance for the CAP.   
The deficit on the balance of payments increases the financial burden of the 
Community budget. It is also important to remember that within the CAP, the application of 
support measures, such as common custom tariff (CCT) does not only play a protective role, 
but also creates finance to support other non-tariff measures. This implies increasing import, 
which on the one hand, has a negative effect on trade balance and as a consequence of this on 
the balance of payments; but on the other hand, increasing imports, in particular in the EU 
where CCT is applied, increase the revenue incomes collected via tariff measures which in 
turn increase the resources of the Community budget. The CCT is actually one of the 
important support measures which contribute to the CAP budget in financing other non-tariff 
measures.  
Indeed, CAP measures increase the expenditure of the CAP budget, and excessive 
direct payments and export subsidies, in particular, have increased the cost of the CAP budget 
in the last decade. Therefore, both the cost of subsidies on export and the import revenue 
results of the common custom tariff to estimate the trade balance of the CAP products is to be 
considered.    
The export revenues, which are obtained from exporting goods, need to be subtracted 
from the amount of export subsidies to estimate the contribution to the trade balance. It is 
obvious that in the CAP the application of support measures creates trade distortion and the 
effect of this distortion is indirectly reflected in the balance of payments.  
In the figure below, the impact of the price support system of the EU CAP is 
illustrated. It is supposed that the price gap, (t) between internal (Pp) and world products (Pr), 
is applied as a common custom tariff, resulting in a reduction of imported products from Q4 to 
Q2. The red line represents the import amount.  
The amount of import after the application of the common custom tariff (ad valorem 
tax formula) can be calculated for the tariff revenues with the blue coloured area E, as shown 
in equation1 below.   
 Ad valorem tax = (1+t) Pr 
 
Total value of net imports after tariff (It): 
 It = [(Pp+ Pp. t) (Q1- Q2)] 
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Figure 4.6: The market price support causes a trade distortion. 
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However, it is obvious that for the calculation of the trade balance, it is required to 
subtract the tariff revenues from the import value in the case where no tariff is applied. 
Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the difference between total import value 
without tariff and total import value with tariff. By doing so the difference between these two 
will give the total expenditure on import as shown below: 
Total import revenue (Ir), 
 Ir= (Pp-Pr). (Q1-Q2) 
 
Net import expenditure (Ie), 
Ie =     It    –    Ir 
Ie =   [(Pr+ Pr. t) (Q1- Q2)] - [(Pp-Pr). (Q1-Q2) ] 
 
Pp: EU unit value at producer price (farm gate price) 
t: the price gap between internal and world products, which is applied as a common 
custom tariff.  
Pr: world reference price 
(Q1- Q2): imported product amount 
 
For the export, 
Now it is supposed that the price gap between internal (Pp) and world products (Pr) 
will be applied as an export subsidy (Pp-Pr) which will reduce the product price below the 
world level and increase the EU product sales from Q5Q6 to Q5Q7, which is shown by the blue 
coloured areas (B+C). Areas B and C represent the export sales, while the sales amount of 
importing country reduces as shown in the blue coloured areas (A+B).  As a consequence of 
the price reduction, export demand outside the union is increased. Therefore, it is required to 
estimate the amount of subsidy and production increase in the market and then calculate the 
value of the export as given below.      
Total values of export subsidy expenditure Es = (Pp-Pr). (Q5-Q7)  
 
It is required to subtract the above given value from the total export value (without 
subsidy) to estimate the gain from export.  
Therefore, the value of total export (Et) is below given form: 
 
   E     A 
 
B     C
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Et = Pp (Q5-Q7)   
 
Pp is the EU producer price, but application of the export subsidy, reduces the price 
level out of the Union so that the EU product price falls below the world price (Pr) level.   
Hence, to estimate total export revenue Er is then: 
Er =  Et  -   Es 
Er =  Pp (Q5-Q7) – (Pp- Pr)(Q5-Q7) 
 
Pp: EU producer price 
Pr: World reference price 
Pp-Pr: export subsidy amount per unit 
(Q5-Q7): exported product amount  
 
The below given formula can be used to estimate the trade balance for CAP products 
which are supported with tariff and non-tariff measures. By doing so, the trade balance, which 
is dependent on the difference between export and import of goods, can be better estimated in 
the balance of payments calculation. 
Trade balance (Tb) is then, 
Tb = Er  - Ie   
Tb = [ Pp (Q5-Q7) – (Pp- Pr)(Q5-Q7) ]- [[(Pp+ Pp. t) (Q1- Q2)] - [(Pp-Pr). (Q1-Q2)] ] 
 
In the table below, the above trade balance formula has been used to illustrate the 
impact of the tariff and export subsidies on the trade balance. Below, in Table 4.7, barley 
export and import amounts are taken as a sample product in the given scenario used to 
illustrate the impact of the export subsidies and import tariffs on export and import values 
which influence the trade balance.  
 
Table 4.7: The impact of the tariff and export subsidy on Trade balance of barley (Only 
barley is considered) (€/ t)  
Year Total Import 
 tax (It) 
Net import 
expenditure (Ie) 
Total 
Export 
value (Et) 
Net Export 
revenue (Er) 
Balance with tariff and 
without subsidy 
effects(Et- It)  
Balance without tariff 
and subsidy effect  
(Er-Ie) 
1994 327.645 15.787 1,157.422 578.511 1,124.657 562.723 
1995 610.745 58.346 553.938 393.008 492.864 334.661 
1996 34.233 33.867 1,205.763 1,181.328 1,171.529 1,147.461 
1997 59.555 57.220 598.695 556,611 539.140 499.391 
1998 45.169 30.061 1,122.093 681.895 1,076.923 651.834 
1999 255.627 232.240 1,597.030 1,112.474 1,341.403 880.234 
2000 102.333 101.167 1,142.094 1,117.511 1,039.760 1,016.343 
Source: calculated by the author from the Eurostat database, Director General for Agriculture and Fisheries, 
http://www.euros.ch/agrifish.html, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003 and   
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_290/l_29020021028en00010932.pdf   
 
The tariff and export subsidies had considerable impact on import and export of barley 
trade and trade balance as indicated in the table above. The trade balance of 1994 has 
considerably increased from the result of the import tariff and export subsidy compared to the 
trade balance without export subsidy and import tariff in the same year. The mentioned 
situation has had, in almost all years, similar effects on the trade balance. The mentioned trade 
balance difference has surprisingly not been observed in 1996, 1997 and in 2000, where the 
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price gap between internal and world products fell. The price gap was approximately 2.5 € in 
1996 and 2000 and 8€ in 1997, which reduced the impact of these support measures on trade 
balance. This means the application of the export subsidies and common custom tariffs have 
less positive effects on trade balance when the price gap between internal and world products 
is reduced, because the difference between export and import values, which gives the trade 
balance, is almost the same, with or without support measures. 
In the last decade, the decline in import has also been affected by higher import tariffs, 
which prevent the access of third world country producers into the market. The application of 
the common custom tariff is a fixed percentage. The application of fixed percentage can only 
be changed with commission approval. In recent years the price gap between internal and 
world cereal producers fell. The application of the common custom tariff was maintained. 
However, the application of a variable levy is adjustable. If a variable levy is preferable for 
use on imports then the amount of the levy is the price gap between world and EU prices. Any 
increase or decrease in the price gap would be reflected in the amount of the levy.  
However, if a variable levy were preferred as an instrument to protect internal 
producers from producers outside the Union, it would have less trade distorting effect on third 
world country producers, because a decline in the price gap between internal and external 
producers would also reduce the levy amount. A decline in the levy would reduce the 
imported product price and might increase the imported product access to the EU. 
It is obvious that the application of a flexible levy causes less trade distortion than 
tariffs.  
In the next decade, the CAP reform must concentrate on replacement of the CCT with 
the flexible levy. The flexible levy can be better and more easily adapted to changes in the 
price gap between internal and external producers, because any change in the CCT is required 
to change the measure on tax regulations. It is obvious that an application of the variable 
import levy could be more advantageous than the common custom tariff (CCT), which may 
contribute to a reduction of the trade distortion in the market. By such an application, any 
reduction on intervention price would be easily reflected in the variable import levy, which 
would be continuously regulated in the price gap between internal and world products. As a 
consequence of this policy change, some lower cost products from third world countries will 
gain access into the EU market. This will both increase fair trade and consumer welfare.    
The export subsidies, which are dependent on the price gap between internal and 
world products, must also be continuously regulated to the price gap; this means any increase 
and decrease in the price gap must be reflected in the applied export subsidy for the 
prevention of excessive spending from the CAP budget. The better regulation of export 
subsidies into the price gap changes will reduce the resource transfers from lower cost 
production to higher cost production and increase fair trade in the world markets.  
In short, the CCT and intervention price mechanism have been mostly used to prevent 
the access of imported products to the EU market, and excessive export subsidies were given 
to boost the amount of export in the world market to increase the trade balance.  The 
application of these measures reduced self-sufficiency and market-oriented production in the 
market. The new measures must be planned to lessen the transfers from consumers and tax 
payers to producers and for greater transparency in domestic production to agriculture in order 
to for increase fair trade.   
The negative effects of the CAP measures on the external trade balance are 
summarized below: 
• The common custom tariff increases the revenues of the CAP budget and reduces the 
balance of trade deficits but increases the trade distortion,    
• Export subsidies contribute to an increase in the exported product amount. Increasing 
exports may contribute to covering the deficits in the trade balance. However, it is 
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required to estimate the export subsidy amount in order to determine the positive 
contribution to the balance of trade. It is possible that expenditure on export subsidies 
may go beyond the expected income from subsidized export.  
• CAP reforms are oriented to support producers. But with the exception of common 
custom tariff other non-tariff measures increase the expenditure of the CAP budget 
which then reduces financial capacity. 
• In recent years the price gap disappeared. Moreover, internal prices fell below the 
world price for cereal products, but application of common custom tariff stayed intact 
thus contributing to an increase in the revenue obtained from external trade.   
  
4.3 Effects on the Cereal Products  
 
The impact of the support measures has increased the surplus amount in the CAP, but 
in the last decade, the application of set-aside measures on cereal products has reduced the 
amount of production. The application of compulsory set-aside, together with voluntary set-
aside, reduced the arable land in agriculture (see Table 2.1 and 2.2). However, a decline in 
arable land did not contribute to a reduction in the production of cereals, but increased 
production of most of the cereals (see Table 3.9).  For example, wheat production increased 
from 82,8 mn/t in 1994 to 92.0 mn/t in 2003, barley production increased from 38,9 mn/t in 
1994 to 46.6 mn/t in 2003, and finally, maize production also increased from 28.2 mn/t in 
1994 to 40.2 mn/t in 2001. Set-aside and direct payments were planned to cover farmers’ 
losses whilst they were setting their land aside from production. This meant that support 
measures had less effect on reducing cereal products. Nevertheless, wheat production, which 
had higher intervention stocks relative to other cereals, has fallen slightly. This happened 
whilst export of wheat products increased in the world markets, because the consumption 
level increased from 134.2 to 178.3 (mn/t) (see Table 2.7.2) and the export level also 
increased about 2% (see Table 4.10). These positive improvements have contributed to a 
reduction in the stock levels in the last decade (see Table 2.7.1).  A consequence of positive 
improvements in wheat, and also in maize and barley, caused stock levels in cereals to fall 
from 18.7 to 7.9 mn/ tons (see table 2.7), while export amounts increased approximately from 
29.1 to 37.6 mn/ tons (see Table 2.7). Altogether this has meant that CAP measures have 
contributed to an increase in export amounts by means of export subsidies. But some of these 
measure such as set-aside and early retirement on the one hand, reduced cereals and, on the 
other hand, some others such as output and area payments stimulated producers to increase 
production. Such a contradiction between support measures reduced the success of applied 
CAP policies which increased the CAP expenditure on cereals in the last decade (see Table 
2.5). 
In Turkey the production of cereals showed a very small increase in this period. For 
example wheat production increased from 14.5 mn/t in 1994 to 15.8 mn/t in 2003, and barley 
production increased from 6.4 mn/t in 1994 to 7.4 mn/t in 2003 (see Table 3.9), which was 
very small compared to the CAP cereals. Moreover in the CAP reform proposals were 
planned to reduce the surplus amount in the CAP. Moreover, in Turkey the export of cereal 
products relative to imports is less and there was not any planned policy or program to reduce 
cereal production (see Table 4.4).                   
The effects of the CAP on the cereal sector are given below: 
• Set-aside measure reduced cereal production together with land use. 
• Free movement of goods within the Union accelerated the trade between member 
countries. Increasing internal trade reduced trade access into the Union while export amounts 
increased as a result of export subsidies.                    
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• An intervention price mechanism was required to support producer income and to 
prevent a price fall below the intervention price. As a result of this measure, internal prices 
were artificially increased. Intervention purchase, which stimulated an increase in production, 
had an impact on the supply. 
• Direct payments are given to cover the income gap of farmers which is determined per 
hectare for arable crops (cereals). Excessive payments increased the income of producers.   
• Environmental measures and the adaptation of new regulations for plant genetics and 
organic farming supported the CAP measures for increasing production and export capacity 
whilst reducing imports from Turkey.        
• The set-aside measure was planned to reduce excessive production. Hence, the 
application of this measure increases the grassland for the animal husbandry sector. While, 
compulsory set-aside measure reduced the use of arable land approximately 15 percent, it 
increased the transfers from consumers and tax payers to producers in the last decade. Income 
effects have gone beyond the set-aside effect.  
• Import-export: Maintenance of CCT and export subsidies remain as safeguard 
measures in the internal market to protect internal producers, but by doing so both measures 
increase the trade distortion in the world market and continue to increase cereal production in 
the CAP.  
The impact of support measures has had a negative effect on reducing cereals 
production in the last decade. The production amount, in spite of compulsory set-aside, has 
not been reduced to the desired level. The existing compulsory set-aside measure was 
combined with direct payments which increased the production amount of cereals in the CAP. 
However, if the existing support and payments are maintained for internal producers, it is 
obvious that cereals production will continue to increase in the following decade.  
In Turkey similarly as a non-member country the impact of agricultural subsidies 
which were especially concentrated in input subsidies have boosted the cereals production and 
steadily increased. But, since 2001 the newly started ARIP program introduced the DIS 
instead of input subsidies in Turkey. However, due to lack of information and communication 
most of the producers in less favoured regions received less support relative to producers in 
the Aegean and Western regions in Turkey. Due to this the unequal distribution of DIS, which   
transferred about 50 USD per hectare to farmers, production increased in western and Aegean 
regions.  
Consequently, similar to the CAP, the application of agricultural support measures in 
Turkey increased the transfers to producers. Large-scale producers in favourite regions, in 
particular, received most of the support which increased the cereals production. In Turkey, too 
unequal distribution of input subsidies and later DIS to producers increased production.          
      
4.4 Price Distortion Effects 
 
Price distortion effects of the CAP measures have two dimensions; on the one hand, 
the price support system contributes to a reduction of price differences on similar products 
between member countries, and on the other hand, it affects the external product prices with 
different support measures, such as, tariff and export subsidies. 
Effect in the CAP: 
The negative impacts of the CAP intervention measures, which are determined by the 
Commission, but applied differently by the community agencies in member countries, 
increase the price disparity. This different application creates difficulties in obtaining the price 
equation on the market.  
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Table 4.8.1: Food prices differ significantly between member states 
Product Min. Prices   Max. Prices   
Pork  Germany  78  Sweden  131  
Beef  Ireland  67  Belgium  117  
Salmon  Spain  61  Denmark  133  
Cod  Italy  85  France  115  
Oranges  Spain  51  UK  141  
Bananas  Spain  76  Sweden  120  
Tomatoes  Spain  58  Germany  115  
Potatoes  Ireland  56  Denmark  175  
Cheese  Holland 75  Italy  125  
 Source: 1http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/smn/smn27/s27mn05.htm 
Note: Highest and lowest prices of selected fresh food (100 = EU average). Prices are average prices, including 
VAT, for supermarkets. 
 
Shown in the above table are the large price differences between members in 
agricultural products.  Let us consider for example tomato and TV set prices. The minimum 
price of tomatoes is € 58 in Spain and the maximum price is € 115 in Germany which is 
almost 100% higher than in Spain. However, if we consider the TV set prices in the table 
below, the minimum price is € 79 in Portugal and the maximum price is € 120 in Sweden 
which is almost 50 percent higher than in Portugal. It is important to remember that within the 
EU there is no trade restriction between member countries. The distance between Portugal 
and Sweden (app.3000 km) is longer than the distance between Spain and Germany (app. 
1300 km). This means, therefore, that transportation costs cannot cause such high internal 
price differences.  If this were the case then the high price differences would also be seen in 
the industrial sector, or there would be regional market regulations which affect product 
prices in agriculture (see table below).  
 
Table 4.8.2: Prices differ less for electronics 
Product Min. prices   Max. Prices   
Camcorder (Panasonic)  Austria  86  France  116  
Portable CD Players -Philips  Germany  79  Spain  123  
14 inch Colour TV (Sony)  Portugal  79  Sweden  120  
25 inch Colour TV (Philips)  Sweden  78  Denmark  123  
29 inch Colour TV (Sony)  Portugal  82  Denmark  122  
Digital Versatile Disc (Sony)  Germany  84  Spain  111  
Audio Mini System (Sony)  UK  83  Sweden  122  
Video Cassette Rec. (Panasonic)  Italy  89  France  115  
Compact Disc Player (Sony)  Italy  88  Austria  112  
Video Cassette Recorder (Sony)  Germany  81  Denmark  126  
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/international_market/en/update/score/scoresurvey.htm 
Note for table 3.1-and 3.2: Highest and lowest prices of selected consumer electronics goods (100 = EU 
average). Price levels are yearly average at national level for specialist stores. 
 
The implementation of economic integration has still not been completed, which has 
reduced the success of the single currency and created difficulties for an equation of similar 
product prices. It is obvious that “the ease with which consumers and firms can compare 
 185
prices in different EU countries will increase dramatically with the single currency.”7 Price 
transparency is one of the important effects of the single currency. Price comparisons between 
different countries are good indicators of an estimation of economic integration and market 
performance, because increasing price differences between countries have negative effects on 
the economic integration, and the opposite is also true. Equation of similar product prices 
increases the competition and market efficiency, where goods are traded freely, because 
similar products with similar prices maintain downward pressure on prices for similar 
products.  
Nevertheless, price support mechanism prevents price fluctuation on the market. 
Effect in Turkey: 
The effects in Turkey occur when producers in Turkey export into the EU markets 
with common custom tariffs. The results of this are that, on the one side, internal producers 
are protected from Turkish producers, Turkish, support systems increase the prices in Turkey 
so that the producers are prevented from entering the internal market.  
Price distortion which is dependent on the rate of protection, explained in section 
3.2.1, also affects the producers in Turkey when internal producers export their products with 
subsidies. By doing so the price of the exported product amount declines below the world 
prices and increases the market share in Turkey. As a consequence of these export subsidies; 
the market share of Turkish producers’ falls, while their product price is artificially increased 
by the CCT.     
The price distortion effects of the CAP support system are summarized:  
The price support system increases the price differences in the market and reduces 
economic integration in the EU.   
It reduces the access of imported products into the internal market.  
Higher internal prices stimulate external producers to increase their product price to 
capture part of the tax revenues. 
Export subsidies cause a sharp decline on exported product prices so that the external 
producers are not able to compete in the world market 
Decline in exported product price increases market share of internal producers while 
external producers reduce their share on the world market. 
In the CAP, high common custom tariffs for agricultural products (especially for 
cereals) eliminate almost all imports so that there is no apparent imported distortion on the 
internal market (see Table 4.6).  
 
4.5 Revenue Effects 
 
The revenue effect of tariff and non-tariff measures of the CAP varies from one 
measure to another. The application of the support measures is not actually dependent on an 
increase in the revenues of the CAP of the EU. The primary goal is to prevent the loss of 
producers and maintain market stability.   
Most of the support measures increase the expenditure of the CAP budget which is 
costly. Especially after the MacSharry reform, which replaced the price support measures 
with direct payments and increased the expenditure on export subsidies, budget costs of the 
CAP increased, except CCT and quotas license rights (if the license right belongs to the 
community) had positive effects on the Community budget. Price support, export subsidies, 
direct payments and set-aside payment had negative effects on the CAP budget. 
In the table below, the development of agricultural incomes in the last decade is 
shown. In the nineties the amount of income increase differs between member countries, but 
                                                 
7 A. Harrison E. Dalkiran E. Elsey: International Business, 2000, p.351 
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in the last decade, in almost all member countries’ agricultural incomes increased. However, 
in member countries such as Belgium, the UK, and Luxembourg and especially in Holland, 
agricultural incomes fell. In particular, a decline in these countries has been observed since 
the Uruguay round which reduced the amount of budget spending on export subsidies by 
about 36% and agricultural support by about 20% over a six year period.   
 
Table 4.9.1: Development of total agricultural incomes per capita in CAP (1995=100) 
    Countries 1990 1992 1994 1996 1999 2002 
EU-15 : : 94.0 103.5 100.2 107.2 
Belgium 116.1 113.6 111.1 109.7 99.7 107.8 
Denmark 86.0 73.4 84.0 102.1 74.8 81.1 
Germany : 94.4 93.6 113.1 94.6 110.9 
Greece : : 95.9 95.2 96.5 111.8 
Spain 102.1 87.3 100.4 112.3 107.8 125.1 
France 87.2 83.5 94.2 100.5 106.4 108.9 
Ireland 76.0 87.4 93.5 102.3 92.5 92.6 
Italy 78.1 83.0 91.1 105.7 116.6 110.7 
Luxembourg 99.1 92.8 88.6 103.8 94.3 91.1 
Holland 115.8 104.8 97.3 95.9 86.4 81.2 
Austria 90.4 86.3 88.1 92.1 78.1 95.3 
Portugal 94.6 70.1 91.1 109.8 125.8 136.8 
Finland 100.7 81.7 88.2 80.6 82.3 106.6 
Sweden 106.5 79.4 84.0 98.1 94.0 114.8 
United 
Kingdom 
67.5 72.5 90.6 93.7 61.1 64.0 
Source: European Commission Directorate General for Agriculture: Agriculture in the European Union 
Statistical and Economic information 2002, Belgium, 2003, (selected data form table 4.1.6.2), p.32    
 
In the figure below agricultural income and GDP in Turkey between 1997 and 2002 is 
illustrated. The share of agricultural GDP in the total GDP was maintained at the same level 
whilst income in agriculture was in decline. The reason for this sharp decline between 1999 
and 2002 was the replacement of the agricultural input subsidies and price support with the 
DIS programme designed to bring Turkish agriculture more closely in line with the CAP 
support system. 
 
Figure 4.7: Agricultural GDP and Income change in Turkey between 1997 and 2002  
   
 
Source: Lundell, Lampietti, Pertev, Pohlmeier, Akder, Ocek, Jha: Turkey, A review of the Impact of the Reform of 
Agricultural Sector Subsidization, 2004, p.5 
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 The results of the new support system showed that most of Turkish farmers suffered a 
net income loss. In Turkey the application of the DIS was enlarged throughout all the regions, 
while other subsidies (input subsidies and price support) were removed or reduced.  By doing 
this, most of the Turkish farmers lost about half of their income, about 40% of which was 
covered by the DIS payments in the second year of the application. “The large difference 
between the fiscal savings from the agricultural transfers (subsidy and DIS) reform program 
(USD 4.3 billion) and the net income loss to farmers (USD1.45 billion) is a testimony to the 
gross inefficiencies of the pre reform agricultural subsidies in supporting farmers’ income. 
This indicates that from a fiscal or taxpayer perspective the current DIS program is a much 
more cost effective and fiscally sustainable way of supporting farmers’ income than the 
earlier regime of output and input subsides.”8 The newly introduced DIS system has not been 
equally applied and the regional distribution of DIS payments varies from one region to 
region, where large-scale farmers receive most of subsides and small-scale producers believe 
that they are not even eligible to receive this subsidy. Through this neglect of the small-scale 
producers most of the large-scale producers who own most of the land receive financial 
support and part-time farmers who work on their land receive nothing. It is hoped, however, 
that in future these difficulties will be overcome and the new policy will bring a more 
equitable system in agriculture.               
In the table below the share of agricultural GDP in the total GDP indicates that both in 
the EU and in Turkey, decline in agricultural GDP in the total GDP was observed in the last 
decade. On the contrary, total income level was in decline in Turkey whilst it increased in the 
EU in the same period.   
 
Table 4.9.2: Share of agriculture in GDP (%) 
Countries GDP 1990 GDP 1999 
EU-15 3.6 1.8 
Turkey 16.67  13.34 (in 1997) 
 Source: Edgar Elgar: The Politics and Economics of the EU, 2001, p.217 and European Commission: European 
Economics, No: 2, Belgium, 2003, p.259 and for Turkey, Çakmak: Agricultural Policy Reform and Rural 
Development in Turkey, 1998, p.4  
 
4.6 Effects on Investment Policy  
 
In the CAP, the internal market has been protected by various support measures. Most 
of the support measures increase producer income, but make a very small contribution to 
capacity increase. The existence of over-production in the cereal sector prevents the producer 
from increasing capacity. Furthermore, apart from export subsidies, other support measures 
have no effect on the increase of the market share. In the CAP system, payments which are 
given to the producers are not proposed to increase productivity, but to support the income of 
producers and price intervention is supposed to secure price stability in the market. Therefore, 
ineffective incentive policies reduce the productivity within the CAP.    
Investment Promotion: For less developed regions this is supplied from the ERDF 
(European regional and Development Fund). Improvement of the existing agricultural 
structure receives support from the EAGGF. The European Finance Bank supports projects in 
agriculture to improve the welfare of people who work in agriculture.  
Investment promotions can be realized by the reduction of interest rate on credits, 
reduction of the taxation, direct subsidies, in cash money etc. Due to these incitements 
                                                 
8 Lundel, Lampietti, Pertev, Pohlmeier, Akder, Ocek, Jha: Turkey, A review of the Impact of the Reform of 
Agricultural Sector Subsidization, 2004, p.viii 
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regional disparities can be eliminated within the CAP. The support measures of the CAP also 
create finance in order to reduce disparities between regions and countries.  
In the table below, the increase in machinery investment and fertilizer use is given. In 
the CAP the decline in arable areas tractors’ and harvesters’ use continued. This implies that 
machinery use increased in the rest of the arable land, which positively accelerated rural 
development and productivity. In addition, increasing exports of agricultural machinery also 
meant an increase in the amount of machinery used in agriculture. The increased transfers to 
producers, therefore, obviously positively affected machinery use in the last decade. However, 
total fertilizer exports increased whilst consumption fell between the periods 1985 to 2003. In 
contrast, in Turkey, tractor use increased considerably, whilst harvester use decreased. The 
export of fertilizers decreased whilst consumption of fertilizers increased in the same period. 
The reason for this was the decreasing Turkish production of fertilisers and increasing 
consumption of them between 1985 and 2002. 
 
Table 4.10: Machinery and fertilizers in agriculture in the EU and in Turkey  
Country Item 1985 1990 1995 2002 
Land use (1000ha) 150.330 148.542 142.456 140.987 
Tractors in use – number 7,189.975 7,414.790 7,077.840 6,953.532 
Harvester in use- number 635.158 598.176 545.461 846.774 
Agricultural machineries 
import- 1000 $ 
33,717.616 7,390.437 8,277.240 9,120.839 
Agricultural machineries export 
1000 $ 
5,144.831 10,075.587 11,137.941 12,695.826 
Total fertilizer production 
(mn/t) 
24,637.1 83 20,608.814 16,229.000 12,601.203 
Total fertilizers import-qty-mn/t  9,814.457 12,588.855 12,537.800 12,478,612 
Total fertilizers export-qty-mn/ t 11,427.903 12,122.824 9,990.200 9,162.666 
EU-15 
Total fertilizer consumption 21,564.562 19,660.489 17,267.703 14,845.970 
Land use (1000ha) 38.130 39.677 39.493 41.690 
Tractors in use – number 582.291 689.650 776.863 970.083 
Harvester in use- number 13.615 11.741 12.706 11.539 
Agricultural machineries import- 
1000 $ 
38.968 41.070 37.383 43.989 
Agricultural machineries export- 
1000 $ 
7.620 3.884 9.922 62.330 
Total fertilizer production (mn/t) 1,373.800 1,563.861 1,330.902 935.772 
Total fertilizers import-qty-mn/ t 449.166 624.218 632.582 961.211 
Total fertilizers export-qty-mn/ t 169.400 156.975 49.461 138.124 
TR 
Total fertilizer consumption 1,426.900 1,887.520 1,700.388 1,743.173 
Source: http://faostat.fao.org/ , Agriculture, crops primary selected statistics from FAO database, forecasted by 
myself. 
 
4. 7 Effects on   Employment in the Agricultural Sector 
 
In the CAP, it is obvious that the application of support measures is planned to 
maintain the livelihood of and a reasonable income for producers, but also maintenance of 
workforce is desired, even if it is not stated in a Article 39, because it is evident that without 
CAP support measures most of the least efficient producers would be eliminated.  
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In Turkey similarly a newly applied ARIP programme reduced the arable land and 
employees in agriculture. However, in Turkey the number of people employed in agriculture 
was rather high relative to the EU countries which require managing through other support 
programmes such as training on new agricultural planting methods, development of know-
how and the use of technology etc.     
In the CAP, the effects of support measures on unemployment were observed after the 
application of set-aside measures and the early retirement scheme in 1988, which reduced 
about 5 million ha arable land in agriculture. But the application of compulsory set-aside in 
the 1992 MacSharry reform also reduced the land use and employees too.  
As seen in the table below, in almost all countries the labour force has declined. 
However, it is obvious that without these support measures the employment situation would 
have drastically worsened. When unemployment rises in agriculture it increases the migration 
to towns. “In addition to shrinking the nations current standard of living, severe 
unemployment may have longer-term effects on the economy’s productive capacity and 
therefore on the future path of potential GDP fall and future living standards.”9      
In the table below, the decreasing amount of employed persons in agriculture is 
shown. Especially after the MacSharry reform in 1992, the amount of employed people 
continued to fall until 2001. 
 
Table 4.11.1: Persons employed in agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
 
                In thousands Countries 
1980 1990 2001 
EU-15 12,730 9,562 6,701 
Austria 323 269 215 
Belgium 116 119 56 
Denmark 200 147 96 
Germany 1.403 1.081 956 
Greece 1.016 889 627 
Spain 2,229 1,496 1,025 
France 1,821 1,394 964 
Ireland 209 173 120 
Italy 2,899 1,913 1,113 
Luxembourg 9 6 3 
Holland 244 297 238 
Portugal 1,122 840 645 
Finland 314 207 140 
Sweden 211 154 114 
U.K. 614 577 390 
Turkey 20,335 21,507 21,016 (year 2000) 
Source: European Commission Directorate General for Agriculture: Agriculture in the European Union Statistical 
and Economic information 2002, EU Commission DG Agriculture, Belgium, 2003, (selected data form table 
3.5.1.2, p.125) and for Turkey: http://faostat.fao.org/ , Employment in Agriculture, crops primary selected 
statistics from FAO database. 
 
The major problem in Turkish agriculture is the high percentage of employed people 
in agriculture which comprise about 30 % of the total employment in Turkey. Indeed, both the 
high employment numbers and lower machinery use in agriculture disguise employment in 
the sector and reduce productivity in agriculture (see table 4.11.2). It is obvious that large 
                                                 
9 James Ragan JR, and Lloyd B. Thomas JR: Principles of Economics, 1992, p.223 
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shifts from agriculture to services are still needed. However, large cities in Turkey cannot 
easily absorb further high levels of migration. Therefore the migration flow from Turkey to 
the EU counties can be predicted. “Some Turkish economic commentators think Turkey will 
enter a ‘golden age’ after 2010, similar to that experienced by the Asian tigers in the past, 
with a very high ratio of the active to total population.” The reason for this is the young 
population in Turkey, where about 50 % of the total population is under the age of 25. But 
less know-how and communication difficulties with Turkish workers reduce the migration 
option to the EU countries.                
In the table below, the amount of people employed in agriculture is shown. In the EU 
the share of people in total employment is 4.3% and the GNP contribution is only 1.7%. The 
people employed in the CEECs are almost fivefold, and in Turkey it is eightfold which is 
rather high and needs to be reduced in order for Turkish agriculture to be adopted into the 
CAP system (see table below).    
 
Table 4.11.2: Share of employment and GDP in EU and CEECs in 2003 
 
 
Source: Jacquet: Future Agricultural Policy in the European Union, February 2003 and for Turkey data from 
IMF direction of trade statistics CD- Rom for agricultural value added and agricultural employment data and 
Eurostat, European Commission, Director General for Agriculture, FAO and UNSO, 
http://www.un.org/esa/earthsummit  
 
After the eastern enlargement share of employed persons in agriculture increased, 
results of higher employment share in agriculture in CEEC’s (see Table above). Similarly, in 
Turkey, share of employees in agriculture is about 32% which is rather high compared to the 
EU and CEEC’s. This implies about 50% of Turkish farmers are required to move employees 
from the agricultural sector to the industry and service sectors. However, a fall in agricultural 
employment cannot be realised in a short period, because such a decline would mean about a 
12% growth in the service and industry sectors. This will require higher investment for a 
capacity increase in both sectors. But a more difficult problem will be the integration of these 
people, who are not qualified for employment in the service and industry fields, into the two 
other sectors; this will require long-term training programmes to achieve integration. 
Therefore, it will be very difficult to adopt the Turkish agriculture in to the CAP within a 
decade.               
 
4. 8 Effects on Productivity in Agriculture 
 
In the last decade agricultural incomes increased (see Table 4.5) while CAP 
expenditure on cereal products, i.e. about a 45 % share of the CAP budget, has also increased. 
The increasing incomes have obviously resulted in higher transfers to producers in the last 
decade. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that CAP interventions contributed to an 
increase in the output amount in the last decade, which was not the planned goal of the CAP 
support measures.          
In Turkey agricultural support had been realised via input subsidies until 1999, and 
this had a significant effect on production costs, but the TGB (Turkish Grain Board) reduced 
the income level of producers and productivity in this sector. Moreover, the duality in 
   EU CEEC’s Turkey 
Agricultural employment/total employment (%) 4.3 21.5 32.7 
Agricultural GNP/GNP, 1999 (%) 1.7 7.0 14.2 
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agriculture of modern versus traditional planting methods creates difficulties in this sector. 
Regional disparities in production, competition, resource and technology use, unequal 
distribution of subsidies reduce the efficiency and productivity in the cereals sector. It is clear 
that adoption of the Turkish agriculture into the CAP level will require a unique application 
throughout the whole land.       
The negative impacts of support measures on productivity both in the Union and in 
Turkey are summarized below: 
1. Reduced motivation: Direct payments and export subsidies increase incomes without 
any increase in investment and production. Income guarantee reduces the entrepreneurial 
spirit of producers.      
2.  Market intervention creates unfair trade for Turkish producers in the market. CAP 
measures not only cause distortion on the market but also replace some efficient production of 
exportable commodities from Turkey with the insufficient production of the CAP producers.  
3.  The set-aside measure was combined with direct payments which was dependent on 
the production amount in the last decade. Consequently, producers use the other 85% of their 
arable land more intensively to receive more payment.  
4.  In recent years a reduction of cereals prices has been observed, but against this 
decline, neither CCT nor export subsidies have been reduced for Turkish non-member country 
producers nor has the trade distortion effect of the CAP reduced. The payments have 
increased the expenditure of the CAP budget and had little effect on productivity. This mainly 
occurs in cereal products where there was excessive over-production and further payments 
only contributed to an increase in the surplus.  
5.  Small and medium enterprises (SME) must be supported in order to become self-
sufficient in the market and therefore increase productivity.  
6.  Endeavours must be made to reduce disparities between regions to increase growth 
and productivity. 
If the membership of Turkey is realized the share of lower cost production will be 
increased, because in the CAP the EU-15 producers have capital-intensive production relative 
to Turkey where labour intensive production is in use. In the CAP system after Turkey’s 
membership, the technical advantage of EU countries will be used in order to reduce the cost 
of production and to increase productivity. Turkey’s membership will increase the market 
capacity of internal producers. Increasing market capacity will increase production capacity. 
In such an enlarged market, competition between large-scale producers will also increase.  
In the EU there is an excessive supply of cereals and “growth in the EU has 
continuously exceeded domestic demand growth and resulted in the emergence of excess 
supply in cereals, beef dairy, products, wine and some fruits,”10 but after Turkey’s 
membership the enlarged market capacity will increase.      
If support measures in the CAP are maintained, over-production and producer income 
will continue to dominate the CAP expenditure in order to finance storage costs and direct 
payment to producers.  
Finally, in the CAP investment for the new production technique and plant genetics 
may contribute to an increase in productivity. After Turkey’s membership cooperation with 
Turkish producers will increase the investment demand in Turkey. Consequently, increasing 
investments by the EU’s multinational firms will increase their market capacity and their 
competitive opportunities for lower-cost production exporting to the Near East markets.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Artis and Lee: The Economy of the EU, 1997, p.92 
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4.9 Dynamic Effects 
 
Dynamic effects enhance productivity and the rate of GDP growth, causing faster 
technological progress, increasing welfare, reducing uncertainty, and increasing efficiency, 
due to intensification of competition.   
  According to the dynamic economy, production can only be analysed by dynamic 
effects because it is dependent on time and technological changes. It has positive competition 
effects, economies of scale, and future growth. Dynamic effects gains are obtained in the long 
run, consideration time means price, marketing demand etc. The dynamic effect of integration 
is directly related to the growth of GDP. 
The dynamic effects of the economic union play a more important role than static 
effects (Customs Union theory: Trade creation- trade distortion). Dynamic trade creation 
occurs when a change in custom tariff affects the trade volume and growth. The growth rate is 
determined endogenously in a dynamic economy. The dynamic gains occur when member 
countries are integrated into the single market. This integration allows member countries to 
use the advantage of economies of scale to reduce product prices, and to specialise in certain 
products. Countries may agree to allocate certain goods production. This happens as a result 
of economies of scale, which means increasing mass-production of goods contributes to a 
reduction of the average costs. Economies of scale occur where capital-intensive production is 
used as is observed in the EU. Economies of scale contribute to an understanding of why 
firms in certain sectors grow rapidly and become efficient in the market place.  
The dynamic gains occur where the rate of growth of the GNP is enhanced rather than 
welfare. There are two ways to estimate this, “either through increased productivity growth at 
a given investment ratio or through increased investment itself. This is true whether the 
increased sales are generated internally or through the pressures of demand for exports from 
abroad through regional integration.”11 The estimation of growth rate therefore contributes to 
an indication of dynamic effects. The GDP is dependent on an increase of investment itself at 
a given period. In the CAP there is overproduction in other sectors besides that of cereals. 
This implies that in these sectors dynamic gains can occur if external demand is enlarged, 
because excessive production can only be exported to increase the capacity and productivity, 
otherwise it will be destroyed or denominated to maintain at least an existing production 
capacity.  
The EU dynamic effects are obtained in the long-term. “Due to the increase in internal 
heterogeneity of the economic block, the effects are likely to be spatially asymmetric. From 
the point of view of both existing as well as acceding member states the dynamic growth or 
accumulative effect understood as a permanent change in the long-term average growth rate 
of GDP per capita is especially appealing.”12 As mentioned above, the dynamic gains of the 
Customs Union is possible in the long-term, apart from economies of scale, which can   occur 
either internally (within the firm as a result of mass-production) or externally (outside the firm 
as a result of its location).  
In the figure below, internal scale economies, which increase in production reducing 
the average costs because of marketing, technical managerial, research and development 
economies, are considered,.  To explain the impacts of scale economies, two countries X 
(Romania) and Y (Turkey) are considered. In the figure Dx+y is their demand for commodity, 
x+y. Sw is the world supply curve and ACx and ACy is their negatively-sloped aggregate 
supply curves for commodity Z in countries X and Y.  
                                                 
11 Ali M. El- Agraa: Regional Integration, 1999, p.175 
12 Brodzicki: In Search for Accumulative Effects of European Integration, 2003, http://econpapers.hhs.se 
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In the figure, free trade is the best policy resulting with oq6 amount of consumption, 
which is covered by imports at price PA. If X and Y countries impose tariffs to prevent access 
into the market then, these tariffs will be PAPC and PAPD for Y and X countries respectively 
resulting in oq1 and oq2 production for X and Y countries.  
When X and Y enter into the Customs Union (CU) the production amount will be then 
increased to 0q5 at price PB. This will raise the consumption in X and Y to 0q3 because of the 
decline in product price.  The results of this consumer surplus will increase to PBPDEG for 
country X and PBPCFG for country Y. Part of these gains is PBPDEI for X and PBPCFL for Y 
which are cost reduction effects. The production gain for Y and production loss for X occurs 
due to keeping production together.   
However, in the CAP, the existence of the intervention price mechanism changes the 
above-mentioned impact of the Customs Union. Let’s suppose that after the Customs Union 
product price is estimated as the Pi intervention price, which is the minimum price for the 
producers in the market. The production changes from q3 to q7 and the entire union output 
changes from q5 to q8 due to the results of the CAP intervention price. Then the expected 
consumer surplus for X and Y countries will change. The consumer surplus is reduced from 
PBPDEG to PDPiEZ in X country and in country Y from PBPcFG to PcPiZF. The cost 
reduction effect for country X is PiPDEJ and PcPiKF for country Y.          
 
Figure 4.8: Economies of scale and Customs Union  
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Source: Ali M. El- Agraa: Regional Integration, 1999, p.45 
 
As explained above the CAP support measures have affected and changed the 
producer gain and consumer surplus. However, as in this example, gain or loss in the Customs 
Union is dependent on the production costs of countries before joining the Customs Union. If 
the production cost is as high as in country X before the Customs Union then it is expected 
that in that country producer gain will decrease while consumer gain will increase. If, as in 
country Y, production cost is cheaper before the Customs Union then producer gain will 
increase and consumer surplus will fall. However, it is not possible to predict which member 
country will gain from the formation of the Customs Union.  But it is evident that the 
reallocation of resources and productivity of new investment is increased after the formation 
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of the Customs Union. The effect of increasing resources and demand capacity increases the 
gain of countries with lower production costs.               
Due to the enlargement of the markets, production capacity also increases as seen in 
the figure above. In the CAP, producers mostly have over-production and this is related to the 
demand capacity. However, in the EU there is not sufficient demand and this caused an over-
production in the market. In 2015 the anticipated membership of Turkey will increase the 
market capacity together with the production of the CAP. It is obvious that, as indicated in the 
table below, increasing production will increase Turkey’s market share in the EU-15. 
Therefore, expanding market capacity may occur for EU –15. Furthermore, if production, as 
indicated in the table, further increases, then this will only contribute to an increase in the 
surplus amount, which is an expensive problem within the CAP system. It is also possible that 
increasing production in Turkey may capture part of the internal market from the results of the 
cheaper production costs relative to the EU. However, if the market capacity, after Turkey’s 
possible membership, increases the demand of internal production of the EU-15, then this will 
increase profit and production capacity and possibly employment, because more profit means 
more investments. Increasing investment will increase the amount of enterprise. This will 
create jobs and increase demand in the market. In reality there are many other factors which 
affect this circulation in economics, such as, lower interest rates, import amounts, demand 
elasticity etc. Such dynamic effects can only be realized in the long run and it is more 
effective than the short-term static effects. 
The development of the cereal production both in the EU and in Turkey is shown in 
the table below. The impact of support measures has obvious less effect on reducing the 
production in the EU CAP.  Over time increasing level of cereals, especially in the EU, 
increased the storage costs of the community agencies. However, decreasing producer price 
and maintenance of export subsides have increased the market share both in and outside the 
Union, whilst the market share of Turkish producers together with other non-member 
countries’ producers fell by the end of the nineties.        
 
Table 4.12: The production amount in cereals in the EU and in Turkey (mn/t)  
 European Union Turkey 
Year Wheat Barley Other grains Maize Wheat  Barley  Maize Other grains 
1986 72.0 46.8 52.1 25.5 15.4 6.2 2.1 6.2 
1991 90.7 51.5 55.8 27.3 16.9 7.1 2.1 7.1 
1992 84.8 43.3 46.8 30.0 15.9 6.3 2.1 6.3 
1993 80.8 42.9 47.2 29.8 17.4 6.8 2.4 6.8 
1994 82.8 38.9 43.3 28.2 14.5 6.4 1.8 6.4 
1995 87.7 43.4 49.2 30.1 14.9 6.8 1.1 6.8 
1996 99.9 52.7 59.6 35.5 15.3 7.3 1.9 7.3 
1998 103.8 51.6 57.9 35.8 17.2 8.2 2.2 8.2 
2000 105.2 51.4 58.1 38.4 17.2 7.3 2.2 7.3 
2001 91.8 48.1 54.3 40.5 16.0 6.8 2.1 6.8 
2003 92.0 46.6 53.5 34.2 15.8 7.4 2.6 7.4 
Source: calculated from the Eurostat database, Agris database1973-2003, CD-Rom, 2003 and for Turkey from 
OECD database: Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005.     
 
In the CAP, the existence of the intervention price mechanism, which secures the 
market prices with intervention prices for certain agricultural products and reasonable income 
for producers, has reduced the productivity and market oriented production which would 
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increase competition for internal producers in the world markets. However, the price support 
system also reduced the price fluctuation on the market.  
The formation of the Customs Union has had a positive effect on firms in 
specialisation of similar product industries. It allowed for taking the advantage both in the size 
of the market and the differentiation of similar product trade which is observed in intra-
industry trade. However, in such an IIT increasing competition within the same industry 
accelerates growth and creates pressure on firms to reduce product prices, as observed in the 
cereals sector in the last decade. But growing firms tend to become an oligopolistic power in 
imperfect competition as was observed in the CAP and increasing intra-industry trade shows 
that the Customs Union tends to move in imperfect competition. (See Table 1.3) 
 
4.10 Welfare Effect for the Consumers 
  
The welfare effect of the price support system in the CAP varies both in cases where output 
is less than demand, or is in excess of  demand. In cereal products, considered in my research, 
there is excessive production and there is only transfer from consumers and taxpayers to 
producers. Therefore, the welfare effect is only considered for excessive production where 
supply exceeds demand. The transfer from producer to consumer is not relevant for cereal 
products.  
In 1980 Morris measured the ‘effect on resources’ of the CAP. He also considered the 
concept of economic surplus to represent the impact of support measures on consumers and 
producers. “Such calculations require assumptions about two potentially controversial factors: 
the appropriate level of world prices and the response of producers and consumers to changes 
in prices.”13 In his study he considered the impact on the net exports of the EU, of the CAP 
price support system which is dependent on the price changes by means of support measures 
and responses of producers and consumer’s to these price changes in the market. This requires 
the estimation of the price elasticity of demand and supply. In the EU price changes on cereals 
are dependent on CAP policies of the Commission. Therefore, any increase or decrease on 
prices cannot be dependent on the changes in quantity supplied or demanded which contribute 
to an estimation of the price elasticity. This implies that, in the EU, quantity supplied and 
demanded have had less effect on the estimation of the cereal prices, because the intervention 
price mechanism increased the cereal prices artificially and contributed to protection of 
producer gain at the cost of consumer’s welfare.    
In the last decade application of CAP policies reduced the cereals prices to below the 
world prices which affected the consumer’s welfare in and outside the EU. In particular the 
application of the green box measure, which increases fair trade in the world markets, can also 
be quantified by looking at the difference between the total benefits accruing to consumers 
and tax payers and the costs  imposed on the producer in agriculture. 
The welfare implication of the CAP policies requires an examination of the effects of 
the CAP liberalisation on the distribution of incomes which means transfers from producers to 
consumers to tax payers.  
There are some studies that analyse the distribution of incomes results of the CAP 
liberalisation. For example, Tyres and Anderson estimated the effects of the liberalisation of 
the agricultural market on economic welfare. According to this study, by 2000, the cost of 
welfare of agricultural protection in the EU was estimated at 30.9 billion USD (1988), or 
equivalently 0.38% of developed countries GDP. This has meant that the cost of every dollar 
received by producers would have cost consumers and tax payers 1.22 USD. Similar results 
have also been obtained from Roningen and Dixit’s study. According to their estimation total 
                                                 
13Ali M. El Agraa: Regional Integration, 1999, p.325 
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welfare benefits of a multilateral liberalisation were calculated (here considered the 1986- 
1987 average of PSE’s and CSE’s) by year 2000 at 26.6 billion USD (1988) or 0.33 % of 
developed countries. In this study, compared to Tyres and Anderson’s estimation, the cost of a 
dollar received by producers would have cost consumers and tax payers about 1.25 USD. 
However, these estimations were realised in a static model approach and for a dynamic model 
it is necessary to estimate the impact of supply and factor rigidity in the short-run medium-
term to determine the social impact of any transfers in population.       
The possible welfare effect on consumers is illustrated in the graphics below.  It is not 
easy to determine the net welfare effect of the CAP, but at least it is possible to illustrate the 
welfare effect of support measures on consumer surplus and on producer gain.     
 In the figure below, the welfare effect of support measures is considered for excessive 
production. It is assumed that output exceeding demand is also relevant for cereal products in 
the CAP. The Union now provides a subsidy for exports in Turkey. The effects of an export 
subsidy cause a price increase from P1 to P2 in the EU but the price in Turkey as an importing 
country falls. The higher price of commodity benefits producers which cause an increase of 
producer surplus as is shown in the area ACGD. The price increase harms consumer surplus. 
The reduction of consumer surplus is the area ABFD. The amount of subsidy is the area 
EBCH, which is the cost of the CAP budget. The cost of production/ consumption 
(deadweight loss) is the triangles EBF and GCH. The cost of the CAP budget is represented 
with the area of BECH. Here it is evident that there is consumer loss while there is producer 
gain by means of subsidies.  
 p 
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 Figure 4.9: Excessive supply rather than demand in the Union   
 
In the figure above it can be seen that there is over-production in the Union. The 
application of subsidy for export increases producer gain from export, but harms consumers in 
the Union. The PSS is unresponsive to consumer demands. Instead of consumer preferences, 
producers tend to increase their production capacity where the price support mechanism 
encourages them, because subsidising exports increases the product price in the Union. But 
for Turkey as an importing country, consumer demand has increased because of the EU’s 
export subsidies. However, in Turkey only 12 percent of the cereals are imported from the EU 
see (Table 4.5), therefore subsidized export from the CAP had no positive effect on consumer 
welfare in Turkey (see Table 4.13.2).    
The impact of the EU’s export subsidies has a negative effect on Turkish producers, 
which reduces their production and market share in the EU market because of the increasing 
market share of the EU’s internal producers. (see Chapter 3 export subsidies). 
It is obvious that support measures of the CAP have resulted in high food prices and 
welfare losses for European consumers. A reform proposal is expected in 2015. A decline in 
the price gap between external and internal cereal products tends to reduce the export 
subsidies in the new reform proposals. Green box measures, especially, began to be preferred 
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for reducing the trade distortion instead of the amber box measure which was accepted by the 
WTO as the most trade distorting measure and was replaced with the green box measures. 
 A comparison of the total CSE in Turkey and in the EU in 1986 and in 2004 is 
illustrated in the table below. The higher transfers in the beginning of the period from EU 
consumers to producers were realised, whilst in Turkey there were lower transfers relative to 
EU consumers. Over time in the EU a significant reduction of transfers from consumers to 
producers was observed.  
 
Table 4.13.1: The comparison of total CSE and CSE for cereals between EU and Turkey in 
1986 and in 2004.    
EU Turkey 
1986 2004 1986 2004 
Transfers to/ from 
Consumers 
 Euro/mn % Euro/mn. %  Euro mn % Euro mn % 
Total CSE   -74.045 : -51.782 : -2.280 : -6.254 : 
CSE for Wheat  -4.050 -33 -385 -4 -31 -5 -436 -34 
CSE for Maize -540 -9 -428 -8 -4 -4 -78 -11 
CSE for Barley -932 -13 -148 -4 -8 -4 -30 -2 
CSE for Other grains -1.133 -15 -175 -4 -8 -4 -30 -2 
Source: OECD database: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005 calculated by myself. 
Note: (Exchange rate sale, 1 Euro in November 1986 = 679.76TL and 1 Euro in November 2004= 1.854,400 TL)   
 
The total consumer support estimate (CSE) and CSE support for selected cereal 
products for the EU and for Turkey are indicated in the table below. The estimated CSE for 
wheat was reduced about 90% and for barley and other grains a decline of about 80 % in CSE 
was observed. But for maize there was only a 20 % reduction from 1986 to 2004.   However, 
the amount of total transfers from consumers to producers was only reduced by about 30 % 
which meant transfers to (from) consumers increased about 70%between the same periods.   
 In Turkey an estimation of the welfare increase for consumers was rather more 
difficult than the EU’s estimation. On the one hand, inflation in this period was rather high, 
which reduced the comparison of support estimation, because it was required to use a less 
fluctuating currency than TL for a better indication of transfers to consumers. For this reason, 
the USD was considered for a comparison of the amount of transfer between 1986 and 2003.  
Exchanging the TRL with the USD contributed to the comparison of the monetary changes 
between EU and Turkey. In Table 4.13 proportional reductions on consumer support is 
observed, particularly in the EU, but welfare loss has been observed in both countries for the 
total CSE and CSE for cereal products within this period. However, it is obvious that a 
comparison of CSE between Turkey and the EU may also require knowing other economic 
parameters such as changes in consumer income and price changes etc. for a better 
comparison of the transfers between the EU and Turkey which is not possible with the CSE 
calculation. Nevertheless, the below given data contributes to a comparison of the CSE 
between the EU and Turkey. In the table below the total CSE for the EU consumers has 
resulted in a positive amount which means about a 30% decrease in consumer transfers to 
producers. In contrast, in Turkey the consumer welfare was reduced approximately three fold 
(280%). However, the higher inflation and the very small amount of payments in 1986 caused 
an increase in transfers from consumers to producers. In contrast, in the EU the amount of the 
transfers was rather high compared to Turkey and the currencies in the EU countries were 
more stable than that of Turkey.                        
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Table 4.13.2: The comparison of total CSE and CSE for cereals between the EU and Turkey.    
EU Euro/mn. Turkey (TL/ mn. And Euro mn) Transfers to/ from 
Consumers 1986-2004 In % 2004-1986 (TL/ mn) 2004-1986 (Euro/ mn) In % 
Total CSE   -22,263 -30 -13,156 -3,974 280 
CSE for Wheat  -3,665 -90 -808.9 -405 600 
CES for Maize -112 -20 -144.7 -74 90 
CSE for Barley -785 -84 -55.6 -22 175 
CSE for Other grains -958 -84 -55.6 -22 175 
Source: OECD database: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005 calculated by myself.    
Note: (Exchange rate sale, 1 Euro in November 1986 = 679.76TL and 1 Euro in November 2004= 1.854,400 TL)   
 
Instead of these higher transfers in the CAP and in Turkey which are guaranteed for 
the producers by the Council in the EU and the Turkish Grain Board in Turkey, a considerable 
amount of decoupled payments aimed at increasing productivity and market-oriented 
production for high quality, lower-cost products would be the best possible solution to prevent 
both consumer welfare loss and producer gains. It is a mistake to think that European 
consumers could have enjoyed maintaining the higher market prices in the EU which reduced 
their income and welfare whilst producer gain was increased, because consumers purchase 
food and services to optimize their utility and are not supporters of the stable market prices. 
 
4.11 Distribution Effect for Producers 
 
The production effect arises because the subvention of some efficient production of 
exportable commodities in the third world countries which are replaced by the insufficient 
production in the EU. As is shown in Figure 4.9, the amount of export is increased because of 
subsidy.  Subsidy increases the production amounts in the Union (see in Fig. 4.9 the producer 
surplus increase ‘ACGD’ area), which increases exports to third world countries. 
 In fact, in the Union, agricultural production is expensive and needs to be subsidized. 
However, subsidies reduce the opportunities for competition of producers in Turkey as a non-
member country, whilst internal producers artificially increase their market capacity in 
Turkey and in other non-member countries.   
 In the figure below, various effects of tariffs are illustrated to estimate the impact on 
production. In the figure two goods A and B in two different countries are considered.  In the 
pre-trade situation social welfare is realised at the equilibrium point E where price line is 
tangential to the production frontier line (transformation curve). The equilibrium is at point E, 
but consumption point is at point EC, where the highest indifference curve is tangential to the 
price line. At point Ec the export amount is the difference of EB and ECB and import amount is 
EA ECA. The gain from trade is visible as the social indifference curve tangent at Ec is higher 
than the E. 
 Now let us consider there is a tariff amount applied on products. When the country 
imposes a tariff on commodity A the product price will increase as will the rate of exchange 
PB/PA, which shifts the equilibrium from E to H. Thus, after the tariff application, the export 
reduces from EB ECB to EBHB and import amount from EA ECA to EAHA. At point H the 
consumption point does not end at point Hc, because consumers will also respond to this price 
change in the market and equalize the marginal rate of substitution to this price. Thus moving 
on the R’R’ line to find the point where marginal rate of substitution is equal to the domestic 
relative price. This point is found at E’c, where indifference curve I’ has the same slope as 
Ph’Ph’, which is parallel to PhPh. “The Production effects consist in the passage from E to H. 
The domestic output of the protected commodity increases by EAHA, whilst the output of the 
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other commodity decreases by EBHB.”14 The volume of trade effect, shown in the figure with 
bold red lines on the x-axis and y-axis was the import EA ECA and export amount EB ECB. 
After the trade tariff is imposed the import amount increases to EA E’CA and export amount 
increases to EB E’CB. The red colour shows the trade capacity before the tariff. The yellow 
colour shows the decrease in trade. The blue colours represent the amount of trade increase 
(export and import).  
The production effect, which is supported by import tariffs, as illustrated in the figure, 
reduces the welfare of the consumer. To bring about a better understanding of this let us 
consider indifference curves in the figure above. The indifference curve, I’’’, offers 
consumers higher utilities than the other two curves. In the figure, after the application of 
import tariffs, consumer welfare reduced from Indifference curve I’’’ to I’, where the lowest 
utility compared to the two indifference curves is obtained. But from the production effect the 
situation is also similar, although as stated above, domestic output of the protected commodity 
increases by EAHA, whilst the output of the other commodity decreases by EBH. However, the 
real national output in free trade for product A was OR, before tariffs, but after the tariff was 
imposed it fell to OPh, even if, the tariff revenue OPh were only to reach OPh’ which is still 
lower than OR. Therefore, it is evident that tariff measures reduce the values of real national 
output together with the consumer welfare.       
 
Figure 4.10: Production effect 
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Source: Giancarlo Gandolfo: International Trade Theory and Policy, 1998, p.155   
 
                                                 
14 Giancarlo Gandfolfo: International Trade Theory and Policy, 1998, p.156  
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In the EU production costs are lowered because of support measures and some internal 
productions are replaced from the efficient production of Turkish producers to less efficient 
production of internal producers. The negative effect of market intervention measures can be 
seen in Table 4.14 which is the results of NTM. Approximately 100% percent of all food 
products were affected whilst this amount for industrial products was only a 33% increase in 
1986. Thomson calculated the effect of price support in the CAP results of trade liberalisation 
in 1986. In his study, he calculated that about 15% of the total income of taxpayers and 
consumers was transferred to producers. In 2000 Tyres and Anderson calculated the impact of 
the CAP policies on producer gain and consumer loss. According to this study, by the year 
2000, consumer and tax payers cost was estimated as 159 and 11.3 billion USD (1988) 
respectively, for the CAP producer total gain was estimated as 139.9 bn USD (1988).     
The distribution effect of the CAP measures obviously dramatically increased 
producer gain in the last decade. Indeed the intervention price mechanism, which prevents a 
price fall below the intervention price, secured the producer price and reasonable income 
whilst price fluctuation in the market was also prevented. Since 1992 the application of direct 
payments contributed to an increase in the transfers from consumers and taxpayers to 
producers. Similarly, in Turkey monetary transfers via input subsidies were realised via input 
subsidies in the last decade. But, since 2001, the introduction of the ARIP programme and 
DIS measure, which was planned to bring the support measures in Turkey closer to the CAP 
system, increased the amount of transfers from consumers and tax payers to producers. 
However, both in the CAP and in Turkey most of these transfers have been gone to the large-
scale producers whilst small and medium-scale producers, especially in less-favoured areas, 
received only one fifth of the total payments (see also Figures 4.4.1.and 4.4.2 and 4.5 in pages 
173). Regional disparities and differences between countries cannot be reduced by this 
method. In 2005 new applications of decoupled direct payments based on land use per hectare 
are expected to reduce both unequal distribution of payments and excessive transfers to 
producers in the CAP.  
In Table 4.14 below, comparisons of the total PSE amounts between the EU and 
Turkey in 1986 and in 2004 are indicated. The higher amount of total support in the EU 
relative to Turkey is considerable.  
 
Table 4.14: EU and Turkey Total PSE in 1986 and in 2004  
 
EU (Euro Mio) Turkey (Euro Mio) Total support in agriculture with some 
important support measures 1986 2004 1986 2004 
PSE Total 97,371 107,686 2,794 9,019 
 Market price support (MPS) total 86,386 57,125 2,08 7,0 
Payments based on output 3,975 3,737 - 276 
based on unlimited output 790 203 - 276 
based on limited output 3,185 3,534 - - 
Payments based on area planted/ 1,979 30,339 - - 
based on unlimited area/ animal no  1,101 808 - - 
based on limited area/ animal no 878 29,531 - - 
Payments based on input use 4,128 9,267 710 140 
Payments based historical entitlement  0 2,344 - 1,596 
Payments based on input constrain 653 5,297 - - 
Miscellaneous Payments 250 -452 - - 
Source: OECD database: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005 calculated by myself.    
Note: (Exchange rate sale, 1 Euro in November 1986 = 679.76TL and 1 Euro in November 2004= 1.854,400 TL)   
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In the table above, in the EU total MPS have been in decline whilst direct payments 
have increased. In contrast, in Turkey in 2001, the total MPS was increased whilst total input 
use was reduced and replaced with the DIS (indicated with the payments based historical 
entitlement in the table) which showed a considerable increase in the total income support for 
producers in agriculture.    
In the second table below the changes in the amount of the total PSE and PSE based 
on area and input and PSE for selected cereal products is compared between 1986 and 2004 to 
bring about a better understanding of transfers from consumers and taxpayers to producers. It 
is obvious that, neither in Turkey nor in the EU, has the amount of transfers been reduced to 
producers. Furthermore, transfers of about 10% in the EU and almost 360% in Turkey have 
increased. However, the higher increase in Turkey was realised because at the start of the 
application as mentioned in the welfare effect, the amount of producer support was very little 
relative to the EU’s total PSE. Over time market price support has been reduced by almost 30 
percent for EU producers whilst payments based on area planted increased about 125%. In 
Turkey, in contrast, the payments based on area were not realised for Turkish farmers. 
Instead, there were mainly payments based on input use and these were sharply reduced and 
replaced in the 1999 ARIP programme with payments based on historical entitlement, known 
as DIS (direct income support). Due to this decline (since 1999) in input use caused negative 
value on changes between 1986 and 2004, whilst changes in payments based on historical 
entitlements which comprises DIS payments increased and resulted in positive values as 
shown in the table below.   
In the EU there were several support measures which increased the transfers to 
producers in this period. In Turkey there was a lessening of transfers relative to the EU 
between 1986 and 2004.     
                 
Table 4.15.1: EU and Turkey Total PSE Changes between 1986 and 2004  
 
EU (Euro Mio) Turkey (billion/ TL) & (Euro mn) Total support in agriculture with some 
important support measures 1986-2004 In % 2004-1986 TL/ bn 2004-1986 USD/ mn In % 
PSE Total 10,315 10.5 16,721.5 6,279 360 
 Market price support total -29,261 -33.8 12,988.3 4,920 390 
Payments based on output -239 -5 513.068 276 -- 
based on unlimited output -587 -74 -- -- -- 
based on limited output 349 10 -- -- -- 
Payments based on area planted/ 28,360 143 -- -- -- 
based on unlimited area/ animal no  -293 -26.5 -- -- -- 
based on limited area/ animal no 28,653 326 -- -- -- 
Payments based on input use 5,139 124 260.089 570 72 
Payments based historical entitlement  2,344 -- 2,960.000 1,596 -- 
Payments based on input constrain 4,644 70 -- -- -- 
Miscellaneous Payments -702 -28 -- -- -- 
Source: OECD database: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005 calculated by myself.    
Note: (Exchange rate sale, 1 Euro in November 1986 = 679.76TL and 1 Euro in November 2004= 1,854.400 TL)   
 
In table below the amount of transfers for selected cereals is also compared with 
Turkey’s support amount between 1986 and 2003. A considerable level of support for wheat, 
both in Turkey and in the EU, had been realised. In the EU the amount of transfers for maize 
was reduced, whilst in Turkey this increased in the same period. In contrast, in Turkey for 
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barley and for other grains a decline in support was observed, whilst in the EU an increase in 
support level was observed.          
 
 Table 4.15.2: EU and Turkey, PSE for Selected Cereals Changes between 1986 and 2003  
 
EU (Euro Mio) Turkey (billion/ TL) & (Euro/mn) Support in Agriculture for selected cereals  
2003-1986 In % 2003-1986 
TL bn 
2003-1986 
Euro mn 
In % 
PSE Wheat 1,251 15 1,953.073 946 320 
PSE barley 49 1 279.706 -9 -5 
PSE Maize -216 -7 297.524 139 510 
PSE Other Grains 727 13 279.706 -9 -5 
Source: OECD database: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005 calculated by myself.    
Note: (Exchange rate sale, 1 Euro in November 1986 = 679.76TL and 1 Euro in November 2003= 1.694,851 TL)   
 
 
4.12  Effects on International Trade 
 
The CAP support measures have negative effects in Turkey and the rest of the world 
trade. The excessive export subsidies and import tariffs reduce the flow of international trade 
in the world market. In the CAP the existence of over-production can only be eliminated by 
external EU trade which increased in the last decade by means of export subsidies. Expansion 
into the third world countries is secured by WTO agreements which contribute to a reduction 
of trade restrictions in both parts. The WTO secures fair trade in the world markets via green 
box measures, which comprise most of trade distorting measures relative to the amber box 
measures. 
 The enlargement of multinational firms in developed countries plays an important role 
in developing international trade. In the last decade, the support measures of the CAP caused 
a trade distortion for Turkey and other non-member countries, and although these were 
reformed several times trade distortion effects have continued.  
The CAP is not only responsible for trade distortion in agriculture, as was also 
acknowledged in the WTO negotiations held by the US agriculture secretary Ann Veneman, 
US trade Representative Robert Zoellick and EU farm Commissioner Franz Fischler: “We 
have no intention of restricting access of cereals and rice to the EU market. GATT provisions 
fully provide for the maintenance of the rights of our WTO partners. Our objective in these 
negotiations, therefore, is to improve the system to more accurately fulfil our WTO 
obligations and protect our rights. The present EU regime for importing rice and cereals to the 
EU does not work.”15  
The existence of protective measures in agriculture reduces fair trade in the world 
market. A free market approach leads to more efficient use of the world’s scarce resources 
which contributes to an increase in global wealth and enables people to benefit economically.  
Support in the world market can be dependent on two factors: “First it is argued that if 
agricultural commodity production is not internationally competitive, production linked 
support may be needed to guarantee the supply of non-commodity benefits. Second, in the 
presence of joint ventures and potentially high transaction costs related to direct targeting of 
non-commodity outputs, it may be wiser to support non-commodity outputs indirectly via the 
commodity output rather than use instruments targeting directly non-commodity outputs.”16  
                                                 
15 EU Commission: Commission has no intention of restricting access of cereals and rice to the EU market", 
reference: IP/ 02/ 962, Brussels, 28 June 2002, 
16 European Review of Agricultural Economics, Volume:30, No:1, March 2003 
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However, applications of support measures have negative effects. Firstly, they reduce the 
welfare of consumers and secondly, they cause a trade distortion in the World market. It is 
obvious that EU trade cannot be considered only in the internal market. The EU CAP has 
external implications which need to be considered in trade with non- member countries. This 
can be done with bilateral agreements to increase both export and import which influence 
trade balance, production capacity etc., between EU and non- member countries 
In the CAP inefficient producers are protected with CAP support measures. In addition 
to this, CAP support measures increase the economic power of large member countries and 
their influence on small member countries, with less economic power, through internal EU 
trade and direct investments.  
The table below shows that the Uruguay round of tariff reductions in 1994 and then 
Customs Union, which was signed between Turkey and EU in 1995, made little contribution 
to an increase in the trade capacity between Turkey and the EU producers. Therefore, 
Turkey’s membership of the Customs Union (1995) has had no substantial effect on 
increasing trade capacity, because the Customs Union does not cover the whole agricultural 
product trade but only some fruit and vegetables and nuts that are not produced in the EU 
countries. But for cereals the protection was maintained by the EU. In the table below Turkish 
imports from world markets increased from 11 billion USD in 1986 to 69.4 billion USD in 
2003. In contrast, total exports increased from 3.2 billion USD to 24.4 billion USD in 2003. 
Hence, almost three fold increases on total imports relative to exports were observed in 
Turkey between 1986 and 2003. The outcome is the trade deficit from 3.5 bn USD to 22 bn 
USD between 1986 and 2003.   
 
Table 4.16: Turkish Trade Statistics with the EU 15 (bn USD)  
 
Year Total Exports 
world 
Total Imports 
World 
Total Exports to 
EU 15 
% of Exports to 
EU 15 
Total Imports 
From EU 15  
% of imports 
from EU 15 
2003 47,255 69,458 24,488 0.52 31,696 0.46 
2002  36,206 51,572 18,460 0.51 23,321 0.45 
2001 31,320 41,393 16,118 0.51 18,280 0.44 
2000 27,769 27,769 14,511 0.52 26,610 0.49 
1995 21,648 21,648 11,084 0.51 16,862 0.47 
1990 12,959 12,959 6,906 0.53 9,354 0.42 
1986 7,456 7,456 3,263 0.44 4,516 0.41 
Source: Fahri and Güneş: Turkish Membership in the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the Agricultural 
Sector, 2005, table 2  
 
The share of support increased by 5 percent only in imported products from the EU 
countries, which contributed to increase the competitiveness and market share of the EU 
producers in and outside the Union. However  
Therefore, over time CAP producers became more productive and competitive in the 
world markets, what contributes to an increase in the market share of internal producers 
outside the Union, whilst producers outside the Union (as in Turkey) reduced their market 
share. The outcome has been an increase on balance of payments deficit from 3.5 bn USD to 
22 bn USD in the same period. However, the above-mentioned small increase in exports 
relative to imports in Turkey cannot be dependent only on the CAP measures. The WTO 
measures which have contributed to reducing the trade distorting measures in the world 
markets, in particular the green box measures, increased the import in the Turkish market.  
Turkish exports have also declined and experienced serious difficulties as a result of the IMP 
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policies which have reduced production in agriculture of cereals and increased imports from 
third world countries.                    
It is obvious that a marked increase in the export of Turkish agricultural products has 
been very difficult to achieve since Turkey’s membership, because in the CAP trade distorting 
measures have been reduced and adopted in accordance with the WTO regulations where the 
EU and also Turkey are members of the WTO. Therefore, similar reductions have been 
adopted in Turkey as well as in the EU, which means that removal of all trade restrictions 
after Turkey’s possible EU membership will not cause any significant increase in trade 
between the EU and Turkey in the near future. Moreover, except for other technical measures, 
for certain fruits and vegetables and for nuts which are not produced in EU countries, there is 
no CCT between Turkey and the EU. However, for certain crops such as cereal products CCT 
was maintained. Therefore, Turkey’s membership will probably contribute to an increase in 
trade capacity only for those products such as cereals which are protected by the CCT. But for 
those products which, relative to Turkey, it is less advantageous to produce in the EU 
countries, such as cotton, nuts and some vegetables and fruits, the market share is expected to 
increase. The reason for this trade increase may depend on the Viner’s Customs Union theory, 
where trade creation between Turkey and the EU is realised and trade distortion for other non-
member countries is expected. Therefore, exports from non-member countries to Turkey will 
become more expensive than before, because of the CCT and some other technical standards 
such as sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures of the CAP which will be applied in 
Turkey.  
The EU membership of Turkey will also change some important economic parameters 
in the EU CAP.  By 2015 the population of the EU will have grown by 11%, the agricultural 
GDP in the total GDP will be increased on average seven-fold while agricultural workers will 
increase eight-fold. As well as this, Turkish membership arable land will increase by 
approximately 30% and market capacity significantly (see Tables 2.20 and 2.21). 
 In the EU CAP the share of employed persons in total employment is only 4.3 per 
cent, but in Turkey this amount increases up to 32.7 per cent. It is evident that after Turkey’s 
membership, free movement of labour will probably not be permitted. Therefore, free 
movement of the labour force will not occur for Turkish people. However, the cheaper labour 
force in Turkey will accelerate foreign direct investments (FDI) in the country. The FDI will 
increase in Turkey which also increases after the eastern enlargement in CEECs too. This will 
happen after Turkey’s membership which will contribute to reducing the production cost and 
price via FDI in Turkey, thus increasing the productivity and competition of CAP producers 
in the world markets.  
Consequently, EU membership for Turkey and the removal of trade barriers in 
agriculture will increase the trade capacity between the EU and Turkey, while Turkey’s trade 
relations between other non-member countries will weaken. The trade creation between the 
EU and Turkey may be developed in two different forms: either the enlargement will force 
internal producers to reduce the cost of production in order to lower the product prices, or 
Turkish farmers may be forced to increase their product prices which will contribute to an 
improvement in their existing production methods and an increase in their product quality to 
EU standards, such as environment-friendly packaging, healthy, hygienic and organic farm 
products etc. In the first case, producer gain will decrease and consumer surplus will increase. 
In the second case, Turkish producers’ gain will increase while consumer surplus will fall.  
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4.13 The Cost of CAP Support Measures in Cereals for Turkey’s Membership 
 
There are certain differences between the CAP and Turkish agricultural support system, 
which increase the financial cost of possible membership. For example, in the EU about 5 
percent of the population are employed in agriculture, whereas in Turkey the number is about 
32.7 percent.  Arable land comprises about 37 million hectares in Turkey but in the EU-25 it 
is about 167 million hectares. The share of agriculture in the total GDP is about 14.2 % 
whereas in the EU 15 it is only 1.4 percent and in the ten new CEEC countries it is about 7 %. 
However, agriculture’s contribution to the GDP is about 212 bn Euro whilst for the EU-27 it 
is estimated as 9.716 bn Euro (see Table 2.20 in section 2.5.3). These considerable differences 
between the EU and Turkey increase the financial burden of this membership. However, in 
2004 the CEECs membership brought to light the fact that in the EU rural development 
policies have not remained unchanged, which means that EU rules are changed to 
accommodate the financial requirements of accession of less developed poor countries. As 
can be seen in the table below, the finance of structural and rural development policies varies 
in amount between the EU-15 and the CEECs. Increasing negative reactions of member states 
who are net contributors of the CAP budget, such as the UK and Germany, to financing other 
members who are net receivers of the Community budget has reduced the amount of transfers 
to these members in the last decade. Most of the southern countries and CEEC countries are 
expected to receive less financial support from the Community budget between 200-2006 
periods (see Table 4.17 below). In addition to this, WTO regulations, especially the green box 
measure, which contributed to reducing trade distorting support measures, reduced the amount 
of monetary transfers to producers in the CAP. Finally, the current CAP support system is 
dependent on the member countries’ financial capability which allows countries to finance 
CAP policies as much as possible with their own resources. However, part of the community 
budget is still reserved for financing the member countries economies but not that much as it 
was done for other poorer countries such as Portugal, Greece and Ireland in the past.  
Consequently, less financial support - only 5.7 million Euros - was allocated to the 
CEECs between 2004 and 2006, whilst for the EU 15 it was almost 32.9 million Euros (see 
table below). Similarly, it is expected that the financial transfers’ amounts from the 
Community budget to the Turkish producers and agriculture will be low. This means that an 
important part of the financial support will be realised by domestic resources and there will be 
no higher amount of transfers from the Community budget. Turkey’s domestic sources will, 
therefore, be increased to finance the agricultural sector during adoption into the CAP.  
The size of the Community budget and the cost of the CAP budget still comprise an 
important share of the EU budget. For example, between 2000 and 2006 the largest part of the 
budget - about 38.6 billion Euros was distributed to finance the CAP. However, an important 
share of the CAP budget goes to finance the developed countries of the EU-15 and a small 
portion of it is distributed between less developed (relative to the EU-15) CEECs. For 
example, during the period 2000-2006, 33 billion Euros were appropriated for rural 
development while the new members (CEECs) received 5.8 billion Euros for the same 
purpose (see table below).           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 206
Table 4.17: EAGGF guarantee section support on regional and rural development for EU- 15 
and ten latest EU members 
EU- 15 (2000- 2006)  EU- 10 (2000- 2006)  
Country Million Euro Share (% 
of EU)  
Country Million Euro Share (% 
of EU) 
Austria 3,207.9 9.7 Cyprus 74.9 1.3 
Belgium 379.2 1.2 Czech Rep. 542.9 9.4 
Denmark 348.9 1.1 Estonia 150.5 2.6 
Finland 2,199.3 6.7 Hungary 602.5 10.5 
France 5,763.6 17.5 Latvia 328.1 5.7 
Germany 5,308.6 16.1 Lithuania 489.5 8.5 
Greece 993.5 3.0 Malta 26.8 0.5 
Ireland 2,388.9 7.3 Poland 2,867.0 49.8 
Italy 4,512.3 13.7 Slovakia 397.2 6.9 
Luxembourg 91.0 0.3 Slovenia 281.6 4.9 
Netherlands 417.1 1.3    
Portugal 1,516.7 4.6    
Spain 3,480.9 10.6    
Sweden 1,130.0 3.4    
United 
Kingdom 
1,167.9 3.5    
Total 32,905.9 100.0  5,761.0 100 
Source: Gunaydin: EU CAP can be the Way Out for Turkish Agricultural Sector? No: 69/ 70 and 71 issues, P.13 
 
 In the coming decade it is expected that agricultural payments to producers will be 
realised via direct payments. “International Commitments to the WTO after the URAA 
provided a strong motivation for the EU policymakers to employ decoupled payments as a 
means of providing domestic support. Domestic policies considered trade distorting is limited 
by a country’s ‘amber box’ commitments, but countries are free to provide unlimited support 
for ‘green box’ policies that are considered minimally trade distorting including decoupled 
payments.”17 Therefore, support measures other than direct payments will not be preferred to 
support producers in the CAP. Hence, for the adoption of Turkish agriculture into the CAP 
system is not required to consider any support measures other than direct payments to 
estimate the cost of Turkey’s membership to the CAP budget, especially in estimating support 
in the crop sector. 
 Finally, the estimation of the EU’s budgetary finance on second pillar policies, namely 
agriculture and rural development programs, for Turkey’s membership is very difficult, 
because for this issue, which is expected to be realised in the coming decade, there are no 
planned programmes. The larger share of agricultural employment must be reduced and 
realised in a long-term programme, because, on the one hand, the knowledge and 
qualifications of employees for other sectors than agriculture will need to be improved, and on 
the other hand, new investments in these regions must be realised otherwise migration is 
unavoidable. 
 Consequently, it is obvious that as well as producer support in agriculture, it will also 
require rural development and investment programmes in Turkey which are not yet planned. 
But there are rough estimations of the cost of Turkey’s membership, as well as the EU 
Commission’s estimation. “Based on current acquis, the cost of extending the existing 
                                                 
17 David Kelch and Mary Anne Normile: CAP Reform of 2003- 04, 2004, p.12,   
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common agricultural policy including rural development to Turkey based on the estimates 
provided in the section on agriculture would amount 8.2 billion Euro (2004 prices) by 2025, 
the first year it is assumed 100% of direct payments would be due. Of this figure, 2.3 Euro 
billion would be rural development funding, 5.3 Euro billion direct payments and 660 Euro 
million market expenditure (all 2004 prices).18 However, some of the other estimations of the 
cost of Turkey’s membership vary one from the other. For example, outgoing commissioner 
Franz Fischler sent a nine page letter to fellow commissioners. In it he estimated the cost of 
Turkey’s membership. He claims, “Turkish accession would cost the EU 11.3 bn Euro in farm 
subsidies alone and regional funding would also be massive.” In his estimation a major part of 
the financial support (about 8 bn Euros) goes to direct payments.  
Although these estimations may give some information on the cost of Turkey’s 
membership, it is difficult to estimate the real cost, because the planned CAP support polices 
may be reformed and increase support amounts, or they may reduce support for new 
members. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Turkey’s membership will significantly increase the 
expenditure of the Community budget with the cost of direct payments being calculated as 
€5.1 bn for Turkish producers in 2005 and €6.1 bn for 2015.  
The cost of Turkey’s EU membership, for crop products in agricultural only, is 
calculated below. In the first scenario it is assumed that the existing direct income support is 
maintained. In the ARIP program it was introduced as 5 USD for a minimum of 199 acres and 
more in 1999, and increased to 200 acres in 2000 and then 500 acres in 2002; the direct 
income support was then increased to 50 USD and maintained for 5 ha (500acres) and above 
arable land to date. This means that an estimation of the DIS is required in order to gain 
information such as the ceiling of farm land for payments. But, for a better estimation, the 
fluctuations in the annual reduction of direct payments in nominal USD or Euros can be 
considered, although it is difficult to estimate future exchange rates. However, it is expected 
that trade relations between EU and Turkey may/ will appreciate the TR Lira by about 20% 
against the Euro to increase the export capacity of EU producers.  
 In the table below the total amount of DIS payments in cereal and rice costs to the 
community budget are estimated about 1.8 million Euros in 2004 and 2.2 million Euros in 
2015.  
 
Table 4.18: Direct Income Support for cereals estimation in Turkey (current prices) 
               (Euro/ mn)  
product Euro/tonne Reference yield  DIS unit Total units DIS mn/ euro 
common wheat  63  2.41 152 8,190 971 
durum wheat 63 0.96 346 910 246 
barley 63 2.46 155 3,547 429 
maize 63 4.81 303 537 127 
rye 63 1.82 114 144 13 
oats 63 2.08 131 145 15 
rice 102 1.43 146 61 7 
Total (mn euro) real terms 2004 for Turkey 1,808 bn 
Total (mn euro) nominal terms 2015 for Turkey 2,248 bn 
Source: EU Commission: Turkey in EU, Chapter 12: Expected Consequence for Turkey of the EU Entry in 
2015, December 2004, http://www.scirus.com 
 
                                                 
18 Commission of the European Communities: Issue Arising from Turkey’s Membership perspective, p.46 
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 In the second scenario the estimation of financial support for Turkish producers in the 
cereals sector is realised via decoupled single area payments. In the coming decade it is 
expected that there will only be decoupled payments to support producers in the CAP, these 
being determined by the Commission for certain periods as a fixed amount of money per 
hectare of the arable land. By applying new decoupled single farm payments it is expected 
that in WTO terminology, these direct payments will be classified in the green box and not in 
blue box measures which are less trade distorting measures.   
  The calculation of the total amount of payments per hectare is estimated as given 
below:     
 
Table 4.19: Reference situation in Turkey: 
Total area (average 2000-2002) (mn/ ha) 23,06 
Arable crops area ( included cereals, oilseeds protein feed) (mn/ ha)  18,14 
Fallow (mn/ ha) 4,93 
Reference area  (Arable crop+ fallow) (mn/ ha)   23,06 
set aside (mn/ ha) 2,31 
Source.Turkish Republic Prime Ministerial Statistics: Agriculture, 2005, Table 11.1 data used for the estimation 
of reference areas, calculated by the Author,  Note: as assumtion there is no land transfers between 2000 and 
2005  
 In the following table the calculation of set-aside payments is given. It is important to 
note that the reference yield noted below is considered about 4t/ ha, which is relative to the 
first scenario high, but it is supposed that in the coming decade productivity in Turkish 
agriculture will increase as a result of the rural development programmes of the EU. 
Therefore, instead of three 3t/ha, the reference yield is considered as 4t/ha. The payment per 
hectare 63€/t for the arable land and for set-aside areas is taken from the council regulations 
(EC) No: 1782/ 2003 article 134 and the reference period from article 38. 
Calculation of the payments: 
 
Table 4.20: Set-aside entitlements 
number of entitlements (mn/ ha)  2,31 
payments per hectare (€) 63 €/t x 4t/ ha (reference yield 
for cereals)  
252 
total set aside payments (€) 252x 2306 581.1 
Source: Calculated by the Author, Note: Total (real terms)(mn 2005 Euro) 
 
 The estimation of the single farm payments can be considered either partly or totally 
decoupled. In the table below it is considered that 75 percent of the arable land is decoupled 
and farmers will claim subsidy without the obligation to cultivate cereals. In addition, 25 
percent of the arable land is assumed to be coupled for claiming subsidy with the obligation of 
cultivating cereals on the land.      
 
Table 4.21: Normal entitlements  
Number of Entitlements Reference Area (mn ha) 23,06 
Reference Amount (mn/ €) Arable corps : 63 €/t x 4t/ ha x 18.139ha x 
75% 
3,43 
 total reference amount € (x1000) considered 
only crops  
3,428.271 
payments entitlements per 
hectare (€) 
total amount/reference area 3,428.271/ 
23.065 
148.64 
Source: Calculated by the Author, Note: Total (real terms)(mn 2005 Euro) 
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 The  above estimated decoupled payments for the reference area are used in the table 
below to estimate the total amount of decoupled and coupled payment to agricutural 
producers in Turkey;  this works out at about 4 bn Euros for decoupled and 1 bn Euros for 
coupled payments. Finally, the  total amount of coupled and decoupled payments at  2005 
prices was estimated at 5.1 bn Euros, and  at  2015 prices it was 6.1 bn Euros.  
  
Table 4.22: Determination of the subsidies in 2015 (1000€) 
Decoupled payments (bn/ €) 252x 23.06 + 148,64x 23.06 4,01 
Coupled payments  (bn/ €) Arable corps : 63 €/t x 4t/ ha x 18.139ha x 
25% 
1,14 
Total payments (bn/ €) Total (real terms)(mn 2005 Euro) 
 
5,15 
Total payments (bn/ €) Total (nominal terms)(mn 2015 Euro) 
 
6,18 
Source: Calculated by the Author 
 
4.14 A Short Comparison of EU and Turkish (Farm Security) Supports and Their  
 Effects on International Trade for cereals 
 
In the CAP agricultural support measures for cereals were mainly concentrated in the 
higher price support for producers increased the CCT and export subsides in this sector. 
However, levels and CAP expenditure increased in the last decade. The CAP support 
measures are broken down as follows: 
The first pillar  
• The price support system (PSS) (in particular market price support, CCT, export 
subsidies, intervention to purchase surplus products) increased the cost of the CAP budget.  In 
addition, the PPS increased trade distortion in the world markets, as was observed in cereals 
trade in the last decade. On the one hand, excessive export subsidies increased the market 
share of internal producers and on the other hand the CCT increased the cereals prices of 
external producers by capturing part of the tax revenues collected by the community agencies. 
• Direct payments were introduced in MacSharry reform and paid for arable land which 
was no longer in agricultural use. The payments based on limited area planted showed a 
considerable increase on transfers from consumers to producers, although it was assumed as a 
less trade distorting support measure. 
 The second pillar 
• The second pillar of the CAP comprises rural development and environmental 
measures available under the rural development regulation. Sustainable development was 
observed integrating economic social and environmental objectives.  
In the Cap an important part of budget expenditure goes to finance the first pillar 
measures and for the second pillar measures only one fifth of the total Community 
expenditures are spent.  
In the CAP applied reforms had some positive effects on reducing product prices and 
export subsidies to producers. But on the one hand, product prices were reduced by about 35 
per cent in 1992 and 15 per cent in 1999 and on the other hand, various newly introduced 
payments, especially direct payments, increased the transfers to producers which reduced the 
positive impact of those reforms (see table below). In the same period, the amount of 
payments based on output was slightly reduced, but payments based on area still increased 
although in lesser amounts. Both payments based on historical entitlements and those based 
on input constraints sharply increased between 1986 and 2003. (see table below).  
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Table 4.23: Effects of the CAP reforms between 1986 and 2003 
 
 Payments 1986- 1992  
1988 reform 
1993-1999 MacSharry 
reform Uruguay round 
2000- 2003, Agenda 2000 
Doha round 
1.Arable area 
reduction  
(see table 5.3) 
Voluntary set-aside 
together with set-
aside: less effect  
10 percent compulsory 
set-aside as well as 
voluntary set-aside 
Maintenance of compulsory set-aside 
2.Decrease in 
prices 
-35% -15% -5% 
3.Payments total 
effect  
Total compensation 
for income loss of 
producers  
Income for early 
retirement  
Partial compensation 
Coupled direct 
payments 
Direct payments is replaced in 2005 
with decoupled payments 
3.1Payments 
based on output 
-13% unlimited 
output payments 
sharply reduced 
limited output 
maintained 
18% unlimited output 
payments increased 
limited output 
payments slightly 
reduced  
-11% unlimited output payments again 
sharply reduced limited output 
payments maintained. 
3.2 Payments 
based on area 
planted 
 
 
 900% Partial: 
payments based on 
unlimited area 
reduced  
limited area 
payments slightly 
increased and  
maintained    
70% Partial: 
payments based on 
unlimited area reduced 
Limited area payments 
after 1992 reform 
sharply increased. 
16% Single Payment: 
payments based on unlimited are 
decreased. But limited area payments 
continued to increase. Decoupled 
Single area payments (breaking the 
link between production and 
payments) planned to apply in 2005.  
3.3 Payments 
based on input 
use  
68% payments 
based input use 
increased  
2% small increase after 
the MacSharry reform 
30% after the Agenda 2000 increase 
on input payments maintained. 
 
3.4 Payments 
based on 
historical 
entitlements  
Not applied. 
Introduced in 1989. 
Based on historical 
support programme 
-28% reduced income 
support  
273% increased excessively 
3.5 Payments 
based on input 
constraint 
 
290% sharply 
increased 
 44% continued to 
increase  
42% increased 
Agri-
environmental 
measures 
Weak support about 
4% of the budget 
Small support 10% of 
the budget 
Agri-environmental support measures 
and sanitary phytosanitary measures 
increased about 20% in the CAP 
budget. 
Modulation of 
payments 
(limitation of 
payments to the 
large scale 
farmers) 
  At the initiative of 
community agencies in 
member states 
Modulation set at the European level 
Source: Calculated by the Author from the OECD PSE database and from tables 3.10 and 4.15  
 
In the CAP difficulties in the effective application of support measures reduced the 
success of reforms. These are:        
• The PSS (in particular market price support, CCT, export subsidies) increased trade 
distortion in the world markets. Any increase or decrease in product prices has negative 
effects on the demand capacity, even if the basic foodstuffs have inelastic demand. A similar 
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price decrease was observed in cereals trade in the last decade. The excessive export subsidies 
increased the market share for internal producers while the CCT increased the cereal prices of 
external producers by capturing part of the tax revenues collected by the community agencies. 
• Direct payments were paid for arable land no longer in agricultural use. In addition, 
direct payments were accepted as a costly but less trade-distorting support measure, as well as 
market price support which increased the burden on the CAP budget. 
• The entitlement for receiving payments was evaluated by the Commission. Once a 
farmer is entitled to receive payment it is difficult to remove these payments. Each year 
similar producers received the payment, which could create a hindrance to other producers 
who wanted to apply for receipt of payments. This meant distribution of direct payments was 
more difficult relative to the market support or other subsidies.   
• The estimation of a producer who needs to be subsidised is very difficult. It depends 
on production amounts, prices, and now for decoupled payments, arable area, fallow land, and 
set-aside land have become more important for receiving payment. 
• Eligibility to receive export subsidies is dependent on the commission’s decisions 
when applications are made to apply for an export license. Each year producers offer their 
production and prices to the Commission. The Commission prefer to support producers 
-mostly the large-scale producers- who have over-production and cheaper prices. This has 
meant that subsidies were mostly shared between large-scale farms. 
• The common custom tariff increased the trade distortion and welfare of the consumers. 
But the CCT is one of the important measures which contributed to an increase in the 
revenues of the community budget. However, the cereal price in the internal market fell below 
the external price but neither the share of applied CCT nor the tax policy has changed in the 
last decade. The collected tariff revenues were one of the major means of supporting the other 
measures in the CAP, such as direct payments.   
In Turkey as a non-Union member, the CAP measures also had negative effects. In 
particular, the application of the CAP’s price support system reduced the market share of 
Turkish producers who have lower relative cost advantages.  
Before 1999 in Turkey, government support in the crop sector was realised via input 
subsidies. Interventions were in the form of price support and tariff protection. Input subsides 
and lower interest rate bank credits were used to support producers’ income and production. 
The market price for the purchase of crop products which was announced by the TGB 
(Turkish Grain Board) was usually paid later than at purchasing time, what sometimes was a 
delay of more than two seasons. Such delays decreased the nominal value of payments, 
because of high rates of inflation. By delaying such payments to producers the monetary value 
of support prices, which were announced by the TGB, made only a small contribution to 
producers’ income.  
  A new agricultural support programme was introduced in Turkey in 1999.  The ARIP 
(Agricultural Rural Implementation Project) programme was proposed by the World Bank for 
the period 1999-2006. However, at the commencement of the ARIP only the Aegean and 
South East Anatolian regions were considered. In 2001 it was extended throughout in Turkey. 
The programme was introduced mainly to reduce input subsidies and replace them by a 
support system for agricultural producers and farms. Incentives were also given to increase 
productivity. The ARIP focuses on three main areas:  
“The first is to phase out government intervention in the output, credit, and fertilizer 
markets and the introduction of direct income support (DIS) for farmers through per hectare 
payment independent of crop choice. 
The second theme, closely related to the output price support of the first theme, has 
been the commercialization and privatization of (State Economic Enterprises) SEEs including 
Turkseker (Turkish Sugar Company) and Tekel (Turkish Alcohol and Tobacco Company); 
 212
restructuring of TMO (Turkish Grain Board) and quasi governmental Agricultural Sales 
Cooperative Unions (ASCUs), intervened in the past to support certain commodity prices on 
behalf of the government. 
Alternative crop payments formed the third theme. It provided grants to farmers who 
require assistance in switching from surplus crops to net imported products. The programme 
was intended to cover the cost of shifting from producing tobacco and hazelnuts to the 
production of oilseed feed crops and corn.”19 However, an important effect of the ARIP 
project on Turkish agriculture is observed especially in the agricultural support system. Input 
subsidies and agricultural credits were reduced and a DIS was introduced for Turkish 
producers. The DIS payments were based on a flat rate per hectare and 50 USD per hectare of 
arable land was made to all agricultural land users, thus implying that both owning and hiring 
land for agricultural use would be a reason for receiving DIS payments. This application 
brought the Turkish agricultural support one step closer to the CAP support system, but still 
there are some other differences between Turkey and the CAP. The application of market 
price support, CCT, some non tariff measures such as direct payments based on area/ output/ 
animal, compulsory set-aside and some other miscellaneous payments in the CAP support 
system differ from the application of the Turkish support system. However, in Turkey there is 
no need to adopt these measures, which are expected to be sharply reduced or removed from 
the CAP system in the coming decade. It is expected that by 2015 there will only be 
decoupled single area payments. Therefore, the application of the DIS payments and the 
reduction of other support measures facilitate the adoption of the Turkish agriculture into the 
support system of the CAP. However, during the accession period of Turkey into the EU, 
there are some other structural and regional differences, such as lower productivity, higher 
employment etc, which require to be supported by rural development programmes (second 
pillar measures) of the CAP.  
The important difference between Turkey’s DIS measure of the ARIP programme and 
the CAP’s direct payment measure was the application time, because in Turkey the 
application of the DIS was realised and replaced with other support measures in a very short 
time, whilst in the EU application of the direct payments and replacement with other measures 
extended until 2013. Due to this difference on running time in Turkey the application of the 
ARIP programme sharply reduced or replaced all other support measures such as input 
subsidies, agricultural credits and fertilizer aids within three years, which caused a 
considerable income loss for producers and created differences in applications in different 
regions. In particular, income loss is observed for small- and medium-scale producers, 
because DIS payments were unequally distributed especially for large-scale producers and 
producers in less favoured areas have been neglected (see Figure 4.5). In contrast, in the CAP 
the application of direct payments was introduced in 1992 and steadily applied through the 
whole community, which was again reformed in 2003 and  it was planned to replace these 
with decoupled direct payments by 2005 in some member countries such as in Spain, Portugal 
and in some other northern member countries. But for all community members it is expected 
to be applied in 2007. In addition, decoupled direct payments will be steadily increased and 
replaced with other support measures which will have a trade distortion effect in the CAP 
until 2013.  
Consequently, ARIP programme and application of the DIS payments which sharply 
reduced other support measures has caused strong income loss for producers in Turkey (see 
table below).  
 
                                                 
19 Cakmak Erol: Structural Changes and Market Opening in Agriculture: Turkey Towards EU Accession,  
WP: 04/ 10, 2004, p.5,   
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Table 4.24: Effects of policy changes in agriculture in Turkey between 1986 and 2003 
Payments Until - 1999 ARIP 
programme 
2001-2005 ARIP programme 
1.Arable area reduction  
(see table below) 
no planned programme 10 percent set-aside introduced and small scale 
farms reduced whilst 20+ increased 
2.Increase in prices Higher inflation caused a sharp 
price fluctuation  
Since 2000 fiscal policies reduced the inflation 
and price fluctuation 
3.Payments total effect  Small compensation for income 
loss of producers  
Partial compensation 
Coupled direct income support (DIS) 
3.1Payments based on 
output 
Not applied Not applied 
3.2 Payments based on 
area planted 
Not applied Not applied 
3.3 Payments based on 
input use  
230% input use decreased   75% decrease on input use after the ARIP 
programme 
3.4 Payments based on 
historical entitlements  
Not applied. Introduced in 
1999. Based on ARIP 
programme as DIS payments  
1999 introduced for 199 acre 5 USD and  
2001 distributed unequally in all regions started 
for 200 acre and increased to 500 acre in 2002 
and maintained in 2003 similarly (10acre=1ha) 
 (Payment for 1 ha was 50 USD).  
DIS 240% increased 
3.5 Payments based on 
input constraint 
Not applied  Not applied 
Agri-environmental 
measures 
Weak information and support Very Small support. Agri-environmental support 
measures introduced for adopting into the CAP 
Modulation of 
payments 
(limitation of payments 
to the large scale 
farmers) 
 Not relevant  Distribute mostly to the large farms and 
producers 
Source: Calculated by the Author from the OECD PSE database and from tables 3.10 and 4.15  
 
In Turkey major difficulties in effective application of support measures reduced the 
success of the ARIP programmes in agriculture. These difficulties are given below:              
• In Turkey small- and medium-scale farms have been mostly neglected regarding DIS 
payments. Bureaucratic difficulties and hurdles increased the cost of DIS payments 
between regions.  
• The large-scale farmers divided their lands on paper because of insufficient 
bureaucratic inspections and received significant amounts of DIS payments. In particular, in 
the East and South East Anatolian regions, the existence of the Agha concept (Ağalık) allows 
the opportunity for the Agha to have an important part of the land in those regions in a system 
almost akin to slavery (Kesim). By means of this system most of the people who work on the 
land will then be dependent on this Agha who employs them for a cup of meal. Due to this 
Agha concept most of the DIS payments are collected by the Aghas and farmers who work on 
the land receive nothing, thus increasing more and more the abyss between rich and poor.  
• In these regions where Agha sovereignty is maintained people who have closer 
relations to the Agha were easily registered as farmers and collected DIS for the Agha. 
• In western regions there was also a problem in the distribution of the DIS payments. 
The land owners in the western and Aegean regions hire their land to the peasants who argued 
that most of the DIS payments were being distributed to people who were not working on the 
land.  
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• There are almost 2.7 billion registered farmers in Turkey but only about 4 million 
farmers are registered to receive DIS.  This is the outcome of the above-given difficulties. But 
not all farmers have been properly informed about the DIS; therefore some of them suppose 
that they are not eligible to receive the DIS.      
• “About 23.4 million hectares of arable land was used by 3.9 million farms. But 
approximately 16.5 million/ ha landowners applied for DIS payments, of which 70% of these 
applications were entitled to receive DIS payments.”20 Moreover, most of these payments 
were distributed to the Agha’s men who were registered as farmers. Therefore, real farmers 
who work on the land received nothing to help improve farmland and agricultural productivity 
in Turkey.  
      A comparison of the farm size changes in the EU and in Turkey is also indicated in the 
table below, to bring about a better understanding of the effects of the CAP reforms and ARIP 
programme. In Turkey the number of farms of less than 5 ha in size fell between 1991-2001, 
whilst in the EU a small increase was observed between 1987 and 2001. In Turkey a 
considerable decrease has been observed in the number of farms from 5 to 20 ha in size, 
whilst the number of farms from 20 to 55 ha and 50 ha plus in size increased between 1991 
and 2001. Similarly, in the EU the number of farms from 5 to 20 and 20 to 50 ha in size 
decreased, whilst those farms of 50 ha plus rose from 1987 to 2000.    
 
Table 4.25: Number of farms and arable areas in Turkey and in the EU  
Farm size 
(ha) 
Turkey x1000  EU X1000 
 1991 2001  1987 (EU- 12) 2000 (EU- 15)  
0- 5 2,761.4 177.8 3,411 3,903.2 
5- 20 1,096.6 829.8 2,099 1,525.6 
20- 50 173.4 950.5 946 738.4 
50< 36.8 559.9 473 603.4 
Total  4,068.4 3,021.2 6,929 6,770.7 
Source: DIE (SIS): 2001 Genel Tarım Sayımı, SIS, 2004 and EU Commission: The Agricultural Situation in the 
EU Report 1999 and Europe EU Commission Agricultural statistics: The 2003 Agricultural Year – (Farm 
structure). And Eurostat: European Commission DG 6 for Agriculture FAO and UNSO and 1987 data from 
Baldwin and Wyplosz: The Economics of European Integration,  
 
In a comparison of the price support system and agricultural structure between the 
CAP and Turkey it can be observed that in the CAP system there were various support 
measures which increased the amount of transfers to EU producers relative to producers in 
Turkey. The agricultural measures of the CAP were mostly concentrated in rural areas to 
increase the productivity and self-sufficiency of producers. But in Turkey support measures 
have mostly been distributed to those persons who are not actually working the land such as 
Aghas and owners of arable land.  
 Over time the negative effects of direct payments, which increased the burden of the 
CAP budget together with production, have been reformed through decoupled direct 
payments which break the link between subsidies and production. By doing this producers 
became more independent in estimating in accordance with consumer demand, what product 
should be planted on their land which would create more market oriented production. In 
contrast,   in Turkey, the ARIP programme which in 1999 introduced the DIS to producers 
has also experienced some negative effects, although DIS payments were planned to reduce 
                                                 
20 Gunaydin Gokhan: EU CAP’s Direct Income Support: Agricultural Support or Poverty Aid?, No: 69/ 70 and 
71 issues., p.50 
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the effect of other measures, such as input subsidies and price support which caused trade 
distortion in the market. The reason for the problems experienced in Turkey was not only the 
sharp changes on applied policies in agriculture but also the bureaucratic hurdles which 
limited the proper application and inspection of measures in agriculture.  
In Turkey planned policies must be applied in accordance with the statistical data, but 
regional information is also required for the confirmation of producers’ declarations on their 
land. It is obvious that adoption into the CAP system of Turkish producers, who have 
economic difficulties and inefficiencies on their planting methods, will be very difficult. 
Moreover, after Turkey’s membership, competition between Turkish producers and CAP 
producers will be very difficult, because, on the one side Turkish producers, who, relative to 
the EU producers, have small- and medium-size production with financial difficulties. And on 
the other side CAP producers, who were supported for almost 50 years by the Community 
budget (about 50 %) have solved all structural and technical problems and have secured 
reasonable income and production for producers. 
The maintenance of DIS payments, which are given on the use of arable land and are 
not dependent on what product is produced on this land, creates difficulties, because the 
Turkish Grain Board (TGB/ TMO) purchases the farmers’ products and then payments are 
realised in accordance with the limited output which is contradicted by DIS payments. On the 
one hand, the TGB purchases farmers’ products and on the other hand it supports producers 
with direct payments according to their land but with limited output. By doing this it is 
supposed that certain products will be intensively supported when the TGB announce the 
product prices for each one every year, whilst others will be neglected because of limitations 
on production. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that decoupled payments can be applied in countries 
where structural and regional problems in agriculture are already being solved and where 
things are properly functioning.                     
In the last decade reforms which were planned in the CAP considered only producer 
gain, although CAP objectives considered both producers and consumers. The objectives of 
the CAP are to increase productivity and to ensure reasonable incomes with the preservation 
of employment opportunities, but CAP objectives comprise of consumer welfare too. 
However, planned reforms in the CAP significantly increased producer gain while consumer 
welfare was neglected.  
In the last decade the increasing trend for environmentally-friendly production 
methods, healthy breeding and organic farming has been noted and applied in the CAP. By 
doing this, internal consumers became more conscious of purchasing organic products which 
are produced by environmentally friendly methods, without hormones or other chemical 
substances. The above-mentioned standards are also expected from producers outside the 
Union who are exporting into the EU market. Therefore, imported products below the EU’s 
requirements, some of which are explained above, will not gain access into the EU markets. 
Apart from these technical measures, some trade-distorting measures such as export subsidies 
and market price support are expected to be reduced or removed from the CAP agenda. More 
liberal and technical measures are expected, such as sanitary and phytosanitary hygiene, 
healthy environmentally-friendly production methods, labelling and quality increase will 
become more important in the EU CAP. 
It is obvious that the application of these requirements (healthy products and 
prevention of pollution by means of environmental friendly products) will be a hindrance to 
Turkish producers and some other non-member producers. However, application of these 
measures will not create any more reaction between countries in the world markets, but will 
restrict trade with reasonable objections such as quality assurance or environmentally- 
friendly production requirements with the EU countries.  
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 Conclusion 
 
The estimation of the PSE on cereals has contributed to determining the effects of the 
price support system of the EU CAP on producer gain and consumer welfare in the Union and 
outside it in Turkey as a non-member country. The major focus of this study was the 
evaluation of benefits and costs of common agricultural policies of the EU on fair trade in the 
EU market and in Turkey. This may contribute to the formation of a new reform proposal 
considering the impact of the former measures that had positive effects on fair trade and 
consumer welfare relative to other measures which had only contributed to an increase in 
transfers to producers. In particular, the CAP measures that have been reformed for 
improvement of producer gain in accordance with the theory of comparative advantages can 
be considered for the development of support measures in agriculture.    
The CAP of the EU Commission between 1986 and 2003 followed interventionist 
economic policies and tariff/ non-tariff measures together to protect internal producers from 
those outside the Union. At the end of the last decade it was observed that these measures had 
significant negative effects, explained in the following section, on consumer welfare and fair 
trade in the agricultural sector.  
 
5.1 Findings 
 
The major problems of the price support system of the CAP can be classified into 
three groups. These are:  
• Export subsidies: Create transfer to producers from consumers and reduce the welfare 
of consumers and taxpayers.  
• Import access: Higher product prices which are required to protect internal producers 
with tariffs from exporters outside the Union, 
• Market support: In the last decade the green box (minimal trade distortion) and the 
blue box (for direct payments with supply control such as acreage set-aside) were mainly 
maintained, whilst the amber box measures were sharply reduced in accordance with the 
WTO regulations. However, a decline in market price support and export subsidy at a desired 
level to increase fair trade in accordance with the comparative advantages theory was not 
realised. But the new support system tends to move towards less trade distortion despite 
former measures which affected production decisions and trade outcomes. However, this has 
not meant that the new system reduced the transfers from consumers to producers. The new 
system of direct decoupled payments has only changed the form of transfers to producer. In 
addition, these payments are still unequally distributed to producers. This implies about 75 
percent of the distributed subsidies have gone to large-scale producers and only 25 percent of 
subsidies are given to the small- and medium-size enterprises.  Unequal distribution of 
subsidies is not only observed in the CAP of the EU but also in other countries as well as in 
Turkey. 
Apart from the problems mentioned above, which increased trade distortion in and 
outside the Union, there were additional problems which caused difficulties between 1985 
and 2003. These are: 
• The CCT of the CAP stayed almost intact in the last decade. However, the price gap 
between internal and external producers on cereals was in decline. Furthermore, at the end of 
the decade, internal prices on cereal products were well below the world prices but neither the 
CCT nor the share of applied tariff had been reduced for imported product access. In the next 
decade it is expected to cut the tariff amount for cereal products in order to reduce the 
negative effect of the CCT on fair trade.        
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• Agri-environmental farming, introduced in the last decade, is accepted as a new form 
of protection which may cause a hindrance for importers to the EU markets. However, by 
applying this new protection measures EU farmers undermine their international 
competitiveness, because those regulations desired by the EU increase the cost of production 
which is not important in most of the least developed countries. It can be suggested, therefore, 
that those agri-environmental regulations may be made a voluntary rather than a compulsory 
measure.     
• Over time the applied reforms of the CAP and support policies have indicated that 
endeavours are made to maintain the agricultural support in a way which is more suitable to 
reduction of the reactions of other WTO members. Through five reforms of the CAP it is still 
far from having market-oriented production methods and being multifunctional in general. 
Moreover, the CAP measures lead other nations to follow the same regulations to increase 
trade. But it must be remembered that agricultural politics are no better off in other parts of 
the world; in Japan, in Korea, in the United States etc. But unfortunately the CAP policies 
were mostly blamed for distorting world trade relative to the other nations’ agricultural 
policies. In Turkey transfers from consumers and tax payers to producers, which were partly 
reduced and replaced with DIS at the end of the decade, had less effect on reducing the trade 
distorting effect of the agricultural support measures.  
In the Doha round trade talks the EU offered to eliminate export subsidies on farm 
produce, although elimination of export subsidies was not supported especially by the US 
commissioners.      
• The EU brought to light the pollution and environmental damage in and out of the 
Union. In particular, after Mediterranean countries joined the EU intensification of agriculture 
could have lead to soil erosion and water damage problems through using pesticides, 
fertilizers and machinery. Therefore, the need for environmentally-friendly production 
methods and some other technical measures such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures were 
introduced.  
 
5.2. Effects of the Producer Support Measures 
 
The impact of the producer support measures which mostly influenced the export and 
import capacity of producers and changed producers’ gain and consumers’ welfare in and 
outside the Union, is given below. 
 
Positive effects:  
• Market intervention and subsidies protect producers and rural welfare, 
• Support measures protect inefficient producers to maintain their production, 
• The intervention price prevents  price fluctuation if the intervention price is below the 
equilibrium (see section 1.3), 
• Export subsidies increase the competition opportunities of domestic producers on the 
world market.  
• Reduction of preventive measures and subsidizing producers increases trade capacity 
of producers and countries which have bilateral subventions on trade, 
• Production subsidies contribute indirectly to imported product amounts, where there is 
a lesser output, because subsidized internal products increase the imported product 
amount, 
• Subsidies increase producer surplus, 
• Subsidizing producers in the form of direct payments is more preferable than tariff 
measures, subsidy is a direct form of aid and has less distortion effect than the 
common custom tariff,   
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• Increased export of agricultural products, 
• The world market share of the EU producers’ increase by means of export subsidies. 
• Storage costs are covered by the community agencies which reduces the cost to 
producers.  
• Set-aside increases the grassland for the animal husbandry sector 
• Export subsidies contribute to an increase in the welfare of consumers in an importing 
country 
• Export subsidies are dependent on the price gap between world and EU cereal product. 
Any decline in the price gap is expected to reduce the export subsidies. 
• Direct payments have no direct effect on the product prices.  
• Direct payments, CCT and export subsidies increase the transfers from consumers and 
tax payers to producers, 
• Direct payments relative to other measures have less negative effects on unfair trade, 
• Direct payments reduce the tension between member and non-member countries’ 
producers,  
• Direct payments increase the income of the internal producer, 
• Set-aside payments are given to reduce surplus amounts. 
 
  Negative effects: 
• Market intervention and subsidy are costly and given for arable land which is no 
longer in use in agriculture,  
• Set-aside payments reduce mostly land use, but set-aside payments have less effect on 
reducing the surplus amount if producers use the rest of their land intensively.     
• The largest and most efficient farms are estimated to receive about three fourths of 
budgetary support while the rest received approximately one fourth of total subsidies 
• Some efficient production of exportable commodities in the third world countries are 
replaced by the inefficient production of exportable commodities of the CAP, 
• Market support measures cause a trade distortion for producers in non-member 
countries, and reduce the welfare of the consumers, 
• Subvention redistributes income from the internal consumer who pays a higher price 
for products of internal producers, 
• Subsidies cause unfair competition which is inconsistent with the comparative 
advantages theory, 
• Price intervention reduces the welfare of consumers if there is over-production,  
• Subsidies are the guaranteed income for producers. Once it is allocated it will be paid 
every year because it is difficult to remove, 
• Reduce consumer surplus, 
• Intervention price increases product price, 
• Subsidies cause  producer and consumer  (deadweight loss), 
• Reduce competition of producers in non-member countries, 
• CCT reduce the imported product access into the EU market, 
• CCT is determined on the price gap between internal and external products. Therefore 
application of CCT compels producers in third world countries to increase their 
exported product prices to capture part of the revenue income which will be collected 
by the community agencies.       
• Direct payments, which are dependent on production, influence producers to 
concentrate on products which receive the best subsidy. By doing so consumer 
demand is not considered on the market.    
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• Reduces the productivity of producers because producers are getting paid to do 
nothing 
• It has an indirect effect on  production as it depends on the producer whether it is used 
to increase production capacity or not, 
• Secure income guarantee but reduce the entrepreneurial spirit 
• It is difficult to estimate application and control, 
• Price support measures are often used for political purposes such as vote guarantee 
rather than increasing  self-sufficiency and rural welfare, 
• Producers are forced to apply policies of non-agricultural people, 
• Producers become more dependent on the support measures for their production rather 
than market-oriented production. 
 
In the European Union producers are dependent on the CAP support measures which 
are concentrated on income security. Support measures are expected to increase productivity 
and self-sufficiency and these increases may contribute to increasing market-oriented 
production. However, market-oriented applications are reduced through politicians’ vote-
oriented policies. Such policies are inconsistent with the Comparative Advantages theory 
which bases international trade on the lower relative cost advantages of producers.   
 The CAP price support system, because of its restrictive measures, has adverse effects 
on non-member countries’ trade..  Indeed, the “CAP has depressed world agricultural trade 
and has denied farmers in other countries fair access to one of the world’s most important 
markets.”1 There have been large amounts of products which were cheaper in the world 
markets, but CAP policies, which increased the protection of internal producers in the Union, 
reduced third world countries’ product access to the EU market. The CAP policies create 
pressure on the market prices, increase world supply and cut the world demand. An additional 
reason for trade distortion is the gaining of EU membership, as joining the CAP means 
accepting all the   regulations which increase trade capacity between members and decrease it 
with non-members.   
Turkey’s membership will obviously effect the creation of trade between the EU and 
Turkish producers. However, the rate of this trade creation must be questioned. Firstly, both 
the EU and Turkey are members of the WTO which means that both countries apply the same 
WTO measures in order to increase trade liberalisation; during the last decade,the amber box 
measure especially was preferred to the green box measure, and tariffs and quotas were also  
reduced.  
This means that EU membership probably will not add much to Turkish exports. In 
addition, in the CAP, the PSS stimulates internal producers to increase similar products trade.  
But in the last decade firms in developed countries moved to IIT and firms in less developed 
countries turned to the Ricardo model of trade. Therefore, this increasingly similar product 
trade between member countries negatively affects trade relations of producers in and outside 
the Union.   
For the producers in less developed countries, as well as in Turkey, subsistence 
farming is an important characteristic of agriculture. This type of farm is not sufficiently 
productive where hidden unemployment and lower competitiveness are mostly observed. 
Lack of information, a shortage of communication technologies and insufficient infrastructure 
has reduced planned goals, especially in those regions which are geographically and 
climatically unsuited to supporting agriculture. Subsistence farming reduces the planned goals 
because farmers are mostly oriented to produce for their regional markets and their production 
                                                 
1Valerio Lintner and Sonia Mazey: The European Community, Mc Grawy-Hill Book Company Ltd, England 
1991,p.99 
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is limited within this regional scope. Therefore, production by such farmers is mostly 
dependent on their previous market sales. It is important to reduce the scepticism of farmers 
of innovation and the rapidly developing know-how. Changes In regional state planning and 
policies are required in order to improve this condition in rural areas.                    
Another disadvantage for producers in non-member countries is the single currency, 
which facilitated and reduced the transaction costs between member countries, but which is 
maintained for non-member countries. External producers often incur the cost of exchanging 
their currency when exporting to the EU market.  
 Finally, in the CAP system the more you produce the more subsidies you effectively 
get. This system greatly increases the income of large-scale producers while the income of 
small-scale producers is only maintained at its current level.  
 
       
5.3  The CAP’s Best Possible Support Measure 
 
In the CAP to date applied polices have mostly had a positive effect on the producers’ 
gain whilst consumer welfare has been neglected. However, in the last decade CAP support 
measures were mostly blamed by the WTO and third world countries’ producers for trade 
distortion and some important reforms have been put into effect in order to reduce trade 
distortion effects in the world markets. The CAP reforms mostly replaced the existing support 
measures by new measures but did not remove them from the CAP agenda. Therefore, it is 
difficult to determine the best possible support measure, which may contribute to reducing 
transfers to producers. Some of these measures contributed to reducing the direct intervention 
effects. Reforms in the CAP were designed to reduce the trade distorting support measures by 
other measures, which are accepted in the WTO terminology as ‘green box measures’ for 
increasing fair trade.  
The PSE estimation for cereal products has helped to identify support measures in the 
CAP, which were less trade distorting, both, inside and outside EU markets. The direct 
payments, which were first introduced by the MacSharry reform, can be seen as the best 
possible support measure in the CAP system. It is obvious that application of the limited area 
payments reduced the negative effects of the transfers from consumers to producers. Decline 
in arable area use also had a considerable impact on reducing excessive cereal production. By 
2005, application of decoupled direct payments to producers, which break the link between 
production and payments, is expected to reduce, both, overproduction and excessive payments 
to producers, thus leading to a reduction in the welfare loss of consumers, too.    
The impact of the CAP support measures on trade distortion is higher relative to 
Turkey’s support measures. But Turkey’s support measures, which used to be concentrated an 
input subsidies, also increased the transfers to Turkish producers. The ARIP program in 
Turkey, which replaced the input subsidies with DIS payments in 1999, and the CAP’s 
decoupled single area payments, which were started in 2005, are expected to lead for a 
reduction of the amount of transfers to producers by 2013, at which time the CAP support 
measures are expected to be concentrated only on decoupled single area payments. It is also 
important to remember that Turkey’s possible membership will not be realized before 2015. 
Therefore, if Turkey’s EU membership application is successful, the above-mentioned single 
area payments will be applied both for the EU and Turkish producers. This means that 
application of single area payments, on the one hand, will reduce the trade distortion in world 
markets, and on the other hand, these payments will also decrease the amount of transfers 
from consumers and tax payers to producers. 
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5.4 Future Perspective of the CAP Reform Proposal 
 
 In the CAP, on the one hand, a significant reduction in support measures has been 
realised, but on the other hand, new support measures have been put into effect in the last 
decade. By that transfers are not reduced nor are the welfare of consumers increased. 
However, the acknowledgment of green box measures by the WTO as less trade-distorting, 
compelled countries to reduce or replace amber box measures by blue or green box measures. 
Direct payments, which are considered as blue box measures, still are trade-distorting. These 
measures should be reduced under AMS.  
 The Strategy of change in agricultural product trade must not be concentrated only on 
the support measures, because these measures not only restrict the relative lower cost 
advantage of producers, but also reduce the welfare of the nations. A new policy should 
support the developing countries’ food security policy and rural development programmes, 
which will lead them to pursue appropriate agricultural policies and developments.  
 Support measures for EU internal producers affect agriculture in developing 
countries’, their trade capacity, food security and economic development. Therefore, the 
impact of CAP policies should be considered, both, in and outside the European Union to 
reduce trade distortions and secure maintenance of livelihood for producers both in and 
outside the European Union. Some CAP policies, which of necessity require reform, are given 
below.  These are: 
• If the tariff rate of input is lower than the tariff rate on final product this will cause an 
increase in the profit rate of the producer, or in other words, reduce tariff expenditure. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) in estimating the 
Common Custom Tariff (CCT) which is only dependent on the price gap between internal and 
external producers. In addition, a decline in the price gap has no effect on reducing the CCT 
which was intended to be adjusted according to the price gap between internal and external 
product prices.  
• New regulations on tariff commitments, such as reducing some tariffs for rarely 
produced commodities and raising some others that had over-production, are required. This 
will contribute to controlling the surplus amounts and price fluctuation in the market.   
• The common custom tariff (CCT) can be replaced by variable import levies, which 
may better regulate the effects of price changes on applied tariffs in the Union. In the last 
decade, internal product prices fell below world prices in cereal products, but custom tariffs 
stayed high because these are fixed and can only be changed by a decision of the 
Commission. In contrast, a variable levy could be adjusted according to the difference 
between internal and world product prices without requiring any change in the regulation.    
• Decoupled direct payments should be related to use of arable land, but must not be 
totally decoupled from production. For example, 75% of the arable land could be decoupled, 
but the other 25% could be used to limit the production of a certain type of production. Above 
a certain production amount, producers could receive a reduced rate of payments. Breaking 
the link between production and payments will influence producers to become more market-
oriented and producers will shift production in accordance with consumers’ demand.  
• Set-aside measures should be maintained to reduce over-production in cereals. 
However, in the past the application of the voluntary (1988) and compulsory (1992) set-aside 
measures doubled payments to producers. Replacement of compulsory set-aside by voluntary 
set-aside could reduce the amount of these payments to producers. For small- and medium-
scale producers with farms up to 10 ha no set-aside application is required.  
• The removal of export subsidies will reduce trade distortions on the world markets. In 
recent years, EU cereal prices fell below world prices what meant that the price gap between 
internal and external producers applied to export subsides was no longer an argument to 
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provide subsidies. Maintenance of export subsides will only increase the trade distortions on 
world markets. Export subsidies should be removed from the CAP agenda. If the existing high 
price level for some cereal products is maintained, then it is obvious that after EU accession 
producers in Turkey will require to be subsidised from the CAP budget to maintain their 
exports. The total cost of decoupled payments for the cereal products is forecast as 6.18 bn 
Euro in nominal terms by 2015.    
• Ethnical products effects: In the EU consumers are used to buy the products they are 
accustomed to. This implies that ethnical foods create a permanent market for producers 
without considering the substitution effect. Apart from this, hygienic production, quality and 
labelling affect consumer demand and production. Therefore, producers in small- or medium-
scale firms must concentrate on ethnical production which increases their competition in the 
EU markets.     
• Removal of de minimis allowance is required for countries where AMS level is high. 
According to the de minis allowance agricultural support level (payments) must not exceed 
more than 5 percent of the total production value for producers in developed countries and 10 
% of the production value for producers in developing countries.    
• Provisions or reduction commitments are required for some developing countries to 
cut transportation and marketing costs from taxation of imported products. In particular, 
transport facilities for developing countries, because transport difficulties such as delays in 
port, product damage of perishable agricultural products etc., increase the loss to third world 
countries’ producers who are dependent for their economies on agricultural product trade. 
 In the EU, southern countries and the CEECs are poor relative to northern countries. A 
comparison of the previous financial support to the southern countries of the EU with 
transfers to the CEECs shows that finance of the southern enlargement was rather high 
relative to the CEECs enlargement (see also Table 4.17). Many development programmes and 
much financial assistance were required in both enlargements to increase regional 
development and economic prosperity. Insufficient use of technology and planting methods 
required high levels of support for development of rural communities in different regions. 
Over time, both the increasing negative reactions of net contributors, such as the UK, 
Germany and France, to financing net receiver countries from the Community budget, and the 
previous policy, which was aimed at the full economic and monetary integration of member 
countries into the EU, were affected, and changed these conditions for becoming an EU 
member. Therefore, it is expected that new members of the EU will not receive any more high 
level support to reduce economic differences between them. In addition, it is expected that 
from the first pillar of the community budget there will be only single area payments for 
producers. This implies that countries will finance their agriculture more from their own 
resources than from the CAP budget. And from the second pillar of the community budget 
only suitable rural development projects will be financed for economic development in 
agriculture as a whole.       
  In the coming decade the CAP reform is expected to concentrate on productivity 
increase, self-sufficiency and more market-oriented production. However, support measures 
will continue to support innovative and highly technological production methods to increase 
high quality environmentally-friendly organic farm products with a lower cost advantage. In 
the CAP producers are protected with tariff and non-tariff measures. But, unilateral 
restrictions (such as CCT, price intervention measure etc.) are very dangerous, because they 
may incite rivals ( non EU producers) to react in a similar manner; some measures in the last 
decade, for example, higher CCT, compelled non-member producers to increase their product 
prices to capture part of the revenues collected via CCT. By doing this consumers both in and 
outside the Union suffered a loss. Higher protection may also compel countries to abandon 
trading with such highly-protected countries and try to increase their trade relations by 
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directing their trade to those countries where restrictions are low in relation to those of the 
highly-protected nations.  This would reduce the substitution effect of products which are 
chosen by consumers for their lower prices, or high qualities, or better tests than internal 
products. Thus, a decline in substituted products in the internal market will obviously 
negatively affect consumer welfare.  
Agricultural support measures imply high prices not only for producers but also for 
consumers as well.   
  
  
 Glossary 
 
Ad valorem tax: A tariff on imports estimated as a percentage of the value of the 
products, such as, 10 % of tax on a product means 10 % value of the product. 
Agenda 2000: The EU Commission draft prepared in 1997. It covers the period 2000-
2006. Agenda reform comprises mainly of environmentally-friendly production, improvement 
of the competitive power of the CAP and maintenance of production and set- aside measures, 
which require alternative job opportunities for those producers who have become redundant. 
Agricultural levies: Agricultural levies are applied for certain agricultural products to 
support internal producers’ income and to secure the price stability in the market. 
Agricultural prices: In the CAP, there are different price supports, which are applied 
by the CAP. Internal prices are the market prices (guide price) and intervention price outside 
the Union. There is a threshold price for imported products, an indicator price for fruit and 
vegetables, and a sluice gate price for pig meat. 
Agricultural spending:  Agricultural expenditure comprises of almost 50 percent of the 
CAP budget. 
Agricultural storage: This is applied for surplus products which are bought by the 
community agencies and are stored to prevent an excessive price fall in the market. It is a 
support measure for the intervention price mechanism.        
Agrimonetary System: In 1995 the agrimonetary regime was introduced to prevent 
dramatic price changes. According to this system “minimum import prices, intervention 
prices, import levies and export subsidies are all fixed in terms of ECU’s and converted into 
each of the member states national currencies using the so called ‘green rates’ of exchange.” 
Agricultural Reform Implementation Programme (ARIP): The programme was 
introduced to reduce the trade-distorting support measures in agriculture and to increase rural 
development in Turkey.  
Balance of trade: Balance of trade is a record of the economic transactions between 
one country and the rest of the world. The balance of payments deficit means excessive 
purchases of foreign goods and services, or excessive investment overseas. A balance of 
payment surplus can occur when export of goods and services exceed imports or excessive 
foreign investments. 
CAP: The common agricultural policy was founded in 1962. The CAP is based on the 
internal market, which provides higher prices to producers compared to the world market. 
Common market: it was established according to the treaty of Rome in 1958; it was 
called the EEC / EC until 1993 and then the European Union with the Maastricht agreement 
in 1993. 
Common market organisation: It is designed to monitor EU agriculture. 
Community preference: This is one of the important principles of the CAP. The 
products of community origin are bought in preference by using common custom tariffs and 
export refunds. 
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Common custom tariff: After the formation of the Customs Union (1968) in the EU, 
within the EU zone, the common custom tariff (CCT) began to apply for the rest of the world. 
Qualified majority in the Council decides the CCT rates. 
Compulsory set- aside: It was introduced by the MacSharry reform (1992) to reduce 
surplus amounts by reducing use of arable land.   
Customs Union: An agreement between two or more countries to remove internal 
tariffs and restrictions on trade such as quotas VER (voluntary export restraint), etc 
Decoupling: It was planned by the Commission to break the link between production 
and payments. It was put into effect in 2005. 
Deficiency payments: Deficiency payments were first used in the UK. It is a subsidy 
per unit of production. These payments were used to cover income losses of producers where 
there was no internal protection. In the CAP system, frontier protection is the most visible 
element in the price and market system. These payments support producers without damaging 
consumers and keep prices close to world market prices. 
Direct Coupled Payments: It was planned by the Mac Sharry reform to replace the 
PSS with direct payments to reduce the trade distortion effect of the CAP. Direct payments 
are based on the limited or unlimited output / area/ animal. 
Direct income support: It was planned in Turkey’s ARIP programme in 1999 for 
replacing market support with direct income support.             
Doha Development Agenda: It was started in November 2001 and is scheduled to end 
by January 2005. At the new Round of CAP meetings, the EU put forward concrete measures 
which will contribute to liberalising world trade. It is planned to offer a greater market access 
for all, lowering the trade-distorting farm subsidies, a sharp reduction for all forms of export 
subsidies, and also food safety and environmentally friendly production for third world 
countries’ producers. 
Domestic support commitments: Domestic support commitments are defined in 
domestic support reduction commitments for agricultural producers. 
Effective rate of protection: ERP is the percentage increase in value added per unit in 
an economic activity which is made possible by the tariff structure relative to the situation in 
the absence of tariffs, but with the same exchange rate. 
External protection: These are namely the export subsidies, which are given to export 
the over production and increase the export of the internal producers, which increases the 
expenditure of the CAP budget. 
  Export restitution: it is paid by the community agencies to agricultural exporters.  
 European Monetary System: European Monetary System was introduced in March 1979 
with eight of the nine members of the EU participating in its exchange rate mechanism (ERM), 
which was introduced in 1972. At that time differences in inflation rates across members of the 
ERM were as large as 10 percentage points. This caused a difficulty in maintaining  stability in 
the ERM. Fixed exchange rates differences in inflation translate directly into changes in relative 
price, which shifts competitiveness across countries. Inflation rate differentials narrowed across 
Europe by the Mid 1980s.  
 Fair trade: The fair trade implies price support for sustainability and equity of traders 
to decrease the trade distortion effects of protectionist measures (such as tariffs, subsidies or 
quotas) on the nation’s welfare.   
 Fischer Franz: Austrian Commissioner of Agriculture (DG -VI), Rural Development 
and Fisheries.  
 Flat rate area payment: It is based on the direct payments the farmer received in 2001 
or the average of three preceding years. Currently direct aid schemes make no distinction 
between farmers receiving small amounts and those receiving larger amounts, with the 
eligibility conditions and administrative and control provisions being the same. 
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 Institutional policies: It is the price, which is used in the agricultural support system. It 
is set according to the proposal of the Commission and consultation of the EU parliament.      
Internal protection: Internal protection is given to protect producers from exporters 
outside of the Union. This can be dependent on the ‘community preference’ principal, which 
implies products of community origin are bought in preference. 
 Legal (explicit) protection: The annual fixing of the intervention price determines the 
overall level of support for producers. The fixing of intervention prices (and, following them, 
threshold prices) influences the prices of products in the market and secures the prices and 
incomes of producers. 
Market unity: Market unity means that all agricultural products within the Union will 
be protected against lower prices of imported products. 
Market price support: Market price support means price intervention mechanism. This 
is used to prevent market price stability and to secure producers’ reasonable prices. 
Maastricht Treaty: The Maastricht treaty was signed in 1992; known as the treaty of 
the European Union. The treaty of Maastricht was put into effect in 1993, when the name of 
the EEC was changed to the EU. It introduced the economic and monetary Union, established 
the Ombudsman (a civil servant who considers complaints from ordinary citizens against the 
public authorities), introduced more qualified majority voting and increased the influence of 
the EU parliament.      
MacSharry Reform: The Ray MacSharry reform was introduced in 1992 into the CAP. 
It was planned to reduce the support price for cattle and cereals 15 %, and for beef 29 %. He 
introduced the compulsory set- aside into the CAP. The PSS would be replaced with direct 
payments to support loss of producers from the result of the set-aside application. 
Market price support: MPS is the most important component of the PSE. It is an 
amount of price support which is given by a community agency (government) to support 
producers.       
Merger Treaty: The three communities (European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
Euratom, EEC) were knitted together through the Merger Treaty in 1965. 
Method of Producer Subsidy Equivalent: PSE is a precise way of measuring the 
transfers from government / community agencies to producers. According to OECD data and 
current OECD methodology, measurement of the support and use in agricultural policies is 
classified in three categories; transfers to producers individually, producer support estimate 
(PSE), transfers to consumers individually, consumer support estimate (CSE), and transfers to 
general services to agriculture collectively (GSSE). 
Nominal rate of protection: The NRP protection afforded an industry directly by the 
tariff and/ or NTB on its output, ignoring effects of other trade barriers on the industry's 
inputs. 
 Non- tariff Measures: The non-tariff measures are divided into two parts according to 
their direct and indirect affects. Quantitative measures, such as, import quotas and VER 
restrict import directly. However, levies, minimum price requirements and technical standards 
have an indirect effect on import.  
Organic Farming: The EU rules, which, in the last decade, have been increasingly 
applied to reduce the chemical substance use in agriculture. It allows a certain non- organic 
content in ecological products. 
Quotas: It is in the form of export quotas, import quotas and production quotas, which 
limit the product amount. 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures: Technical measures for protecting human health 
or control of animal and plant pests and diseases. 
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Set- aside: It was first introduced in the 1988 reforms in the form of voluntary set-
aside, but later in 1992 it was developed and divided into voluntary and compulsory set-aside 
to reduce the surplus amount in the CAP 
Single area payments decoupled: Single area payments mean breaking the link 
between subsidies and production. This has also meant that there will be no dependency on 
production volume to avoid abandonment of production. 
Single European Act: The SEA was signed in 1987. All technical, fiscal and physical 
barriers were removed and all member countries confirmed the objective of the progressive 
realization of an economic and monetary union. 
SLIM Project: Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market.   SLIM simplified the rules 
and reduced the difficulties of the single market. It simplified agricultural measures to ensure 
facilities for the domestic producer within the market.  
EAGGF: European agricultural guarantee and guidance fund (EAGGF) consists of 
two sub sections: the guarantee section, which finances the support measures of the CAP, and 
the guidance section, which finances the policies of the CAP. Approximately 90 % of the 
CAP budget goes to finance CAP support measures, while the other 10 % is used for the 
implementation of the CAP policies 
Price support system: In the CAP, there are different support measures, which were 
planned to support producers. These are intervention price mechanism, export subsidies and 
common custom tariff.    
Price intervention mechanism: Price intervention is used to prevent an excessive price 
fall. The state agency intervened in the market to purchase a part of the supply, affectively 
increasing the product price. It is the price gap between internal and external product prices 
for cereals.  
Producer Subsidy equivalent: PSE is an indicator of the annual monetary value of 
gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers. It is measured at the 
farm-gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their 
nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or income. 
Single Currency: It was the planned goal of the Maastricht agreement which was 
signed in 1992. In 2002 the Euro was put into circulation. 
Specific tariff: Specific tariff is a fixed charge per unit of import 
Surplus: The products which are excessively produced in the CAP and cause beef and 
butter mountains.   
Subventions: According to the 92nd article of the Rome treaty, a proposal of the 
Commission to the Council gives subvention for financial promotion to less developed 
regions to create a unified market.  
Structural funds: It was designed to achieve social and economic cohesion in the EU 
Tacis: EU program which was planned to aid Eastern Europe and central Asia and 
Mongolia. 
Trade creation: Trade creation occurs when internal tariffs are removed between 
member countries. This contributes to increased trade between member countries. 
Trade distortion: Some efficient production of exportable commodities in third world 
countries is replaced by the insufficient production in the EU, which is prevented by tariff 
barriers in the countries outside the Union. 
Treaty of Rome: It was signed in 1957 to set up the EEC and Euro Atomic 
Community in 1958. By 1987 the treaty of Rome contained 248 articles divided into six parts, 
principles, foundations, policies, association, institutions and final provisions. In the Rome 
treaty, articles 38 – 47 comprise the CAP of the EU. Article 85, comprises rules on 
competition, taxation and approximation of laws. 
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Tariff escalation: Tariff escalation is the process by which higher tariff rates are 
applied as a protection from imported products. However, from manufactured products to raw 
material, tariff rates are increasingly reduced, which compels importers to prefer raw material 
imports. By doing so, the growth of manufacturing industries in the exporting countries is 
hindered by the results of this tariff escalation.  
Turkish Grain Board (TMO): It is the State purchasing office for crops products. TGO 
every year announce the producer prices in October for cereals.      
Uruguay Round: The 1994 Uruguay Round reform of the EU. CAP. Agricultural 
subvention was planned to reduce, and export and import would gain more support.    
Variable levies: The price difference between internal and world products is applied as 
a tariff on imported products. 
Value added Tax: Value added tax is applied as a VAT rate, between 15 % to 25% on 
prices of all products and services. 
Voluntary export restraint: VER’s are arrangements by which the government of an 
importing country forces foreign exporters to agree voluntarily among themselves on how to 
restrict their exports into that country. 
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